AMIT KUMAR DAS, JOINT SECRETARY, BAITANIK, A REGISTERED SOCIETYversusSHRIMATI HUTHEESINGH TAGORE CHARITABLE TRUST

                  [2024] 1 S.C.R. 1090 : 2024 INSC 73

            Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik,
                       A Registered Society
                                v.
           Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust
                    (Civil Appeal No. 1405-1406 of 2024)
                                30 January 2024
             [Aniruddha Bose And Sanjay Kumar*, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Scope and extent of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by a High
       Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with the
       provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

                                   Headnotes
       Contempt – Constitution of India – Article 215 – Contempt of
       Courts Act, 1971 – Exercise of contempt jurisdiction by High
       Court – Scope – Suit filed by Trust against Society, decreed
       by Trial Court directing delivery of possession of the suit
       premises to the Trust – Execution proceedings initiated by the
       Trust– In appeal by Society, order passed staying execution
       proceedings – Contempt proceedings initiatiated by the Trust
       alleging violation of the condition set out in the stay order
       stating that the Society had resorted to letting out the suit
       premises – High Court found the contemnor-appellant guilty
       of willfully violating the status quo condition in the stay order
       however, instead of initiating contempt proceedings, it vacated
       the stay order passed in the appeal in exercise of contempt
       jurisdiction – Propriety:
       Held: Directions which are explicit in the judgment or ‘are plainly
       self-evident’ can be taken into account for the purpose of considering
       whether there is any disobedience or willful violation – Court has
       a duty to issue appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying
       the things done in violation of the Court order and in that regard,
       the Court may even take restitutive measures at any stage of the
       proceedings – In addition to punishing a contemnor for disobeying
       its orders, the Court can also ensure that such a contemnor does
       not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedience by merely
       suffering the punishment meted out to him – In the present case,
       vacating of the stay order in the appeal by the High Court in

* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                               1091

  Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
          Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust

     exercise of contempt jurisdiction did not assume either a restitutive
     or a remedying character – Violation of the status quo condition in
     the stay order stood complete, even as per the High Court, and
     vacating of the stay order did not have the effect of restoring the
     parties to their original position or deny the contemnor the benefit
     of the disobedience which already stood concluded – Violation of
     a conditional stay order would entail vacating thereof in a properly
     constituted proceeding – High Court erred by resorting to such a
     step while exercising contempt jurisdiction – The concluded act in
     violation of the status quo order in relation to possession of the suit
     premises amounted to ‘civil contempt’ u/s.2(b) of the Contempt of
     Courts Act and warranted appropriate consequences – However,
     without taking recourse to such a step, the High Court thought it fit
     to vacate the stay order in the appeal so as to enable the Trust to
     execute the decree – This action of the High Court transgressed
     the scope and extent of its contempt jurisdiction and cannot be
     sustained – Impugned order set aside to that extent – However,
     as the High Court desisted from exercising contempt jurisdiction,
     despite finding the contemnor guilty of willfully violating the status
     quo condition in the stay order, matter remanded to the High Court
     for continuing with that exercise. [Paras 14-17]

                               Case Law Cited
           Sudhir Vasudeva vs. M.George Ravishekaran [2014] 4
           SCR 27 : (2014) 3 SCC 373; Baranagore Jute Factory
           PLC. Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) vs. Baranagore Jute
           Factory PLC [2017] 4 SCR 700 : (2017) 5 SCC 506;
           Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction
           Co. (P) Ltd. [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295 : (1996) 4 SCC
           622; Mohammad Idris vs. Rustam Jehangir Babuji [1985]
           1 SCR 598 : (1984) 4 SCC 216 – relied on.

                                 List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

                              List of Keywords
     Contempt; Contempt jurisdiction of High Court; Execution
     proceedings stayed; Contemnor guilty; Willful violation
     of status quo condition; Disobedience or willful violation;
     Restitutive measures; Remedying character; Stay order
     vacated; Benefit of the disobedience; Restoring parties to
     their original position; Civil contempt.
1092                                                     [2024] 1 S.C.R.

                 SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL



                          Case Arising From

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.1405-1406 of
     2024.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2014 of the High Court at
     Calcutta in CPAN No.2113 of 2013 and FA No.229 of 2010.
                        Appearances for Parties
     Jayanta Mitra, Sr. Adv., Ajay Gaggar, Amarjit Singh Bedi, Varun
     Chandiok, Ms. Riya Seth, Yashwant Gaggar, Uttiyo Mallick, Ms.
     Anubhi Goyal, Robin Sirohi, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Harin P Raval, Sr. Adv., Anando Mukherjee, Ms. Shrestha Narayan,
     Ms. Shreya Bansal, Shwetank Singh, Ms. Urmi H. Raval, Siddharth
     H. Raval, Advs. for the Respondent.

               Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment
     Sanjay Kumar, J
1.   Leave granted.
2.   Focus in this appeal is on the scope and extent of the contempt
     jurisdiction exercised by a High Court under Article 215 of the
     Constitution of India read with the provisions of the Contempt of
     Courts Act, 1971.
3.   By judgment dated 12.11.2014 passed in C.P.A.N. 2113 of 2013
     in F.A. No. 229 of 2010, a Division Bench of the High Court at
     Calcutta held that the act of the contemnor therein was in willful
     disobedience to the stay order passed in the first appeal and was
     not only contemptuous but also illegal and invalid. However, instead
     of initiating proceedings for contempt, the Division Bench opined
     that justice would be subserved by vacating the stay order passed
     in the first appeal. Aggrieved by this turn of events, the contemnor
     is before this Court.
4.   By order dated 27.01.2015, this Court stayed the operation of the
     impugned judgment passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
5.   Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust, Kolkata (for brevity,
     ‘the Trust’), was the plaintiff in T. Suit No. 164 of 2004, filed for
     declaration of title, recovery of possession and for damages, before
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1093

     Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
             Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust

       the learned 3rd Civil Judge (Senior Division), Alipore. This suit was
       instituted by it against Baitanik, a registered society (for brevity, ‘the
       Society’), which was in occupation of the premises, detailed in suit
       schedules A and B, situated at 4B, Elgin Road (now, Lala Lajpat Rai
       Sarani), Bhawanipore, Kolkata. The Trial Court decreed the suit by
       its judgment dated 25.02.2009 and directed delivery of possession of
       the suit premises to the Trust within 30 days. Execution proceedings
       were initiated by the Trust on 30.07.2009.
6.     While so, the Society preferred an appeal in F.A.T. No. 321 of
       2009 against the judgment dated 25.02.2009, which was thereafter
       renumbered as F.A. No. 229 of 2009, before the High Court at
       Calcutta. Therein, an interim order was passed on 03.03.2010 in
       CAN 7021 of 2009 (application for stay) in the following terms: -
            “……. We, therefore, dispose of the application for stay
            with the following directions: -
            1)    There shall be an unconditional order of stay of all
                  further proceedings in title execution case pending in
                  the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division),
                  Third Court at Alipore, for a period of eight weeks.
            2)    The appellant is directed to deposit Rs. 10,00,000/-
                  (Rupees Ten Lac only) with the learned Registrar
                  General of this Court by eight weeks without prejudice
                  to the rights and contentions of the parties and subject
                  to the result of the appeal.
            3)    The appellant must go on depositing current
                  occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 35,000/-
                  (Rupees thirty five thousand) only per month for the
                  suit premises during the pendency of the appeal with
                  the learned Registrar General of this Court. First of
                  such deposit for the month of March, 2010 is to be
                  made by April 16, 2010. All subsequent deposits are
                  to be made by fifteenth of each succeeding month
                  for which the same is due and payable.
            4)    All these deposits are to be made by the defendant
                  no. 1-appellant without prejudice to the rights and
                  contentions of the parties and subject to the result
                  of the appeal.
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               SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL


        5)   If the defendant no.1-appellant deposits Rs.10,00,000/-
             (Rupees ten lac), only and goes on paying the monthly
             occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 35,000/-
             (Rupees thirty five thousand) only, the interim order
             of stay shall continue till the disposal of the appeal.
        6)   The learned Registrar General is requested to invest
             the amounts that may be deposited by the appellant in;
             short term renewable interest bearing fixed deposits
             scheme with any nationalized bank of his choice. He
             is, further, requested to see that such fixed deposits
             are renewed from time to time during the pendency
             of this appeal subject, however, to any order that
             may be passed in this appeal.
        7)   In default of the deposits, as aforesaid, the interim
             order of stay shall stand vacated and the decree
             shall be executed at once.
        However, we clarify that pendency of this appeal shall not
        prevent the plaintiffs-respondents-decree holders from
        initiating proceedings for recovery of mesne profit under
        Order XX, rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
        learned trial judge shall be at liberty to proceed with such
        proceedings in accordance with law.
        However, the learned trial judge shall not pass any final
        order without the leave of this Court.
        The defendant no. 1 appellant is, also, directed to maintain
        status quo, as regards possession, nature and character,
        as of to (sic.) today, in relation to the property in suit
        during the pendency of the appeal. We, further, restrain
        the defendant no.1 appellant from creating any third
        party interest in relation to the property-in-suit including
        granting of any licence in favour of any third party during
        the pendency of this appeal.
        With the aforesaid directions, the application for stay, filed
        under C.A.N. 7021 of 2009, is, thus, disposed of.
        We make no order as to costs
        Let the hearing of the appeal be expedited……”
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                          1095

     Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
             Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust

7.     By order dated 10.08.2010, the High Court is stated to have extended
       the time to deposit the sum of ₹10 lakh by a period of two months,
       but it is an admitted fact that the said deposit was made only on
       22.12.2010.
8.     Pertinent to note, the Society also filed CAN. 8838 of 2010 in its appeal
       seeking leave to let out a portion of the suit premises. However, by
       order dated 07.03.2011, the High Court rejected the said application.
9.     Developments thereafter led to initiation of contempt proceedings by
       the Trust, in C.P.A.N. 2113 of 2013, alleging violation of the condition
       set out in the stay order dated 03.03.2010. More particularly, it was
       alleged that the Society had resorted to letting out the suit premises
       for holding exhibitions. While considering this allegation, a Division
       Bench of the High Court at Calcutta took note of the Report dated
       06.06.2013 of the Sub-Inspector of Bhawanipore Police Station,
       confirming that Ms. Sofia Khatoon and Ms. Roommee Bhattacharya
       had jointly held an exhibition from 13.05.2013 to 19.05.2013 on the
       ground floor of the suit premises after paying a sum of ₹6,000/- to the
       Society towards rent. The Division Bench also noted that a receipt
       had been issued by the contemnor, viz., Amit Kumar Das, the Joint
       Secretary of the Society, as if it was a donation instead of rent for
       use of the suit premises. On his behalf, it was contended that the
       very purpose of the Society was to promote and spread the culture
       of Tagore amongst the public, through songs, dramas, dances and
       literary discussions, and even if any such events were held in the
       suit premises, there was no change in the character of the property.
       The Division Bench further noted that the inquiring officer had learnt
       that, after the order of the High Court, the Society was collecting
       rent in the garb of donations by letting out the suit premises for
       holding exhibitions.
10. Observing that one of the conditions of the stay order dated
    03.03.2010 was that the Society must maintain status quo as regards
    possession of the suit premises pending the appeal and refrain from
    creating any third-party interest in relation thereto, including by way
    of grant of a licence, the Division Bench concluded that the Society
    had, in fact, granted licences for short terms to third parties for the
    purpose of exhibitions, dances and other functions on payment of
    donations. Further, the Division Bench noted that all the functions
    which were being held at the suit premises, in lieu of donations, were
1096                                                        [2024] 1 S.C.R.

                      SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL


     not organized by the Society itself, and such acts on its part amounted
     to willful and deliberate violation of the order dated 03.03.2010 passed
     in the first appeal. The Division Bench also took note of the fact that
     the application filed by the Society seeking leave to let out a portion
     of the suit premises had already been rejected. As the execution
     proceedings initiated by the Trust, the decree holder, stood stayed
     by virtue of the order dated 03.03.2010, the Division Bench opined
     that justice would be subserved by vacating the said order of stay of
     execution proceedings without initiating a proceeding for contempt.
     The Bench accordingly allowed C.P.A.N.2113 of 2013 and vacated
     the order of stay granted in F.A. No. 229 of 2009. The Bench held
     that the decree would be executable at once, subject to the result
     of the pending appeal.
11. The appellant before us, viz., the contemnor, would contend that
    it was not open to the High Court to vacate the stay order passed
    in the appeal in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. He would point
    out that no steps were taken by the Trust to seek such relief in the
    appeal and the High Court ought not to have resorted to such action
    in the contempt case.
12. On the contrary, the Trust would argue that the impugned order does
    not warrant interference at this stage as the order of stay dated
    03.03.2010 in the appeal stood vacated automatically in terms of
    clause 7 thereof, as there was a default in the making of deposits as
    directed in the earlier clauses. It would point out that the Society was
    required to deposit a sum of ₹10 lakh with the Registrar General of
    the High Court within the stipulated time but such deposit was made
    only on 22.12.2010, well after the expiry thereof. It would also point
    out that the Society was required to deposit occupation charges @
    ₹35,000/- per month during the pendency of the appeal and assert
    that the Society stopped making such deposits since February, 2020.
    It is however admitted by the Trust that no steps were taken to revive
    the execution proceedings on these grounds.
13. Now, a look at caselaw on the point. In Sudhir Vasudeva vs.
    M.George Ravishekaran1, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed
    as under, in the context of exercise of contempt jurisdiction: -



1   [2014] 4 SCR 27 : (2014) 3 SCC 373
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                             1097

    Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
            Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust

             “19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as
             this Court to punish for contempt is a special and rare
             power available both under the Constitution as well as
             the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.…… The very nature
             of the power casts a sacred duty in the Courts to exercise
             the same with the greatest of care and caution. This is
             also necessary as, more often than not, adjudication of
             a contempt plea involves a process of self-determination
             of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in respect
             of which disobedience is alleged. The Courts must not,
             therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which
             is alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions
             that have not been dealt with or decided in the judgment
             or the order violation of which is alleged. Only such
             directions which are explicit in a judgment or order or are
             plainly self-evident ought to be taken into account for the
             purpose of consideration as to whether there has been
             any disobedience or willful violation of the same. Decided
             issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities
             be considered. The Courts must also ensure that while
             considering a contempt plea the power available to the
             Court in other corrective jurisdictions like review or appeal
             is not trenched upon. No order or direction supplemental
             to what has been already expressed should be issued by
             the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of the
             contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other
             jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above…..”
14. However, in Baranagore Jute Factory PLC. Mazdoor Sangh (BMS)
    vs. Baranagore Jute Factory PLC.2, considering the aforestated
    precedent, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court noted that the 3-Judge
    Bench had clarified therein that directions which are explicit in the
    judgment or ‘are plainly self-evident’ can be taken into account for the
    purpose of considering whether there is any disobedience or willful
    violation. The Bench further held that the Court has a duty to issue
    appropriate directions for remedying or rectifying the things done in
    violation of the Court order and in that regard, the Court may even
    take restitutive measures at any stage of the proceedings.


2    [2017] 4 SCR 700 : (2017) 5 SCC 506
1098                                                      [2024] 1 S.C.R.

                      SUPREME COURT REPORT: DIGITAL


15. Significantly, the 2-Judge Bench had merely echoed the affirmation
    of the legal position by another 2-Judge Bench of this Court in Delhi
    Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.3.
    The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/
    or keep the fruits of his contempt was reiterated therein. Reference
    was made by the Bench to Mohammad Idris vs. Rustam Jehangir
    Babuji4, wherein it was held that undergoing punishment for contempt
    would not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate
    directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of
    its orders. Therefore, the principle that stands crystallized by these
    judgments is that, in addition to punishing a contemnor for disobeying
    its orders, the Court can also ensure that such a contemnor does
    not continue to enjoy the benefits of his disobedience by merely
    suffering the punishment meted out to him.
16. This being the settled legal position, we find that the fact situation
    in the present case is such, that vacating of the stay order in the
    appeal by the High Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction did
    not assume either a restitutive or a remedying character. Violation
    of the status quo condition in the stay order stood complete, even
    as per the High Court, and vacating of the stay order did not have
    the effect of restoring the parties to their original position or deny
    the contemnor the benefit of the disobedience which already stood
    concluded. Violation of a conditional stay order, in the usual course,
    would entail vacating thereof in a properly constituted proceeding. By
    resorting to such a step while exercising contempt jurisdiction, the
    High Court, in our considered opinion was not acting in furtherance
    of the principle adumbrated in the above decisions.
17. No doubt, the concluded act in violation of the status quo order
    in relation to possession of the suit premises amounted to ‘civil
    contempt’ under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
    and warranted appropriate consequences under the provisions
    thereof. However, without taking recourse to such a step, the High
    Court thought it fit to vacate the stay order in the appeal so as to
    enable the Trust to execute the decree. This action of the High Court
    clearly transgressed the scope and extent of its contempt jurisdiction


3   [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 295 : (1996) 4 SCC 622
4   [1985] 1 SCR 598 : (1984) 4 SCC 216
[2024] 1 S.C.R.                                                         1099

  Amit Kumar Das, Joint Secretary, Baitanik, A Registered Society v.
          Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust

     and cannot be sustained. To that extent, the impugned order is set
     aside. However, as the High Court desisted from exercising contempt
     jurisdiction, owing to this misconceived measure, despite finding the
     contemnor guilty of willfully violating the status quo condition in the
     stay order, we consider it appropriate to remand the matter to the
     High Court for continuing with that exercise as we have now set aside
     the course of action adopted by the High Court in the alternative.
18. Further, as the Trust asserts that the stay order stood vacated
    automatically owing to the default by the Society in making deposits,
    it is for the Trust to take appropriate steps. The Trust would be at
    liberty to take all such measures as are permissible in law in that
    regard, be it before the High Court or the executing Court.
19. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, to the extent indicated
    above.
     Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.
     In the circumstances, parties shall bear their own costs.


     Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey                  Result of the case:
                                                         Appeal partly allowed.