AMINA BEEVIversusTHACHI & ORS.

                        [2010] 12 S.C.R. 1084


A                           AMINA BEEVI
                                   v.
                        THACHI & ORS.
      (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 15221 of 2007 Etc.)

                         OCTOBER 27, 2010
B
                [D.K. JAIN AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

        KERALA LAND REFORMS ACT, 1963:

c         s.51, proviso - Surrender by tenant of his interests in the
    leasehold land to landlord - HELD: Being in contravention
    of s. 51, was void.

      ss. 13-A and 125 - Restoration of possession of tenants
  dispossessed after 1.4.1964 - Jurisdiction of civil court -
D Held: Suit for recovery of possession by a tenant is neither
  barred expressly nor impliedly bys. 13-A - Further, s.125
  makes it clear that in any suit regarding rights of a tenant the
  issues of rights of tenant and whether a person is tenant will
  have to be referred to the civil court.
E
       'MS', the owner of the suit property (agricultural
  lands) leased out the same to 'K' in the year 1945-46. 'MS'
  died on 24.7.1968. His legal heirs, namely, his wife, son
  and daughter, executed sale deeds, Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-
F 2 in respect of a part of the suit land. On 29. 7 .1968, 'K'
  executed a leasehold assignment deed, Ext. A-3, in
  favour of the son of 'MS'. The purchasers of the suit
  property under Ext. A-1 and A-2 obtained loans from State
  Bank of Travancore and in turn mortgaged to the Bank
G the properties under Exts. A-1 and A-2. After the death of
  'K', his legal heirs filed a civil suit in the year 1980 against
  the landlords, the purchasers and the Bank. The trial court
  decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiffs had
  leasehold rights over the suit property and were entitled

H                                 1084
           AMINA BEEVI v. THACH I & ORS.                1085


to recover possession thereof. The appeals filed by the          A
Bank and the purchasers were dismissed and so also
their second appeals.

     In the instant petitions for special leave to appeal, the
questions for consideration before the Court were: (1)           B
whether the High Court was right in holding that Ext.A3,
though styled as assignment of leasehold right, was in
fact a surrender of the leasehold right by the lessee in
favour of landlord and, therefore, hit bys. 51 of the Kerala
Land Reforms Act, 1963 which prohibited surrender of             C
interest of a tenant except in favour of the Government;
and (2) whether the suit filed by the tenants for
declaration of their tenancy rights in respect of the suit
land and for recovery of possession thereof was
expressly or impliedly barred by s.13A of the Act.
                                                                 D
    Dismissing the SLPs, the Court

     HELD: 1. In view of the proviso to s.51 of the Kerala
Land Reforms Act, 1963, any surrender by the tenant of
his interest to any person other than the Government is          E
prohibited. Ext.A3, being a surrender by the tenant of his
interest in favour of a person other than the Government,
was in contravention of s.51 and was void. This Court is,
therefore, not inclined to disturb the finding of the High
Court that Ext.A3 though styled as a leasehold
assignment deed was in fact a surrender of the interest
                                                                 F
of the tenant and was prohibited by s.51 of the Act. [para
6] [1091-G-H; 1092-A]

     2.1 Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
provides that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits    G
of a civil nature excepting suits which are either
expressly or impliedly barred. A plain reading of sub-s.
(1) of s.13A of the Act would show that a person who has
been dispossessed of his land in his occupation on or
                                                                 H
   1086    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2010] 12 S.C.R.

A after 1st April, 1964 and such person would have been a
  tenant under the Act as amended by the Kerala Land
  Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, at the time of such
  dispossession, would be entitled subject to the
  provisions of the Section to restoration of the possession
B of the land. None of the sub-sections of s.13A expressly
  state that a suit by a tenant for recovery of possession
  of the land which was under his occupation was barred.
  Therefore, a suit for recovery of possession by a tenant
  is not "expressly" barred. It cannot also be held that such
c a suit was "impliedly" barred by s.13A of the Act because
  of what is provided in s.125 of the Act. [para 7, 9 and 10]
  [1092-C; 1095-C-D; 1095-F]

       2.2 The provisions of s.125 make it amply clear that
  in any suit regarding rights of a tenant, the rights of the
D tenant including a question whether a person is a tenant
  will have to be referred by the Civil Court to the Land
  Tribunal and after the Land Tribunal decides the question,
  the Civil Court will decide the suit in accordance with the
  decision of the Land Tribunal. Considering these clear
E provisions of s.125 of the Act, this Court is of the
  considered opinion that the suit of the plaintiffs-
  respondents for declaration that they were tenants in
  respect of the suit property and for recovery of
  possession of the suit property from the defendants and
F for mesne profit was not barred either expressly or
  impliedly by s.13A of the Act. [para 1O] [1096-C-E]

       Koyappathodi Puthiyedath Ahammedkutty v. State of
   Kera/a and Others 1987 (Supp) SCC 158 - held
G inapplicable.
       3.1 It cannot be said that the Land Tribunal, to which
  the claim of tenancy of the plaintiffs-respondents was
  referred, has not considered the claim properly. A perusal
  of the order dated 13.11.1984 of the Land Tribunal shows
H that it has dealt with the oral evidence of several



   ' 1
           AMINA BEEVI v. THACH I & ORS.                 1087


witnesses and a large number of documents filed on               A
behalf of the parties and, in the light of the available
evidence, has come to the conclusion that the father of
the plaintiffs-respondents and after him the plaintiffs-
respondents had leasehold rights. The trial court has
accepted this finding of the Land Tribunal. The finding of       B
the Land Tribunal and the trial court on this point is a
finding of fact based on oral and documentary evidence
and this Court is not inclined to disturb this finding in this
Special Leave Petition. [para 11] [1096-G-H; 1097-A-B]

     3.2 Further, the issue whether the purchasers under         C
Exts. A-1 and A-2 were bona fide purchasers of the suit
property, having not been raised before the trial court, it
has not recorded a finding in this regard. Therefore, it is
not necessary to decide, in the instant case, whether a
tenant could or could not recover the land which was             D
under his occupation from a bona fide purchaser by
virtue of proviso (a) to sub-s. (1) of s.13A of the Act. [para
12] [1097 -C-D]

                     Case Law Reference:                         E
    1987 (Supp) SCC 158          held inapplicable para 3

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP (Civil) No.
15221 of 2007.
                                                                 F
    From the Judgment & Order dated 28.03.2007 of the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in S.A. No. 517 of 1988.

                            WITH

SLP (Civil) No. 19320 of 2007.                                   G
    Parag P. Tripathi, ASG, C.S. Rajan, K.N. Madhusoodanan,
T.G. Narayanan Nair, A.V. rangam, Shadan Farasat, Amey
Nargolkar, Buddy A. Rangadhan for the Petitioner.
                                                                 H
    1088    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A       C.S. Vaidyanathan, Haris Beeran, S. Sreekumar, Siraj
    Karoly, Radha Shyam Jena for the Respondents.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      A. K. PATNAIK, J. 1. These Special Leave Petitions have
B been filed against the common judgment and decree dated
  28.03.2007 passed by the Kerala High Court in Second
  Appeal Nos. 517 of 1988 and 311 of 1988.

       2. The facts very briefly are that Makkar Sahib was the
c owner of the suit property and in the year 1945-46 he made
  an oral lease of the suit property in favour of Kunjali on an
  annual rent. Pursuant to the oral lease, Kunjali obtained
  possession of the suit property and remained in possession
  of the suit property. Makkar Sahib died and on 24.07.1968, the
0 legal heirs of late Makkar Sahib, namely, his wife Mariyumma,
  his daughter Kochu Pathu and his son Abdul Kadar executed
  a sale deed (Ext. A 1) in respect of three acres of land out of
  the suit property in favour of Aisu and another sale deed (Ext.
  A2) in respect of two acres and one acre out of the suit property
E in favour of Fathima Beevi and Amina Beevi. On 29.07.1968,
  Kunjali executed a leasehold assignment deed (Ext. A3) in
  favour of Abdul Kadar. On 29.07 .1968 Mariyumma, Kochu
  Pathu and Abdul Kadar executed a sale deed (Ext. A4) in
  favour of Kunjali in respect of 75 cents of land. The purchasers
  of the suit property under Exhibits A 1 and A2, namely, Aisu,
F Fathima Beevi and Amina Beevi obtained loans from the State
  Bank of Travancore and mortgaged the properties purchased
  by them under Exhibits A 1 and A2 in favour of the Bank as
  security for the loan. When the loan was not repaid, the State
  Bank of Travancore filed a mortgage suit, O.S. No.131 of 1974,
G and obtained a decree for sale of the mortgaged property. In
  the year 1974, Mariyumma, Kochu Pathu and Abdul Kadar also
  sold some portions of the suit property to V.K. Kesavan and
  Janaky. Kunjali died leaving behind his wife Thachi, sons C.A.
  Sulaiman and M.A. Karim and daughters Aisha, Pathu and
H
 AMINA BE:EVI v. THACH I & ORS. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.] 1089


Howa. Thachi, Sulaiman, Aisha, Pathu and Howa (Plaintiffs)             A
filed a suit, O.S. No.129 of 1980, against Mariyumma, Kochu
Pathu, Abdul Kadar, Fathima Beevi, Amina Beevi, Aisu, V.K.
Kesavan, Janaky and the State Bank of Travancore (defendant
nos. 1 to 9) and the Trial Court decreed the suit declaring that
the plaintiffs have leasehold right over the suit property and are     B
entitled to recover possession of the suit property from
defendants no. 1 to 9 and are also entitled to mesne profit from
the date of suit till recovery of the possession or till expiry of
period of 3 years whichever was earlier. Aggrieved, the State
Bank of Travancore, Amina Beevi, V.K. Kesavan and Janaky               c
filed three appeals, A.S. Nos. 111, 117 and 121 of 1986. By a
judgment and decree dated 30.10.1987, the Additional District
Judge, Parur, dismissed the appeals. Against the judgment and
decree of the Additional District Judge, Parur, Amina Beevi and
the State Bank of Travancore filed Second Appeal Nos. 517              D
of 1988 and 311 of 1988 under Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 and by the impugned common judgment
and decree dated 28.03.2007, the High Court dismissed the
second appeals.

      3. Mr. C. S. Rajan, learned senior counsel appearing for         E
the petitioner in S.L.P. (C) 15221 of 2007 Amina Beevi,
submitted that the High Court has taken a view that Ext.A3 was
a surrender of the interest of the tenant Kunjali in the suit
property in favour of the landlord Abdul Kadar and such
surrender of the interest of the tenant in favour of any party other   F
than the Government was prohibited under Section 51 of the
Kera la Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short 'the Act'). He
submitted that a plain reading of Ext.A3 would show that it is
not a surrender but an assignment by Kunjali in favour of Abdul
Kadar and, therefore, the High Court was not right in coming           G
to the conclusion that Ext.A3 was a surrender hit by the statutory
prohibition in Section 51 of the Act. He next submitted that in
any case the fact remains that the plaintiffs in the suit, who are
the legal heirs of the tenant Kunjali, had been dispossessed of
the suit land and their remedy was not a suit in the civil court       H
                                                                r



    1090    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A but an application. to the Land Tribunal under Section 13A of
  the Act for restoration of possession. He cited the decision of
  this Court in Koyappathodi Puthiyedath Ahammedkutty v.
  State of Kera/a and Others (1987 (Supp) SCC 158] in which
  it has been held that when a surrender is shown to have been
B made contrary to the provision contained in Section 51 of the
  Act, the tenant concerned would be entitled to restoration of
  possession under Section 13A of the Act.

       4. Mr. Parag Tripathi, learned senior counsel appearing for
  the petitioner in SLP(C) 19320 of 2007, the State Bank of
C Travancore, submitted that proviso (a) to sub-Section (1) of
  Section 13A of the Act makes it clear that land sold to a bona
  fide purchaser is saved from the provisions of Section 13A of
  the Act. He submitted that Aisu, Fathima Beevi and Amina
  Beevi were bona fide purchasers of the suit property under
D Exhibits A 1 and A2 and hence the purchases of land made by
  them were protected under Proviso (a) of sub-Section (1) of
  Section 13A of the Act. He further submitted that in accordance
  with the provisions of sub-Section (3) of Section 125 of the Act,
  the Trial Court in the present case referred the question whether
E the plaintiffs were tenants in respect of the suit property to the
  Land Tribunal and a reading of the order passed by the Land
  Tribunal would show that the Land Tribunal has not properly
  decided the question whether the plaintiffs were tenants in
  respect of the suit property.
F
       5. In reply, Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel
  appearing for the plaintiffs-respondents, submitted that a plain
  reading of Ext.A3 would show that under Ext.A3 Kunjali has
  surrendered his leasehold right in favour of Abdul Kadar and
G therefore the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion
  that Ext.A3 though styled as leasehold assignment deed was
  actually a surrender of tenancy rights which was prohibited by
  Section 51 of the Act. In reply to the contention of Mr. Rajan
  that the only remedy of the plaintiffs-respondents was to apply
  to the Land Tribunal under Section 13A of the Act and not a
H
 AMINA BEEVI v. THACH I & ORS. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.] 1091


suit in a civil court, he submitted that Section 13A of the Act      A
was an additional remedy given to the tenant who is
dispossessed of his land and did not bar a civil suit for
declaration of right of tenancy and for recovery of the
possession of land covered by the tenancy. He submitted that
Aisu, Fathima Beevi and Amina Beevi who were impleaded               B
as defendants No.4, 5 and 6 in the suit have not taken any plea
in their written statement that they were bona fide purchasers
of the suit property and hence the contention of Mr. Parag
Tripathi that the Act protected bona fide purchasers of land
does not arise for decision in this case. He relied on the order     c
passed by the Land Tribunal to show that the Land Tribunal has
gone into the evidence at length and decided that the plaintiffs-
respondents were tenants in respect of the suit property.

      6. The first question that we have to decide is whether the
 High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that Ext.A3        D
though styled as assignment of leasehold right was in fact a
 surrender of the leasehold right by lessee in favour of landlord
 and therefore hit by Section 51 of the Act which prohibits
 surrender of interest of a tenant except in favour of the
Government. We have perused Ext.A3, copy of which has been           E
annexed to SLP (C) 15221 of 2007 as Annexure P3, and we
find that under Ext.A3 Kunjali, who was the ten~nt of the suit
land, has assigned his "leasehold right and possession" and
"relinquished" all his rights over the property in favour of Abdul
Kadar. In substance, therefore, Ext.A3 is a surrender of             F
leasehold or tenancy right by the lessee or the tenant in favour
of landlord. Sub-Section (1) of Section 51 of the Act provides
that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, a tenant may
terminate the tenancy in respect of any land held by him at any
time by surrender of his interest therein but makes it clear in      G
the proviso that no such surrender shall be made in favour of
any person other than the Government. Hence, under Section
51 of the Act any surrender of his interest by the tenant to any
person either than the Government is prohibited. Ext.A3, being
a surrender by the tenant of his interest in favour of a person      H
other than the Government, was in contravention of Section 51
    1092     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [201 OJ 12 S.C.R.


A   and was void. We are, therefore, not inclined to disturb the
    finding of the High Court that Ext.A3 though styled as a
    leasehold assignment deed was in fact a surrender of the
    interest of the tenant and was prohibited by Section 51 of the
    Act.
B
       7. The second question which we are called upon to
  decide in this case is whether the only remedy of the plaintiffs-
  respondents was to apply to the Land Tribunal under Section
  13A of the Act and consequently the suit filed by the plaintiffs-
  respondents was barred under the Act. Section 9 of the Code
C of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that Civil Courts have
  jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits which
  are either expressly or impliedly barred. Hence, we have to
  consider whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs-respondents for
  declaration of their tenancy rights in respect of suit land and
D for recovery of possession of the suit land was expressly or
  impliedly barred by Section 13A of the Act.

        8. Sections 13A and 125 of the Act, which are relevant for
    deciding this question are quoted herein below:
E
         "13A. Restoration of possession of persons
         dispossessed on or after 1st April, 1964 - (1)
         Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
         law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any
         judgment, decree or order of Court, where any
F
         person has been dispossessed of the land in his
         occupation on or after the 1st day of April, 1964, such
         person shall, if he would have been a tenant under this Act
         as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment)
G        Act, 1969, at the time of such dispossession, be entitled
         subject to the provisions of this section to restoration of
         possession of the land:

               Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall-
H               (a) apply in any case where the said land has been
AMINA BEEVI v. THACH I & ORS. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.] 1093


           sold to a bona fide purchaser for consideration          A
           before the date of publication of the Kerala Land
           Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 1968, in the Gazette; or

           (b) entitle any person to restoration of possession
           of any land which has been resumed under the             B
           provisions of this Act.

   (2) Any person entitled to restoration of possession under
   sub-section (1) may, within a period of six months from the
   commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment)
   Act, 1969, apply to the Land Tribunal for the restoration of     C
   possession of the land,

   (3) The Land Tribunal may, after such inquiry as it deems
   fit, pass an order allowing the application for restoration
   and directing the applicant to deposit the compensation,         D
   if any, received by the applicant under any decree or order
   of Court towards value of improvements or otherwise and
   the value of improvements, if any effected on the land after
   the dispossession as may be determined by the Land
   Tribunal, within such period as may be specified in the
                                                                    E
   order.

   (4) On the deposit of the compensation and value of
   improvements as required in the order under sub-section
   (3), the Land Tribunal shall restore the applicant to
   possession of the land, if need be by removing any person        F
   who refuses to vacate the same.

    125. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Coutts - (1) No Civil Court
   shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any
   question or to determine any matter which is by or under         F
   this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to
   be determined by the Land Tribunal or the appellate
   authority or the Land Board [or the Taluk Land Board] or
   the Government or an officer of the Government;
                                                                    H
    1094   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 12 S.C.R.


A             Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section
              shall apply to proceedings pending in any Court at
              the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms
              Amendment Act, 1969.

       (2) No order of the Land Tribunal or the appellate authority
B
       or the Land Board [or the Taluk Land Board] or the
       Government or an officer of the Government made under
       this Act shall be questioned in any Civil Court, except as
       provided in this Act.

c      (3) If in any suit or other proceedings any question
       regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran
       (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant
       or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the Civil Court shall stay
       the suit or other proceedings and refer such question to
D      the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which
       the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant
       records for the decision of that question only.

       (4) The Land Tribunal shall decide the question referred
       to it under sub-section (3) and return the records together
E
       with its decision to the Civil Court.

       (5) The Civil Court shall then proceed to decide the suit
       or other proceedings accepting the decision of the Land
       Tribunal on the question referred to it.
F
       (6) The decision of the Land Tribunal on the question
       referred to it shall, for the purposes of appeal, be deemed
       to be part of the finding of the Civil Court.

       (7) No Civil Court have power to grant injunction in any suit
G      or other proceeding referred to in sub-section (3)
       restraining any person from entering into or occupying or
       cultivating any land or kudikidappu or to appoint a receiver
       for any property in respect of which a question referred to
       in that sub-section has arisen, till such question is decided
H
 AMINA BEEVI v. THACH I & ORS. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.] 1095


     by the Land Tribunal, and any such injunction granted or          A
     appointment made before the commencement of the
     Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, or before
     such question has arisen, shall stand cancelled.

     (8) In this Section, "Civil Court" shall include a Rent Control
                                                                       B
     Court as defined in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent
     Control) Act, 1965."

      9. A plain reading of Sub-Section (1) of Section 13A of
the Act quoted above would show that a person who has been
dispossessed of his land in his occupation on or after 1st             C
April, 1964 and such person would have been a tenant under
the Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment)
Act, 1969, at the time of such dispossession, would be entitled
subject to the provisions of the Section to restoration of the
possession of the land. It, thus, appears that any person who          D
has been dispossessed of land under his occupation on or
after 1st April, 1964 and such person would have been a
tenant under the Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms
(Amendment) Act, 1969 has been provided with a special
remedy of restoration of possession of land under Section              E
13A of the Act. None of the sub-sections of Section 13A
expressly state that a suit by a tenant for recovery of
possession of land which was under his occupation was barred.
Hence a suit for recovery of possession by a tenant is not
"expressly" barred.                                                    F

      10. We cannot also hold that such a suit was "impliedly"
barred by Section 13A of the Act because of what is provided
in Section 125 of the Act. Sub-Section (1) of Section 125 of
the Act quoted above states that no Civil Court shall have
jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to         G
determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to
be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the
Land Tribunal and sub-Section (3) of Section 125 states that if
in any suit or other proceedings any question regarding rights
of a tenant including a question as to whether a person is a           H
    1096     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010] 12 S.C.R.


A   tenant arises, the Civil Court shall stay the suit or other
    proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having
    jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is
    situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that
    question only. Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 further states that
B   the Land Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under
    sub-Section (3) and return the records together with its decision
    to the Civil Court and under sub-section (5) of Section 125 the
    Civil Court shall then proceed to decide the suit or other
     proceedings accepting the decision of the Land Tribunal on the
c   question referred to it. These provisions make it amply clear
    that in any suit regarding rights of a tenant, the rights of the
    tenant including a question whether a person is a tenant will
     have to be referred by the Civil Court to the Land Tribunal and
    after the Land Tribunal decides the question, the Civil Court will
     decide the suit in accordance with the decision of the Land
0
     Tribunal. Considering these clear provisions of Section 125 of
     the Act, we are of the considered opinion that the suit of the
     plaintiffs-respondents for declaration that they were tenants in
     respect of the suit property and for recovery of possession of
     the suit property from the defendants and for mesne profit was
E    not barred either expressly or impliedly by Section 13A of the
     Act. This Court has also not held in Koyappathodi Puthiyedath
     Ahammedkutty v. State of Kera/a and Others (supra) cited by
     Mr. Rajan that the tenant cannot institute a suit in a Civil Court
     for declaration of his tenancy in respect of a land and for
F    recovery of possession of the land covered by the tenancy.

       11. We may now take up the contention of Mr. Tripathi that
  the Land Tribunal, to which the claim of tenancy of the plaintiffs-
  respondents was referred, has not considered the claim
G properly. We have perused the order dated 13.11.1984 of the
  Land Tribunal, Perumbavoor, a copy of which has been
  annexed as Annexure R-2 in I.A. No.2 of 2010 in SLP (C)
  No.19320 of 2007, and we find that the Land Tribunal has dealt
  with the oral evidence of several witnesses and a large number
H of documents filed on behalf of the parties and has come to
 AMINA BEEVI v. THACH! & ORS. [A.K. PATNAIK, J.)1097


the conclusion that the father of the plaintiffs-respondents and     A
after him the plaintiffs-respondents had leasehold rights in the
light of the available evidence. We also find that the Trial Court
has accepted this finding of the Land Tribunal upholding the
leasehold right of the plaintiffs-respondents and has decided
Issue No.1 in the suit accordingly. The finding of the Land          B
Tribunal and the Trial Court on this point is a finding of fact
based on oral and documentary evidence and we are not
inclined to disturb this finding in this Special Leave Petition.

     12. We also find that no issue was raised before the Trial      C
Court whether Aisu, Fathima Beevi and Amina Beevi were
bona fide purchasers of the suit property and therefore the Trial
Court has not recorded a finding on this issue. In the absence
of any finding on this issue of fact, we do not think it necessary
to decide in this case whether a tenant could or could not
recover land which was under his occupation from a bona fide         D
purchaser by virtue of what' is provided in Proviso (a} to Sub-
section (1) of Section 13A of the Act.

    13. In the result, we hold that there is no merit in these
Special Leave Petitions and we accordingly dismiss the same.         E
No costs.

R.P.                                           SLPs dismissed.