Supreme Court of India
AMARINDER SINGHversusSPECIAL COMMITIEE, PUNJAB VIDHAN ,SABHA & OTHERS
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 240
- Decided
- 26 April 2010
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- K G BALAKRISHNAN
Holding
The Punjab Vidhan Sabha exceeded its constitutional powers by expelling the member, rendering the resolution under Article 194(3) invalid.
Summary
Captain Amarinder Singh, former Chief Minister of Punjab, was expelled from the Punjab Vidhan Sabha for the remainder of its 13th term after a Special Committee found him involved in an alleged illegal exemption of land during his tenure as Chief Minister in the 12th term. The appellant challenged the expulsion, arguing that the alleged misconduct was an executive act, did not obstruct legislative proceedings, pertained to a previous Assembly, and was sub judice. The Supreme Court examined whether the expulsion was a proper exercise of legislative privileges under Article 194(3) and whether the Assembly could act on matters from a dissolved house. The Court held that the exemption was an executive act, the Assembly’s action did not protect legislative integrity, the matter fell outside the scope of the current Assembly’s business, and the sub‑judice rule barred the Assembly from intervening. Consequently, the resolution expelling the appellant was declared unconstitutional and his membership was restored.
Issues considered
- Whether the alleged misconduct warranted the exercise of legislative privileges under Article 194(3) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Punjab Vidhan Sabha could take up an incident that occurred during its previous term as a breach of privilege.
- Whether the Punjab Vidhan Sabha violated the sub‑judice norm by dealing with a matter pending before a court.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure
- Constitution of Indias. Article 105(3), s. Article 107(3), s. Article 122(1), s. Article 172(1), s. Article 174(2)(a), s. Article 174(2)(b), s. Article 190, s. Article 191, s. Article 194(3), s. Article 212(1), s. Article 356
- Punjab Apartment and Property Regulation Acts. Section 5
- Punjab Land Improvement Acts. Section 36
- Punjab Town Improvement Acts. Section 56
- Representation of the People Acts. 1971
Subjects
legislative privilegeexpulsion of memberArticle 194(3)separation of powerssub judicedissolution of legislaturedoctrine of lapsejudicial reviewPunjab Vidhan Sabhaexecutive act
Judgment
[2010] 4 S.C.R. 1105
AMARINDER SINGH A
v. 1 I
SPECIAL COMMITIEE, PUNJAB VIDHAN ,SABHA &
OTHERS ·.I
1
(Civil Appeal No. 6053 of 2008)
B
APRIL 26, 2010
[K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI, R.V. RAVEENDRAN, P.
SATHASIVAM, J.M. PANCHAL, AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.] •
Constitution of India, 1950: c
I I
Article 194(3) - Powers and privileges of House of
Legislature - Expulsion of Me.mber of Vidhan Sabha for
alleged improper exemption of land from acquisition scheme
when he was Chief Minister during previous term of the House 0
- HELD: The allegedly improper exemption of land was an
executive act and it did not distort, obstruct or threaten the
integrity of the legislative proceedings in any manner - The
Vidhan Sabha exceeded its powers by expelling the Member
on the ground of a breach of privilege when there existed none E
- Resolution passed by Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 10.9.2008
directing expulsion of appellant for the remainder of 13th Term
of Vidhan Sabha is declared invalid - Judicial review.
Article 105(3) and 194(3) rlw Articles 122(1) and 212(1)
- Expulsion of Member of Vidhan Sabha - Judicial review of F
- HELD: Though Articles 122(1) and 212(1) make it clear that
Courts cannot inquire into matters relating to irregularities in
observance of procedure before Legislature, but Courts can
examine whether proceedings conducted under Article 105(3)
or Article 194(3) are 'tainted on account of substantive or G
gross illegality or unconstitutionality' - In the instant case, the
a/legations of wrong doing pertain to executive act given effect
to in previous term of the House - Besides, there was no
conceivable obstruction caused to the conduct of routine
1105 H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A legislative business - Therefore, tne act of recommending the
expulsion cannot be justified as a proper exercise of 'powers,
privileges and immunities' conferred by Article 194(3) and is
constitutionally invalid.
Article 194(3) - House of Legislature - Exercise of
8
powers and privileges relating to acts done in previous term
of the House - Vidhan Sabha recommending expulsion of
its member for alleged improper exemption of land from
acquis,"tion scheme, when he was Chief Minister during the
C previous term of the House - HELD: Ordinarily, legislative
business does not survive the 'dissolution' of the House - In
the instant case, the alleged improper exemption of land took
place during the 12th Vidhan Sabha, and at the time of
reconstitution of the 13th Vidhan Sabha, there was no pending
motion, report or any other order of business which had a
D connection with the alleged improper exemption of land - It
was, therefore, not proper for the Assembly to inquire into
actions that took place during its previous term - Doctrine of
lapse.
E Legislature:
House of Legislature - Inquiring into sub-judice matter
- HELD: Ordinarily, legislative proceedings should not touch
on sub-judice matters - In the instant case, improper
c exemption of land had already been questioned and was
pending before the High Court - Therefore, the Vidhan Sabha
should have refrained from dealing with the same subject
matter - Rules of Business and Conduct of the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha - rr. 39(1), 50, 93(2)(iv) and 150(a) - Rules of
Business and Conduct of the Lok Sabha - rr. 173, 188 and
G 352
Constitutionalism:
Constitution of India - Separation of powers - House of
H Legislature - Resolution containing directions as to how
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1107
VIDHAN SABHA
investigation into the alleged wrong doings of a Member of A
the fjouse, along with some others should be conducted as
also certain directions tq Vigilance Department in that regard
- HELD: These functions are within the domain of Executive,
a'1d the Legislature would not assume the responsil;ility of
monitoring an ongoing investigation - Further, a legislative B
body is not entru,s~ed with the power of adjudicating a case
once an appropfiate forum is in existence under the
constitutional scµeme - There was an obvious jurisdictional
error on the part of the Vidhan Sabha - Doctrines -
E$eparation of/powers. c
The appellant, who was the Chief Minister of the State
dur.ing~~ 12th term of the Vidhan Sabha, was elected
as a M mber of the House for its 13th term, which was
cons ti uted on 1.3.2007, and became the leader of the
opposition. A privilege motion was moved in the 13th D
Vidhan Sabha in respect of grant of exemption of 32.10
jiCres of land from the acquislflon scheme and tampering
with the proceedings dated 1:3.2006,-0f the 12th Vidhan
·Sabha in that regard. The,matter /was referred to the
Privilege Committee' of the House, and its report was E
tabled before the Hduse on 18.12.2007. The matter was
further referred to the Special Committee to examine the
role of the appellant in the matter. The report of the
Special Committee, which was presented to the House
on 5.9.2008, recorded the findings, inter alia, that the F
appellant ,and three others were involved in corruption,
conspiracy to 1cause wrongful loss to public exchequer
and abuse of public office in relation to exemption of land
from the acquisition scheme. The House, accepting the
report of the Special Committee, passed the resolution G
dated 10.9.2008 recommending expulsion of the appellant
for the remaining term of the 13th Vidhan Sabha and a
direction to the Secretary of the Vidhan Sabha to
approaGh the Election Commission of India to have the
H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 4 S.C.R.
A seat of the appellant declared as vacant. It was further
recommended that since the House did not possess any
investigation facilities, a custodial interrogation of the
persons involved should be directed and the Director,
Vigilance Department be instructed to file an FIR and,
B after investigation, to submit its report to the Speaker of
the House. A notification was issued to that effect the
same day, i.e. on 10.9.2008. The appellant filed a writ
petition before the High Court, which did not grant any
stay of operation of the resolution except protection to
c the appellant from custodial interrogation. Aggrieved, the
appellant filed the appeal. A transfer petition was also
filed which was allowed and the writ petition before the
High Court was transferred to the Supreme Court. Two
writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution were
filed by the other persons involved in the exemption
0
matter along with the appellant. Since the subject matter
touched on substantial question of law requiring
interpretation of Article 194(3) of the Constitution, the
appeal and the connected matters were, ultimately,
referred to the Constitution Bench.
E
The questions for consideration before the Court
were: (i) "Whether the alleged misconduct on .part of the
appellant and the petitioners warranted the exercise of
legislative privileges under Article 194(3) of the
F Constitution?"; (ii) "Whether it was proper for the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha to take up, as a matter of breach of
privilege, an incident that occurred during its previous
term?"; and (iii) "Whether the impugned acts of the
Punjab Vidhan Sabha violated the norms that should be
G respected in relation to sub judice matters?"
Disposing of the appeal and the connected matters,
the Court
HELD: 1.1. The exercis_e of legislative privileges is not
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1109
VIDHAN SABHA
an end in itself .. They are supposed to be exercised in A
order
I
to ensure that legislative functions can be
exercised effectively, without undue obstructions. The
important consideration for scrutinising the exercise of
. leriislative privileges is whether the same was necessary
to safeguard the integrity of legislative functions. [Para B
24] [1136-D, E, F]
1.2. A breach of privilege by a member of the
legislature can only be established when his act is directly
connected with or bears a proximity to his duties, role or C
functions as a legislator. This test of proximity should be
the rule of thumb, while of course accounting for
exceptional circumstances where a person who is both
a legislator and a holder of executive office may commit
a breach of privilege. It is the considered view of the Court
that such a breach has not occurred in the instant case. D
[Para 35] [1157-B]
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 1
SCR 317 = (2007) 3 sec 184, relied on.
E
Re Special Reference 1 of 1964, 1965 SCR 413 =AIR
1965 SC 745; State of Karnataka v. Union of India, 1978 (2)
SCR 1 = (1977) 4 SCC 608, referred to.
New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia, (1993)
100 DLR 4th 212, referred to. F
Parliame[ltary Procedure- Law Privileges, Practice &
Precedents by Subhash C. Kashyap Vol. 2 (New Delhi:
Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2000) p.1555;
Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 16th edn. (London: G
Bytterworths, 1957); Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn.
(Reissue Vol. 34, at p. 553; 76th Report of the Senate
Committee of Privileges (Australia); Hatsell's Collection of
Cases of Privileges of Parliament (1776); Sir Erskine May's
H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A Parliamentary Practice (1950); Advanced Law Lexicon,by
Ramanatha Aiyar 2nd edn. Vol. 3 (New Delhi: Wadhwa &
Co. Nagpur, 1997); Report of the Select Committee on
Parliamentary Privilege (1967) (UK), referred to.
1.3. Even considering the parliamentary practice in
8
India, it is quite apparent that the expulsion of members
should only be sustained if their actions have caused
obstructions to legislative functions or are likely to cause
the same.Legislatures have power to expel their
C members, subject to the judicially prescribed guidelines.
[para 36] [1157 -D]
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 1
SCR 317 = (2007) 3 SCC 184; and P. V. Narasimha Rao v.
=
State. 1998 (2) SCR 870 (1998) 4 SCC 626, referred to.
D
Practice and Procedure of Parliament,by Kaul and
Shakdher, 5th edn. (New Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co.
Pvt. Ltd., 2001) pp. 191-193; Parliamentary Procedure- Law
Privileges, Practice & Precedents by Subhash C. Kashyap
E Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
2000), p.1555, referred to.
1.4. The various grounds for disqualification of
members of legislative assemblies (MLAs) have been
enumerated in Articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution.
F For most circumstances, there is elaborate machinery in
place to decide questions pertaining to the
disqualification of members and the vacancy of seats. If
a sitting member of a legislature is found guilty of
committing a statutory offence, then disqualification can
G be a consequence as per the scheme contemplated in
the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is for the
purpose of tackling unforeseen and novel impediments
to legislative functioning that the 'powers, privileges and
immunities' contemplated by Article 194(3) of the
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1111
VIDHAN SABHA
Constitution have not been codified. But, the A
expressions such as 'lowering the dignity of the house',
'conduct unbecoming of a member of the House' and
'unfitness of a member' are openly-worded and abstract
grounds which, if recognised, will trigger the
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of legislative B
privileges by incumbent majorities to target their political
opponents as well as dissidents. [Para 33,38) [1161-B;
1151-A; 1160-H; 1161-A; 1161-C]
1.5. In Raja Ram Pal's case, the majority decision of C
this Court did recognise that the legislature's power to
punish for its contempt could be exercised to expel
legislators for grounds other than those prescribed in the
Constitution, but it was not the intention of this Court to
prescribe an untrammeled power. By laying down a clear
set of guidelines for judicial review over the exercise of D
parliamentary privileges, this Court had made its
intentions quite clear. Accordingly, the power of a
legislative chamber to punish for its own contempt
should broadly ccjncide with the legislature's interest in
protecting the integrity of its functions. (Para 38) (1161- E
D, E]
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 1
SCR 317 = (2007) 3 sec 184, relied on.
1.6. In the instant case, the allegedly improper F
exemption of land was an executive act attributable to the
appellant and it did not distort, obstruct or threaten the
integrity of legislative proceedings in any manner.
Therefore, the exercise of legislative privileges under
Article 194(3) of the Constitution was not proper. The G
considered view of the Court is that the Punjab Vidhan
Sabha exceeded its powers by expelling the appellant on
the ground of a breach of privilege when there existed
none. (para 55(i)] (1171-E-G]
H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 4 S.C.R.
A 2.1. In view of the principles of judicial review in
relation to exercise of parliamentary privileges as culled
out in Raja Ram Pal's case, this Court is empowered to
scrutinize the exercise of legislative privileges which
admittedly include the power of a legislative chamber to
8 punish for contempt of itself. The specific guidelines in
the saic case advocate due deference to the actions of
the legislature in the ordinary course of events. Articles
122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution make it amply clear
that Courts canr;10t inquire into matters related to
c irregularities in o'bservance of procedures before the
legislature. However, the Courts can examine whether
proceedings conducted under Article 105(3) or 194(3) are
'tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or
unconstitutionality'. [para 29-30] [1146-C-E-G)
D 2.2. This Court recognizes that the threshold for
exercising judicial review in a case such as the instant
one is indeed very high and it must begin with a
presumption that the legislatures' actions were valid. The
facts in the instant case do not merely touch on a
E procedural irregularity. The relevant fact here is not only
that the allegations of wrongdoing pertain to an executive
act, but the fact is also that there is no conceivable
obstruction caused to the conduct of routine legislative
business.Sufficient material has been produced to
F demonstrate that it was not necessary for the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha to have exercised its powers under Article
194(3) to recommend and then notify the expulsion of the
appellant. It cannot be said that the alleged misconduct
on part of the appellant had the effect of obstructing the
G ordinary legislative functions of the Vidhan Sabha.
Therefore, the act of recommending the appellant's
expulsion through the impugned resolution cannot be
justified as a proper exercise of 'powers, privileges and
immunities' conferred by Article 194(3). [para 29-30) [1146-
H F-H; A, B, CJ
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1113
VIDHAN SABHA
3. Ordinarily, legislative business does not survive A
the 'dissolution' of the House. The exception to this norm
is covered by the 'doctrine of lapse' wherein the
successor House can choose to take up a pending
motion or any order of business after the re-constitution
of the House. However, this exception is not applicable B
in the facts of the instant case. The allegedly improper
exemption of a plot of land took place during the 12th
term of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha which was
subsequently dissolved; whereas the constitution of the
Special Committee, to inquire into the same, took place c
during the 13th term. Th'erefore, it was not proper for the
13th Punjab Vidhan Sabha to claim a breach of privileges
on account of the alleged misconduct which actually
took place during its 12th term; especially when at the
time of the reconstitution of the 13th Punjab Vidhan 0
Sabha, t.here was no pending motion, report or any other
order of business which had a connection with the
allegedly improper exemption of land. However, this view
should not be mistaken for a general proposition since
it may be that in some circumstances the acts that have
E
taken place during the previous terms of a Legislature
could actually have the effect of distorting, obstructing
or diluting the integrity of legislative business in the
succeeding term. Evidently, no such consequence or
tendency has been demonstrated in the instant case.
[para 39-40,44,45 and 55(ii)] (1167-A; 1168-B; 1177-H; F
1178-A]
Gujarat Assembly Election case (2002) 3 Suppl.
SCR 366 = (2002) 8 SCC 237; Purushothaman Nambudiri
v. State of Kera/a, 1962 Suppl. SCR 753 = AIR 1962 SC G
694; Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of
India (1991) 2 Suppl. SCR 1 = (1991) 4 SCC 699, referred
to.
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edn. (West Group) p. 506;
H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd edn.,
Vol. 20-1 ; and Practice and Procedure of Parliament,by
Kaul and Shakdher, 5th edn. (New Delhi: Metropolitan
Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2001) pp. 191-193, referred to.
B 4.1. It is a settled principle that ordinarily the content
of legislafive proceedings should not touch on sub judice
matters. The ratiqnale for this norm is that legislative
debate or scrutiny over matters pending for adjudication
could unduly prejudice the rights' of the litigants. In the
C case at hand, the allegedly improper exemption of land
from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme had already been
questioned before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
and the subject matter of dispute was pending before it.
This fact was well known at the time of the constitution
of the Special Committee by the Vidhan Sabha on
D 18.12.2007. Therefore, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha should
h::tve refrained from dealing with the same subject matter
and ought not to have constituted a committee to inquire
into it. Rules 39(1 ), 50, 93(2)(iv) and 150(d) of the Rules
of Business and Conduct of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha
E are quite categorical in laying down a prohibition on the
taking up of any matter which is pending adjudication
before a court of law. Analogues provisions are Rules
173,188 and 352 of the Rules of Business and Conduct
of the Lok Sabha. [para 46,49, 51 and 55] [1168-D; 1170-
F F; 1172-H; A, B; 1178-D 1178-D]
Parliamentary Procedure- Law Privileges,· Practice &
rrecedents Vol. 2 by Subhash C. Kashyap, (New Delhi:
Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2000) ; and Griffith
G and Ryle, Parliament, Functions and Procedure (2003),
Chapter 6 Para 6-075, referred to.
4.2. The doctrine of separation of powers is an
inseparable part of the evolution of parliamentary
democracy itself. Our institutions of governance have
H been intentionally founded on the principle of separation
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1115
VIDHAN SABHA
of powers and the Constitution does not give unfettered A
power to any organ. All the three principal organs are
expected to work in harmony and in consonance with the
spirit and essence of the Constitution. The resolution
dated 10-9-2008 passed by the Punjab Vidhan Sabha
contains directions as to how the investigation into the B
appellant's and petitioners' alleged wrongdoing should
be conducted. The resolution directs the filing of FIRs
and custodial interrogation in addition to directing the
Vigilance Department, to find out where the appellan~ and
the others have stored their 'ill gotten wealth' and further c
directs the Vigilance Department to report back to the
Speaker of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. These functions
are within the domain of the executive. It is up to the
investigating agencies themselves to decide how to
proceed with the investigation in a particular case. The 0
role of the legislature in this regard can at best be
recommendatory and the Speaker of the Legislature
would not assume the responsibility of monitoring an
ongoing investigation. [Para 52-53] [1173-C, E; 1175-E-G]
4.3. Further, a legislative body is not entrusted with E
the power of adjudicating a case once an appropriate
forum is in existence under the constitutional scheme. A
determination of guilt or innocence by way of fact-finding
is a role properly reserved for the trial judge. The only
exception to this principle is when the impugned acts F
have the effect of distorting, obstructing or threatening
the integrity of legislative proceedings or are likely to do
the same, thereby warranting the exercise of privileges.
There was an obvious jurisdictional error on part of the
Punjab Vidhan Sabha in the instant case. [para 52-53] G
[1173-E; 1174-H; 1175-A]
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1976 SCR 347 =
(1975) Supp SCC 1, referred to.
Kilbourn v. Thompson 103 US 168 (1881 ), referred to. H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A 5. It is declared that the resolution passed by the
Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 10-9-2008, directing expulsion
of the appellant for the remainder of the 13th term of the
Vidhan Sabha is constitutionally invalid. Therefore, the
appellant's membership in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha is
B directed to be restored. However, nothing in this
judgment should act as a hurdle against the investigation,
if any, into the alleged role of the appellant and the
petitioners in the improper exemption of land from the
Amritsar Improvement Scheme that was notified on 13-
C 1-2006. [para 56) [1178-F, G]
Case Law Reference:
(2007) 1 SCR 317 relied on para 12
(1993) 100 DLR 4th 212 referred to para 20
D
(1965) SCR 413 referred to para 21
(1978) 2 SCR 1 referred to para 22
(1998) 2 SCR 870 referred to para 36
E para 42
(2002) 3 Suppl. SCR 366 referred to
(1962) Suppl. SCR 753 referred to para 43
(1991) 2 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to para 43
F 1976 SCR 347 referred to para 52
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6053 of 2008.
From the Judgment & Order dated 15.9.2007 of the High
G Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 16216
of 2008.
WITH
H T.C. (C) No. 1 of 2009, W.P. (C) Nos. 442 and 443 of 2008.
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1117
VIDHAN SABHA
Gopal Subramanium, ASG, K. Parasaran, Uday Umesh A
Lalit, Ashok H. Desai, Ravi Shankar Prasad, Shyam Diwan K.
Parasaran, Uday Umesh Lalit, Jayshree Anand, AAG Atul
Nanda, Rameeza Hakeem, Abhijat, P. Medh, Law Associates
& Co. K.K. Mahalik, Nitu Kumai Sinha, Kuldip Singh, Gaurav
Agrawal, Ajay Pal, Aprajita Singh, Nikhil Jain, Aman Pal, B
Sukhda Pritam, Ardendhu Mauli K. Prasad, Gorminder Singh,
Anuradha Biundra, Menka Guruswamy, Charu Sangwan,
.Paruthi K. Goswamy, Chaman Lal Premi, Jai Shree Anand,
Ajay Bansal, Aman Ahluwalia, Balaji Subramanian (for B.K.
Prasad) for the appearing parties. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI 1. The appellant was the
Chief Minister of the State of Punjab during the 12th term of
the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. The appellant was duly elected as D
a member of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha for its 13th term.
2. The Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 10-9-2008 passed a
resolution which directed the expulsion of the appellant for the
remainder of the 13th term of the same Vidhan Sabha. This E
resolution was passed after considering a report submitted by
a Special Committee of the Vidhan Sabha (Respondent No
1) on 3-9-2008 which recorded findings that the appellan• along
with some other persons (petitioners in the connected matters)
had engaged in criminal misconduct. The Special Committee
had itself been constituted on 18-12-2007 in pursuance of a
F
resolution passed by the Vidhan Sabha. It had been given the
task of inquiring into allegations of misconduct that related back
to the appellant's tenure as the Chief Minister of the State of
Punjab during the 12th term of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. More
specifically, it was alleged that the appellant was responsible G
for the improper exemption of a vacant plot of land which was
licensed to a particular private party (measuring 32.10 acres)
from a pool of 187 acres of land that had been notified for
acquisition by the Amritsar Land Improvement Trust on 5-12-
2003. The Amritsar Land Improvement Trust is a statutory body H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A which had notified the plan for acquisition in pursuance of a
developmental scheme, as contemplated under Section 36 of
the Punjab Land Improvement Act. 1922. Earlier, on 23-6-2003,
a private party (M/s. Veer Colonizers) had applied for a licence
under Section 5 of the Punjab Apartment and Property
B Regulation Act, 1995 to develop the above-mentioned plot of
32.1 O acres which was situated in the proximity of the Amritsar-
of
Jalandhar road. At the time the colohizer's application for a
development licence, the said plot was not covered by any
acquisition scheme, though it had been covered by two
c schemes in the past which had lapsed by then. After the
notification of the scheme, the colonizer approached the
concerned ~uthorities, seeking an exemption from the proposed
acquisition of land. Subsequently on 7-10-2005, the Amritsar
Land Improvement Trust granted a No-objection certificate,
thereby permitting the exemption of the said plot of 32.10 acres
0
from the scheme for acquisition. This decision to exempt the
said plot of 32.10 acres was notified by the State Government
on 13-01-2006 under Section 56 of the Punjab Town
Improvement Act. Since the appellant was serving as the Chief
E Minister of the State at the time, it was alleged that the decision
to exempt the plot was an executive act that could be attributed
to him.
3. However, some other private parties who owned plots
in the pool of land that had been notified for acquisition by the
F Amritsar Land Improvement Trust on 5-12-2003, raised
objections a~ainst the exemption referred to above. The gist
of their objections is that the State Government had unduly
favoured one private party by exempting the said plot of 32.10
acres from the scheme for acquisition. In fact the validity of the
G exemption was questioned in several cases instituted before
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, namely those of Major
General Sukhdip Randhawa (Retd.) & Ors. Vs. State of
Punjab (CWP No. 16923 of 2006), Mis. Daljit Singh Vs. State
of Punjab (CWP No. 20266 of 2006), Sudarshan Kaur Vs.
H State of Punjab (CWP No. 2929 of 2007) and Basant
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITIEE, PUNJAB 1119
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
Colonisers & Builders (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Punjab (CWP No. A
7838 of 2008). All of these cases were pending before the High
Court at the time of the hearings in the present case.
4. Following the elections held to re-constitute the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha in February 2007, there was a transition in
B
power in the -State. The 13th Vidhan Sabha was constituted on
1-3-2007. The appellant who had served as the Chief Minister
of the State during the 12th term of the Vidhan Sabha, became
the leader of the opposition in the 13th term: In pursuance of a
news report dated 22.3.2007, some members of the Legislative
Assembly moved a privilege motion in respect of allegafions C
of tampering in the proceedings of the 12th Vidhan Sabha
(dated 1-3-2006). These allegations were in regard to a starred
question relating to the grant of exemption of 32.10 ac1es of
land. On 5-4-2007 the notice of motion was referred to the
Privileges Committee of the House by the Speaker. Thereafter, D
questions were raised on the floor of the house which cast
aspersions on the appellant's past conduct. On 18-12-2007, the
report of the Privileges Committee was tabled before the
House. The incumbent Chief Minister brought a motion which
specifically questioned the appellant's role in the exemption of E
the 32.10 acre plot from the acquisition scheme notified by the
Amritsar Improvement Trust. Following this motion, the Speaker
of the House approved the constitution of a Special Committee
to inquire into the alleged misconduct. The terms of reference
for the Special Committee required it to examine as to what F
were the reasons for exempting the said plot measuring 32.10
acres of land. As part of this inquiry, the Special Committee
had to examine whether any rule/norms had been violated on
account of this exemption and whether it had caused monetary
losses to the State exchequer. The stated objective was to G
identify those responsible for such losses.
5. The Special Committee submitted its report on 3-9-
2008 which was presented to the House on 5-9-2008. The
report included findings that Captain Amarinder Singh (former H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A Chief Minister, appellant in Civil Appeal No. 6053 of 2008),
Choudhary Jagjit Singh [former Local Bodies Minister,
petitioner in Writ Petition (Civ.) No. 443 of 2008], Late Sh.
Raghunath Sahai Puri [former Housing Minister, since
deceased] and Sh.· Jugal Kishore Sharma [former Chairman
B of Amritsar Land Improvement Trust, petitioner in Writ Petition
(Civ.) No. 442 of 2008) had been involved in 'corruption,
conspiracy to cause wrongful loss and abuse of public office'
in relation to the exemption of land from the above-mentioned
acquisition scheme. It must be noted that out of the four
C individuals named in the report, only Captain Amarinder Singh
was elected as a member of the 13th Punjab Vidhan Sabha.
After considering these findings, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha
passed the impugned resolution on 10-9-2008 which is
extracted below:
D "After accepting the report submitted by the Special
Committee appointed by this House, this august House
recommends the following action:
*** *** ***
E
(i) Captain Amarinder Singh is expelled for the remaining
term of the 13th Punjab Vidhan Sabha. The Secretary of
the Vidhan Sabha is instructed to approach the Election
Commission of India to have his seat declared as vacant.
F (ii) The recommendations of the Privilege Committee have
been tabled in the House on 18.12.2007 and they be
forwarded to Chief Secretary, Punjab Government with the
undermentioned instructions:-
Because this House does not possess any facility
G
to investigate and find out where the accused have
stashed away the ill gotten wealth or how it has
been distributed, it is essential to have custodial
interrogation. Director Vigilance Department,
Punjab which deals with corruption cases and is an
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITIEE, PUNJAB 1121
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
arm of the Punjab Government be instructed to file, A
a FIR keeping in mind the various instructions of the
CrPC.
The vigilance department is to investigate and
submit its report to the Speaker of this House within B
two months from today."
6. In pursuance of the said resolution, the secretariat of the
Punjab Vidhan Sabha issued a notification on 10-9-2008 which
declared that Captain Amarinder Singh had been expelled from
the membership of the 13th Vidhan Sabha for the remaining C
term of the State Legislature, (that is 3.5 years). It was also
declared that his assembly constituency seat (76-Patiala Town)
was 'rendered vacant, thereby setting aside his election to the
same. Aggrieved by the findings of the report submitted by the
Special Committee on 3-9-2008, the appellant moved the High D
Co,urt of Punjab and Haryana (C.W.P. 11548 of 2008).
Following the impugned resolution on 10-9-2008, the said
petition was withdrawn and C.W.P. 16216 of 2008 was
instituted before the High Court to challenge the Special
Committee's report as well as the impugned resolution dated E
10.9.2008. On 15-9-2008, a division bench of the High Court
issued an order directing that the case be heard on merits on
1-12-2008. The High Court did not grant a stay on the operation
of the impugned resolution, but granted protection to Captain
• Amarinder Singh from custodial interrogation and directed F
further listing on 1-12-2008. Dissatisfied with the High Court's
order, the appellant approached this court by way of a petition
eeeking special leave to appeal. The appellant contended that ,
the High Court ought to have stayed the report dated 3.9.2008 \
and the Resolution and Notification dated 10.9.2008. He G
apprehended that a fresh election would be conducted in the
intervening period, thereby compromising his rights.
7. A division bench of this court directed notice on 26-9- ·
2008 and referred the case for hearing by a three judge bench.
On 3-10-2008, a three judge bench (B.N. Agarwal, G.S. Singhvi H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20101 4 s.r :~.
A ·and Aft3b Alam, JJ.] granted leave in the special leave petition
(C.A No. 6053/2008). It allowed Transfer Petition (C) No. 1087/
2008 for transfer of CWP No. 16216/2008 from the Punjab and
Haryana High Court (the transferred case is T.C. (C) No. 1 of
2009.) and directed the same to be heard with the Civil Appeal
B along w"h W.P. (C) No. 442/2008 and W.P. (C) No. 443/ 2008.
The three judge bench did not grant a stay on the operation of
the impugned resolution which had directed the expulsion of the
appellant from the Vidhan Sabha. However, relief was granted
to the extent that even though the appellant could not participate
c in the legislative proceedings, his seat would not fall vacant until
the adjudication of this case. A stay was also granted in respect
of the Vidhan Sabha's specific directions to the Punjab
Vigilance Department, but it was clarified that the appellant and
the petitioners could be investigated in accordance with law.
Subsequently, the three judge bench found that the subject
0
matter touched on substantial questions of law requiring the
interpretation of Article 194(3) of the Constitution. thereby
deeming 1t fit to refer these matters to a constitution bench by
way of an order dated 11-2-2009.
E OVERVIEW OF CONTENTIONS
8. The counsel appearing for the appellant and the
petitioners have prayed trat the impugned resolution as well
as the report submitted by the Special Committee be
F invalidated in their entirety. Accordingly. the appellant has
sought r8stor::ition of his men~bershT for the remainder of the
13th tE:rr;i of trie "1injab V!·1~ an Sahha The main thrust of the
appellants contentions ::; thdt tne acts of constituting the
Special Conim1ttee on 18 1.:! -'''07. the submission of its
G report 0n 3-9-2008 and the i~pugned resolution passed by the
Assembly on 10 9-2008 r:annot be defended as a proper
exercise of legislative priv iege~ under Article 194 of the
Constitution. It was urged that t~e allegations of misconduct on
part of the appellant and the peH:oners were relatable to their
executive actions which in no way disrupted or affected the
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1123
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.JI.]
legislative functions of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. It was A
reasoned that legislative privileges are exercised to sate-;uarc.:
the integrity of legislative proceedings and the alleged .
misconduct did not threaten the same in any manner. Another
contention was whether it was proper for the 13th Vidhan
Sabha to exercise its privileges to inquire into acts that had B
occurred during the 12th term of the Vidhan Sabha. It was also
pointed out that the alleged misconduct on the part of the
appellant and the petitioners had already been questioned
before the High Court of Punjab Haryana by private parties
whose lands had not been exempted from the Amritsar c
Improvement Scheme. Thus, it was argued that it was improper
for the legislature to act in respect of subject-matter which was
pending adjudication, thereby violating the norm of not
interfering in sub judice matters. It was further argued that even
though legislative privileges are exercised to ensure the dignity
0
and disr:ipline of the House, the same cannot encroach into the
judicial domain by recording a finding of guilt and
recommending punitive action in respect of the alleged
misconduct. To support this objection. it was urged that the
appellant and the petitioners had not been given a fair
opportunity to contest or meet the allegations against them and
E
hence the proceedings of the Special Committee were violative
of the principles of natural justice.
9. The respondents' case is that the Punjab Vidhan Sabha
had legitimately exercised its privileges to recommend punitive F
action in the present case, since the alleged misconduct on part
of the appellant and the petitioners had brought disrepute to
the House as a whole. It was reasoned that even though the
power of expulsion for such misconduct has not been
enumerated in Articles 190 and 191 of the Constitution [which G
prescribe the grounds for disqualification of MLAs] the
legislature had a broad power to take punitive action for the
breach of its privileges which includes the power to punish for
its own contempt. It was submitted that the appellant and the
petitioners had committed a breach of privilege as well as H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 4 S.C.R.
A contempt of the house since they had previously suppressed
efforts of the legislature to inquire into the alleged misconduct
in relation to the Amritsar Improvement Scheme. Since
legislative privileges have not been codified and are shaped
by precedents, the counsel for the respondents have cited
B some English precedents in support of their contention that
privileges can be exercised to punish ma/a fide acts which do
not directly obstruct the proceedings of the House, but impede
its dignity nevertheless.
10. In the course of the hearing on merits before this
C constitution bench, Shri K. Parasaran and Shri U.U. Lalit, Sr.
Advs. appeared on behalf of the appellant. Thereafter, Shri
Ashok Desai, Sr. Adv. appeared for the respondent whose
submissions were supplemented by Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad,
Sr. Adv., while Shri Gopal Subramanium, (Additional Solicitor
D General, now Solicitor General) represented the views of the
Union government.
11. In light of the facts of this case and the contentions
outlined above, the following questions arise for consideration:
E
I. Whether the alleged misconduct on part of the
appellant and the petitioners warranted the exercise
of legislative privileges under Article 194(3) of the
Constitution?
F II. Whether it was proper for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha
to take up, as a matter of breach of privilege, an
incident that occurred during its previous term?
Ill. Whether the impugned acts of the Punjab Vidhan
G Sabha violated the norms that should be respected
in relation to sub Judice matters?
Re: Question I.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents have
H submitted that it was proper for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTIEE, PUNJAB 1125
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
constitute the Special Committee and pass the impugned A
resolution which recommended the expulsion of the appellant.
The core of their argument is that the misconduct on part of the
appellant had brought disrepute to the Vidhan Sabha and it was
justifiable to exercise legislative privileges for mitigating the
same. The· respondents have adopted a two-pronged line of B
reasoning. Firstly, they have asserted that the alleged
misconduct on part of the appellant amounted to a breach of
privilege as well as contempt of the House. Secondly, they have
contended that since the 'powers, privileges and immunities'
conferred on State Legislatures by Article 194(3) of the c
Constitution have not been codified, it would not be proper to
place limitations on their exercise. The implicit rationale is that
legislative assemblies should retain flexibility in the exercise of
their privileges and the power to punish for contempt, so that
they can tackle new and unforeseen impediments to their
0
reputation and functioning. The respondents' submissions have
dwelt at length with the idea that the legislature's power to
· punish for its own contempt cannot be trammeled since it is
different from the remedial objective of exercising privileges to
maintain the dignity and discipline of the house. The
respondents have extensively relied on the constitution bench E
decision in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha,
\2007) 3 SCC 184, where this Court had upheld the Lok
Sabha's power to expel its members in view of misconduct in
the nature of accepting bribes to ask specified questions on
the floor of the House. However, the majority opinions of this F
Court had also clarified that the exercise of parliamentary
privileges in such cases was open to judicial scrutiny.
13. As outlined earlier, the appellant has questioned the
impugned resolution since it recommends punitive action in G
respect of his misconduct which was allegedly committed in his
capacity as the Chief Minister of the State of Punjab. It was
submitted that the alleged irregularity in exempting a plot of land
from an acquisition scheme was entirely relatable to the
discharge of executive functions. The act of exempting land did H
1126 SUPREl\/IE COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A not in any way obstruct the functions of the Punjab Vidhan
Sabha. It was urged that even though the exercise of legislative
privileges and the concomitant power to punish for contempt
have not been codified, they cannot be construed as unlimited
powers since that could lead to their indiscriminate and
B disproportionate use. The counsel appearing for the appellant
and the petitioners have also submitted that when the Special
Committee was constituted on 18-12-2007 it did not bear the
nomenclature of a privileges committee and at the time it was
not apparent to the appellant and the petitioners that they were
C facing such an action. However, the respondent submits that the
incumbent Chief Ministers' motion brought on 18-12-2007 was
in the nature of a privileges motion. Irrespective of the contested
facts, it will be proper for us to view this controversy from the
prism of legislative privileges. Mr. Gopal Subramanium drew
our attention to the two main considerations that should guide
0
the adjudication of this case, namely those of 'history' and
'necessity'. Considerations of history require us to examine
whether there are any applicable precedents for the exercise
of legislative privileges in similar circumstances. The
consideration of necessity entails that the scope of privileges
E shot..1d be identified on the basis of what is necessary to prevent
or punish obstructions to legislative functioning.
14. Before addressing these-contentions, we can take a
bird's eye view of the law on legislative privileges. The State
F Legislatures are conferred with 'powers, privileges and
immunities' by way of Article 194 of the Constitution which
reads:
"194. Powers, privileges, etc, of the Houses of
Legislatures and of the members and committees
G
thereof- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution
and to the rules and st~nding orders regulating the
procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of
speech in the Legislature of every State.
H (2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1127
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said A
or any vote given by ·him in the Legislature or any
. committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in
respect of the publication by or under the authority of a
House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or
proceedings. B
(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities
of a House of the Legislature of a State, and of the
members and the committees of a House of such
Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be
defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, C
shall be those of that House and of its members and
committees immediately before the coming into force of
Section 26 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978.
D
(4) The provisions of clauses (1 ), (2) and (3) shall apply in
relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have
the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the
proceedings of, a House of the Legislature of a State or
any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members E
of that Legislature."
15. The powers and privileges conferred on the State
Legislatures are akin to those conferred on the Union
Parliament by Article 105. Therefore, the principles and
precedents relatable to the exercise of parliamentary privileges F
are relevant for deciding this case. Both Articles 105 and 194
explicitly refer to the freedom of speech in the House and the
freedom to publish proceedings withC'~Jt exposure to liability.
However, other legislative privileges have not been
enumerated. Article 105(3) and 194(3) are openly worded and G
prescribe that the powers, privileges and immunities available
to the legislature are those which were available at the time of
the enactment of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth) Amendment Act,
1978. Subhash C. Kashyap has elaborated on the Indian
position with these words [In Parliamentary Procedure - The H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A Law, Privileges, Practice and Precedents, Vol. 2 (New Delhi,
Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2000) at p. 1555]:
"As regards other privileges, Art. 105(3) as originally
enacted provided that that in other respects, the powers,
privileges and immunities of Parliament, its committees
B and members, until defined by Parliament by law, shall be
the same as those of the House of Commons of the United
Kingdom as on the comir;g into the force of the
Constitution on 26 Jan. 1950. This clause was however,
amended in 1978, to provide that in respect of privileges
c other than those specified in the Constitution, the powers,
privileges and immunities of each House of Parliament, its
members and Committees shall be such as may from time
to time be defined by Parliament by law and until so
defined shall be those of that House, its members and
D Committees immediately before coming into the force of
section 15 of the Co11stitution (44th Amendment), 1978
(w.e.f. 20 June 1978). This amendment has in fact made
only verbal changes by omitting all references to the British
House of Commons but the substance remains the same.
E In other words, each House, its Cc:mmittees and members
in actual practice, shall continue to enjoy the powers,
privileges and immunities (other than those specified in the
Constitution) that were available to the British House of
Commons as on 26 Jan. 1950."
F
16. Since the scope of 'powers, privileges and immunities'
available under Article 105(3) and 194(3) has not been codified
by way of statute till date, it is open for us to consider the
principles and precedents relatable to the British House of
Commons. In Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) C.K. Thakkar, J.
G in his concurring opinion had described Parliamentary
Privileges as those fundamental rights which the House and its
Members possess so as to enable them to carry out their
functions effectively and efficiently. It was observed:
H "519. In its creative-sense, in England the House did not
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1129
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
sit down to build its edifice of the powers, privileges and A
immunities of Parliament. The evolution of the English
parliamentary institution has thus historical development.
It is the story of conflict between the Crown's absolute
prerogatives and the Common's insistence for powers,
privileges and immunities; struggle between high handed B
actions of monarchs and people's claim of democratic
means and methods. Parliamentary privileges are the
rights which the Houses of Parliament and Members
posses so as to enable them to carry out their functions
effectively and efficiently. Some of the parliamentary c
privileges thus preceded Parliament itself. They are,
therefore, rightly described by Sir Erskine May as
"fundamental rights" of the Houses as against the
prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of ordinary courts
of law and the special rights of the House of Lords." 0
17. The evolution of legislative privileges can be traced
back to medieval England when there was an ongoing tussle
for power between the monarch and the Parliament. In most
cases, privil~ges were exercised to protect the members of
parliament from undue pressure or influence by the monarch E
among others. Conversely, with the gradual strengthening of
parliament there were also some excesses in the name of
legislative privileges. However, the ideas governing the
relationship between the executive and the legislature have
undergone a sea change since then. In modern parliamentary F
democracies, it is the legislature which consists of the people's
representatives who are expected to monitor executive
functions. This is achieved by embodying the idea of 'collective
responsibility' which entails that those who wield executive
power are accountable to the legislature. However, legislative G
privileges serve a distinct purpose. They are exercised to
safeguard the integrity of legislative functions against
obstructions which could be caused by members of the House
as well as non-members. Needless to say, it is conceivable that
in some instances persons holding executive office could H
1130 SUPREME COL ~T REPORTS (2010] 4 S.C.R.
A potentially cause obstructions to legislative functions. Hence,
there is a need to stress on the operative principles that can
be relied on to test the validity of the exercise of legislative
privileges in the present case. In his widely cited work, Sir
Erskine May (1950) has answered the question 'What
B constitutes privilege?' in the following manner [See: Erskine
May, Parliamentary Practice, 16th edrJ (London: Butterworths,
1957) in 'Chapter Ill: General View of the Privilege of
Parliament' at p. 42] :
"Parliamentary privilege is the sum of the peculiar rights
c enjoyed by each House collectively as a constituent part
of the High Court of Parliament, and by members of each
House individually, without which they could not discharge
their functions and which exceed those possessed by other
bodies or individuals. Thus privilege, though part of the law
D of the land is, to a certain extent an exemption from the
ordinary law.
The privileges of individual members of the House of Lords
may be distinguished from, the privileges of individual
E members of the House of Commons; both again have
common privileges as members of the Parliament; and the
Lords have special privileges as peers, distinct from those
which they have as members of a House co-ordinate with
the House of Commons." [Stubbs, Constitutional History,
F iii (4th edn.) p.504]
The particular privileges of the Commons have been
defined as:-
"The sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its
G individuai Members as against the prerogatives of the
Crown, the authority of the ordinary courts of law and the
special rights of the House of Lords."
Distinction between function and Privilege proper-
H It is more convenient to reserve the term 'privilege' to
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1131
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
certain fundamental rights of each House which are A
generally accepted as necessary for the exercise of its
constitutional functions.
Ancillary nature of Privilege - A necessary means to
fulfillment of functions- The distinctive mark of a privilege
B
is its ancillary character. The privileges of Parliament are
rights which are "absolutely necessary for the due
execution of its powers."
I
In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edn. (Reissue Vol. 34,
at p. 553) it has been stated: c
"Claims to rights and privileges- The House of Lords and
the House of Commo,ns claim for their Members, both
individually and collectively, certain rights and privileges
which are necessary to each House, without which they
0
could not discharge their functions and which exceed those
possessed by other bodies and individuals. In 1705, the
House of Lords resolved that neither House had power to
create any new privilege and when this was communicated
to the Commons, that House agreed .... "
E
18. It would be instructive to refer to the following extracts
from a lecture on Parliamentary Privileges by Viscount Kilmer
- The Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, [Delivered on May
4, 1959 at the University of London] :-
F
"The first question which springs to the mind is, 'What
precisely is Parliamentary Privilege?'- and its question
which is not altogether easy to answer.
A privilege is essentially a·private advantage in law enjoyed
by a person or a class of persons or an association which G
iz not enjoyed by others. Looked at from this aspect,
privilege consists of that bundle of advantages which
members of both Houses enjoy or have at one time
enjoyed to a greater extent than their fellow citizens:
freedom to access to Westminster, freedom from arrest H
11'32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A or process, freedom from liability in the courts for what they
say or do in Parliament. From another point of view,
Parliamentary Privilege is the special dignity and authority
and enjoyed by each House in its corporate capacity such
as its right to control its own proceedings and to punish
B both members and strangers for contempt. I think these are
really two sides of the coin. Any Parliament, it is to function
properly, must have some privileges which will ensure
freedom (to a greater or lesser degree) from outside
interference. If the business of Parliament is of supreme
importance, then nobody else must be allowed to impede
c it, whether by throwing fireworks from the gallery or bringing
actions against members for what they say in debate.
A close parallel !s provided by the powers of the superior
courts to punish for contempt. If you try to interfere with the
D administration of justice either by throwing tomatoes at the
judge or by intimidating a witness you will be liable to be
proceeded against for contempt. Once again, a body
whose functions are of paramount importance can be seen
making certain that outside interference is reduced to a
E minimum."
19. In Australia, the scope of Parliamentary Privileges was
enunciated in the 76th Report of the Senate Committee of
Privileges, wherein it was observed:
- F "The word "privilege", modern usage, connotes a special
right accorded to a select group which sets that group
apart from all other persons. The Macquarie Dictionary's
primary definition of privilege is as follows: "A right of
immunity enjoyed by a person or persons beyond the
G common advantage of others. The privileges of Parliament
are immunities conferred in order1o ensure that the duties
of members as representatives of their constituents may
be carried out without fear of intimidation or punishment,
and without improper impediment. These immunities,
H established as part of the common law and recognized in
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1133
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJl.J
•
statutes such as the Bill of Rights of 1688, are limited in A
number and effect. They relate only to those matters which
have common to be recognized as crucial to the operation
of a fearless Parliament on behalf of the people. As
pointed out in a submission by the Department of the
Senate to the Joint Select Committee on Parliamentary B
Privilege, a privilege of Parliament is more properly called
an immunity from the operation of certain laws, which are
otherwise unduly restrictive of the proper performance of
the duties of members of Parliament."
20. In a Canadian case reported as New Brunswick C
Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia, (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 212,
Lamer, C.J. had cited the following extract from an academic
commentary [See: Joseph Maingot, Parliamentary Privilege
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1982) at p. 12]:
D
"Parliamentary privilege is the necessary immunity that the
law provides for members of Parliament and for members
of the legislatures of each of the ten provinces and two
territories, in order for these legislators to do their
legislative work. It is also necessary immunity that the law E
provides for anyone while taking part in a proceeding in
Parliament or in a legislature. Finally, it is the authority and
power of each House of Parliament and of each legislature •
to enforce that immunity.
F
Parliamentary privilege and immunity with respect to the
exercise of that privilege are founded upon necessity.
Parliamentary privilege and the breadth of individual
privileges encompassed by that term are accorded to
members of the House of Parliament and the legislative
assemblies because they are judges necessary to the G
discharge of their legislative function.
The contents and extent of parliamentary privileges have
evolved with reference to their necessity. In Precedents of
Proceedings in the House of Commons, Vol. I, 3rd Ed. H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 4 S.C.R.
• A (London: T Payne, 1796), John Hatsell defined at p. 1 the
privileges of parliament as including those rights which are
absolutely necessary for the due execution of its power".
It is important to note that, in this context, the justification
of necessity is applied in a general sense. That is, general
B categories of privilege are deemed necessary to the
discharge of the Assembly's function. Each specific
instance of the exercise of a general privilege needs to be
shown to be necessary."
21. In the past, this Court has adopted a similar conception
c of legislative privileges to interpret Article 194(3). For example
iri Re Special Reference 1 of 1964, AIR 1965 SC 745, (also
known as the UP. Assembly case) Gajendragadkar C.J. had
held, at Para. 33:
D " ... The Constitution-makers must have thought that the
legislatures will take some time to make laws in respect
of their powers, privileges and immunities. During the
interval, it was clearly necessary to confer on them the
necessary powers, privileges and immunities. There can
E be little doubt that the powers, privileges and immunities
which are contemplated by clause (3), are incidental
powers, privileges and immunities which every legislature
must possess in order tha.t it may be able to function
effectively, and that explains the purpose of the latter part
F of clause (3}."
22. In State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC
608, a seven judge bench of this Court construed the powers
contained in Article 194(3) as those 'necessary for the conduct
of the business of the House', at Para. 57:
G
"57. It is evident, from the Chapter in which Article 194
occurs as well as the heading and its marginal note that
the 'powers' meant to be indicated here are not
independent. They are powers which depend upon and are
H necessary for the conduct of the business of each House.
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1135
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
They cannot also be expanded into those of the House of A
Commons for all purposes ... We need not travel beyond
tt.e words of Article 194 itself, read with other provisions
of the Constitution, to clearly read such a conclusion."
23. Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J. (majority opinion) in Para. 471
B
of Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) has quoted from
Parliamentary Privilege- First Report (Lord Nicholas) which
describes Parliamentary Privilege as:
"Parliamentary privilege consists of the rights and
immunities which the two Houses of Parliament and their C
Members and officers "possess to enable them to carry out
their parliamentary functions effectively. Without this
protection Members would be handicapped in performing
their parliamentary duties, and the authority of Parliament
itself in confronting the executive and as a forum for D
expressing the anxieties of citizens would be
correspondingly diminished."
In UP. Assembly case (supra.), this Court had also drawn
a distinction between the exercise of legislative privileges and
E
that of ordinary legislative functions in the following manner:
"There is a distinction between privilege and function,
though it is not always apparent. On the whole, however,
it is more convenient to reserve the term 'privilege' to
certain fundamental rights of each House which are F
generally accepted as necessary for the exercise of its
constitutional functions. The distinctive mark of a privilege
is its ancillary character. The privileges of Parliament are
rights which are absolutely necessary for the due execution
of its powers. They are enjoyed by individual Members, G
because the House cannot perform its functions without
unimpeded use of the services of its Members; and by
each House for the protection of its Members and the
vindication of its own authority and dignity."
H
1136 SUPREME COi.JRT REPORTS [201 OJ 4 S.C.R.
A In Hatse//'s Collection of Cases of Privileges of Parliament
(1776), Parliamentary privileges have been defined as those
rights which are 'absolutely necessary for the dUZ_ execution of
its powers'. A similar definition has also been quoted in Sir
Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice (1950) and is also found
0 in Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 2nd edn. Vol. 3
(New Delhi: Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur, 1997) which defines
privilege as:
''The distinctive mark of a Parliamentary Privilege is its
ancillary character. They are rights which a sovereign
c legislature must possess for the due execution of its
powers. Some of them are enjoyed by individual members
of the House."
24. The observations cited above make it amply clear that
o the exercise of legislative privileges is not an end in itself. They
are supposed to be exercised in order to ensure that legislative
functions can be exercised effectively, without undue
obstructions. These functions include the right of members to
speak and vote on the floor of the house as well as the
E proceedings of various legislative committees. In this respect,
privileges can be exercised to protect persons engaged as
administrative employees as well. The important consideration
for scrutinising the exercise of legislative privileges is whether
the same was necessary to safeguard the integrity of legislative
F functions. We are also expected to look to precedents involving
the British House of Commons. The most elaborate list of
Parliamentary Privileges exercised by the British House of
Commons has been compiled by Pritiosh Roy in his work
Parliamentary Privilege in India which has been quoted in Raja
G Ram Pal's case (supra.) at Paragraphs 94-97 and has been
reproduced below:
(1) Privilege of freedom of speech, comprising the right
of exclusive control by the House over its own
proceedings. It is a composite privilege which includes:
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMM!TTEE, PUNJAB 1137
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
(i) the power to initiate and consider matters of A
legislation or discussion in such order as it pleases;
(ii) the privilege of freedom in debate proper- absolute
immunity of members for statements made in
debate, not actionable at law; B
(iii) the power to discipline its own members;
(iv) the power to regulate its own procedure- the right
of the House to be the sole judge of the lawfulness
of its own proceedings; c
(v) the right to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts;
(vi.) the right to exclude strangers;
(vii) the right to ensure privacy of debate; D
(ix) the right to control or prohibit publication of its
· debates and proceedings;
2. Privilege of freedom from arrest or molestation the
claim ofthe Commons to freedom of members ·E
from arrest in civil action or suits during the time of
the Parliament and during the period when a
member journeys to or returns from the Parliament.
This privilege includes:
F
(i) exemption of a member from attending Court as a
witness- service of a civil or criminal process within
the precincts of the House is a breach of privilege.
(ii) a member cannot be admitted as bail;
G
(iii) exemption of a member from jury servicf?
(iv) no such privilege claimed in respect of criminal
offences or statutory detention;
(v) right of the House to be informed of arrest of H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A members on criminal charges;
(vi) extension of the privilege to witnesses summoned
to attend before the House or its committees, and
to officers in immediate attendance upon the
service of the House.
B
(3) Privilege of freedom of access to the sovereign
through the Speaker.
(4) Privilege of the House of receiving a favourable
c construction of the proceedings of the House from
the sovereign.
(5) Power of the House to inflict punishment for
contempt on members or strangers- a power akin
to the powers possessed by the superior courts of
D justice to punish for contempt.
It includes:
(i) the power to commit a person to prison, to the
E custody of its own officers or to one of the State
prisons, (the keystone of parliamentary privilege] the
commitment being for any period not beyond the
date of the prorogation of the House;
(ii) the incompetence of the courts of justice to admit
F a person committed by the House to bail;
(iii) when the person is committed by the House upon
a general or unspeaking warrant which does not
state the particular facts constituting the contempt
G the incompetence of the courts of justice to inquire
into the nature of contempt;
(iv) the power of the House to arrest an offender
through its own officers or through the aid and
power of the civil government;
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1139
VIDHAN SABHA {K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
(v) the power of the officers of the House to break open A
outer doors to effect the execution of the warrant of
arrest;
(vi) the power of the House to administer reprimand or
admonition to an offender;
B
(vii) the power of the House to secure the 9ttendance,
whether in custody or not, of persons whose
conduct is impugned on a matter of privilege;
(viii) the power of the House to direct the Attorney c
General to prosecute an offender where the breach
of privilege is also an offence at law and the extent
of the power of the House to inflict punishment is
not considered adequate to the offence;
(ix) the power of the House to punish a member by (a) D
suspension from the service of the House, or (b)
expulsion, rendering his seat vacant.
6. Privilege of the House to provide for its own due
constitution or composition. It includes: E
(i) the power of the House to order the issue of new
writs to fill vacancies that arise in the Commons in
the course of a Parliament;
(ii) the power of the House in respect of the trial of F
controverted elections of members of the
Commons;
(iii) the power of the House to determine the
qualifications of.its members to sit and vote in the G
House in cases of doubt- it includes the power of
expulsion of a member. A major portion of this
ancient privilege of the House of Commons has
been eroded by the statute.
H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A 7. The power of the House to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of papers."
25. However, we are only obliged to follow British
precedents to the extent that they are compatible with our
constitutional scheme. This is because the legislatures in India
B do not have a wide power of self-composition in a manner akin
to the British House of Commons. This position was clarified
in Raja Ram Pal's case, (Supra.) at Para. 87:
"87. In UP. Assembly. Case (Special Reference No.1 of
c 1964) it was settled by this Court that a broad claim that
all the powers enjoyed by the House of Commons at the
commencement of the Constitution of India vest in an
Indian Legislature cannot be accepted in its entirety
because there are some powers which cannot obviously
D be so claimed. In this context, the following observations
appearing at SCR p.448 of the judgment should suffice:
(AIR 1965 SC 745, p.764, para. 45)
"Take the privilege of freedom of access which is
exercised by the House of Commons as a body
E and through its Speaker 'to have at all times the
right to petition, counsel, or remonstrate with their
Sovereign through their chosen representative and
have a favourable construction placed on his words
was justly regarded by the Commons as
F fundamental privilege' [Sir Erskine May's
Parliamentary Practice, (16th Edn.), p.86]. It is
hardly necessary to point out that the House cannot
claim this privilege. Similarly, the privilege to pass
acts of attainder and impeachments cannot be
G claimed by the House. The House of Commons
also claims the privilege in regard to its own
Constitution. This privilege is expressed in three
ways, first by the order of new writs to fill vacancies
that arise in the Commons in the course of a
H Parliament; secondly, by the trial of controverted
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1141
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
elections; and thirdly, by determining the A
qualifications of its members in cases of doubt
(May's Parliamentary Practice, p.175). This
privilege again, admittedly, cannot be claimed by
the House. Therefore, it would not be correct to say
that all powers and privileges which were B
possessed by the House of Commons at the
relevant time can be claimed by the House."
26. Hence, it is a well-settled position that all the privileges
claimed by the House of Commons cannot be automatically C
claimed by legislative bodies in India. With respect to the
examples noted above, it is quite apparent that vacancies
arising in the legislative bodies (Union Parliament and State
Legisbtive Assemblies) are duly filled up through the election
procedures contemplated by the Constitution that have been
fleshed out in detail through the Representation of People Act, D
1951. Similarly disputes relating to elections are heard by the
competent courts and disqualifications are effected as per the
grounds enumerated in the Constitution. While Articles 101 and
102 enumerate the grounds for vacation of seats and the
disqualification of Members of Parliament (MPs) respectively, E
Article 190 and Article 191 deal with these aspects in relation
to Members of State Legislatures. The manner of effecting
disqualifications has also been laid down in relation to the
various grounds for the same.
F
27. In Raja Ram Pal's case, (supra.) the majority had
decided that the parliamentary privileges available under
Article 105(3) could be legitimately exercised to expel
members for grounds other than those prescribed for
disqualification of members under Article 102. This Court had G
upheld the validity of the proceedings of a privileges committee
of the Lok Sabha which had inquired into the improper acts of
some MPs and recommended their expulsion. In that case, the
misconduct was in the nature of accepting bribes in return for
asking specified questions on the floor of the house. One of H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A the expelled MPs had been reported for accepting gratification
in lieu of improper allocation of funds under the Member of
Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS). The
acceptance of bribes had been recorded on camera by some
journalists and later on the video-footage was treated as
B conclusive evidence of guilt by the privileges committee. In the
present case, the respondents have cited this decision in
support of their contention that it was proper for the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha to have exercised its' power to punish for
contempt (derived from Article 194(3) of the Constitution] in
c order to recommend the expulsion of the appellant. It was
argued that the Vidhan Sabha was empowered to expel
members on grounds other than those prescribed for
disqualification of members under Article 191. However, an
important consideration in that case was that the misconduct
which was the ground for the MPs' expulsion had a direct
0
connection with their legislative functions, namely those of
asking questions at the behest of vested interests and the
improper allocation of funds under the MPLADS scheme
respectively. With respect to the allegations against the
E appellant in the present case, it is quite difficult to see how the
improper exemption of a particular plot of land from an
acquisition scheme caused an obstruction to the conduct of
legislative business. If it is indeed felt that the allegations of
misconduct on part of the former Chief Minister had brought
disrepute to the entire House, then the proper course is to
r pursue criminal investigation and prosecution before the
appropriate judicial forum.
28. At this juncture, we must reiterate the principles which
guide judicial scrutiny of the exercise of legislative privileges
G (including the power to punish for contempt of the House). In
Raja Ram Pal's case, Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J. had framed the
following guidelines, at Para. 431:
"431. Summary of the Principles relating to Parameters
of Judicial Review in relation to exercise of Parliamentary
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1143
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
Provisions A
We may summarize the principles that can be culled out
from the above discussion. They are:
a. Parliament is a co-ordinate organ and its views do
deserve deference even while its acts are amenable to B
judicial scrutiny;
b. Constitutional system of government abhors absolutism
and it being the cardinal principle of our Constitution that
no one, howsoever lofty, can claim to be the sole judge of c
the power given under the Constitution, mere co-ordinate
constitutional status, or even the status of an exalted
constitutional functionaries, does not disentitle this Court
from exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review of action
which part-take the character of judicial or quasi-judicial 0
decision;
c. The expediency and necessity of exercise of power or
privilege by the legislature are for the determination of the
legislative authority and not for determination by the courts;
E
d. The judicial review of the manner of exercise of power
of contempt or privilege does not mean the _said
jurisdiction is being usurped by the judicature;
e. Having regard to the importance of the functions
F
discharged by the legislature under the Constitution and
the majesty and grandeur of its task, there would always
be an initial presumption that the powers, privileges etc
have been regularly and reasonably exercised, not violating
the law or the Constitutional provisions, this presumption G
being a rebuttable one;
f. The fact that Parliament is an august body of co-ordinate
constitutional position does not mean that there can be no
judicially manageable standards co review exercise of its
power; H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 4 S.C.R.
A g. While the area of powers, privileges and immunities of
the legislature being exceptional and extraordinary its acts,
particularly relating to exercise thereof, ought not to be
tested on the traditional parameters of judicial review in
the same manner as an ordinary administrative action
B would be tested, and the Court would confine itself to the
ackncwledged parameters of judicial review and within the
judicially discoverable and manageable standards, there
is no foundation to the plea that a legislative body cannot
be attributed jurisdictional error;
c h. The Judicature is not prevented from scrutinizing the
validity of the action of the legislature trespassing on the
fundamental rights conferred on the citizens;
i. The broad contention that the exercise of privileges by
D legislatures cannot be decided against the touchstone of
fundamental rights or the constitutional provisions is not
correct;
j. If a citizen, whether a non-member or a memoer of the
Legislature, complains that his fundamental rights Linder
E
Article 20 or 21 had been contravened, it is the duty of this
Court to examine the merits of the said conterttion,
especially when the impugned action entails civil
consequences;
F k. There is no basis to claim of bar of exclusive cognizance
or absolute immunity to the Parliamentary proceedings in
Article 105(3) of the Constitution;
I. The manner of enforcement of privilege by the legislature
G can result in judicial scrutiny, though subject to the
restrictions contained in the other Constitutional
provisions, for example Article 122 or 212;
m. Articles 122(1) and Article 212(1) dispJace the broad
doctrine of exclusive cognizance of the legislature in
H England of exclusive cognizance of internal proceedings
A'MARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1145
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
of the House rendering irrelevant the case law that A
emanated from courts in that jurisdiction; inasmuch as the
same has no application to the system of governance
provided by Constitution of India
n. Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) prohibit the validity of B
any proceedings in legislature from being called in question
in a court merely on the ground of irregularity of procedure;
o. The truth or correctness of the material will not be·
questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of
the material or substitute its opinion for that of the C
legislature;
p. Ordinarily, the legislature, as a body, cannot be accused
of having acted for an extraneous purpose or being
actuated by caprice or ma/a fide intention, and the court o
will not lightly presume abuse or misuse, giving allowance
for the fact that the legislature is the best judge of such
matters, but if in a given case, the allegations to such effect
are made, the Court may examine the validity of the said
contention. the onus on the person alleging being extremely E
heavy
q. The rules which the legislature has to make for
regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business
have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution;
F
r. Mere availability of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct
of Business, as made by the legislature in exercise of
enabling powers under the Constitution, is never a
guarantee that they have been duly followed;
G
s. The proceedings which may be tainted on account of
substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality are not
protected from judicial scrutiny;
t. Even if some of the material on which the action is taken
is found to be irrelevant,_ the court would still not interfere H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the
action;
u. An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination
does ordinarily oust the power of the court to review the
decision but not on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or it
B
t,eing a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality,
irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala tides,
non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity;"
C 29. Hence, we are empowered to scrutinize the exercise
of legislative privileges which admittedly include the power of
a legislative chamber to punish for contempt of itself. Articles
122(1) and 212(1) make it amply clear ·that Courts cannot
inquire into matters related to irregularities in observance of
D procedures before the legislature. However, we can examine
whether proceedings conducted under Article 105(3) or 194(3)
are 'tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or
unconstitutionality'. The facts before us do not merely touch on
a procedural irregularity. The appellant has contended that the
E Punjab Vidhan Sabha has committed a substantive
jurisdictional error by exercising powers under Article 194(3)
to inquire into the appellant's actions which were taken in his
executive capacity. As explained earlier, the relevant fact here
is not only that the allegations of wrongdoing pertain to an
F executive act, but the fact that there is no conceivable
obstruction caused to the conduct of routine legislative
business.
30. Before commenting further on the merits of the
contentions, we must draw attention to the specific guidelines
G in Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) that advocate due deference
to the actions of the legislature in the ordinary course of events.
We do recognize that the threshold for exercising judicial review
in a case such as the present one is indeed very high and we
must begin with a presumption that the legislatures' actions
H were valid. However, the counsel for the appellant and the
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1147
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.] ',;
. ' 1·
' . ..
::P~t!\i.o,~e~s r~ve P,roauced sufficient.materials to demonstrate A
that it was not neces.sary tor the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to have
exercised its powers under Article 19.4(3) to recommend and
then notify the expulsion of the appellant. We fail to see ·how
the alleged misconduct on part of the appellant had the effect
qf obStructing the ordinary legislative functions of the Vidhan B
Sabha. In its role as a deliberative body which is expected to
monitor executive functions in line with the idea of 'collective
"-responsibility', the Punjab Vidhan Sabha was of course free to
inqaire into the alleged misconduct and examine its
implications. However, the act of recommending the appellant's G
expulsion through the impugned resolution cannot be justified
as a proper exercise of 'powers, privileges and immunities'
· conferred by Article 194(3).
31. In their submissions, the counsel for the respondents
have cited some English precedents in an attempt to draw an D
analogy. with the facts in the present case. The intended
purpose of doing so is to demonstrate the exercise of
legislati"ie privileges in the past to punish conduct that took
place outside the 'four walls of the house' and yet diminished
the reputation of the legislature. We have already explaineg,.that E
all British precedents cannot be automaticaHy followed in the
Indian context. One reason for this is that Indian legislatures are
controlled by a written constitution and hence they do not have
an absolute power of self-composition, unlike the British House
of Commons which is controlled by an unwritten constitution. F
Another reason is that some of the English precedents
involving the exercise of privileges were clear instances of
overbreadth. Far from being good law as contended by the
respondents, these old English cases have been subsequently
described by authors as examples of arbitrary exercise of G
privileges. In fact Para. 417 of Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.)
conveys this position in rhe following words:
"217. Constitutional History of England by'Professor F.W.
Maitland (1st Edn. 1908, reprinted 1941 ), based or( his
' . , H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 4 S.C.R.
A lectures, is divided chronologically. In the last and most
contemporary 'Period V' titled "Sketch of Public Law at the
Present Day ( 1887-88)", he deals with the House of
Commons in Part Ill. It has been opined by him that the
earlier exercise of privileges fr')m the fourteenth to the
eighteenth century have fallen into utter desuetude an may
furnish only an example of an arbitrary and sometimes
oppressive exercise of uncanalised power by the House.
After mentioning the membership and the qualification of
the voters as also principles and the mode of election and
dealing with the power of the voters as also principles and
c the mode of election and dealing with the power of
determining disputed elections by the House of Commons,
one of the facets of the privilege of the House of Commons
to provide for and regulate its own constitution, in the
context of the vacation of seats in the House by incurring
D
"disqualifications, he refers in sub-para (6) to the power of
expulsion. His words may be extracted:
''The House has an undoubted power of expelling
a Member, and the law does not attempt to define
E the cases in which it may be used. If the House
voted the expulsion of AB. on the ground that he
was ugly, no court could give A.B. any relief.
Probably it would not be exercised now- a days,
unless the Member was charged with crime or with
F some very gross misbehaviour falling short of
crime, and in general the House would wait until he
had been tried and convicted by a court of law. In
1856, a Member who had been indicted for fraud
and who had fled from the accusation was
G expelled."
32. The respondents have quoted Para. 215 of Raja Ram
Pal's case (supra.) to contend that even in cases of criminal
offences such as forgery, perjury, breach.of trust, corruption in
public offices etc. wherein there may be no direct obstruction
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1149
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
to legislative
I
business, members have been expelled from the A
British House· of Commons through the exercise of
Parllamentary privileges. In fact, Para. 215 paraphrases a
passage from Sir Erskine May's promihent work which touches
on the power of the House to expel its' members. However, the
exact passage dealing with the power of expulsion, (See B
Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 15th Edn. (1950)] states
that at the time of writing (i.e. 1950) the power of expulsion was
reserved only for cases involving conviction for grave
misdemeanors. A reading of the original passage makes it
amply clear that Sif Erskine May was referring to grounds on c
which members hac;lbeen expelled in the past. However, citing
the same does not amount to their endorsement and the
respondent's reliance on the said passage is quite misplaced.
The original passage is reproduced below:
EXPULSION BY THE COMMONS D
"The purpose of'e~pulsion is not so much disciplinary as
remedial, not so- much to punish Members as to rid the
House of persons who are unfit for membership. It may
justly be regardea as an example of the House's power E
to regulate its own constitution. But it is more convenient
to treat it among the methods of punishment at the
disposal of the House. At the present time expulsion is
practically reserved for the punishment of persons
convicted of grave misdemeanors, whose seats are not, F
as in the case of Members convicted of treason or felony,
automatically vacated.
Members have been expelled as being in open rebellion;
as having been guilty of forgery; of perjury; of frauds and
breaches of trust; of misappropriation of public money; of G
conspiracy to defraud; of fraudulent converaionofproperty;
of corruption in the administration of justice, or in public
offices, or in the e~ecution of their Members of the House;
of conduct unbecoming th.e c;IJaracter of an officer and a
gentlemen; and contempt, libels and other offences H
1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A committed against the House itself." ,.
33. At this juncture, we must clarify that if a sitting member
of a legislature in India is found guilty of committing a statutory
offence, then disqualification can be a consequence as per the
scheme contemplated in the Representation of People Act,
8 1951. The respondents have also referred to the Table
produced in Para. 582 of Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) which
surveys the exercise of privileges by the British House of
Commons between 1667 and 1954. They have drawn our
attention to some of the instances to contend that members
C were indeed expelled for acts that took place outside the 'four
walls of the house' and had no direct bearing on legislative
. functions. However as we have explained above, it is not
appropriate to mechanically rely on all of these precedents. If
we must look to English precedents for guidance, we find a far
D more appropriate sample set in the table of cases from the
period 1945-1965 which forms an Appendix to the Report of
the Select Committee on Parliamentary Privilege (1967) in
the United Kingdom. The same has been reproduced below:
RECENT CASES OF PRIVILEGE (1945-65)
E
DATE Subject of Report and Action by the
Complaint Recommendation House
of the Committee
of Privileges
March Offer of a bribe Offer was a Tacit Acceptance
F 1945 (Henderson's conditional donation-
H.C. 63 Case) AO questiori of oribery
(1944-45) arose and no breach
of privilege
'
October Service of Breach of privilege Tacit acceptance
1945 summons within but particular
G H.C. 31 the precincts on circumstances did
(1945-46) a sitting day not require further
(Verney's C::ise) action
July 1946 Poster designed Breach of privilege Tacit Acceptance
HC..1a1 to intimidate but too petty in scale
(1945-46) Members (Mrs. to justify further action
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1151
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.] .
Tennant's Case):" by.Hoµsci ir'it tpn'"' -:
December Assault on
:
Member and assailant Resolution :
" A
1946H.C. Member (Piratin's both guilty of contemp1 Member guilty of
36 Case) gross contempt,
(1946-47) assailant guilty of
contempt (10
February 1947) B
March Improper pressurE Nothing improper and Resolution:
1947 on Member by no b_reach of privilege Inconsistent with.
H.C. 118 Trade Union duty of Member
(1946-47) (W.J.Brown's to enter
Case) contractual
agreements
c
limiting his
independence in
Parliament
April 1947 Newspaper 1) Grave contempt by (1) Member
H.C. 138 suggested newspaper and by expelled; Editor D
(1946-47) Members Mr. Allighan summoned to Bar
accepted 2) Disclosure of and reprimanded
payments for information from (30October,1947)
information party meetings for 2) This view not
(Gary Allighan's payment constitutes accepted by
Ca_se) b'reach of privilege House E
July 1947
H.C. 137
(1946-47) Refusal by House to take Witnesses
witnesses before such steps as ordered to attend
.
Committee of may seem at Bar of House
Privileges to necessary and examined by F
answer certain Mr. Speaker
questions (Case Resolution:
of Schofield and Refusal to answer
Dobson) constitutes
contempt (12
August 1947) G
August Personal Member guilty of Member ordered
1947 H.C. statement by privilege to be reprimanded
142 (1946- Member about for dishonourable
47) acceptance of conduct (House
payments by did not confirm
newsoaoer the view of the H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 4 S.C.R.
A referred to Committee on
Committee breach of
(Walkden's Case) privilege) 30
October and 10
December 1947)
March Broadcast Inconsistent with Tacit acceptance
B 1948 reflecting on dignity of House to
H.C. 112 allegiance of examine further
(1947-48) Members (Colm
Brogan's Case)
July 1949 Misrepresentation Technical breach of Tacit acceptance
H.C. 261 by newspaper of privilege but no action
c (1948-49) Member's speech called for
(Case of "Daily
Worker'')
March Broadcast No contempt Tacit acceptance
1951 commenting on
D H.C. 149 future decision
(1950-51) by House on
privilege matter
(B.B.C. case)
March Letter reflecting Letters did not reflect Tacit acceptance
1951 on integrity of on Members in their
E H.C. 227 Members capacity as such and
(1950-51) (Clan Briton therefore no breach
case) of privilege
June 1951 Disclosure by An inquiry into the Tacit Acceptance
H.C. 227 newspaper of facts did not reveal
(1950-51) evidence given to any intention any
F Estimates intention to infringe
Committee privilege
(Case of Daily
Telegraph)
June 1951 Speech by Lady Words constituted a Tacit Acceptance
G H.C. 235 Mellor imputed breach of privilege but
(1950-51) partially to the circumstances did
Deputy Speaker not require further
(Lady Mellor's action by House
Case)
July 1951 Obstruction by No breach of privilege Tacit Acceptance
H H.C. 244 police of Member
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1153
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
(1950-51) driving to attend A
House and
subsequent
summons
(John Lewis's
Case)
B
April 1953 Lady Member's Unauthorized reports Tacit acceptance
H.C. 171 disrespect in of proceedings in
(1952-53) "Sunday House amount to
Express" breach of privilege;
article describing but normally House
other Members · waives its privileges.
(Mrs. Ford's Apologies having
c
case) been made, no further
action needed
December Reflection on Breach of privilege; bu' Tacit Acceptance
1953 Members in matter not worthy of
H.C. 31 newspaper article occupying further time D
(1953-54) imputing motives of the House
in voting
(Case of "Daily
Worker")
March Deputy Assistant No precedent for Tacit Acceptance
1955 Chaplain General regarding it as breach E
H.C. 112 threatens a of privilege; but
(1954-55) subordinate with matter for responsible
a view to Minister
influencing
proceedings in
Parliament F
Novem~r Molestation of Serious breach of Tacit acceptance
1956 Member by privilege; but in view of
H.C.27 telephone humble apology, no
(1956-57) (Editor of Sunday further action needed
Graphic's case )
G
November Imputation in Editor of "Sunday Editor ordered to
1956 newspaper article Express" guilty of attend at Bar anc
H.C. 38 that Members serious contempt apology made at
(1956-57) were receiving and should be Bar of House
"prodigious" reprimanded Resolution: He
H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20'10] 4 S.C.R.
•q.
A supp1ememary was guhlf ur
petrol allowances serious contempt
(Case of "Sunday (24 January 1957)
Express")
'--·
December Offensive Cartoon constituted Tacit Acceptance
1956 newspaper reflection on Members
B H.C. 39 cartoon and contempt, but in
(1956-57) reflecting on view of withdrawal of
conduct of cartoon from later
Members (Case editions and
of"Evening publication of
News") unqualified apology,
c no further action
needed
January Broadcast and No contempt by B.B.C Tacit acceptance
1957 newspaper or by newspaper
H.C. 74 comment on
(1956- 57) matter under
D consideration by
Committee of
Privileges
(Case of B.B.C.
and "Romford
Recorder''
newspaper)
April 1957 Action by London Breach of privilege Resolution:
H.C. 305 Electricity Board London Electricity
(1956-57) in threatening to Board had not
institute commented any
F proceedings for breach of privilege
libel respecting Division: Ayes
statement in 219; Noes 196 (8
letter by Member July 1958)
to Minister
(Strauss Case)
G July 1960 Letter containing Breach of privilege; Tacit acceptance
H.C. 284 threat to Member but no further action
(1959-60) (Colin Jordan's needed as offence
case) had not been repeated
March Reflection on No breach of privilege Tacit acceptance
1964 allegiance of and no contempt of the
H
-~
AMARINf)ER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1155
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
· · ·1-1.c:,24:Z·,
.... ,...
'~ \
,Members made. House; po f~~h, ... A
(1963,.64) 'outside House action needed
(Quintin Hogg's
Case)
February Imputation Gross contempt of Tacit acceptance
1965 against House and breach
H.C. 129 Member's of privilege; but no B
1964-65 drunkenness further action needed
(Duffy's case) following letter from
Member withdrawing
remarks
May 1965 Letter threatening Breach of privilege and Tacit acceptance
H.C. 228 Members of improper attempt to
c
(1964-65) House (case of influence Members; in
anonymous their parliamentary
threatening conduct; but dignity
letters) of House best
maintained by taking
no further action D
July 1965 Speech by No contempt and no Tacit acceptance
H.C. 269 Chancellor of the further action needed
(1964- Exchequer
65) outside House
reflecting on E
Members
(Callaghan's
case)
34. A perusal of the above-mentioned table reveals the
following:
F
(i), The only cases in this Table where the House was
of the view that a breach of privileges had taken
place were those in which the questionable conduct
bore a direct nexus to the functioning or the
proceedings of the House or the functioning of a G
member within the House. Even in such cases no
serious action followed, much less an action of
expulsion. These were:
Service of summons in the precincts of the House H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 4 S.C.R.
A without permission of the House (Verney's case
1945-46)
Misrepresentation by a newspaper of the speech
of a Member within the House (Walkden's Case
1946-47)
B
Speech by a Member imputing impartiality to the
Deputy Speaker of the~House
Unauthorized reports of proceedings of the House
(Mrs. Ford's case 1952-53)
c
Intimidation/molestation/threat of a Member in the
House (Mrs. Tennant's case 1945-46) and (Editor
of "Sunday Graphic's" case 1956-57) and (Colin
Jordan's case 1959-60)
D
(ii) The instances where the House was of the view that
contempt of the House had taken place were those
where there were direct obstructions and
imputations against members, namely when:
E There was an assault on the Member in the House
(Piratin's case 1946-47)
There was a refusal by a witness to answer
questions before a Privileges Committee (Case of
F Schofield and Dobson 1946-47)
There was an imputation by a newspaper that
members were receiving unusually large petrol
allowances (case of "Sunday Express" 1956-57)
G There was an imputation regarding a Member's
drunkenness (Duffy's case 1964-65)
tiii) In the one instance where the Privileges Committee
did indeed recommend the expulsion of a member (Gary
Allighan, 1947) the House ultimately did not accept the
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1157
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
same recommendation. A
35. It would be safe to say that a breach of privilege by a
member of the legislature can only be established when a
member's act is directly connected with or bears a proximity
to his duties, role or functions as a legislator. This test of
8
proximity should be the rule of thumb, while of course accounting
for exceptional circumstances where a person who is both a
legislator and a holder of executive office may commit a breach
of privilege. It is our considered view that such a breach has
not occurred in the present case.
c
36. Even if we turn to parliamentary practice in India, it is
quite apparent that the expulsion of members should only be
sustained if their actions have caused obstructions to legislative
functions or are likely to cause the same. The following
examples have been discussed in Raja Ram Pa/'s_case o
(supra.) at Paragraphs 301-317:
One can refer to the chain of events leading up to
the resignation of Mr. H.G. Mudgal from the Lok
Sabha on 24-9-1951. Mr. H.G. Mudgal was charged
with having engaged himself in 'certain dealings E
with the Bombay Bullion Association which included
canvassing support am:I making propaganda in
Parliament on problems like option business,
stamp duty etc. and receipt of financial or business
advantages from the Bombay .Buttlon Association'
in the discharge of his duty In Parliament.
Subsequently, a Committee ap13ointed by
Parliament to inquire into the said tnember's
activities found his conduct to be derogatory to the
dignity of the House and inconsistent with the G
standard
.
which
I
Parliament was entitled to expect
from its members. In pursuance of these findings,
a motion for expulsion was brought before the
House which prompted the member to submit his
resignation. [See: Kaul and Shakdher, Practice and H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A Procedurf] ot Parliament, 5th edn, (New Delhi:
Metropolitan Book Co. Pvt. Ltd. 2001) at p. 262] It
is pertinent to note that the misconduct which
triggered a recommendation for expulsion had a
clear nexus with legislative functions.
B
Another relevant instance is that of the expulsion of
Mr. Subramanium Swamy from the Rajya Sabha.
On 2-9-1976 the Rajya Sabha adopted a motion
appointing a committee to investigate the conduct
and activities of Mr. Swamy, within and outside the
c country, including alleged anti-India propaganda
calculated to bring into disrepute Parliament and
other democratic institutions of the country and
generally behaving in a manner unworthy of a
member. The Committee presented its report on
D 12-11-1976 recommending expulsion and on 15-
11-1976 the Rajya Sabha adopted a motion to
expel the said member. [See: Subhash C.
Kashyap, Parliamentary Procedure- Law
Privileges, Practice & Precedents Vol. 2, (New
E Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2000)
at p. 1657]
We can also invite attention to the instance when
Mrs. Indira Gandhi and two others were expelled
from the Lok Sabha by way of a motion adopted
F
on 19-12-1978. The background was that on 18-11-
1977, a motion was adopted by the House referring
to the Committee of privileges a question of breach
of privilege and contempt of the House against Mrs.
Gandhi and others regarding obstruction,
G intimidation, harassment and institution of false
cases by Mrs. Gandhi and others against certain
officials. The Committee of Privileges recorded a
finding that Mrs. Indira Gandhi had committed a
breach of privilege and contempt of the House by
H causing obstruction, intimidation, harassment and
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1159
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
;:· 1 ~;~~~~ •• ·.L~$ttiption orita1se 1 '·ca~Js against the officers A'
· concerned who were collecting information for the
purpose of an answer to a certain question that had
been asked in the House. The nature of punitive
action to follow was left to the wisdom of the House.
On 19-12-1978, the House adopted a motion which .· B
recommended Mrs. Gandhi's expulsion a!J'.iong '
other things. However, this expulsion was Ul)done
during the term of the Seventh Lok Sabha, wherein
I
; there was a substantive debate on whether the
House had the power to expel its members in the c
exercise of privileges. At that point of time, the
majority of the House had resolved that there was ·
no power of expulsion in such circumstances.
However, the position has since been clarified in
Raja Ram Pal's case (supra.) which has
0
recognised the power of legislatures to exp~1. their
members, subject to the judicially presc"ribed
guidelines. Nevertheless, what is relevant for the
present case is that the initial recommGndation for
e~pulsion wa~(t~ig~~.d
b.y condu·c..tll!·t·.h·. ··~.t bore a E
direct causal lin~to~eg1Slatjl{e functions;.;<
Another comparable instance was flOted by S.C..
Agarwal, J. in his dissenting opinion in P. V.
Narasimha Rao v. State, (1998) 4 SCC 626,
wherein it was observed: F
"25. It does not, however, constitute breach or contempt
qf the House if the offering of payment of bribe is related
to the business other than that of the House. In 1974, the
Lok Sabha considered the matter relating to offer or
payment of bribe in the import licences case wherein it -G
was afleged that a Member of ~ok Sabha had taken bribe
arid forged signatures of the Members for fu'1hering the
cause of certain applicants. The question of privi:ege was
disallowed since it was considered that the conduct of the
Member, although improper, was not related to the· H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 4 S.C.R.
A business of the House. But at the same time 1t was held
that as the allegation of bribery and forgery was very
serious and unbecoming of a Member of Parliament, he
could be held guilty of lowering the dignity of the House.
(See: Kaul and Shakdher at pp. 254, 255)."
B
37. As outlined earlier, the respondents have also
contended that the power of a legislature to punish for its own
contempt should not be seen as incidental to its' power of self-
composition and that it should have a wider import than the
C remedial power of preventing obstructions to legislative
functions. It will be useful to refer to the following extract from
the respondents' written submissions:
" ... Even if the House of Legislature has limited powers,
such power is not only restricted to ex facie contempts, but
D
even acts committed outside the House. It is open to the
Assembly to use its power for protective purposes, and the
acts that it can act upon are not only those that are
committed in the House, but upon anything that lowers the
dignity of the House. Thus, the petitioners' submission that
E the House only has the power to remove obstructions
during its proceedings cannot be accepted."
In pursuance of this line of reasoning, the respondents have
argued that the appellant's actions have lowered the dignity of
F the house and the same amounts to conduct unbecoming of a
member of the House, even though such conduct had no
bearing on legislative functions. It was urged that the underlying
motive behind the expulsion was not merely that of punishment
but also to remove a member who was seen as unfit to continue
G as a member of the legislature.
38. We are unable to agree with this line of reasoning
presented on behalf of the respondents. Expressions such as
'lowering the dignity of the house', 'conduct unbecoming of a
member ot thE3 House' and 'unfitness of a member' are openly-
H worded and abstract grounds which if recognised, will trigger
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. C01'J1MITTEE, PUNJAB 1161
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of legislative A
privileges by incumbent majorities to target their political
opponents as well as dissidents. The various grounds for
·disqualification of members of legislative assemblies (MLAs)
have been enumerated in Articles 190 and 191 of the
Constitution. For most circumstances, there is an elaborate B
machinery in place to decide questions pertaining to the
disqualification of members and the vacancy of seats. However;
it is for the purpose of tackling unforeseen and novel
impediments to legislative fun_ctioning that the 'powe~s.
privileges and immunities' contemplated by Article 194(3) ofthe c
Constitution have not been codified. In Raja Ram Pal's case
(supra.) the majoritY decision of this Court did recognise that
the legislature's power to punish for its contempt could be
exercised to expel: legislators for grounds other than those
prescribed in the Constitution, but it was not the intention of this
0
Court to prescribe an untrammeled power. By laying down a
clear set of guidelines for judicial review over the exercise of
parliamentary privileges, this Court had made its intentions quite
clear. Accordingly, we are of the view that the. power of a
legislative chamber to punish for its own contempt should
broadly coincide with the legislature's interest in protecting the E
integrity of its functions. There can of course be some
exceptional circumstances where acts that take place outside
the 'four walls of the house' could have the effect of distorting,
obstructing or diluting the integrity of legislative functions. An
obvious example is th.at of legislators accepting bribes in lieu F
of asking questions or voting on the floor of the House.
However, with respect to the facts before us, the respondents
have failed to demonstrate how the alleged misconduct on part
of the appellant and the petitioners could have a comparable
effect. Using the route of legislative privileges to recommend G
the appellant's expulsion in the present case is beyond the
legitimate exercise of the privilege power of the House.
Re: Question II.
H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A 39. The next aspect that merits our attention is whether it
was proper for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to consider the
alleged misconduct as a breach of privilege in spite of the fact
that it took place during the Vidhan Sabha's previous term. The
allegedly improper exemption of a plot of land (measuring 32.10
B Acres) from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme had been
notified on 13-1-2006, during the 12th term of the Punjab Vidhan
I
Sabha. On 22-02-2006, a question pertaining to this allegedly
improper exemption was raised in the House and the same
1
I
I was discussed On 22-02-2006, 28-02-2006 and 1-3-2006
C respectively. At this juncture it must be clarified that there were
separate allegations in the respondent's submissions which
suggest that the appellant had played a part in suppressing
I
sdr;ne materials when questions had been asked about the
allegedly improper exemption. However, the said suppression
I
of ~pterials had been inquired into by another Committee and
0
ther~ w~re no findings against the appellant.
40. \As mentioned earlier, the House was subsequently
diss_olVed and a new regime was voted to power in the elections
held in February 2007. It was during the present term of the
E House. (i.e. the 13th term of th~ Punjab Vidhan Sabha) that the
allegedly improper exemption wa~ made the subject-m<:tter of
an inquiry by a Special Committee whic;h was constituted in
pursuance of a.resolution passed by the House on 18-12-2007.
The Special Committee presented it~ report on the floor of the
F House on 3-9-2008, which in turn became the basis of the
impugned resolution of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha that was
passed on 10-9-2008. Before addressing the contentious
issue, it is necessary to understand the implications of the
d:ssolution of a legislative chamber, since the Punjab Vidhan
G ~'abha had been dissolved andrn-¢onstituted during the period
between the operative dates, i.e. the date of notification of the
allegedly improper exemption of land from the Amritsar
Improvement Scheme (13-1-2006) and the constitution of the
Spe_cial Committee to inquire into the said allegations of
H misconduct ( 18-12-2007).
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1163
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, C.11.]
41. The literal meaning of 'dissolution' is listed in Black's A
Law Dictionary, 8th edn. [(West Group) at p. 506] as 'the act
of bringing to an end; termination'. P. Ramanatha Aiyar,
Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edn., Vol. 2D-I, (Wadhwa & Co.,
2005) furnishes the following definition, at p. 1435: .
"Dissolution and prorogation.- Constitution of India, B
Art.107 (3), 174(2) (a) & (b), 196. Dissolution of Parliament
is invariably proceeded by prorogation, and what is true
about the result of prorogation, is, it is said a fortiori true
about the result of dissolution. Dissolution of Parliament is
sometimes described as "a civil death of Parliament". llbert C
in his work on 'Parliament' has observed that 'prorogation'
means the end of a Session (not of parliament)'; and adds
that "like dissolution it kills all bills which have not yet been
passed". He also describes dissolution as "an end of
Parliament (not merely of a session) by royal D
proclamation", and observes that "it wipes the slate clean
of uncompleted bills or other proceedings".
The effects of dissolution have also been discussed in the
following manner [Cited from: Kaul and Shakdher, Practice and E
Procedure of Parliament, 5th edn. (New Delhi: Metropolitan
Book Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2001) at pp. 191-193):
EFFECTS OF DISSOLUTION
"Dissolution, as already stated, marks the end of the life F
of a House and is followed by the constitution of a new
House. One the Hou.se has been dissolved, the dissolution
is irrevocable. There is no power vested in the president
to cancel his order of dissolution and revive the previous
House. The consequences of dissolution are absolute and G
irrevocable. In Lok Sabha, which alone is subject to
dissolution under the Constitution, dissolution "passes a
sponge over the Parliamentary slate''. All business pending
,bdfore it or any of its committees lapses on dissolution.
No part of the records of the dissolved House can be
H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A carried over and transcribed into the records and registers
of the new House. In short, dissolution draws the final
curtain upon the existing House.
Business before a Committee: Ail business pending
before Parliamentary Committees of Lok Sabha lapse on
8 dissolution of Lok Sabha. Committees themselves stand
dissolved on dissolution of a Lok Sabha. However, a
Committee which is unable to complete its work before the
dissolution of a House may report to the house to that
effect, in which case any preliminary memorandum or note
c that the committee may have prepared or any evidence
that it may have taken is made available to the new
Committee when appointed."
42. Coming to judicial observations, the effect of
D dissolution of a House were discussed by this Court in the
Gujarat Assembly Election case, (2002) 8 SCC 237. V.N.
Khare, J. (as His Lordship then was) had made the following
observations:
"40 ... Dissolution ends the life of the legislature and brings
E an end to all business. The entire chain of sittings and
sessions gets broken and there is no next session or the
first sitting of the next session after the House itself has
ceased to exist. Dissolution of Legislative Assembly ends
the representative capacity of legislators and terminates
F the responsibility of the Cabinet to the Members of the Lok
Sabha or the Legislative Assembly, as the case may be."
Furthermore, Pasayat, J. had explained:
"135. Dissolution brings a legislative body to an end. It
G essentially terrrinates the life of such body and is followed
by constitution of a new body (a Legislative Assembly or
a House of People, as the case may be). Prorogation on
the other hand relates to termination of a session and thus
precludes another session, unless it coincides with the end
H of the legislative term. The basic difference is that
- .... .,,,, '""
~
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1165
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
prorogation unlike dissolution does not affect a legislative A
body's life which may constitute from session to session,
until brought to an end by dissolution. Dissolution draws
the final curtain upon the House. Once the House is
dissolved it becomes irrevocable. There is no power to
recall the order of dissolution and/ or revive the previous B
House. Consequently effect of dissolution is absolute and
irrevocable. It has been described by some learned
authors that dissolution "passes a sponge over the
parliamentary slate". The effect of dissolution is in essence
termination of current business of the legislative body, its c
sittings and sessions. There is a cessation of chain of
sessions, sittings for a dissolved legislative body and there
cannot be· any next session or its first sitting. With the
election of a legislative body a new chapter comes into .
operation. Till that is done the sine qua non of responsible
0
government i.e. accountability is non-existent.
Consequentially, the time stipulation is non-existent. Any
other interpretation would render use. of word "its"- iii
relation to "last sitting in one session" and "first sitting in
the next session" without significance."
E
43. In Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kera/a. AIR
1962 SC 694, Gajendragadkar J. (as His Lordship then was)
had reflected on the effects of the dissolution of the House. The
context in that case was· that a Legislative Assembly had
passed a bill and later the President had sent the bill back for F
reconsideration by the successor assembly. The question of
whether the successor assembly needed to consider the bill
afresh and pass it again was answered in the affirmative:
"6 . ... The duration of the Legislative Assembly is
prescribed by Article 172 (1 ), and normally at the end of G
five years the !ife of the Assembly would come to an end.
Its life could come to an encl before the expiration of the
said period of the five years if during the said five years
the President acts under Article 356. In any case there is
no continuity in the personality of the Assembly where the H
-.>,tq:··· •''
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20101 4 S.C.R.
A life of one Assembly comes to an end and another
Assembly is in due course elected. If that be so, a bill
passed by one Assembly cannot, on well recognized
principles of democratic government be brought back to
the successor Assembly as though a change in the
B personality of the Assembly had not taken place. The
scheme of the Constitution in regard to the duration of the
life of State Legislative Assembly, it is urged, supports the
argument that with the dissolution of the Assembly all
business pending before the Assembly at the date of
c dissolution must lapse. This position would be consonant
with the well recognized princip' •s of democratic rule. The
Assembly derives its sovereign power to legislate
essentially because it represents the will of the citizens of
the State, and when one Assembly has been dissolved and
another has been elected in its place, the successor
D
Assembly cannot be required to carry on with the business
pending before its predecessor, because that would
assume continuity of personality which in the eyes of the
Constitution does not exist. Therefore, sending the bill
back to the successor Assembly with the message of the
E President would be inconsistent with the basic principles
of democracy."
In Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of
India, (1991) 4 SCC 699, G.N. Ray, J. had discussed the effect
F of dissolution of the Lok Sabha:
"51. Adverting to the effect of dissolution on other business
such as motions, resolutions etc. the learned authors say:
"All other business pending in Lok Sabha e.g.
G rr )tions, amendments, supplementary demands for
grants etc., at whatever stage, lapses upon
dissolution, as also the petitions presented to the
House which stand referred to the Committee on
Petitions."
H
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1167
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
44. On the basis of the authorities cited above, it is evident A
that nrdinarily legislative business does not survive the
dissolution of the House. The exception to this norm is covered
by the 'doctrine of lapse' wherein the successor House can·
choose to take up a pending motion or any order of business
after the re-constitution of the House. However, this exception B
is not applicable in the facts of the present cas~. At the time of
the re constitution of the Punjab Vidhan Sabb~ folllowing the
1
State elections in February 2007, there was no pendihg motion,
report or any other order of business which had a connection
with the allegedly improper exemption of land. It was much later, c
i.e. on 18-12-2007 that a Special Committee was constituted
to inquire into the same. Hence, in this case the Special
Committee proceeded to enquire into the execµtive acts of the
appellants and petitioners which had taken place during the
previous term of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha. It is quite untenable 0
to allow the exercise of legislative privileges to punish past
executive acts especially when there was no pending motion,
report or any other order of business that was relatable to the
said executive acts at the time of the re-constitution of the
House.
E
45. While the legislature is free to inquire into acts and
events that have taken place in the past, the same is ordinarily
done in the nature of fact-finding to improve the quality of law-
making. Legislative oversight over executive actions is an
important facet of parliamentary democracy and such oversight F
can extend to executive decisions taken in the past However, ·
it is altogether another matter if privileges are purportedly
exercised to punish those who have held executive office in the
past. It is quite inconceivable as to how the allegedly improper
exemption of land (notified on 13-1-2006) had the effect of G
obstructing the legislative business in the 13th term of the
Punjab Vidhan Sabha. Hence, it is our considered view 1n
respect of the facts in the present case, that it was improper
for the 13th Punjab Vidhan Sabha to claim a breach of
privileges on account of the alleged misconduct which actually H
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A took p1ace during the 12th term of the Vidhan Sabha. However, :'
our view should not be mistaken for a general proposition since ~
it is within our imagination that in some circumstances the acts "
that have taken place during the previous terms of a Legislature
could actually have the effect of distorting, obstructing or diluting
B the integrity of legislative business in the present term. Evidently,
no such consequence or tendency has been demonstrated in
the present case.
Re: Question Ill.
C 46. As noted in the survey of facts at the beginning of this
opinion, the allegedly improper exemption of land from the
Amritsar !mprovement Scheme is the subject-matter of disputes
that are pending before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
Admittedly, these proceedings had been instituted soon after
D the notification of the said exemption (dated 13-1-2006) and
the fact of their pendency was well known at the time of the
constitution of the Special Committee by the Punjab Vidhan
Sabha on 18-12-2007. This begs the question as to whether it
was proper for the Punjab Vidhan Sabha to inquire into subject-
E matter which was already in question before a judicial forum.
47. The norms to be followed by a legislature in respect
of sub judice matters have been discussed in the following
words [Cited from: Griffith and Ryle, Parliament, Functions and
Procedure (2003), Chapter 6 at Para 6-075):
F
"A more significant reason for not allowing a notice of
motion is if the matter is sub judice (awaiting decision in
the courts); the same rule applies to de~ate and questions.
The sub judice rule does not, however, apply to legislative
G- business or where a ministerial decision is in question (e.g.
in an application for judicial review). It applies only to cases
in UK courts, not ones in courts elsewhere, even if they
concern UK matters (e.g. the European Court of Human
Rights). The Speaker has discretion to waive the rule and
H would normally do so when the case in question concerned
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITIEE, PUNJAB 1169
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
issues of national importance such as the economy, public A
order or essential services.
This long standing practice has been confirmed by
resolutions of the House. Cases which are active in a
criminal court in the United Kingdom must not be referred B
to; this applies from the moment charges are made until
the verdict is given. The same applies to civil actions once
arrangements are made for a hearing. Cases which have
been decided can become sub judice again if one party
applies for leave to appeal. Under this rule, which comes
into operation in relation to some half-dozen cases a C
session, motions (or questions) may not be tabled until the
case is decided. If a motion has been tabled before the
matter became sub judice it is taken off the Order Paper
until the case ceases to be sub judice."
D
48. In fact, the relevant rules of the Rules of Business and
Conduct of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha themselves incorporate
these norms. Reference may be made to the language of Rule
39(10), 50, 93(2)(iv) and 150(d) which lay down the following:
"39. In order that a question may be admissible it shall E
satisfy the following conditions, namely-:
(10) It shall not ask for information on any matter which
. is under adjudication by a court of law having jurisdiction F
in any part of India;
... 50. The right to move-the adjournment of the business
of the Vidhan Sabha (Assembly) for the purpose of
discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance G
shall be subject to the following restrictions, namely -:
****
(ix) the motion shall not deal with a matter on which a
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 4 S.C.R.
A resolution could not be moved;
****
(xi) the motion shall not deal with any matter which is under
adjudication by a Court of law;
B
... 93. ( 1) The matter of every speech shall be strictly
relP.vant to the matter before the House.
(2) A member while speaking shall not-
c ****
(iv) refer to a matter of fact on which a judicial decision is
pending;
.. 150. In order that a resolution may be admissible, it shall
D satisfy the following conditions, namely-
****
(d) it shall not relate to any matter whi{;h is under
adjudication by a Court of law having jurisdiction in any
E part of India."
49. The above-mentioned rules which govern the business
and conduct of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha are quite categorical
in laying down a prohibition on the taking up of any matter which
F is pending adjudication before a court of law. Analogues
provisions control the business and conduct of the Lok Sabha
[See Rules 173, 188 and 352 of the Rules of Business and
Conduct of the Lok Sabha]. While Articles 122(1) and 212(1)
of the Constitution prohibit judicial scrutiny over questions
G relating to compliance with these rules, our attention has been
drawn to the fact that the Punjab Vidhan Sabha proceeded to
inquire into the allegedly improper exemption of land from the
Amritsar Improvement Scheme, even though the same had been
questioned before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
H 50. Subhash C. Kashyap [in Parliamentary Procedure-
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1171
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
Law Privileges, Practice & .·Precedents Vol. 1, (New Delhi: A
Universal Law Publishing Cb. Pvt. Ltd., 2000)] has described
a prominent example where the Speaker of the Lok Sabha had
disallowed discussion on subject-matter that WiiS pending
' ' I
befoie the courts. The following extract also touches on
arguments for allowing the legislature to discuss tfUb judice B
matters in exceptional cases (at pp. 1225- 1226):
(iii) -, he following motion tabled by a member (Madhu
Limaye) was included in the List of Business for 7
May 1968:
c
That this House disapproves of the statements
made by Shri Ranganathan, Under Secy., Ministry
Of External Affairs, on behalf of the Government of
India in his affidavit in opposition on the 21, Apr.
1968, before the Delhi High Court which are I D
contrary to the statements made by the Minister of '
Home Affairs in the House on the 28 Feb. 1968 in
regard to implementation of Kutch Award.
When Limaye was called to move his motion. a
point of order was raised by a member (Narayant E
Rao) and Law Minister (P. Govinda Menon) that
discussion on affidavit would mean discussing a
sub judice matter. The Speaker reserved his ruling.
On 9 May 1968, the Speaker ruled inter alia as
follows: F
The rule on whether a motion which relate\s
to a matter which is under adjudication by a
court of law should be admitted or discussep
in the House has to be interpreted strict!~. G
While on the one hand the Chair has t~
ensure that no discussion in the House
should prejudice the course of justice, th~
Chair has also to see that the House is no(
debarred from discussing an urgent matter: H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A of public importance on the ground that a
similar, allied or linked matter is before a
court of law. The test of sub judice in .my
opinion should be that the matter sought to
be raised in the House is substantially
B identical with the one which a court of law has
to adjudicate. Further, in case the Chair
holds that a matter is sub judice the effect
of this ruling is that the discussion on the
matter is postponed till the judgment of the
c court is delivered. The bar of sub judice will
not apply thereafter, unless the matter
becomes sub judice again on an appeal to
a higher court. Applying these two tests to the
present notice of motion by Shri Limaye, I
consider that in view of the statement by the
D
Law Minister, that 'the question that the
affidavit filed by the Under Secretary is
slightly at variance with what the Home
Minister has stated has been raised in the
court and is under adjudication by the court'
E the very matter which is sought to be raised
by the member is awaiting adjudication by
the court of law.
Hence I consider that discussion on the
F notice of motion should be postponed until
the court has delivered its judgment. I am
however, clear that the matter is of public
importance which should be discussed in the
House and its importance will not be lost if
G the House awaits until the Court has
adjudicated in the matter. [LS Deb. 6.5.1968,
cc 2198- 2203; 7.5.1968, cc. 2649-65;
9.5.1968, cc. 3149- 56]"
51. It is a settled principle that ordinarily the content of
H legislative proceedings should not touch on sub judice matters.
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1173
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
As indicated in the extracf quoted above, the rationale for this A
norm is that legislative debate or scrutiny over matters pending
for adjudication could unduly prejudice the rights of the litigants.
In the case at hand, the allegedly improper exemption of land
(measuring 32.10 acres) from the Amritsar Improvement
Scheme had already been questioned before the High Court B
of Punjab and Haryana. Thus, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha ought
not to have constituted a committee to inquire into the same.
CONCERNS ABOUT INTRUSION INTO THE EXECUTIVE
AND JUDICIAL DOMAIN
c
52. The doctrine of separation of powers is an inseparable
part of the evolution of parliamentary democracy itself.
Renowned French philosopher Montesquieu had drawn the
attention of political theorists to the dangers inherent in the
concentration of legislative, executive and judicial powers in one D
authority and· stressed on the necessity of checks and balances
in constitutional governance. Our institutions of governance have
been intentionally founded on the principle of separation of
powers and the Constitution does not give unfettered power to
any organ. All the three principal organs are expected to work E
in harmony and in consonance with the spirit and essence of
the Constitution. It is clear that a legislative body is not entrusted
with the power of adjudicating a case once an appropriate
forum is in existence under the constitutional scheme. It would
be pertinent to cite the following observations made by M.H. F
Beg J. (as His Lordship then was) in Indira Nehru Gandhi v.
Raj Narain, (1975) Supp SCC 1:
"392 ... 0ne of these basic principles seems to me to be
that, just as courts are not constitutionally competent to
legislate under the guise of interpretation, so also neither G
our Parliament nor any State Legislature, in the purported
exercise of any kind of law- making power, perform an
essentially judicial function by virtually withdrawing a
particular case, pending in any court, and taking upon itself
the duty to decide it by an application of law or its own H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A standards to the facts of that case. Thi~ power must at
least be first constitutionally taken away from the court
concerned and vested in another authority before it can be
lawfully exercised by that other authority. It is not a
necessary or even a natural incident of a "constituent
B power". As Hans Kelsen points out. in his "General Theory
of Law and the State" (see p.143), while creation and
annulment of all general norms, whether basic or not so
basic, is essentially a legislative function their interpretation
and application to findings reached, after a correct
c ascertainment of facts involved in an individual case, by
employing the judicial technique, is really a judicial function.
Neither of the three constitutionally separate organs of
State can, according to the basic scheme of our
Constitution today, leap outside the boundaries of its own
constitutionally assigned sphere or orbit of authority into
D
that of the other. This is the logical meaning of the principle
of supremacy of the Constitution."
53. The impugned resolution (dated 10-9-2008) passed by
the Punjab Vidhan Sabha contains directions as to how the
E investigation into the appellant's and petitioners' alleged
wrongdoing should be conducted. The resolution directs the
filing of First Information Reports (FIRs) and custodial
interrogation in addition to directing the Vigilance Department,
Punjab to find out where the appellant and the others have stored
F their 'ill gotten wealth' and further directs the Vigilance
Department to report back to the Speaker of the Punjab Vidhan
Sabha. These functions are within the domain of the executive.
It is up to the investigating agencies themselves to decide how
to proceed with the investigation in a particular case. The role
G of the legislature in this regard can at best be recommendatory
and the Speaker of a Legislature may not assume the
responsibility of monitoring an ongoing investigation. A
determination of guilt or innocence by way of fact-finding is a
role properly reserved for the trial judge. The only exception to
H this principle is when the impugned acts have the effect of
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITTEE, PUNJAB 1175
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.]
distorting, obstructing or threatening the integrity of legislative A
proceedings or are likely to do the same, thereby warranting
the exercise of privileges. As we have already noted above,
there was an obvious jurisdictional error on part of the Punjab
. Vidhan Sabha in the present case. ·
B
54. A decision of the United States Supreme Court which
raised similar concerns was that of Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 US 168 (1881 ). In that case, the House of Representatives
of the United States Congress had appointed a Special
Committee to investigate into activities related to a 'real estate
pool', since it had attracted investments from one Jay Cook & C
Co. who was a debtor-in-bankruptcy to the Government of the
United States. The Special Committee was set up and it had
served a subpoena to Kilbourn, requiring the latter to present
himself before the_Special Committee and to answer questions
and produce documents. Kilbourn appeared but he refused to D
cooperate with the Committee's proceedings. The House of
Representatives passed a resolution directing that Kilbourn be
arrested and placed under custody until such time as he
purged himself of the contempt and communicated to the
House his willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of the Special E
Committee. The matter reached the Supreme Court of the
United States by way of a writ of habeas corpus filed by
Kileourn. The relevant observations by Miller, J. are produced
as follows:
F
"In looking to the preamble and resolution under which the
committee acted, pefore wliich Kilbourne refused to
testify, we are of the opinion that the House of
Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own
authority, but assumed a power which could only be
properly exercised by another branch of the government, G
because it was, in its nature, clearly judicial.
The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to H
· time ordain and establish If what we have said of the
1176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A division of the P<''vers of the government among the three
departments be sound, this is equivalent to a declaration
that no judicial power is vested in the Congress or either
branch of it, save in cases specifically enumerated to
which we have referred. If the investigation which the
B committee was directed to make was judicial in ~ts
character, and could only be properly and successfully
made by a court of justice, and if it related to a matter
wherein relief or redress could be had only by a judicial
proceeding, we do not, after what has been said, deem it
c necessary to discuss the proposition that the power
attempted to be exercised was one confided by the
Constitution to the judicial, and not to the legislative,
department of the government. We think it equally clear
that the power asserted is judicial, and not legislative. (103
D
us 168, 192-193)
***
How could the House of Representatives know, until it had
been fairly tried, that the courts were powerless to redress
E the creditors of Jay Cook & Co.? The matter was still
pending in a court, and what right had the Congress of the
United States to interfere with a suit pending in a court of
competent jurisdiction? Again, what inadequacy of power
existed in the court, or, as the preamble assumes, in all
courts, to give redress which could lawfully be supplied by
F
an investigatio:i by a committee of one House of
Congress, or by any act or resolution of Congress on the
subject? The case being one of a judicial nature, for which
the power of the courts usually afford the only remedy, it
may well be supposed that those powers were more
G appropriate and more efficient in said of such relief than
the powers which belong to a body whose function is
exclusively legislative. If the settlement to which the
preamble refers as the principal reason why the courts are
rendered powerless was obtained by fraud, or was without
H authority, or for any conceivable reason could be set aside
AMARINDER SINGH v. SPL. COMMITIEE, PUNJAB 1177
VIDHAN SABHA [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI.)
or avoided, it should be done by some appropriate A
proceeding in the court which had the whole matter before
it, and which had all the power in that case proper to be
entrusted to any body, and not by Congress or by any
power to be conferred on a committee of one of the two
Houses." (103 US 168, 194) B
The observations cited above are self-explanatory and,we echo
the concerns about the overreach into the judicial domain in the
fact-situation before us.
CONCLUSION c
55. In the light of the preceding discussion we have arrived
· at the following conclusions:
(i) If there were any irregularities committed by the
appellant and the petitioners in relation to the D
exemption of land (notified on 13-1-2006) from the
Amritsar Improvement Scheme, the proper course
of action on part of the State Government should
have been to move the criminal law machinery with
the filing of a complaint followed by investigation as E
contemplated under the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It is our considered view that the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha exceeded its powers by expellinQ,
the appellant on the ground of a breach of privilege
when there existed none. The allegedly improper F
exemption of land was an executive act attributable .
to the appellant and it did not distort, obstruct or
threaten the integrity of legislative proceedings in
any manner. Hence, the exercise of legislative
privileges under Article 194(3) of the Constitution G
was not proper in the present case.
I /
(ii) Furthermore, the allegedly improper exemption of
land took place during the 12th term of the Punjab
Vidhan Sabha, whereas the constitution of the
Special Committee to inquire into the same took H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 4 S.C.R.
A place during the 13th term. It was not proper for the
Assembly to inquire into actions that took place
during its previous term, especially when there was
no relatable business that had lapsed from the
previous term. If we were to permit the legislature
B to exercise privileges for acting against members
for their executive ·acts during previous terms, the
Courts are likely to be flooded with c es involving
political rivalries. One can conceive mat whenever
there is a change of regime, the fresh incumbents
c would readily fall back on the device of legislative
privileges to expel their political opponents as well
as dissidents. Such a scenario would frustrate
some of the basic objectives of a parliamentary
democracy.
D (iii) When it was well known that the allegedly improper
exemption of land from the Amritsar Improvement
Scheme was the subject-matter of proceedings
instituted before the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana, the Punjab Vidhan Sabha should have
E refrained from dealing with the same subject-
matter.
56. We accordingly declare that the resolution passed by
the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 10-9-2008, directing the expulsion
of the appellant for the remainder of the 13th term of the Vidhan
F Sabha is constitutionally invalid. Hence, we direct the
restoration of the appellant's membership in the Punjab Vidhan
Sabha. However, nothing in this judgment should act as a hurdle
against the investigation, if any, into the alleged role of the
appellant and the petitioners in the improper exemption of land
G from the Amritsar Improvement Scheme that was notified on
13-1-2006. To repeat a cliche, the law will take its own course.
57. This appeal and the connected petitions are disposed
off accordingly, however with no order as to costs.
H R.P. Appeal and connected matters, disposed of
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "legislative privilege"Sign in to search