Supreme Court of India
AMIT CHANCHAL JHAversusREGISTRAR HIGH COURT OF DELHI
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 865
- Decided
- 12 December 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction for criminal contempt, finding the appellant's apology insincere, and set aside only the direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India.
Summary
Advocate Amit Chanchal Jha was convicted by the Delhi High Court for criminal contempt after allegedly abusing a lady advocate in the courtroom, resulting in a seven‑day imprisonment, three‑month debarment and a direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India. Jha appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that he was not given a show‑cause notice, that his conduct did not fall within Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, and that his unconditional apology should set aside the conviction. The Supreme Court examined the vacillating stance of the appellant, the sincerity of his apology, and the necessity of the contempt power to protect the administration of justice. It held that the apology was not genuine, the conviction was proper, and only the direction to refer the case to the Bar Council was unnecessary. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, leaving the conviction and debarment intact, but the referral order was set aside.
Issues considered
- The conduct of the advocate amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the appellant was denied due process, specifically a show‑cause notice, in the contempt proceedings.
- Whether an unconditional apology tendered by the appellant can purge the contempt and warrant setting aside the conviction.
- Whether the direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India was appropriate.
Legislation cited
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 2(c)
Subjects
criminal contemptcontempt of courtslawyer misconductapologydue processBar Council of Indiaprofessional ethicsdebarmentSupreme Court
Judgment
(2014] 12 S.C.R. 424.
A AMIT CHANCHAL JHA
v.
REGISTRAR HIGH COURT OF DELHI
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 864-865 of 2012)
DECEMBER 12, 2014
B
· [T.S. THAKUR AND ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]
· Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: s.2(c)- Criminal contempt
- Allegation that appe1/ant-advocate abused a lady advocate
C during judicial proceedings - Matter taken up by the Bench
in chamber - Appellant admitting the charge - Convicted for
criminal contempt and punished to undergo imprisonment for
7 days and debarred from appearing in court for 3 months and
matter directed to be reported to the Bar Council of India for
D taking appropriate action - Held: Appellant taking vacillating
stand - Apology tendered by appellant not sincere enough
to be accepted so as to set aside the conviction - No reason
to interfere with the impugned orders except to set aside the
direction to refer the matter to the BC/.
E Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The stand of the appellant has been
vacillating. He first made a statement before the Bench
of the High Court on 13th January, 2012 admitting the
F charge. He sought to partly withdraw the said stand by
filing an application for recall. Thereafter, in his petition
in this Co.urt, he tried to contradict not only the lady
advocate but also the High Court. Thereafter, when the
case came up for hearing and on joint request of the
G counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned, an
affidavit was filed withdrawing all the allegations against
respondent no.2. He however, did not withdraw the
allegations against the High Court attributing incorrect
H 424
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 425
OF DELHI
recording of facts in the order of the Bench and the Joint A
Registrar. [Para 15] [631-H; 632-A-B]
R.K. Anand vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC
106:2009 (11) SCR 1026; Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry
oflnformation & Broadcasting, In re. (1995) 3 SCC .619: 1995 B
(3) SCR 450; Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M. V.
Dabholkar (1976) 2 sec 291: 1976 (2) SCR 48 - relied on.
2. The power of contempt should not be lightly
initiated by the .court, particularly against a lawyer but the
fact would remain that exercise of such power becomes C
necessary in the interest of public and also in the interest
of due administration of justice. In view of this, no ground
to interfere with the impugned orders except to set aside
the direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India. ·
[Paras 18, 21] [436-E-F; 440-F-G] . D
Pritam Pal vs. High Court of M.P. 1993 (Supp) 1 SCC
529 - relied on.
Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd. Ali (2001) 8 SCC
650: 2001(3) Suppl. SCR 675 - held applicable. E
Case Law Reference:
2009 (11) SCR 1026 relied on Para 16
1995 (3) SCR 450 relied on Para 17 F
1976 (2 'SCR 48 relied on Para 17
1993 (Supp) 1 sec 529 relied on Para 18
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 675 held inapplicable Para 19
G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 864~865 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order of the High Court of Delhi at
New Delhi dated 13.01.2012 in Crl. Cont. No. 0112012 and H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 12 S.C.R.
A 16.01.2012 in Crl. Misc. No. 753/2012.
M.N. Krishnamani, A. Sharan, Vivek Singh, Rajeev Yadav,
Aseem Chandra, Avinash Tirpathi, Raghvendra Tiwari for the
Appellant.
B Huzefa A. Ahmadi, Geeta Luthra, G. Ramakrishna Prasad,
Filza Moonis, Purnima Bhat for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J .. 1. These appeals have been
preferred against the judgment and order dated 13th January,
2012 in Criminal Contempt No.1 of 2012 and order dated 16th
January, 2012 in Criminal Miscellaneous No.753 of 2012 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. 1 ·
D 2. The appellant is an advocate practicing in Delhi High
Court. On 13th January, 2012 he allegedly abused a lady
advocate (identity not being mentioned) during the judicial
proceedings before an Additional District Judge, posted as
Joint Registrar in the High Court. The Joint Registrar noticed
E that the lady lawyer was crying and she said that she was
slapped by the appellant. The appellant also complained that
he was also slapped. The Joint Registrar asked the lady
advocate to sit in his chamber so that normalcy could be
restored. The matter was mentioned by a group of lawyers
F before the Acting Chief Justice. The matter was taken up by
the Bench in chamber and the Joint Registrar produced the
copy of proceedings recorded by him regarding the incident.
However, the exact details of the incident are not mentioned in
the order passed by the Bench on 13th January, 2012, in order
G to maintain decency. On being confronted, the appellant
admitted the charge. He was informed that his conduct involved
criminal contempt and asked as to why show cause notice be
not issued to him. He stated that he did not wish to"give any
reply and was ready to face the punishment for the charge.
H
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 427
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
3. After due consideration, the Division Bench headed by A
the Acting Chief Justice held that the conduct of the appellant
had caused interference with the judicial procedure and
obstructed the administration of justice and was contumacious.
The appellant appeared to be accustomed to use of brute force
which was antithetic to the procedure established by law. Such B
incidents could lead the young advocates shying away from the
court. Accorpingly, the appellant was convicted for criminal
contempt and was punished to undergo imprisonment for seven
days and asked to do pro bono legal aid work for the inmates
of the jail. He was debarred from appearing in any court in Delhi c
for three months and the matter was directed to be reported to
the Bar Council of India for taking appropriate action.
4. The appellant, thereafter, filed an application for recall
of the order on the ground that the case did not fall in the
definition of 'crlminal contempt' under Section 2(c) of the D
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The altercation between the two
lawyers. had not taken place in the presence .of the Joint
Registrar and thus it was not a case of contempt in the face of
the Court. Moreover, the action of the appellant was not willful
as it was at the spur of the moment. The appellant was regretful E
and remorseful and had expressed regret without any loss of
time. There was no chance of his repetition of the said act and
he had not been issued notice to show cause against the
punishment of debarment from the Court. He sought
reconsideration of the order of imprisonment. The Bench did F
not find any merit in the application. It was held that the appellant
had the standing of about seven years and he had admitted
the incident and had stated that there was no need of issuing
notice to him. The indecent behaviour of physical abuse of a
lady advocate was undisputed. The incident was in the face of G
the court and during the judicial proceedings. If the plea of the
appellant was to be accepted it will encourage litigants and their
counsel to settle scores by use of force during the court
proceedings. The appellant was given due opportunity but he
did not wish to file any reply and wanted the matter to be H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A concluded. Moreover, he could have no explanation for his
.behaviour. Accordingly, the application was dismissed on 16th
January, 2012.
5. The appellant thereafter, filed these appeals. The lady
advocate was impleaded as a party to the proceedings.
8
6. The contention raised in the appeals is that the
impugned order of conviction was not justified as no show
cause notice was given and due procedure was not followed.
Altercation took place on account of unreasonable behavior of
C the lady advocate in seeking adjournment and objecting to his
presence along with the main counsel. The lady advocate
scolded him and also slapped him and he slapped her back
in a reflex reaction. Thereafter, she slapped him a number of
times. The lady advocate falsely complained that the appellant
D had slapped her. She had slapped him first. The appellant
offered unconditional apology as per suggestion of the ·
Registrar after which he was again slapped. In the report of the
Joint Registrar, the facts were not correctly mentioned. The
appellant had also suffered swelling on his lips due to repeated
E slaps which was clear from the prescription of the dispensary
of the High Court. Thereafter, he was pushed hard by the
counsel with whom the lady advocate was working and also
abused. The appellant was informed to appear before the
Court of the Chief Justice. He was advised by the members of
F the Bar and on the assurance of the senior members that since
he was not in a normal state' of mind, he should tender
unconditional apology to defuse the matter reposing faith in the
judiciary. The incident happened on the initiation of the lady
I lawyer who was solely accountable for the incident. The
appellant could not put forward his version before the Chief
G Justice. The order of the Joint Registrar was not shown to him.
Number of advocates supported the lady advocate and the
appellant was not allowed to speak. He was shocked by the
order .of imprisonment passed against him in spite of l:lis
unconditional apology. He was informed that terms of settlement
H
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 429
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
were going on but still he was taken into custody. Indecent A
behavior recorded in order dated 13th January, 2012 was not
correct. Application for recall was made by his wife but her
submissions were not noted by the Court and Order dated 16th
January, 2012 was passed without even acknowledging the
presence of the appellant's wife. · B
7. According to the appellant his unconditional apology
was misconstrued and fair trial was denied to him. The High
Court had fallen into grave error in ignoring the principles of fair
procedure on an erroneous assumption that the appellant had C
pleaded guilty, without verifying the veracity of the said
assumption and without proof of admission of the charge in
written form. There was no written complaint by the lady
advocate. The allegations constituting contempt are. required
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The sentence was not
suspended to enable him to take appropriate remedy. His D
mental conditio,n in surcharged atmosphere was not properly
assessed. The appellant had not voluntarily admitted anything.
He was not given any legal assistance. It was wrongly observed
that appellant had not disputed indecent behavior and physical
abuse as the appellant was never informed or aware of the E
allegations and came to know of the same only from the order
of the Court. Specific notice of debarment was required to be
served on him. Power of suo motu ~ontempt could be exercised
rarely. when the Court receives information from its own
sources. In the present case, proceedings were at the instance F
of the complainant-lady advocate, represented by a team of
lawyers. The proceedings were driven by personal enmity of
senior associate of the lady advocate. The appellant was not
allowed to file affidavit elaborating his defence. The appellant
has also filed application for permission to file Annexures P4 G
to PS. Annexure P4 is a prescription from the dispensary and
Annexures PS to PS are affidavits of advocates in support of
the case of the appellant.
S. A counter affidavit has been filed by the lady advocate
H
disputing the imputations concerning her. She has also
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A mentioned details of the indecent assault of the appellant which
we do not consider it appropriate to record. The appellant has
filed a rejoinder affidavit reiterating the stand taken in the
petition.
8 9. When the matter came up for hearing on 24th
November, 2014, after some hearing on joint request by
learned counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned to 8th
December, 2014. Thereafter affidavit dated 28th November,
2014 was filed in this Court on 2nd December, 2014 stating
as follows :
c
"1. That I withdraw all the averments, a/legations,
statements etc. made against respondent No.2 in the
present Criminal Appeal, Rejoinder Affidavit, Recall
application dated 14.01.2012 filed in the Hon'ble High
D Court or any other application(s)lpleading(s).
2. That I hereby tender my unconditional and unqualified
apology to this Hon'ble Court and to the Hon'ble High
Court in respect of the incident that has occurred in the
Hon'ble High Court on 13.01.2012.
E
3. That I hereby tender my unconditional and unqualified
apology to the respondent No. 2 in respect of the incident
that has occurred in the Hon'ble High Court on
13.01.2012. .
F
4. That the deponent most humbly prays that his apology
is genuine and bonafide and may kindly be accepted by
this Hon'ble Court and the deponent may kindly be
purged of the contempt."
G 10. An application has been filed by a lady advocate
seeking direction to set up a Committee in accordance with
theVishakha Guidelines. An application for impleadment has
also been filed by 68 lady advocates on the ground that issue
concerned the female members of the bar.
H
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 431
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
11. We have heard Shri M.N. Krishnamani, Senior A
Advocate, Shri A. Sharan, Advocate appearing for the appellant
and Shri Huzefa A. Ahmadi, Senior Advocate appearing for the
lady advocate and perused the record.
12. Learned senior advocates appearing for the appellant
have submitted that in view of affidavit tendering unqualified B
and unconditional apology by the appellant to the Court and to
the lady advocate and withdrawal of allegations against the lady
advocate, this Court may set aside the conviction of the
appellant. He had already undergone imprisonment and the
period of debarment from appearing in any courts in Delhiwas C
already over. The Court may also set aside the direction to
report the matter to the Bar Council of India for taking
appropriate action as such direction was unnecessary.
13. Shri Ahmadi, learned senior advocate for the lady
advocate, on the other hand, submitted that mere tendering of D
unconditional apology was not enough in a matter of this nature
where dignity of the Court and of the lady advocate was
involved. It is not a case where conviction ought to be set aside.
He, however, stated that at this stage it may not be necessary
to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India as the matter has E
been dealt with by the Court in the course of considering the
issue of criminal contempt. He submitted that this Court must
dispel the impression that an advocate could commit a serious
misconduct and then get away by mere tendering apology which
in the circumstances could not be taken to be sincere. F
14. We have given our anxious consideration to the
sensitive issue raised before us in the matter.
15. We find substance in the submission of Shri Ahmadi
that the apology tendered by the appellant is not sincere enough G .
to be accepted so as to set aside the conviction. We have
reproduced above the details of the proceedings from which it
is evident that the stand ofthe appellant has been vacillating.
He first made a statement before the Bench of the High Court
on 13th January, 2012 admitting the change. He sought to partly H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A withdraw the said stand by filing an application for recall.
Thereafter, in his petition in this Court the appellant tried to
contradict not only the lady advocate but also the High Court.
Thereafter, when the case came up for hearing and on joint
request of the counsel for the parties, the matter was adjourned,
B an affidavit has_ been filed withdrawing all the allegations
against Respondent No.2. He has however, not withdrawn the
allegations against the High Court attributing incorrect recording
of facts in the order of the the Bench and the Joint Registrar.
16. This Court has earlier acknowledged the falling
C"standards of certain members of the ·sar and it has become
necessary to reiterate the said view on account of repeated
instances which are being highlighted. In R.K. Anand vs.
Registrar. Delhi High Court', this Court expressed its grave
concern and dismay on the decline on ethical and professional
D standards among lawyers as follows:
"331. The other important issue thrown up by this case
and that causes us both grave concern and dismay is the
decline of ethical and professional standards among
iawyers. The conduct of the two appellants (one convicted
E of committing criminal contempt of court and the other
found guilty of misconduct as Special Public Prosecutor),
both of them lawyers of long standing, and designated
Senior Advocates, should not be seen in isolation. The
bitter truth is that the facts of the case are manifestation
F of the general erosion of the professional values among
- lawyers at all levels. We find today lawyers indulging in
practices that would have appalled their predecessors in
the profession barely two or three decades ago. Leaving
aside the many kinds of unethical practices indulged in
. G by a section of lawyers we find that even some highly
successful lawyers seem to live by their own rules of
conduct. ·
xxxxxxxx
H 1. (2009J a sec 1os.
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 433
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
333. We express our concern on the falling professional A
norms among the lawyers with considerable pain
because we strongly feel that unless the trend is
immediately arrested and reversed, it will have very
deleterious consequences for the administration of
justice in the country. No judicial system in a democratic B
society can work satisfactorily unless it is supported by
a Bar that enjoys the unqualified trust and confidence of
the people, that shares the aspirations, hopes and the
ideals of the people and whose members are monetarily
accessible and affordable to the people. c
xxxxxxxx
335. Here we must a/so obseNe that the Bar Council of
India and the Bar Councils of the different States cannot
escape their responsibility in this regard. Indeed the Bar D
Council(s) have very positively taken up a number of
importantissues concerning the administration of justice
in the country. It has consistently fought to safeguard the
interests of lawyers and it has done a lot of goodwork for
their welfare. But on the issue of maintaining high E
professional standards and enforcing discipline among
lawyers its performance hardly matches its achievements
in other areas. It has not shown much concern even to
see that lawyers should obseNe the statutory norms
prescribed by the Council itself. We hope and trust that F
the Council will at least now sit up and pay proper
attention to the restoration of the high professional
standards among lawyers worthy of their position in the
judicial system and in the society."
17. We may also recall the observations of this Court in G
Sanjiv Datta, Dy. Secy., Ministry of Information &
Broadcasting, In re"', that the legal profession is a solemn and
serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who
2. (1995) 3 sec 619. H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A belong to it are its honourable members. The honour as a legal
profession has to be maintained by its members by their
exemplary conduct both in and outside the Court. The lawyer
has to conduct himself as a model for others in his profession
as well as in private and public life. The society has right to
B expect from him ideal behavior. This Court observed :
"20. The legal profession is a solemn and serious
occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong
to it are its honourable members. Although the entry to
the profession can be had by acquiring merely the
c qualification of technical competence, the honour as a
professional has to be maintained by its members by
their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court.
The legal profession is different from other professions
in that what the lawyers do, affects not only an individual
D but the administration of justice which is the foundation
of the civilised society. Both as a leading member of the
intelligentsia of the society and as a responsible citizen,
the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others
both in his professional and in his private and public life.
E The society has a right to expect of him such ideal
behaviour. It must not be forgotten that the legal
profession has always been held in high esteem and its
members have played an enviable role in public life.
The regard for the legal and judicial systems in this
F country is in no small measure due to the tireless role
-played by the stalwarts in the 'profession tci strengthen
them. They took their profession seriously and practised
it with dignity, deference and devotion. If the profession
is to survive, the judicial system ffas to be vitalised. No
G service will be too small in making the system efficient,
effective and credible. The casualness and indifference .
with which some members practise the profession are
certainly not calculated to achieve that purpose or to
enhance the prestige either of the profession or of the
H institution they are serving. If people lose confidence in
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 435
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
the profession on account of the deviant ways of some A
of its members, it is not only the profession which will
suffer but also the administration of justice as a whole.
The present trend unless checked is likely to lead to a
stage when the system will be found wrecked from within
before it is wrecked from outside. It is for the members B
of the profession to introspect and take the corrective
steps in time and also spare the courts the unpleasant
duty. We say no more."
In Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar, it C
was observed :
"15. Now to the legal issue bearing on canons of
professional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built on
the ruins of democracy, for where law ends tyranny
begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very D
survival of our Republic, the integral bond between the
lawyer and the public is unbreakable. And the vital role
of the lawyer depends upon his probity and professional
lifestyle. Be it remembered that the central function of the
legal profession is to promote the administration of E
justice. If the practice of law is th£.!S a public utility of great
implications and a monopoly is statutorily granted by the
nation, it obligates the lawyer to observe scrupulously
those norms which make him worthy of the confidence
a
of the community in him .as vehicle of justice - social F
justice. The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or
strive to thrive on litigation. Canons of conduct cannot be
crystallised into rigid rules but felt by the collective
conscience of the practitioners as right:
..
"It must be a conscience alive to the proprieties G
and the improprieties incident to the discharge of
a sacred public trust. It must be a conscience
governed by the rejection of self-interest and
3. (1976J 2 sec 291. H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
,_
A selfish ambition. It must be a conscience
propelled by a consuming desire to play a leading
role in the fair and impartial administration of
justice, to the end that public confidence may be
kept undiminished at all times in the belief that we
B shall always seek truth and justice in the
preservation of the rule of law. It must be a
conscience, not shaped by rigid rules of doubtful
validity, but answerable only to a moral code which
would drive irresponsible Judges from the
c profession. Without such· a conscience, there
should be no Judge" [Hastings, Hon John S. :
Judicial Ethics as it Relates to Participatfon in
Money-Making Activities - Conference on
Judicial Ethics, p. 8. The School of Law, University
of Chicago (1964)]."
D
-and, we may add, no lawyer. Such is the high,
standard set for professional conduct as
expounded by courts in this country and
elsewhere."
E
18. We are conscious of the fact that the power of
contempt should not be lightly initiated by the Court, particularly
against a lawyer but the fact remains that exercise of such
power becomes necessary in the interest of public and also in
F the interest of due administration of justice. This aspect was
considered in Pritam Pal vs. High Court of M.P.4, wherein
reference was made to catena of decisions and it was
observed:
"48. In Morris v. Crown Office [(1970) 1 ALL ER 1079] at
G page 1081, Lord Denning, M.R.,said: (All ER p. 1081)
"The course of justice must not be deflected or
interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the
very foundations of our society."
H - -----
4. 1993 (Supp) 1 sec 529.
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 437
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
49. In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke: (ALL A
ER p. 1087)
"The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is
to give our courts the power effectively to protect
the rights of the public by ensuring that the
administration of justice shall not be obstructed or B
prevented."
50. Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U.S. [348 US 11 (1954)]
expressed his view as follows: (U.S. p. 14)
"It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in C
its active manifestation, against obstruction and
outrage."
51. In Jennison v. Baker [(1972) 1 ALL ER 997] it is
stated: (All ER p. 1006)
D
"The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while
those who defy it go free, and those who seek its
protection lose hope."
52. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the bench in
Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries E
[ (1980) 3 sec 311] citing those two decisions in the
cases of Offut and Jennison stated thus: .(SCC p. 315,
para 7)
•... it may be necessary to punish as a contempt,
a course of conduct which abuses and makes a F
mockery of the judicial process and which thus
extends its pernicious influence beyond the
parties to the action and affects the interest of the
public in the administration of justice. The public
have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, G
and a vital stake in the effective and orderly
administration of justice, because, unless justice
is so administered, there is the peril of all rights
and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of
protecting the interest of the public in the dlle. H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 12 S.C.R.
A administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted
with the power to commit for contempt of court, not
in order to protect the dignity of the court against
insult or injury as the expression "Contempt of
Court" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to
B vindicate the right· of the public that the
administration of justice shall not be prevented,
prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."
19. As regards, the apology we may recall the
observations of this Court in Pravin C. Shah vs. K.A. Mohd.
C Ali5 that:
"28. xxxxxx It is not enough that he tenders an apology.
The apology tendered should impress the court to be
genuine and sincere. Xxxxx
D 29. This Court has held in M. Y. Shareef v. Hon'ble
Judges of the Nagpur High Court [AIR (1955) SC 19] that
"an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge
the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to
operate as a universal panacea, but it is intended
E to be evidence of real contriteness". (AIR p. 23,
para 10)
Ahmadi, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in M.B.
Sanghi, Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana
[ (1991) 3 sec 600] while considering an apology
F. tendered by an advocate in a contempt proceeding has
stated thus: (SCC p. 603, para 2)
"And here is a member of the profession who has
repeated his performance presumably because
G he was let off lightly on the first occasion. Soft
justice is not the answer- not that the High Court
has been harsh with: him - what I mean is he
cannot be let off on an apology which is far from
sincere. His apology was hollow, there was no
------
H 5. (2001) a sec 650.
AMIT CHANCHAL JHA v. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT 439
OF DELHI [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]
remorse - no regret - it was only a device to A
escape the rigour of the law. What he said in his
affidavit was that he had not uttered the words
attributed to him by the learned Judge; in other
words the learned Judge was lying - adding
insult to injury - and yet if the court finds him B
guilty (he contested the matter tooth and nail) his
unqualitled apology may be accepted. This is no
apology, it is merely a device to escape."
30. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Mulk Raj v. State
of Punjab ((1972) 3 SCC 839] made the following C
obseNations which would throw considerable light on the
question before us: (SCC p. 840, pata 9)
"9. Apology is an act of r;;ontrition. Unless apology
is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good
grace apology is shorn of penitence. If apology is D
offered at a time when the contemnor finds that
the court is going to impose punishment it ceases
to be an apology and it becomes an act of a
cringing coward. The High Court was right in not
taking any notice of the appellant's expression of E
apology 'without any further word'. The High Court
correctly said that acceptance of apology in the
case would amount to allow the offender to go
away with impunity after having committed gross
contempt. " F
31. Thus am.ere statement made by a contemnor before
court that he apologises is hardly enough to amount to
purging himself of the contempt. The court must be
satisfied of the genuineness of the apology. If the court G
is so satisfied and on its basis accepts the apology as .
genuine the court has to make an order holding that the
contemnor has purged himself of the contempt. Till such
an order is passed by the court the delinquent advocate
would continue to be under the spell of the interdict
contained in Rule 11 of the Rules. H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 12 S.C.R.
A 32. Shri Sadrul Anam, teamed counsel for the respondent
Advocate submitted first, that the respondent has in fact
apologised before this Court through the counsel
engaged by him, and second is that when this Court
observed that "this course should set everything at rl,lst"
B it should be treated as the acknowledgement made by
this Court that the contemnor has purged himself of the
guilt.
33. We are unable to accept either of the said
contentions. The observation that j'this course should set
c everything .at rest" in the judgment of this Court cannot
be treated as anything beyond the scope of the plea
made by the respondent in that case. That apart, this
Court was certainly disinclined to accept the apology so
tendered in this Court which is clearly manifested from
D the outright repudiation of that apology when this Court
said thus:
"We regretfully will not be able to accept his
apology at this belated juncture, but would rather
admonish the appellant for his conduct under our
E plenary powers under the Constitution, which we
do hereby."
20. The above observations aptly apply to th~ present
case.
F 21. In view of the .above, we do not find any ground to
interfere with the impugned orders except to set aside the
direction to refer the matter to the Bar Council of India as such
direction is unnecessary in view of the order which we have
passed. ·
G 22. Subject to the above, the appeals are dismJssed.
Devika Gujral Appeals dismissed.
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