Supreme Court of India
AMIT KAPOORversusRAMESH CHANDER & ANR.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 398
- Decided
- 13 September 2012
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A K PATNAIK
Holding
The High Court erred in quashing the charge; the charge under s.306 read with s.107 IPC stands and the trial must continue.
Summary
The appellant, the son of a woman who committed suicide, challenged the High Court's order quashing the charge of abetment of suicide (IPC s.306) framed against the accused property dealer. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had correctly exercised its revisional (s.397) and inherent (s.482) powers of the CrPC to quash a charge at the framing stage. It held that framing of a charge is a tentative exercise under s.228, requiring only a strong suspicion, not a full evidentiary assessment, and that the High Court had improperly delved into the merits of the evidence. The Court reiterated the limited scope of s.397 and the extraordinary nature of s.482, emphasizing that quashing should be sparingly used and only where the allegations are patently absurd or the offence is absent. Consequently, the order quashing the charge was set aside and the trial was directed to proceed on the charges under s.306 read with s.107 and s.448 IPC. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The extent and scope of the High Court's powers under CrPC s.397 and s.482 to quash a charge framed by a trial court.
- Whether a charge under IPC s.306 (abetment of suicide) can be quashed at the charge‑framing stage.
- Whether the allegations constitute a civil dispute rather than a criminal offence.
- Whether the High Court erred by evaluating the evidence and forming a substantive opinion on guilt.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 228, s. 313, s. 397, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 106, s. 107, s. 108, s. 306, s. 448
Subjects
CrPC s.397CrPC s.482IPC s.306Abetment of suicideCharge framingRevision jurisdictionPresumption under s.228Abuse of processCivil vs criminal
Judgment
[2012] 7 S.C.R. 988
A AMIT KAl?OOR
v.
RAMESH CHANDER & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1407 of 2012)
SEPTEMBER 13, 2012
B
[A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:
C ss. 397 and 482 - Extent and scope of powers
exercisable by High Court u/s. 397 independently or read with
s. 482 - Explained - Exercise of jurisdiction u/s. 397 ors. 482
or together, for quashing of charge - Principles culled out -
Maxim, 'qnando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder videtur id
o quo res ipsa non protest.
s. 397 - Revision before High Court challenging the
framing of charges against accused for offences punishable
u/ss.306 and 448 /PC - High Court quashing the charge for
E offence punishable u/s. 306 - Held: As per the suicide note
left by deceased and the statement of her son, she committed
suicide and the abetment by the accused cannot be ruled out
at this stage, but is obviously subject to th.e final view that the
court may take upon trial - One very serious averment that
F was made in the suicide note was that the deceased was totally
frustrated when the accused persons took possession of the
ground floor of her property, and refused to vacate the same
- There could be cases where the circumstances created by
the accused are such that a person feels totally frustrated and
finds it difficult to continue existence - Grabbing of the
G property, as alleged in the suicide note and the statement
made by the son of the deceased, as well as getting blank
papers signed and not giving monies due to them are the
circumstances stated to have led to the suicide of the
H 988
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 989
deceased - Court is not expected to form a firm opinion at A
this stage but a tentative view that would evoke the
presumption referred to u/s 228 of the Code - High Court
could not have appreciated or evaluated the record and
documents filed with it - It was not the stage - Order of High
Court quashing the charge framed for offence punishable u/ B
s. 306 /PC set aside - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 107 and 306.
ss. 227 and 228 - Discharge and framing of charge -
Explained.
PENAL CODE, 1860: c
ss. 107, 108 and 306 - Ingredients - Explained.
An FIR was registered against the appellant and
another on 5.12.2007 in respect of the suicide committed
0
by the deceased on 4.12.2007. The prosecution case as
revealed from the suicide note left by the deceased and
the statement of her son was that on account of the
husband of the deceased falling ill and there being a loss
in the family business, the family decided to sell two of
its properties through the appellant, who was a property E
dealer. In the process, the appellant obtained her
signatures on some blank papers. Subsequently, the
appellant was successful in occupying a portion of the
residential house of the deceased initially for a few days,
but later when he was asked to vacate, he refused stating F
that it was his house as he had paid a sum of
Rs.24,00,000/- for it. The accused and his son were stated
to have threatened the deceased and his family to vacate
the house or else they would ruin them and that the
deceased would get rid of this only after her death. This G
was followed by the appellant sending a legal notice
dated 1.12.2007 to the deceased, which was received by
her on 3.12.2007. The following morning she committed
suicide. The trial court framed charges against the
accused for offences punishable u/ss 306 and 448 IPC. H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A However, in a criminal revision filed by the appellant, the
High Court quashed the charge for offence punishable
u/s 306 IPC.
In the instant appeal filed by the son of the deceased,
B the issue for consideration before the Court was the
extent and scope of the powers exercisable by the High
Court u/s 397 independently or read with s. 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 regarding quashing of
a charge framed by the trial court.
C Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Framing of a charge is an exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of s.228 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, unless the accused is
0 discharged u/s. 227. Under both these provisions, the
court is required to consider the 'record of the case' and
documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the
parties, may either discharge the accused or where it
appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground
E for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and
ingredients of the Section exist, then the court would be
right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against
the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This
presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The
F satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of
constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that
offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such
jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie
case. There is a fine distinction between the language of
G ss. 227 and 228. Section 227 is the expression of a
definite opinion; whereas the judgment of the court u/s.
228 is tentative. At the initial stage of framing of a charge,
the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong
suspicion that the accused has committed an offence,
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 991
which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the A
court has to see is that the material on record and the
facts would be compatible with the innocence of the
accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied
at that stage. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of
charge, the court should form an opinion that the B
accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence is an
approach which is impermissible in terms of s. 228 of the
Code. [paras 10 and 11] [1015-D-G; 1016-D]
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 - C
referred to
1.2. The legislature in its wisdom has used the
expression 'there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence'. This has an inbuilt
element of presumption once the ingredients of an D
offence with reference to the allegations made are
satisfied, the court would not doubt the case of the
prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash
the charge in haste.The word 'presume' in this context
indicates that the truth of the matter has to come out E
when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are
cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material
and evidence is put to the accused in terms of s.313 of
the Code and then the accused is provided an
opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon F
completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the
court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment.
[para 22] [1027-F-H; 1028-A-B]
State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa & Ors. (1996)
4 SCC 659-referred to G
2.1. The inherent as well as the revisional jurisdiction
should be exercised cautiously. If the jurisdiction u/s 482
of the Code in relation to quashing of an FIR is
circumscribed by the factum and caution, in that event, H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A the revisional jurisdiction, particularly, while dealing with
framing of a charge, has to be even more limited. Section
397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for
and examine the records of an inferior court for the
purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and
B regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect
or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-
founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court
to scrutinize the order, which upon the face of it bears a
c token of careful consideration and appear to be in
accordan~e with law. Where the court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed
properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the
0
stated categories. Even framing of charge is a much
advanced stage in the proceedings under the Code. The
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited
one and cannot' be exercised in a routine manner. One
E of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against
an interim or interlocutory order. The court has to keep
in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself
should not lead to injustice ex facie. [Para 8-10) [1015-E;
1013-A-C; E-G]
F State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha &
Ors. (1982) 1 sec 561.
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp.
(1) sec 335
G 2.2. On the other hand, s. 482 is based upon the
maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder videtur
id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives
anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without
which the thing itself would be unavoidable. The Section
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 993
confers very wide power on the High Court to do justice A
and to ensure that the process of court is not permitted
to be abused. Inherent power u/s 482 being an
extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in
regard to matters which are specifically provided for
under other provisions of the Code. Normally the court B
may not invoke its power u/s 482 where a party could
have availed of the remedy available u/s 397 itself. The
inherent powers u/s 482, are of a wide magnitude and are
not as limited as the power u/s 397. Section 482 can be
invoked where the order in question is neither an c
interlocutory order within the meaning of s.397(2) nor a
final order in the strict sense. The distinction between a
final and an interlocutory order is well known in law. The
orders which will be free from the bar of s.397(2) would
be orders which are not purely interlocutory but at the 0
same time are less than a final disposal. They should be
the orders which do determine some right and still are not
rendering the court functus officio of the lis. The
provisions of s. 482 are pervasive. It should not subvert
legal interdicts written into the same Code but, inherent E
powers of the High Court unquestionably have to be read
and construed as free of restriction. The use of
extraordinary powers conferred upon the High Court
under this section are, however, required to be reserved
as far as possible for extraordinary cases. Where the
factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the F
courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to
quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or
two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear
to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the
requirements of the offence. [paras 12 -14 and 20) [1018- G
F-G; 1019-A-C, G-H; 1020-A-C-D; 1026-G]
Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [AIR 1980
SC 258: (1980) 1 SCC 43; Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of
Rajasthan & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 570; Janata Dal v. H. S. H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A Chowdhary & Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 305; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao
Scindia supra State of Bihar & Anr. v. Shri P.P. Sharma &
Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1260 and M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha &
Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2037 - referred to.
8 2.4. Upon objective analysis of various judgments of
this Court, some of the principles to be considered for
proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to
quashing of charge ~ither in exercise of jurisdiction u/s
397 or s. 482 of the Code or together, as the case may
C be, are culled out as follows:
(1) Though there are no limits of the powers of the
High Court u/s 482 of the Code but the more the
power, the more due care and caution is to be
exercised in invoking these powers. The power of
D quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the
charge framed in terms of s. 228 of the Code should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases. [Para 19]
[1022-G; 1023-A-C]
E
(2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record
of the case and the documents submitted therewith
prima facie establish the offence or not. If the
allegations are so patently absurd and inherently
F
improbable that no prudent person can ever reach
such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients
of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court
may interfere. [Para 19] [1023-D-E]
G (3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for
considering whether the case would end in
conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge
or quashing of charge. [Para 19] [1023-F]
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 995
(4) Where the exercise of such power is absolutely A
essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and
for correcting some grave error that might be
committed by the subordinate courts even in such
cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at
the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise B
of its inherent powers. [Para 19) [1023-G-H; 1024-A]
(5) Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any
of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in
force to the very initiation or institution and C
continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a
bar is intended to provide specific protection to an
accused. [Para 19) [1024-A, BJ
(6) The court has a duty to balance the freedom of a
person and the right of the complainant or D
prosecution to investigate and prosecute the
offender. [Para 19) [1024-C]
(7) The process of the court cannot be permitted to
be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
E
[Para 19) [1024-C)
(8) Where the allegations made and as they appeared
from the record and documents annexed therewith
to predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil
wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not F
satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the
Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even
in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the
critical analysis of the evidence. [Para 19) [1024-D-E]
G
(9) It cannot examine the facts, evidence and
materials on record to determine whether there is
sufficient material on the basis of which the case
would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned
primarily with the allegations taken as a whole H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is
it an abuse of the process of court leading to
injustice. [Para 19] [1024-F-G]
(10) It is neither necessary nor is the court called
upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate
B
evidence collected by the investigating agencies to
find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
[Para 19] [1024-H; 1025-A]
(11) Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and
c also amount to an offence, merely because a civil
claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal
complaint cannot be maintained. [Para 19] [1025-A-
B]
D The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a
legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and
ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court
will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent or original
jurisdiction. [para 18] [1022-E]
E
Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. (2006)
6 sec 736 - relied on
(12) In exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 228 and/or u/s
F 482, tile Court cannot take into consideration external
materials given by an accused for reaching the
conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that
there was possibility of his acquittal. The court has
to consider the record and documents annexed with
G by the prosecution. [Para 19] [1025-C]
(13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule
of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is
even broadly satisfied, the court should be more
inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather
H than its quashing at that initial stage. The court is not
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 997
expected to marshal the records with a view to decide A
admissibility and reliability of the documents or
records but is an opinion formed prima facie. [Para
19) [1025-0-E)
(14) Where the charge-sheet, report u/s 173(2) of the 8
Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the
Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a
charge. [Para 19) [1025-F]
(15) Coupled with any or all of the above, where the
court finds that it would amount to abuse of process C
of the Court or that interest of justice favours,
otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to
be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and
substantial justice for administration of which alone,
the courts exist. [Para 19) [1025-G-H] D
State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha &
Ors. AIR 1982 SC 949; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr.
v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 709;
Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 892; Mrs. E
Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors. AIR
1996 SC 309; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors.
AIR 2000 SC 754; Ajay Mitra v. State of MP. AIR 2003 SC
1069); Mis. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate & Ors. AIR 1988 SC 128; State of U.P. v. O.P.
F
Sharma(1996) 7 SCC 705; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. s.
Bangarappa & Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 41; Zundu Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharafu/ Haque & Ors. [AIR 2005 SC
9]; Mis. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Mis.
Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1869; Shakson
Belthissor v. State of Kera/a & Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 466; G
V. V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of UP. & Ors. (2009) 7
SCC 234; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi
Ravindra Babu & Anr. (2009) 11 SCC 203; Sheo Nandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 877; State of
Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1260; H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 7 S.C.R.
A Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2001) 2 SCC
17; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 645;
Savita v. State of Rajasthan (2005) 12 SCC 338; and S. M.
Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2001) 7 SCC 659 - referred
to.
B
3.1. In the instant case, what weighed with the High
Court was that.firstly, it was an abuse of the process of
court and, secondly, it was a case of civil nature and that
the facts, as stated, would not constitute an offence u/s
306 read with s.107 IPC. The High Court itself recorded,
C that 'this aspect of the matter will get unravelled only after
a full-fledged trial'. Once the High Court itself was of the
opinion that clear facts and correctness of the allegations
made can be examined only upon full trial, there was no
need for it to quash the charge u/s 306 at that stage.
D Framing of charge is a kind of tentative view that the trial
court forms in terms of s.228 which is subject to final
culmination of the proceedings. [para 21) [1027-C-E]
3.2. The ingredients of s. 306 IPC are that a person
E commits suicide and somebody alone abets commission
of such suicide which renders him liable for punishment.
Both these ingredients appear to exist in the instant case
in terms of the language of s.228 of the Code, subject to
trial. The deceased committed suicide and as per the
F suicide note left by her and the statement of her son, the
abetment by the accused cannot be ruled out at this stage,
but is obviously subject to the final view that the court
may take upon trial. One very serious averment that was
made in the suicide note was that the deceased was
G totally frustrated when the accused persons took
possession of the ground floor of her property, and
refused to vacate the same. [para 22) [1028-D-F]
3.3. The High Court has also noticed that a perusal
of the suicide note brings to fore the fact that the
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 999
petitioner-accused is not only named but his illegal A
occupation of the house of the deceased is stated to be
one of the primary reasons for the deceased in
committing the suicide. The statement of the son of the
deceased is also on the same line. Once ss. 107 and 306
IPC are read together, then the court has to merely B
examine as to whether apparently the person could be
termed as causing abetment of a thing. An abetter u/s 108
is a person who abets an offence. It includes both the
person who abets either the commission of an offence
or the commission of an act which would be an offence. c
Explanation (1) to. S. 107 has been worded very widely.
[para 24) [1029-C-H; 1030-A]
Goura Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2003) 12 SCC
469 - referred to
D
3.4. A person making wilful misrepresentation or
wilful concealment of material fact and such person
voluntarily causing or procuring or attempting to cause
or procure a thing to be done is said to instigate the
doing of that thing. According to the record, the accused E
had made a wrong statement that he had paid a sum of
Rs.24,00,000/- for purchase of the property and the
property belonged to him. Whether it was a
misrepresentation of the accused and was an attempt to
harass the deceased and her family which ultimately led F
to her suicide is a question to be examined by the court.
It would have been more appropriate exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Court, if it would have left the
matter to be determined by the Court upon complete trial.
[para 25) [1030-G-H; 1031-A-C]
G
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC
618 - Cited
Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of
Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605 - referred to H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A 3.5. There could be cases where the circumstances
created by the accused are ~uch that a person feels
totally frustrated and finds it difficult to continue
existence. Husband of the deceased was a paralysed
person. They were in financial crises. They had sold their
B property. They had great faith in the accused and were
heavily relying on him as their property transactions were
transacted through the accused itself. Grabbing of the
property, as alleged in the suicide note and the statement
made by the son of the deceased as well as getting blank
c papers signed and not giving monies due to them are the
circumstances stated to have led to the suicide of the
deceased. The Court is not expected to form even a firm
opinion at this stage but a tentative view that would
evoke the presumption referred to u/s 228 of the Code.
[para 26] [1032-A-D]
D
3.6. Merely because there was civil transaction
between the parties would not by itself alter the status of
the allegations constituting the criminal offence. This was
not a case where thrillegations were so predominately
E of a civil nature that it would have eliminated criminal
intent and liability. On the contrary, it is a fact and, in fact,
is not even disputed that the deceased committed suicide
and left a suicide note. May be, the accused are able to
prove their non- involvement in inducing or creating
F circumstances which compelled the deceased to commit
suicide but that again is a matter of trial. [para 22] [1028-
8-D]
3.7. There also appears to be some contradiction in
G the judgment of the High Court primarily for the reason
that if charge u/s 306 is to be quashed and the accused
is not to be put to trial for this offence, then where would
be the question of trying them for an offence of criminal
trespass in terms of s.448 IPC based on some facts,
which has been permitted by the High Court. Besides,
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1001
The High Court could not have appreciated or evaluated A
the record and documents filed with it. It was not the
stage. [para 22] (1028-H; 1029-A-B]
3.8. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that
the finding returned by the High Court suffers from an B
error of law. It has delved into the field of appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence which is beyond the
jurisdiction, either revisional or inherent, of the High
Court u/s 397 and 482 of the Code. The order of the High
Court is set aside. The trial court shall proceed with the
trial in accordance with law. [para 27-28] (1032-E-F]
c
Case Law Reference:
(1977) 4 sec 39 Referred to. Para 11
(1982) 1 sec 561 Referred to. Para 9 D
1992 Supp. (1) sec 335 Referred to. Para 9
[AIR 1980 SC 258:
(1980) 1 sec 43 Referred to. Para 13 E
(2001) 8 sec 570 Referred to. Para 14
(1992) 4 sec 305 Referred to. Para 15
(2006) 6 sec 736 Relied on. Para 18 F
AIR 1982 SC 949 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 1988 SC 709 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 1993 SC 892 Relied on. Para 19 G
AIR 1996 SC 309 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 2000 SC 754 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 2003 SC 1069] Relied on. Para 19
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012) 7 S.C.R.
A AIR 1988 SC 128 Relied on. Para 19
(1996) 1 sec 105 Relied on. Para 19
(1995) 4 sec 41 Relied on. Para 19
[AIR 2005 SC 9] Relied on. Para 19
B
AIR 2000 SC 1869 Relied on. Para 19
(2009) 14 sec 466 Relied on. Para 19
(2009) 1 sec 234 Relied on. Para 19
c
(2009) 11 sec 203 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 1987 SC 877 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 1991 SC 1260 Relied on. Para 19
D (2001) 2 sec 11 Relied on. Para 19
(2001) 8 sec 645 Relied on. Para 19
(2005) 12 sec 338 Relied on. Para 19
E c2001) 1 sec 659 Relied on. Para 19
AIR 1991 SC 1260 Referred to. Para 20
AIR 2001 SC 2037 Referred to. Para 20
(1996) 4 sec 659 Referred to. Para 22
F
[(2003) 12 sec 469 Referred to. Para 26
(2009) 16 sec 605 Referred to. Para 26
(2001) 9 sec 618 Referred to. Para 26
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1407 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order dated 13.08.2009 of the High
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1003
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No. A
277 of 2009.
S.K. Dhingra, M.L. Khattar, Shefali Mitra for the Appellant.
P.P. Malhotra, ASG, Shailendra Sharma, Anil Katiyar,
Seeraj Bagga, Rajinder Mathur for the Respondents. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. A question of law that arises more often than not in C
criminal cases is that of the extent and scope of the powers
exercisable by the High Court under Section 397 independently
or read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, the 'Code').
D
3. The facts as they emerge from the record fall within a
very narrow compass. On 4th December, 2007, the Rajouri
Garden Police Station received information that a woman had
committed suicide at C-224, Tagore Garden Extension, Delhi.
Upon making entry under DD No.16A of that date, Sub E
Inspector O.P. Manda! commenced investigation and reached
the place of occurrence. The deceased was identified as
Komal Kapoor. Her body was sent for post mortem. The
Investigating Officer recorded the statement of her son Amit
Kapoor and on 5.12.2007 at about 12.15 p.m. an FIR was
F
registered on the complaint filed by him. This FIR was
registered against Ramesh Chander Sibbal (the accused) and
another, on the basis of the statement of Amit Kapoor and the
suicide note. According to Amit Kapoor, he knew Ramesh
Chander Sibbal for the last 10 years. Father of Amit Kapoor
was running a paint brush business and had purchased property G
No.C-225, Tagore Garden, Delhi through the said Ramesh
Chander Sibbal. Since the father of Amit Kapoor had fallen ill,
his mother was also looking after the business. However, the
family business suffered acute losses. The family discussed the
H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A possibility of selling their moveable and immoveable property
situated at Rohini. The accused persons are stated to have
fraudulently obtained signatures of the deceased in this
connection. In order to get over the financial crises and to meet
their liabilities, the deceased had also discussed the possibility
B of selling another plot owned by the family situated in Bawana
Industrial Area. At that time also, the accused told the
deceased that certain documents have to be executed before
the plot is sold. On this pretext, he again got some papers
signed by them. The accused paid a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to
c the deceased at the first instance and thereafter a sum of
Rs.3,00,000/- for the plot situated in Bawana as against the
market value of Rs.28,00,000/-, with an assurance that the rest
of the amount will be paid after execution of the sale deed.
4. Around the time of Dussehra in 2007, the accused
D approached the deceased claiming that he be given
accommodation on a temporary basis for a period of ten to
twelve days on the ground floor of her house situated at C-224,
Tagore Garden, Delhi on the pretext that his own house was
under renovation. The deceased believing him and keeping the
E relationship in mind, agreed and allowed him to occupy two
rooms on the ground floor. It is alleged that while the deceased
was away at Haridwar, just before the festival of Diwali, the
accused encroached upon one more room in the said house.
When the deceased asked the accused to vacate the said
F premises, he refused and, on the contrary, stated that he had
paid a sum of Rs.24,00,000/- and that it was his house. Not
only this, the accused as well as his son threatened the
deceased and her family to vacate the house or else they would
ruin them. It is also alleged that when the deceased asked the
G accused as to when :;he will get rid of this problem, he is said
to have replied that she could get rid of this only after her death.
This was followed by the accused sending a legal notice dated
1st December, 2007 to the deceased which was received on
3rd December, 2007 in which similar claim was made by the
H accused against the deceased. The trust that she had placed
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1005
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
upon the accused was totally betrayed by him. This led to the A
deceased slipping into depression. In face of all these
circumstances, coupled with the threats extended by the
accused persons, the deceased committed suicide on
4.12.2007 at about 7 .30 a.m. by hanging herself from a ceiling
fan, using a scarf (chunni). It may be noticed at this stage, that B
the deceased had left a suicide note which can appropriately
be reproduced at this stage as under :
"This Ramesh Sibbal, his wife Suman and his son Gaurav.
I am committing suicide for the reason that the aforesaid C
persons who are residing in our house forcefully, used to
say that he was to do white wash so please allow him to
keep some of his articles. But after some time, when I
came, I saw that the aforesaid person has completely
occupied my house as his own house. When my children D
objected to his aforesaid act, he said that he was to stay
there only for a period of 04 days and that he would perform
Diwali worship pooja ceremony at his own house but he
did not vacate the house. When I had gone to Haridwar,
he occupied front room of my house as well after giving E
beatings to my children. I know this person since that day
when he had got my plot of Rohini disposed off. As we both
(husband and wife) had not read those papers (relating to
disposal of our Rohini plot) so this person kept on obtaining
our signatures on the stamp papers relating to our House F
No. C-224 on the pretext that these papers were required
to execute the lease. My husband was ill and I used to
remain busy in looking after him. Whenever, he came to
us he used to show urgency in taking our signature by
stating that the sale proceed of our plot would be given to G
us that day itself. He kept on giving payment time to time
to us and we kept on receiving the same.
Written on the top of page 411
This man gave me only a sum of Rs 05 lacs of my plot H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A situated in Bawana, but he obtained my signature on Rs
15 lacs as I did not read the contents thereof.
When this man got our Bawana a plot sold, he took the
file from us but I do not know as to what he had done with
that amount. He used to say that he had given us the entire
B
amount. Whatever amount he gave to us he used to take
in writing on a paper. After giving his amount, when I asked
for the file, he demanded Rs.05 lacs otherwise, he would
reveal it to my daughter that the file was lying with him. He
also threatened me to sign the paper without raising any
c objection otherwise, he would get our children grandson
and granddaughter kidnapped. On this, I used to scare and
this man used to succeed in getting the stamp papers
signed by me. When he got our plot of Rohini sold, he
started obtaining my signatures. But at the time when the
D plot of Rohini was sold, he told me that the plot situated in
Bawana has been sold and he asked us to accompany
him to sign the papers. Thereafter, he said that the person
with whom he has kept the file was saying to him that he
could take away the file from that person but only in lieu of
E keeping papers of some other house with that person.
When this man (suggested) me to keep other file (of
property) in lieu of taking the said file from that person and
this man (also assured me) that he would return those
papers of property to me as and when the plot of Bawana
F would be sold. On this, I handed over the file of property
No. C-225 to this man. After that, he told that the plot was
not getting higher price and so he offered us to take some
amount, if required by us urgently whereupon , this man
gave us a sum of Rs. 3 lacs but he kept on taking an
G interest at the rate of 10%. This man gave us Rs.5 lacs
earlier and Rs.3 lacs later so he kept on taking an interest
on Rs. 8 lacs. Before Diwali, I gave him a cheque of
Rs.2,50,000/- and also gave a sum of Rs.3 lacs in cash
to his son. Thereafter, I gave a sum of Rs.2 lacs in cash
H and his son knows the account of it whose name is
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1007
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Gaurav. When I gave money, I asked him to give me the A
written paper as I have returned the as I have returned the
money whereupon, he (Gaurav) said that since he had no
paper with him that time so the same would be returned
to her by his father. This man's son Gaurav and wife
Suman are together involved (in this conspiracy). His son B
also used to do my fake signatures. Whenever, I
demanded my file back from him, he used to ask me to
return Rs.15 lacs first. On this, when I asked him as to how
the amount of Rs.5 lacs became to Rs.15 lacs? He replied
that it had become Rs.15 lacs including interest thereon. I c
kept on giving him interest because of the fear of my
family. He has also grabbed my entire money which I had
taken on loan basis from somewhere. I kept on giving him
interest only for the reason that since he used to promise
me to return the papers that day itself or on the next day.
D
Written on top of page no.415
He said that the money of Bawana's (plot) has been sent
by his father and he asked me to write down a receipt of
Rs.04 lacs and when I wrote a receipt of it, he said that E
the money was kept in the motorcycle and he was first
giving me the cash but this man's son did not give me the
said cash. He asked me to sign the papers related to
Bawana's (plot) first and then he would return the paper
as well as the money to me. On reaching the house, I F
demanded the money and paper from him whereupon he
said that he had the paper written by me and that he would
show that paper to my son and when my son asked him
to return the paper, he replied that he would not return the
paper as his mother had taken a sum of Rs.15 lacs from G
him. Kindly take it guaranteed that out of aforesaid Rs.15
lacs I have returned a sum of Rs. of Seven and a half lacs
to him. After that, this man's son came to me and said that
his father was saying to give papers of property No.C-225
to you and in lieu thereof he asked me to show him the H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 7 S.C.R.
A file of lease. On this, when I started to show him the said
file to him then, this man's son Gaurav said that he was
just giving me the said paper and saying this he took away
the lease file from me and since then, he had not returned
me the said paper. Kindly save my house. Please save
B my children from this person. I have not visited any court
to sign. One day these persons crossed all the limits when
his wife said that she was agreed to return all the papers
in lieu of giving a receipt of the same in writing. After that,
they gave me the amount of sale proceeds of Rohini and
c Bawana's properties. She brought fake papers which were
related to some other person's property, to me. I saw that
those papers were fake papers and were in English
language and when I showed those papers to someone,
it was found that those papers were not related to my plot.
When I went to this man's house to show him that those
D
papers were not related to my plot, his wife said that since
there was no electricity in her house that time so they had
given some others property paper to her mistakenly and
that they were just sending their son Gaurav to give me the
correct papers but Gaurav did not come to me till today.
E Thereafter, we started receiving threats from Gunda
elements that they would harm us in different ways. I have
no proof of the money returned by me. This man used to
say to my female friends that he would show them after
purchasing my house by hook and crook. He used to
F spread rumour in the street that I, Komal have sold out my
house to him and that there were several cases pending
related to that house.
I pray, with folded hands, that keeping in view the illness
G of my husband, my house and the papers related thereto
may please be restored to me. This man's wife Suman and
their son Gaurav are most dishonest persons. His wife
Suman used to talk in such an artificial way as she was
telling a truth. One of my sons had died due to cancer and
H if I am dishonest to anyone, my rest of both children may
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1009
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
also die from cancer. You can verify these facts from the A
residents of the street as to how many houses (families)
has been ruined by this person. This man is supported by
some reputed persons who use to give him money but he
did not return their money. He kept on keeping papers of
our property with him and used to lend our money on B
interest to other persons. This man intends to grab my
house. My matter may please be decided. This man
Ramesh Sibbal, his wife Suman and son Gaurav may be
punished so that they may not commit such an act with
anyone in future. He kept on threatening me while involving c
my daughter-in-law that he would do this and that. Since
the day this man entered my house, everything has been
ruined by him. I may please be imparted justice.
Sd/- Koma! Kapur
(In English)" D
5. The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan, effected
recoveries of the articles from the place of occurrence and
thereafter recorded the statements of the witnesses. Upon
completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed in E
terms of Section 173(2) of the Code wherein Ramesh Chander
Sibbal was stated as the accused and names of his wife,
Suman Sibbal and son Gaurav Sibbal were shown in Column
No.2. Upon committal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge
framed charges against the accused under Sections 306 and F
448 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
6. The accused filed a criminal revision being Criminal
Revision No.227 of 2009 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
challenging the order of the trial Court dated 2nd April, 2009,
framing the charge. The High Court vide its judgment dated 13th G
August, 2009 quashed the charge framed under Section 306
IPC, while permitting the Trial Court to continue the trial in
relation to the offence under Section 448 IPC. It will be useful
to refer to certain findings recorded by the High Court in its
H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A judgment dated 13th August, 2009 :
"3. In the background of the aforesaid case set up by
the prosecution the learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that the ingredients of an
offence under Section 306 of the IPC were not
B
present in the instant case. As a matter of fact the
learned counsel for the petitioner went further to say
that this is not a case of suicide, rather is, a case
of homicide. For this purpose he took me through
the post mortem report and also the literature
c (Pathology of Neck Injury by Peter Venezis). On
being told that since the trial was on and hence, the
learned counsel decided to give up the arguments
initially advanced on this aspect of the matter.
D 3.1 As regards whether a charge could be framed
under Section 306 of the IPC, the upshot of his
submissions was that even if the entire material/
evidence placed on record by the prosecution is
fully accepted to be correct, no offence under
E Section 306 of the IPC is made out against the
petitioner accused. For this purpose the learned
counsel for the petitioner took me through the
suicide note dated 04.12.2007, the statement of
the sons of the deceased Amit Kapoor (the
F complainant) and Sumit Kapoor, as well as, the
report of the Forensic Science Laboratory. It was
his submission that merely because the petitioner-
accused is named in the suicide note and has been
referred to as the reason which propelled the
deceased to take the extreme step of suicide, it
G
would still not fall within the realm of Section 306
of the IPC.
xxx xxx xxx
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1011
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
g. a perusal of the suicide note brings to fore the fact A
the petitioner-accused is not only named but his
illegal occupation of the house of the deceased is
stated to be one of the primary reasons for Kamel
Kapoor, to have committed suicide. The statement
of the sons of the deceased, Amit Kapoor and B
Sumit Kapoor, is primarily on the same lines. The
issue for consideration is that, even if it is assumed
at this stage, that the suicide note was written in the
hand writing of the deceased and the statement of
Amit Kapoor is believed to be true in its entirety c
would it be sufficient to charge the petitioner-
accused with the offence of abetment of suicide by
Komal Kapoor. In my view the answer is in the
negative. The mere fact that the actions of the
petitioner-accused, that is, forcible occupation of
0
the portion of the house of the deceased, led her
to take the extreme step of committing suicide
would not bring his act within the definition of
abetment as there is no material or evidence
placed by the prosecution on record to show that E
he intended or had the necessary mens rea that the
Komal Kapoor should take the extreme step of
committing suicide. As long as there is absence of
material and/or evidence on record to show that the
abettor had intended to aid or encourage the
commission of the principal offence, the accused F
cannot be charged with the offence of abetment
and, therefore, in the present case, abetment to
commit suicide. Nor I am persuaded by the
submission that because the name of the petioner-
accused appears in the suicide note it would be G
sufficient to charge him with an offence under
Section 306 of the IPC. In this context see
observation in Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Senger
(supra) and Mahender Singh (supra). In both the
cases not ony was the accused named in the H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A suicide note but they were also cited as the reason
for committing suicide by the deceased. The
learned APP may perhaps be correct in his
submission that the agreement to sell dated
30.06.2007 was executed by the petitioner-
B accused, only to grab the property of the deceased
after a receipt had been executed by the deceased
acknowledging that she had taken a loan from the
petitioner-accused in the first instance in the sum
of Rs.15 lacs and thereafter, another sum of Rs. 1
c lac, but then, this aspect of the matter will get
unravelled only after a full-fledged trial. I do not wish
to comment any further on this aspect of the matter
as it could impact both, the case of the prosecution
as well as that of the defence, and perhaps wisely,
therefore, even the learned counsel or the
D
petitioner-accused has not assailed the charge
framed under Section 448 of the IPC.
xxx xxx xxx
E 12. For the aforementioned reasons, I am of the opinion
that it is a fit case in which this Court should
exercise its revisional and inherent powers to quash
the charge framed against the petitioner accused
under Section 306 of the IPC. The revision petition
is thus partially allowed. The charge framed against
F
the petitioner-accused under Section 306 of the IPC
shall be dropped. The trial court will continue with
the trial of the petitioner-accused in respect of the
remaining charge framed against him."
G 7. Aggrieved from the judgment of the High Court, in the
present appeal, the appellant impugnes the same primarily on
the ground that the High Court had exceeded and not
appropriately exercised its jurisdiction under Sections 397 and
482 of the Code in quashing the charge framed against the
H respondent under Section 306 IPC.
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1013
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
8. Before examining the merits of the present case, we A
must advert to the discussion as to the ambit and scope of the
power which the courts including the High Court can exercise
under Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code. Section 397
of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and
examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of B
satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any
proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this
provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon c
the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear
to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various
judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional
jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under
challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with D
the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no
evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is
exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive
classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to
be determined on its own merits.
E
9. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional
jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot
be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions
is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order.
The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional F
jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the
Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has
been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given
case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the G
categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much
advanced stage in the proceedings under the Cr.P.C. Right
from the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan
Kumar Guha & Ors. [(1982) 1 SCC 561 ], which was reiterated
with approval in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan H
1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A Lal & Ors. [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335], the courts have stated
the principle that if the FIR does not disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing
the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or
received. It is further stated that the legal position appears to
B be that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally
interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit
investigation into the offence alleged to have been committed;
if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no
investigation should normally be permitted. Whether an offence
c has been disclosed or not, must necessarily depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. If on consideration of the
relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is
disclosed, it will normally not interfere with the investigation into
the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the
offence to be completed in order to collect materials for proving
0
the offence. In Bhajan Lat's case (supra), the Court also stated
that though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined, sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae or to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds
E of cases wherein power under Section 482 of the Code for
quashing of an FIR should be exercised, there are
circumstances where the Cciurt may be justified in exercising
such jurisdiction. These are, where the FIR does not prima facie
constitute any offence, does not disclose a cognizable offence
justifying investigation by the police; where the allegations are
F so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; where
there is an expressed legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code; and where a criminal proceeding is
G manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge. Despite stating these grounds,
the Court unambiguously uttered a note of caution to the effect
H that power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1015
{SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too, A
in the rarest of rare cases; the Court also warned that the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made
in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent
powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to B
act according to its whims or caprice.
10. The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent
as well as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously.
If the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in relation to C
quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and caution
afore-noticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction,
particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has to be
even more limited. Framing of a charge is an exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code,
unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the
0
Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to
consider the 'record of the case' and documents submitted
therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge
the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion
there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed E
an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and
ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right
in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the
accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption
is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court F
in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the
facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of
such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie
case. There is a fine distinction between the language of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is expression G
of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section
228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of
charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is
certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which
is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. It may H
1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 7 S.C.R.
A also be noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the
High Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is
available in such cases. Of course, it may be subject to
jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on
B a question of law. However, when factual appreciation is
involved, then it must find place in the class of cases resulting
in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to be
exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power
by the court. Merely an apprehension or suspicion of the same
C would not be a sufficient ground for interference in such cases.
11. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is
concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the
accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could
prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material
D on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence
of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied
at that stage. We may refer to the well settled law laid down by
this Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh
(1977) 4 sec 39:
E
"4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case
for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the
charge against the accused and state by what evidence
he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter
comes at the initial stage the duty of the Court to consider
F
the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and
the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass
thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section
228 of the Code. If "the Judge considers that there is no
G
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so
doing", as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand,
"the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence which- ... (b)
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1017
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing A
a charge against the accused", as provided in Section 228.
Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as
they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning
and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect
of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce B
are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be
attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not
obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider
in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the
facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence c
of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment
which is to be finally applied before recording a finding
regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not
exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter
under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that 0
stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient
ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is
sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the
accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion,
cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion
E
of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong
suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is
ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is
no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be F
drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law
governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the
accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is
proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima
facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. G
It the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce
to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted
before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by
the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of
the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one
conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable.
We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more
example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence
B of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion
of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case
is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so
at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227
or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and
c generally the order which will have to be made will be one
under Section 228 and not under Section 227."
12. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 can be
exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or
proprietary of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior
D court, as the case may be. Though the section does not
specifically use the expression 'prevent abuse of process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice', the jurisdiction
under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, proprietary
or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very
E foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but
ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction
could be exercised where there is palpable error, non-
compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is
completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is
F exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482 is based
upon the maxim quando lex liquid alicuiconcedit, conceder
videtur id quo res ipsa esse non protest, i.e., when the law gives
anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which
the thing itself would bE: unavoidable. The Section confers very
G wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the
process of the Court is not permitted to be abused.
13. It may be somewhat necessary to have a comparative
examination of the powers exercisable by the Court under these
two provisions. There may be some overlapping between these
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1019
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
two powers because both are aimed at securing the ends of A
justice and both have an element of discretion. But, at the same
time, inherent power under Section 482 of the Code being an
extraordinary and residuary power, it is inapplicable in regard
to matters which are specifically provided for under other
provisions of the Code. To put it simply, normally the court may B
not invoke its power under Section 482 of the Code where a
party could have availed of the remedy available under Section
397 of the Code itself. The inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code are of a wide magnitude and are not as limited as
the power under Section 397. Section 482 can be invoked C
where the order in question is neither an interlocutory order
within the meaning of Section 397(2) nor a final order in the
strict sense. Reference in this regard can be made to Raj
Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. [AIR 1980 SC 258 :
(1980) 1 SCC 43]}. In this very case, this Court has observed
that inherent power under Section 482 may not be exercised if D
the bar under Sections 397(2) and 397(3) applies, except in
extraordinary situations, to prevent abuse of the process of the
Court. This itself shows the fine distinction between the powers
exercisable by the Court under these two provisions. In this very
case, the Court also considered as to whether the inherent E
powers of the High Court under Section 482 stand repelled
when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps.
Rejecting the argument, the Court said that the opening words
of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the
Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the F
inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the language
of Section 482. There is no total ban on the exercise of inherent
powers where abuse of the process of the Court or any other
extraordinary situation invites the court's jurisdiction. The
limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The distinction between G
a final and interlocutory order is well known in law. The orders
which will be free from the bar of Section 397(2) would be the
orders which are not purely interlocutory but, at the same time,
are less than a final disposal. They should be the orders which
do determine some right and still are not finally rendering the H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20121 7 S.C.R.
A Court functus officio of the lis. The provisions of Section 482
are pervasive. It should not subvert legal interdicts written into
the same Code but, however, inherent powers of the Court
unquestionably have to be read and construed as free of
restriction.
B 14. In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr.
[(2001) 8 SCC 570], the Court held that Section 482 does not
confer any power but only declares that the High Court
possesses inherent powers for the purposes specified in the
Section. As lacunae are sometimes found in procedural law,
C the Section has been embodied to cover such lacunae
wherever they are discovered. The use of extraordinary powers
conferred upon the High Court under this section are, however,
required to be reserved as far as possible for extraordinary
cases.
D
15. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [(1992) 4 SCC
305J, the Court, while referring to the inherent powers to make
orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, clarified
that such power has to be exercise in appropriate cases ex
E debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for
administration of which alone, the courts exist. The powers
possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
are very wide and the very plenitude of the powers requires a
great caution in its exercise. The High Court, as the highest
F court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State, has inherent
powers to make any order for the purposes of securing the ends
of justice. Being an extra ordinary power, it will, however, not
be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a
subordinate court of its powers.
G 16. If one looks at the development of law in relation to
exercise of inherent powers under the Code, it will be useful to
refer to the following details :
As far back as in 1926, a Division bench of this Court In
H Re: Llewelyn Evans, took the view that the provisions of Section
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1021
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
561A (equivalent to present Section 482) extend to cases not A
only of a person accused of an offence in a criminal court, but
to the cases of any person against whom proceedings are
instituted under the Code in any Court. Explaining the word
"process", the Court said that it was a general word, meaning
in effect anything done by the Court. Explaining the limitations B
and scope of Section 561A, the Court referred to "inherent
jurisdiction", "to prevent abuse of process" and "to secure the
ends of justice" which are terms incapable of having a precise
definition or enumeration, and capable, at the most, of test,
according to well-established principles of criminal c
jurisprudence. The ends of justice are to be understood by
ascertainment of the truth as to the facts on balance of evidence
on each side. With reference to the facts of the case, the Court
held that in the absence of any other method, it has no choice
left in the application of the Section except, such tests subject
0
to the caution to be exercised in the use of inherent jurisdiction
and the avoidance of interference in details and directed
providing of a legal practitioner.
17. Having examined the inter-relationship of these two
very significant provisions of the Code, let us now examine the E
scope of interference under any of these provisions in relation
to quashing the charge. We have already indicated above that
framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where
the Court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and
documents placed therewith before the Court. Taking F
cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an
application of mind by the Court but framing of charge is a
major event where the Court considers the possibility of
discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged
or requiring the accused to face trial. There are different G
categories of cases where the Court may not proceed with the
trial and may discharge the accused or pass such other orders
as may be necessary keeping in view the facts of a given case.
In a case where, upon considering the record of the case and
documents submitted before it, the Court finds that no offence H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution under
the provisions of the Code or any other law for the time being
in force and there is a bar and there exists no ground to
proceed against the accused, the Court may discharge the
accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the
B matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither
leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy
the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is
charged. In such cases, the Court may discharge him or quash
the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two
c provisions.
18. This further raises a question as to the wrongs which
become actionable in accordance with law. It may be purely a
civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also
a criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts.
D But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence
and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such
criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil
wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked
to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual
E foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the
Court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent or original jurisdiction.
In the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors.
[(2006) 6 SCC 736], this Court took the similar view and upheld
F the order of the High Court declining to quash the criminal
proceedings because a civil contract between the parties was
pending.
19. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these
G two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code
and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be
appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which
the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not
only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision
such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1023
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the A
principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction,
particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code
or together, as the case may be :
Though there are no limits of the powers of the
B
1)
Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more
the power, the more due care and caution is to be
exercised in invoking these powers. The power of
quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the
charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code c
should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases.
2) The Court should apply the test as to whether the D
uncontroverted allegations as made from the record
of the case and the documents submitted therewith
prima facie establish the offence or not. If the
allegations are so patently absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever reach E
such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients
of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court
may interfere.
3) The High Court should not unduly interfere. No
meticulous examination of the evidence is needed F
for considering whether the case would end in
conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge
or quashing of charge.
4) Where the exercise of such power is absolutely G
essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice
and for correcting some grave error that might be
committed by the subordinate courts even in such
cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere,
at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A exercise of its inherent powers.
5) Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any
of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in
force to the very initiation or institution and
continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a
B bar is intended to provide specific protection to an
accused.
6) The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a
person and the right of the complainant or
c prosecution to investigate and prosecute the
offender.
7) The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be
used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
D 8) Where the allegations made and as they appeared
from the record and documents annexed therewith
to predominantly give rise and constitute a. 'civil
wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not
satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence,
E the Court may be justified in quashing the charge.
Even in such cases, the Court would not embark
upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
9) Another very significant caution that the courts have
to observe is that it cannot examine the facts,
F
evidence and materials on record to determine
whether there is sufficient material on the basis of
which the case would end in a conviction, the Court
is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as
a whole whether they will constitute an offence and,
G
if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading
to injustice.
10) It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon
to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate
H evidence collected by the investigating agencies to
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1025
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
find out whether it is a case of acquittal or A
conviction.
11) Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also
amount to an offence, merely because a civil'claim
is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal B
complaint cannot be maintained.
12) In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/
or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into
consideration external materials given by an
accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence c
was disclosed or that there was possibility of his
acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and
documents annexed with by the prosecution.
13) Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of D
continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even
broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined
to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its
quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not
expected to marshal the records with a view to
E
decide admissibility and reliability of the documents
or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
14) Where the charge-sheet, report under Section
173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal
defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction F
to frame a charge.
15) Coupled with any or all of the above, where the
Court finds that it would amount to abuse of
process of the Code or that interest of justice G
favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The
power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for administration of
which alone, the courts exist.
H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha
& Ors. [AIR 1982 SC 949]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia &
Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC
709]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [AIR 1993 SC 892];
Mrs. Rupan Deal Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors.
B [AIR 1996 SC 309; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. &
Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 754]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [AIR 2003
SC 1069]; Mis. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial
Magistrate & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 128]; State of UP. v. O.P.
Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. s.
c Bangarappa & Ors. [(1995) 4 SCC 41]; Zundu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors.
[AIR 2005 SC 9]; Mis. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P)-Ltd.
v. Mis. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1869]; Shakson
Belthissor v. State of Kera/a & Anr. [(2009) 14 SCC 466];
0 V. V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of UP. & Ors. [(2009) 7
SCC 234]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi
Ravindra Babu & Anr. [(2009) 11 SCC 203]; Sheo Nandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [AIR 1987 SC 877]; State of
Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. [AIR 1991 SC 1260];
Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. [(2001) 2 SCC
E 17]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. [(2001) 8 SCC 645];
Savita v. State of Rajasthan [(2005) 12 SCC 338]; and S.M.
Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [(2001) 7 SCC 659]}.
20. These are the principles which individually and
F preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into
consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide
plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the
High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has
been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not
G hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one
or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to
be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the
requirements of the offence. At this stage, we may also notice
that the principle stated by this Court in the case of Madhavrao
H Jiwaji Rao Scindia (supra) was reconsidered and explained in
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1027
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
two subsequent judgments of this Court in the cases of State A
of Bihar & Anr. v. Shri P.P. Sharma & Anr. [AIR 1991 SC 1260]
and M.N. Damani v. S.K. Sinha & Ors. [AIR 2001 SC 2037].
In the subsequent judgment, the Court held that, that judgment
did not declare a law of universal application and what was the
principle relating to disputes involving cases of a predominantly B
civil nature with or without criminal intent.
21. In light of the above principles, now if we examine the
findings recorded by the High Court, then it is evident that what
weighed with the High Court was that firstly it was an abuse of C
the process of court and, secondly, it was a case of civil nature
and that the facts, as stated, would not constitute an offence
under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC. Interestingly and
as is evident from the findings recorded by the High Court
reproduced supra that 'this aspect of the matter will get
unravelled only after a full-fledged trial', once the High Court itself D
was of the opinion that clear facts and correctness of the
allegations made can be examined only upon full trial, where
was the need for the Court to quash the charge under Section
306 at that stage. Framing of charge is a kind of tentative view
that the trial court forms in terms of Section 228 which is subject E
to final culmination of the proceedings.
22. We have already noticed that the legislature in its
wisdom has used the expression 'there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence'. This has an inbuilt F
element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with
reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would
not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its
jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court
in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa & Ors. G
[(1996) 4 sec 659) referred to the meaning of the word
'presume' while relying upon the Black's Law Dictionary. It was
defined to mean 'to believe or accept upon probable evidence';
'to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming'.
In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined
by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put
to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then
the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any.
It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes
B with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its
judgment. Merely because there was civil transaction between
the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations
constituting the criminal offence. This was not a case where the
allegations were so predominately of a civil nature that it would
c have eliminated criminal intent and liability. On the contrary, it
is a fact and, in fact, is not even disputed that the deceased
committed suicide and left a suicide note. May be, the accused
are able to prove their non-involvement in inducing or creating
circumstances which compelled the deceased to commit
suicide but that again is a matter of trial. The ingredients of
0
Section 306 are that a person commits suicide and somebody
alone abets commission of such suicide which renders him
liable for punishment. Both these ingredients appear to exist
in the present case in terms of the language of Section 228 of
E the Code, subject to trial. The deceased committed suicide and
as per the suicide note left by her and the statement of her son,
the abetment by the accused cannot be ruled out at this stage,
but is obviously subject to the final view that the court may take
upon trial. One very serious averment that was made in the
suicide note was that the deceased was totally frustrated when
F the accused persons took possession of the ground floor of her
property, C-224, Tagore Garden, Delhi and refused to vacate
the same. It is possible and if the Court believes the version
given by the prosecution and finds that there was actual sale
of property in favour of the accused, as alleged by him, in that
G event, the Court may acquit them of not only the offence under
Section 306 IPC but under Section 107 IPC also. There
appears to be some contradiction in the judgment of the High
Court primarily for the reason that if charge under Section 306
is to be quashed and the accused is not to be put to trial for
H this offence, then where would be the question of trying them
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1029
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
for an offence of crimin'al trespass in terms of Section 448 IPC A
based on some facts, which has been permitted by the High
Court.
23. The High Court could not have appreciated or
evaluated the record and documents filed with it. It was not the B
stage. The Court ought to have examined if the case falls in
any of the above-stated categories.
24. The High Court has also noticed that perusal of the
suicide note brings to fore the fact that the petitioner-accused
is not only named but his illegal occupation of the house of the C
deceased is stated to be one of the primary reasons for Kamal
Kapoor in committing the suicide. The statement of the son of
the deceased is also on the same line. Then the High Court
proceeds further to notice that even if it is assumed at this stage
that the suicide note and statement were correct, the action of D
the petitioner-accused in forcibly occupying the portion of the
house of the deceased and the deceased taking the extreme
step would not bring his act within the definition of abetment,
as there is no material or evidence placed by the prosecution
on record. This finding could hardly be recorded without E
travelling into the merits of the case and appreciating the
evidence. The Court could pronounce whether the offence falls
within the ambit and scope of Section 306 IPC or not. These
documents clearly show that the accused persons had brought
in existence the circumstances which, as claimed by the F
prosecution, led to the extreme step of suicide being taken by
the deceased. It cannot be equated to inflictment of cruelty as
discussed by the High Court in its judgment. Once Sections
107 and 306 IPC are read together, then the Court has to
merely examine as to whether apparently the person could be G
termed as causing abetment of a thing. An abetter under
Section 108 is a person who abets an offence. It includes both
the person who abets either the commission of an offence or
the commission of an act which would be an offence. In terms
of Section 107 IPC, Explanation (1) to Section 107 has been
H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A worded very widely. We may refer to the judgment of this Court
in the case of Goura Venkata Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2003)
12 SCC 469], wherein this Court held as under :
"8. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The
offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence
B
provided in the Act as an offence. A person abets the doing
of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that
thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in
any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally
aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
c These things are essential to complete abetment as a
crime. The word "instigate" literally means to provoke,
incite, urge on or bring about by ·persuasion to do any
thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or
intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section
D 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is
committed in consequence of abetment and there is no
provision for the punishment of such abetment then the
offender is to be punished with the punishment provided
for the original offence. "Act abetted" in Section 109
E means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence
for the abetment of which a person is charged with the
abetment is normally linked with the proved offence. In the
instant case, the abetted persons have been convicted for
commission of offence punishable under Section 304. So
F in the case of A-1 it is Section 304 read with Section 109
IPC, that is attracted."
25. A wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of
material fact and such person voluntarily causing or procuring
G or attempting to cause or procure a thing to be done is said to
instigate the doing of that thing. According to the record, the
accused had made a wrong statement that he had paid a sum
of Rs.24,00,000/- for purchase of the property C-224, Tagore
Garden, Delhi and the property belonged to him. Whether it
was a misrepresentation of the accused and was an attempt
H
AMIT KAPOOR v. RAMESH CHANDER & ANR. 1031
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
to harass the deceased and her family which ultimately led to A
her suicide. is a question to be examined by the Court. The
allegations as made in the afore-stated documents clearly
reflects that blank documents were got signed, but the purpose,
the consideration and complete facts relating to the transaction
were not disclosed to the deceased or the family. This would, B
at least at this stage, not be a case for examining the
correctness or otherwise of these statements as these
allegations cannot be said to be ex facie perverse, untenable
or malicious. It would have been more appropriate exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Court, if it would have left the matter to c
be determined by the Court upon complete trial. May be the
accused would be entitled to get some benefits, but this is not
the stage. These are matters, though of some civil nature, but
are so intricately connected with criminal nature and have
elements of criminality that they cannot fall in the kind of cases
0
which have been stated by us above. There, the case has to
be entirely of a civil nature involving no element of criminality.
26. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Chitresh
Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [(2009) E
16 SCC 605] to contend that the offence under Section 306
read with Section 107 IPC is completely made out against the
accused. It is not the stage for us to consider or evaluate or
marshal the records for the purposes of determining whether
offence under these provisions has been committed or not. It F
is a tentative view that the Court forms on the basis of record
and documents annexed therewith. No doubt that the word
'instigate' used in Section 107 of the IPC has been explained
by this Court in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of
Chhattisgarh [(2001) 9 SCC 618] to say that where the G
accused had, by his acts or omissions or by a continued
course of conduct, created such circumstances that the
deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide, an instigation may have to be inferred. In other words,
instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of the H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A case. All cases may not be of direct evidence in regard to
instigation having a direct nexus to the suicide. There could be
cases where the circumstances created by the accused are
such that a person feels totally frustrated and finds it difficult to
continue existence. Husband of the deceased was a paralysed
B person. They were in financial crises. They had sold their
property. They had great faith in the accused and were heavily
relying on him as their property transactions were transacted
through the accused itself. Grabbing of the property, as alleged
in the suicide note and the statement made by the son of the
c deceased as well as getting blank papers signed and not giving
monies due to them are the circumstances stated to have led
to the suicide of the deceased. The Court is not expected to
form even a firm opinion at this stage but a tentative view that
would evoke the presumption referred to under Section 228 of
the Code.
0
27. Thus, we are of the considered view that the finding
returned by the High Court suffers from an error of law. It has
delved into the field of appreciation and evaluation of the
evidence which is beyond the jurisdiction, either revisional or
E inherent, of the High Court under Sections 397 and 482 of the
Code.
28. For the reasons afore-recorded, this appeal is allowed.
The order of the High Court is set aside. The trial Court shall
F proceed with the trial in accordance with law, uninfluenced in
any way whatsoever from what has been recorded in this
judgment. Charge against the accused under Section 306 read
with Section 107 and Section 448 IPC are found to be in order.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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