Holding

Sections 347D of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and 256 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 are unconstitutional as they permit an executive authority to review decisions of a quasi‑judicial tribunal, violating Article 14 and the basic structure of the Constitution.

Summary

Amrik Singh Lyallpuri, a journalist, challenged the statutory provision that appeals from decisions of the Appellate Tribunal under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 must be heard by the Administrator (the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi). The issue was whether such an appeal could be decided by an executive authority and whether Sections 347D of the DMC Act and 256 of the NDMC Act were constitutionally valid. The Court observed that the tribunals are quasi‑judicial bodies endowed with the powers of a civil court, and allowing an executive authority to review their decisions violated the rule of law, judicial review, and the equality principle under Article 14. Relying on precedents such as P. Sambamurthy and L. Chandra Kumar, the Court declared the provisions unconstitutional. Consequently, pending appeals are to be transferred to the District Judge, Delhi, and the High Court’s judgment was set aside. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether an appeal from an order of the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 can be heard and decided by the Administrator (Lieutenant Governor).
Whether Section 347D of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Section 256 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 are constitutionally valid.
Whether an executive authority may review decisions of a quasi‑judicial tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.

Legislation cited

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957s. 347A, s. 347C, s. 347D, s. 347E
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991s. 41
New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994s. 253, s. 255, s. 256, s. 257

Subjects

Administrative lawJudicial reviewQuasi‑judicial tribunalArticle 14Separation of powersDelhi Municipal Corporation ActNew Delhi Municipal Council ActAppealConstitutionalityProspective overruling

Judgment

[2011) 5 S.C.R. 560

A AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5075 of 2005)
APRIL 21, 2011
B
[G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957: s.347D - Appeal
against order of Appellate Tribunal - Under s. 347D of the
C DMC Act and s.256 of NDMC Act appeal against orders of
Appellate Tribunal shall lie to the Administrator - Under both
the Acts, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred -
Constitutionality of s.347D of the DMC Act and s.256 of
NDMC Act, challenged - Held: s.347D of the DMC Act and
D s.256 of NDMC Act are not constitutionally valid - Both the
said provisions are, therefore, declared unconstitutional being
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - In view of this, till a
proper judicial authority is set up under the said Acts, the
appeals to the Administrator uls.347D of the DMC Act and
E s.256 of NDMC Act shall lie to the District Judge -Alf pending
appeals filed under the erstwhile provisions, as said, shall
stand transferred to the Court of District Judge, Delhi -
However, the decisions which have already been arrived at
by the Administrator under the said two provisions would not
F be reopened in view of the principles of prospective overruling
- New Delhi Municipal Corporation Council Act, 1994 - s. 256.

The questions which arose for consideration in the
instant appeal were whether an appeal from an order of
the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Delhi
G Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and New Delhi Municipal
Corporation Council Act, 1994 can be heard and decided
by the Administrator and whether Section 347D of DMC
Act and Section 256 of NDMC Act are constitutionally
valid.
H 560
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPUR! v. UNION OF INDIA AND 561
ORS.
Allowing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1. A perusal of the provisions of Section 347A
and 347C, sub-clause (7) of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957, (DMC Act) shows that the
Appellate Tribunal shall be manned by a person who is
or has been a District Judge or an Additional District B
Judge or has, for at least ten years, held a judicial office
in India [Section 347A, sub-clause (3)]. Insofar as Section
347C is concerned, it is very clear that such Tribunal shall
have in certain matters, the trappings of a Civil Court
trying a suit under the Civil Procedure Code. Clause (f) C
of sub-section (7) of Section 347 further provides that
proceedings before such Tribunal shall be judicial
proceedings within the meaning of Section 193 and
Section 228 for the purpose of Section 196 of the Indian
Penal Code and every Appellate Tribunal shall be deerned o
to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The .
provisions of Section 253 of the NDMC Act are virtually
on the same lines. Under sub-section (3) of Section 253
of the NDMC Act, a person shall not be qualified for E
appointment as a presiding officer of an Appellate
Tribunal unless he is, or has been, a District Judge or an
Additional District Judge or has, for at least ten years,
held a judicial office. Similarly 1 Section 255 of the NDMC
Act virtually is pari materia with sub-section (7) of Section F
347C of the DMC Act. Therefore, on a reading of the said
two provisions, it is clear that the Appellate Tribunals
created under the said statutes are quasi judicial bodies
with the trappings of the Civil Court and that they are
manned by judicial officers of considerable experience.
In discharging their 1\mctions, such bodies are acting as G
a Civil Court in respect of some of its functions, and the
proceedings before such bodies are judicial proceedings.
An appeal is provided·against the order of such Appellate
Tribunals under both the statutes. [Paras 5, 6, 7] [567·B·
H; 568-A] ., •. :..... · ........ 111 ;,,, ., H ri.
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 5 S.C.R.

A 2.1. Under Section 3470 of the DMC Act, such appeal
shall lie to the Administrator. Similarly, under Section 256
of the NDMC Act, appeal also lies to the Administrator.
Both the sections, namely, Section 3470 of the said Act
and Section 256 of the NDMC Act are couched in similar
8 terms. Under both the Acts, the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court has been barred; vide Section 347E of the said Act
and Section 257 of the NDMC Act. On a comparison of
the definitions of term 'administrator' in DMC Act and
NDMC Act, it is clear that there is not much difference in
c the two definitions and by Administrator is meant
"Lieutenant Governor of the National Capital Territory of
Delhi". [Paras 8, 9, 12] [568-A-B; F-G; 569-D-E]

lndo-China Steam Navigation Company Limited v. Jasjit
Singh,Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta, and Others
D AIR 1964 SC 1140; Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam
Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others AIR 1961 SC 1669 - held
inapplicable.

2.2. Even though the Administrator under the said
E two Acts may be the Lieutenant Governor of the National
Capital Territory of Delhi which may be a high
constitutional authority, it cannot be disputed that the
said authority is an executive authority. [Para 21] [573-C-
D]
F 2.3. It is not suggested for a moment that the
Administrator, who is the Lieutenant Governor in Delhi is
not acting independently. The question is: having regard
to the concept of rule of law and judicial review, whether
a review by an executive authority of a decision taken by
G the judicial or quasi-judicial authority which has the
trappings of the Court is permissible. In view of the
consistent opinion expressed by this Court in P.
Sambhamurty and L. Chandra Kumar, Section 3470 of
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Section 256 of
H the NDMC Act are not constitutionally valid. Both the said
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND 563
ORS.
provisions are, therefore, declared unconstitutional being A
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of this
decision, till a proper judicial authority is set up under the .
said Acts, the appeals to the Administrator under Section
347D of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and
also under Section 256 of the NDMC Act shall lie to the B
District Judge, Delhi. All pending appeals.filed under the
erstwhile provisions, as said, shall stand transferred to
th~ Court of District Judge, Delhi. However, the decisions
which have already been arrived at by the Administrator
under the said two provisions will not .be reopened in· view c
of the principles of prospective overruling. [Paras 24, 25]
[574-F-H; 575-A-B; G-H; 576-A-B]

P. Sambamurthy and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh
and another (1987) 1 sec 362; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union
of India and others AIR 1997 SC 1125; Union of India v. R. D
Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC
1 - relied on.

Case Law Reference:
E
AIR 1964 SC 1140 held inapplicable Para 17
AIR 1961 SC 1669 held inapplicable Para 19
(1987) 1 sec 362 relied on Para 14, 24
AIR 1997 SC 1125 relied on Para 16, 24 F
(2010) 11 sec 1 relied on Para 24
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5075 of 2005.
G
From the Judgment & Order dated 07.01.2004 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.W. 42 (Civil) of 2004.

Harish N. Salve, Indra Sawhney (Amicus Curiae) for the
Appellant.
H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 5 S.C.R.

A Harish Chandra, Nagendra Rai, Rakesh Kumar Khanna,
Chetan Chawla, Rekha Pandey, Mukesh Verma, Praveen
Swarup, Sanjiv Sen, Surya Kant, Seema Rao, Purnima Jauhari
for the Respondents.

8 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GANGULY, J. 1. The principal question raised in this
appeal is the constitutional validity of Section 347D of Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the
said Act'). Similar provisions are also there in Section 256 of
C New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to
as, 'the NDMC Act').

2. The question was raised in a writ petition filed by the
appellant who is a journalist by profession and the editor of Urdu
D Weekly called 'Lalkar'. In the petition it has been urged that one
Shri B.S. Mathur, Additional District and Sessions Judge was
appointed the Presiding Officer of the MCD/NDMC Appellate
Tribunal in terms of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 347 of
the said Act. His appointment was made for deciding appeals
E preferred under Section 343 or Section 3478 of the said Act.
Shri B.S. Mathur was appointed in Appellate Tribunal to hear
and dispose of all appeals from the order passed by the Zonal
Engineer (Buildings) of the respective zones of Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and that of New Delhi Municipal Council.
However, the grievance of the appellant is that orders of the
F Appellate Tribunal are appealable before the Administrator of
Delhi i.e. Lt. Governor under Section 347D of the said Act. The
main grievance in the public interest litigation is when an appeal
is decided by an Appellate Authority which is manned by a
Judge of the Civil Court, appeal from the decision of such
G authority cannot be heard and by an executive authority,
however high such executive authority may be.

3. In order to appreciate this controversy it is necessary
to consider the relevant statutory provisions. The provision for
H
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND 565
ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
constitution of an Appellate Tribunal under Section 347A of the A
said Act are as follows:-

"347A. Appellate Tribunal.· (1) The Central Government
shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one
or more Appellate Tribunals with headquarters at Delhi, for
8
deciding appeals preferred under section 343 or section
3478.

(2) A:n Appellate Tribunal shall consist of one person to be
appointed by the Central Government on such terms and
conditions of service as may be prescribed by rules. c
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment a,s the
presiding officer of an Appellate Tribunal unless he is, or
has been, a district judge or an additional district judge or
has, for at least ten years, held a judicial office in India.
D
(4) The Central Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint
one or more persons having special knowledge of, or
experience in, the matters involved in such appeals, to act
as assessors to advise the Appellate Tribunal in the
proceedings before it, but no advice of the assessors shall E
be binding on the Appellate Tribunal.

(5) The Central Government shall, by notification in the
Official Gazette, define the territorial limits within which an
Appellate Tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction, and where F
different Appellate Tribunals have jurisdiction over the
same territorial limits, the Central Government shall also
provide for the distribution and allocation of work to be
performed by such Tribunals.

(6) For the purpose of enabling it to discharge its functions G
under this Act, every Appellate Tribunal shall have a
Registrar and such other staff on such terms and conditions
of service as may be prescribed by rules :

Provided that the Registrar and staff may be employed H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 5 S.C.R.

A jointly for all or any number of such Tribunals in accordance
with the rules."

4. For the purpose of deciding the controversy of this case,
the provisions of Sections 343 and 3478 are not relevant, but
Section 347C which provides for the procedure before such
8
Appellate Tribunal is relevant. Particularly, the provision of 347C
sub-section (7) which is relevant for the purpose of deciding
the controversy is set out below:-

"Section 347C - Procedure of the Appellate Tribunal
c
)()()()()()()()()(

(7) Every Appellate Tribunal, shall, in addition to the powers
conferred on it under this Act,· have the same powers as
D are vested in a Civil Court while trying a suit under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in respect of
the following matters, namely:--

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons
E and examining them on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavits;

F (d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from
any court or office;

(e) issuing commisisons for the examination of witnesses
or documents; and

G (f) any other matter which may be prescribed by rules, and
every proceeding of an Appellate Tribunal in hearing or
deciding an appeal or in connection with execution of its
order, shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within
the meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for the purpose
H
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND 567
ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and A
every Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (2 of 1974)."

5. From a perusal of the provisions of Section 347A and 8
347C, sub-clause (7), it is clear that the said tribunal shall be
manned by a person who is or has been a District Judge or
an Additional District Judge or has, for at least ten years, held
a judicial office in India [Section 347A, sub-clause (3)]. Insofar
as Section 347C is concerned, it is very clear that such tribunal C
shall have in certain matters, the trappings of a Civil Court trying
a suit under the Civil Procedure Code. Clause (f) of sub-section
(7) of Section 347 further provides that proceedings before such
tribunal shall be judicial proceedings within the meaning of
Section 193 and Section 228 for the purpose of Section 196
of the Indian Penal Code and every Appellate Tribunal shall be D
deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and
Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

6. The provisions of Section 253 of the NDMC Act are
virtually on the same lines. Under sub-section (3) of Section E
347 A and sub-section (3) of Section 253 of the NDMC Act, a
person shall not be qualified for appointment as a presiding
officer of an Appellate Tribunal unless he is, or has been, a
District Judge or an Additional District Judge or has, for at least
ten years, held a judicial office. Similarly, Section 355 of the F
NDMC Act virtually is pari materia with sub-section (7) of
Section 347C of the said Act. Therefore, on a reading of the
aforesaid two provisions it is clear that the Appellate Tribunals
0

created under th e aforesaid statutes are quasi judicial bodies
with the trappings of the Civil Court and that they are manned G
by judicial officers of considerable experience. In discharging
their functions, such bodies are acting as a Civil Court in
respect of some of its functions, and the proceedings before
such bodies are judicial proceedings.
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 5 S.C.R.

A 7. However, an appeal is provided against the order of
such Appellate Tribunals under both the statutes.

8. Under Section 3470 of the said Act, such appeal shall
lie to the Administrator. The relevant provision is set out below:-
B "Section 3470 - Appeal against orders of Appellate
Tribunal • (1) An appeal shall lie to the Administrator
against an order of the Appellate Tribunal, made in an
appeal under section 343 or section 3478, confirming,
modifying or annulling an order made or notice issued
c under this Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section
3478 and section 347C and the rules made thereunder,
shall, so far as may be, apply to the filing and disposal of
D an appeal under this section as they apply to the filing and
disposal of an appeal under those sections.

(3) An order of the Administrator on an appeal under this
section, and subject only to such order, an order of the
Appellate Tribunal under section 3478, and subject to such
E orders of the Administrator or an Appellate Tribunal, an
order or notice referred to in sub-section (1) of that section,
shall be final."

9. Similarly, under Section 256 of the NDMC Act, appeal
F also lies to the Administrator. Both the sections, namely,
Section 3470 of the said Act and Section 256 of the NDMC
Act are couched in similar terms. Under both the Acts, the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been barred; vide Section
347E of the said Act and Section 257 of the NDMC Act.
G
10. The main question which was raised in the writ petition
moved before the High Court was whether an appeal from an
order of the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the aforesaid
two Acts can be heard and decided by the Administrator. The

H
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND 569
ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
term "Administrator" has been defined under Section 2(1) of A
the said Act as follows:-

"Section 2 - Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,--

(1) "Administrator" means the Lieutenant Governor of the B
National Capital Territory of Delhi;"

11. Under Section 2(1) of the NDMC Act, the term
"Administrator" has been defined as follows:-
C
"Section 2 - Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,

(1 )"Administrator" means the Administrator of the National
Capital Territory of Delhi;"
D
12. On a comparison of the aforesaid definitions, it is clear
that there is not much difference in the aforesaid two definitions
and by Administrator is meant "Lieutenant Governor of the
National Capital Territory of Delhi".

13. Mr. Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, who on the E
request of the Court appeared as an Amicus Curie in this
matter, contended that the aforesaid provision of hearing of the
appeal by the Administrator from an order of the Appellate
Tribunal is violative of the concept of judicial review which is
enshrined in our Constitution. The learned counsel submitted F
that the order of the Appellate Tribunal is certainly a quasi
judicial one being passed by Judicial Authority which has the
trappings of the Court and the appeal from such an order
cannot lie to any authority except a judicial authority.
G
14. Under our constitutional scheme it was contended, an
executive authority cannot entertain an appeal from an order
passed by the judicial authority even though such judicial
authority is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. In support of this
contention, reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court H
I 570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 5 S.C.R.

A in the case of P. Sambamurthy and others v. State of Andhra
Pradesh and another, (1987) 1 sec 362, wherein a
Constitution Bench of this Court speaking through Chief Justice
Bhagwati examined the constitutional validity of Article 371 D
(5) of the Constitution, inserted by 32nd Constitution
B Amendment Act, 1973. In P. Sambamurthy (supra), this Court .
was called upon to decide an issue similar to the one at hand .
. Clause (3) of Article 371-D provided for the creation of an
administrative tribunal for the State of Andhra Pradesh so as
to exercise jurisdiction with respect to the matters mentioned
c in sub clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clause (5) however, subjected
the decision of the said administrative tribunal to the
confirmation of the State Government. The Court held it as
violative of the principle of 'rule of law', insofar it placed the
power of reviewing the decision of a quasi judicial tribunal in
D the hands of the executive which according to this Court,
contravened the principle of judicial review. This Court said:

"... The State Government is given the power to modify or
annul any order of the Administrative Tribunal before it
becomes effective either by confirmation by the State
E Government or on the expiration of the period of three
months from the date of the order .... It will thus be seen that
the period of three months from the date of the order is
provided in clause (5) in order to enable the State
Government to decide whether it would confirm the order
F or modify or annul it. Now almost invariably the State
Government would be a party in every service dispute
brought before the Administrative Tribunal and the effect
of the proviso to clause (5) is that the State Government
which is a party to the proceeding before the Administrative
G Tribunal and which contests the claim of the public servant
who comes before the Administrative Tribunal seeking
redress of his grievance against the State Government,
would have the ultimate authority to uphold or reject the
determination of the Administrative Tribunal .... Such a
H provision is, to say the least, shocking and is clearly
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPUR! v. UNION OF INDIA AND 571
ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
subversive of the principles of justice." (See page 368) A

15. This Court further explained that " ... Now if the exercise
of the power of judicial review can be set at naught by the State
Government by overriding the decision given against it, it would
sound the death knell of the rule of law. The rule of law would 8
cease to have any meaning, because then it would be open to
the State Government to defy the law and yet to get away with
it. The proviso to clause (5) of Article 371-D is therefore clearly
violative of the basic structure doctrine."

16. In a subsequent Constitution Bench decision of this C
Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR
1997 SC 1125, Chief Justice Ahmadi, after an analysis of
different decisions of this Court, affirmatively held that judicial
review is one of the basic features of our Constitution. Such a
:-~

finding of this Court, obviously means that there cannot be an D '.:...
administrative review of a decision taken by a judicial or a quasi ,- ..: ,·

judicial authority which has the trappings o(a court. Since
judicial review has been considered an intrinsic part of
constitutionalism, any statutory provision which provides for
a.dministrative review of a decision taken by a judicial or a quasi E
judicial body is, therefore, inconsistent with the aforesaid
postulate and is unconstitutional.

17. The learned senior counsel for the Union of India in this
case has sought to support the impugned judgment by referring F
to the decision of this Court in the case of Inda-China Steam
Navigation Company Limited v. Jasjit Singh, Additional
Collector of Customs, Calcutta, and Others (AIR 1964 SC
1140). The said decision deals with the provisions of the Sea
Customs Act, 1878, which is a pre-Constitutional law. Apart
from that, the scheme of the Sea Customs Act would show that G
when a dispute is raised by an aggrieved party either by way
of an appeal or revision, that dispute has to be decided in the
light of the facts adduced in the proceedings. And this Court
held that the decision of such an authority amounts to a decision
which is given in accordance with the principles of natural justice H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 5 S.C.R.

A and such proceedings are quasi judicial in nature. This Court
also accepted that even though the status of the customs officer
who adjudicates under Section 167 (12A) and Section 183 of
the Act is not that of the tribunal, that does not make a
difference when the matter reaches the stage of appeal and
B revision. On the basis of such reasoning, this Court held that
when such disputes are decided by appellate or revisional
authority, it becomes a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136
of the Constitution and such tribunals being invested with the
judicial power of the State are required to act judicially and that
c they are tribunals within the meaning of Article 136 of the
Constitution.

18. In the instant case, the issue is totally different. Here
the issue is. whether an order passed by a quasi judicial
authority, which has the trappings of a civil court, can be
D reviewed by an administrative authority. Therefore, the ratio in
lndo-China Steam Navigation Company (supra) does not
support the case of the Union of India.

19. Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel for the third
E respondent also wanted to support the impugned judgment by
relying on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the
case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., v. Shyam Sunder
Jhunjhunwala and others (AIR 1961 SC 1669). In that case the
issue raised was that of a company's power to refuse
F registration of transfer of share. On the refusal to register the
transfer of shares, the aggrieved party has two remedies for
seeking relief under the Companies Act. One was to apply to
the Court for rectification of register and the other was to appeal
to the Central Government under Section 111 of the Act against
G the resolution of the company refusing to register the share. In
such a situation, this Court held that when Government, in
exercise of its power of appeal under Section 111 Clause (3)
is acting it is invested with the judicial power of the State to
decide disputes according to law. In such a case, the Central
H
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND 573
ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.)
Government is acting as a Tribunal and it is amenable to the A
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136. (See paras 10 and
23 of the report).

20. As noted above, the issue in this case is not whether
the administrator under the aforesaid statutory provision is a 8
tribunal under Article 136 of the Act. The issue is, as discussed
above, whether the administrative authority can sit in appeal
over the decisions of a judicial or quasi judicial authority which
has the trappings of the Civil Court. Therefore, the decision in
Harinagar (supra) cannot sustain the impugned judgment.
c
21. Even though the Administrator under the aforesaid two
Acts may be the Lieutenant Governor of the National Capital
Territory of Delhi which may be a high constitutional authority,
it cannot be disputed that the said authority is an executive
authority. D

22. Learned senior counsel for Delhi Municipal Corporation
argued by referring to the provisions of Article 239AA of the
Constitution, where provisions in respect to .Delhi have been
made. For a proper appreciation of this question, Article E
239AA, sub-article (1) is set out below:-

"239AA. Special provisions With respect to Delhi.- (1)
As from the date of commencement of the Constitution
(Sixty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1991, the Union territory of
Delhi shall be called the National Capital Territory of Delhi F
(hereafter in this Part referred to as the National Capital
Territory) and the administrator thereof appointed under
Article 239 shall be designated as the Lieutenant
Governor."
G
23. In this connection, we can also refer to the provision
of Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi Act, 1991,
.namely, Section 41 and particularly Section 41(3). Section 41
runs as under:
H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 5 S.C.R.

A "41. Matters in which Lieutenant Governor to act in
his discretion.

(1) The Lieutenant Governor shall act in his discretion
in a matter-
B (i) which falls outside the purview of the powers
conferred on the Legislative Assembly but in
respect of which powers or functions are entrusted
or delegated to him by the President; or

c (ii) in which he is required by or under any law to act
in his discretion or to exercise any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.

(2) If any question arises as to whether any matter is or is
not a matter as respects which the Lieutenant Governor
D is by or under any law required to act in his discretion, the
decision of the Lieutenant Governor thereon shall be final.

(3) If any question arises as to whether any matter is or is
not a matter as respects which the Lieutenant Governor
E is required by any law to exercise any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, the decision of the Lieutenant Governor
thereon shall be final.

24. By referring to the aforesaid two provisions, the learned
counsel argued that the Administrator, who is none other than
F the Lieutenant Governor, has no connection with the State and
is totally independent. Therefore, when he hears the appeal, he
does it as an independent appellate authority. This Court is
unable to accept the aforesaid contention. It is not suggested
for a moment that the Administrator, who is the Lieutenant
G Governor in Delhi is not acting independently. The question is:
having regard to the concept of rule of law and judicial review,
whether a review by an executive authority of a decision taken
by the judicial or quasi-judicial authority which has the trappings
of the Court is permissible. In view of the consistent opinion
H
AMRIK SINGH LYALLPURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND 575
ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
expressed by this Court in P. Sambhamurty (supra) and L. A
Chandra Kumar (supra), discussed above, we are unable to
uphold the constitutional validity of Section 347D of Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and Section 256 of the NDMC
Act. Both the. aforesaid provisions are, therefore, declared
unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. B
In a recent Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Union
of India v. ~- Qa.ndhi, President, Madras Bar Association
[(2010) 11 SCC 1], Justice Raveendran, speaking for. the
unanimous Bench held:-

"102. The fundamental right to equality before law and C
equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the
Constitution, clearly includes a right to have the person's
. rights, adjudicated by a forum which exercises judicial
power in an impartial and independent manner, consistent
with the recognised principles of adjudication. Therefore D
wherever access to courts to enforce such rights is sought
to be abridged, altered, modified or substituted by
directing him to approach an alternative forum, such
legislative Act is open to challenge if it violates the right
to adjudication by an independent forum. Therefore, though E
the challenge by MBA is on the ground of violation of
principles fprming part of the basic structure, they are
relatable to one or more of the express provisions of the
Constitution which gave rise to such principles. Though the
validity of the provisions of a legislative Act cannot be F
challenged on the ground it violates the basic structure of
the Constitution, it can be challenged as violative of
constitutional provisions which enshrine the principles of
the rule of law, separation of powers and independence
of the judiciary." G

25. In view of this deci~ion by this Court, till a proper judicial
authority is set up under the aforesaid Acts, the appeals to the
Administrator under SectiOn 347D of the Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 and also under Section 256 of the
H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 5 S.C.R.

A NDMC Act shall lie to the District Judge, Delhi. All pending
appeals filed under the erstwhile provisions, as aforesaid, shall
stand transferred to the Court of District Judge, Delhi. However,
the decisions which have already been arrived at by the
Administrator under the aforesaid two provisions will not be
B reopened in view of the principles of prospective overruling.

26. The judgment of the High Court is, therefore, set aside
and the appeal is allowed. There will be, however, no orders
as to costs.

C D.G. Appeal allowed.