Holding

Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is a directory provision, not mandatory, and may be waived by the court in exceptional cases meeting prescribed criteria.

Summary

Amardeep Singh filed a civil appeal challenging the Family Court's order granting a waiver of the six‑month cooling‑off period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for a mutual‑consent divorce. The parties had been living separately for over eight years, had settled all pending disputes including a massive alimony award, and sought to avoid further delay. The Supreme Court examined whether the six‑month period is a mandatory statutory requirement or a directory provision that can be waived in exceptional circumstances. Relying on the object of the provision, principles of statutory interpretation, and earlier case law, the Court held that the period is directory and may be waived when the parties have been separated for the requisite period, mediation efforts have failed, a genuine settlement exists, and the waiting period would only prolong their agony. The Court laid down specific criteria for granting such a waiver and affirmed its discretion to do so, including the use of video‑conferencing where appropriate. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of with directions for the parties to approach the concerned court for fresh consideration.

Issues considered

The six‑month cooling‑off period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is mandatory or directory.
Whether the Supreme Court can waive the statutory period under Article 142 of the Constitution in exceptional cases.
What criteria must be satisfied for a court to grant a waiver of the cooling‑off period.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXXIIA Rule 3
Family Courts Act, 1984s. Section 9
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955s. 138, s. 13B

Subjects

Hindu Marriage Actmutual consent divorcecooling‑off periodSection 13BwaiverArticle 142statutory interpretationfamily law

Judgment

[2017] 8 S.C.R. 925

AMARDEEP SINGH A
v.
HARVEEN KAUR
(Civil Appeal No. 11158 of2017)
SEPTEMBER 12, 2017 B

[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.)
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
s.13B(2) - Mutual consent - Cooling period of 6 months -
Object of - Held: The object of the cooling of period was to C
safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise
possibility of differences being reconciled - The object was not to
perpetuate a purposeless marriage or to prolong the agony of the
parties when there was no chance of reconciliation - Though every
effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of D
reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court
should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better
option.
s.138(2) - Provision mandatory or directory - Whether the
minimum period of six months stipulated under s. J3B(2) of the Act
for a motion for passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual E
consent is mandatory or can be relaxed in any exceptional
·situations - Held: Jn determining the question whether provision is
mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive -
The Court has to have the regard to the context, the subject matter
and the object of the provision - This principle is applicable where F
the Court dealing with a divorce by mutual consent is satisfied that
a case is made out to waive the statutory period uls.J 3B(2) - it can
do so after considering that the statutory period of six months
specified in s.138(2), in addition to the statutory period of one year
u!s.J 3B(J) of separation of parties is already over before the first
motion itself; that all efforts for mediation/conciliation to reunite G
the parties have failed; that the parties have genuinely settled their
differences including alimony, custody of child or any other pending
issues between the parties; and that the waiting period will only
prolong their agony- The waiver application can be filed one week
H
925
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver - If
the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting period
for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned
Court - Since the period mentioned in s. 13B(2) is not mandatory
but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in
B the facts and circumstances of each case - Constitution of India -
Art. 142 - Interpretation of statutes - Legislative intent.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The Court must be satisfied that the parties were
living separately for more than the statutory period and all efforts
c at mediation and reconciliation have been tried and have failed
and there is no chance of reconciliation and further waiting
period will only prolong their agony. [Para 14[ [934-C-D)
Nikhil Kumar v. Rupali Kumar (2016) 13 SCC 383 ;
Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010) 4 SCC 393 :
D [20101 2 SCR 414 ; Poonam v. Sumit Tanwar (2010) 4
SCC 460 : (2010) 3 SCR 557 ; Neeti Malviya v. Rakesh
Ma/viya (2010) 6 SCC 413 : [2010[ 6 SCR 1103 ;
Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002) 10 SCC
194 ; Ani/ Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009) 10 SCC
415 : [2009) 14 SCR 90 ; K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini
E AIR 1986 AP 167 (DB); Roopa Reddy v. Prabhakar
Reddy AIR 1994 Kar 12 (DB) ; Dhanjit Vadra v. Smt.
Beena Vadra AIR 1990 Del 146 ; Dinesh Kumar
Shukla v. Smt. Neeta AIR 2005 MP 106 (DB); M.
Krishna Preetha v. Dr. Jayan Moorkkanatt AIR 2010
.F Ker 157 - referred to .
2. Under the traditional Hindu Law, as it stood prior to the
statutory law on the point, marriage is a sacrament and cannot be
dissolved by consent. The Act enabled the court to dissolve
marriage on statutory grounds. By way of amendment in the year
G 1976, the concept of divorce by mutual consent was introduced.
However, Section 13B(2) contains a bar to divorce bei:ng granted
before six months of time elapsing after filing of the divorce
petition by mutual consent. The said period was laid down to enable
the parties to have a rethink so that the court grants divorce by

H
AMARDEEP SINGH v. HARVEEN KAUR 927

mutual consent only if there is no chance for reconciliation. The A
object of the provision is to enable the parties to dissolve a
marriage by consent if the marriage has irretrievably broken down
and to enable them to rehabilitate them as per available options.
The amendment was inspired by the thought that (orcible
perpetuation of status of matrimony between unwilling partners B
did not serve any purpose. The object of the cooling off period
was to safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise
possibility of differences being reconciled. Though every effort
has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of
reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court
should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better C
.option. [Paras 15 and 16) [934-E-H; 935-A]
3. In determining the question whether provision is
mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive.
The Court has to have the regard to the context, the subject
matter and the object of the provision. This principle can be D
applied to the present case. If the Court dealing with a matter is
satisfied that a case is made out to waive the statutory period
under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the following
: i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2),
in addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13B(l)
of separation of parties is already over before the first motion E
itself; ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in
terms of Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/
Section 9 of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have
failed and there is no likelihood of success in that direction by
any further efforts; iii) the parties have genuinely settled their F
differences including alimony, custody of child or any other
·pending issues between the parties; iv) the waiting period will
only prolong their agony. The waiver application can be filed one
week after the first motion giving reasons for the prayer for
waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the
waiting period for the second motion will be in the discretion of G
the concerned Court. [Paras 17-20] [935-A-B; 936-A-E]
Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 480 : (2005]
3 SCR 289 - relied on.

H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

·A Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9'h Edn. 2004) by
Justice GP. Singh - referred to.
4. Since the period mentioned in Section 13B(2) is not
mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise
its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where
B there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there
are chances of alternative rehabilitation. In conducting such
proceedings the Court can also use the medium of video
conferencing and also permit genuine representation of the parties
through close relations such as parents or siblings where the
parties are unable to appear in person for any just and valid reason
C as may satisfy the Court, to advance the interest of justice. (Paras
21 and 22) (936-G-HJ
Case Law Reference
c2016) 13 sec 383 referred to Para3
D (2010) 2 SCR 414 referred to Para4
[2010) 3 SCR 557 referred to Paras
[2010) 6 SCR 1103 referred to Para6
c2002) 10 sec 194 referred to Para8
E (2009) 14 SCR 90 referred to Para 13
AIR 1986 AP 167 (DB) referred to Para 13
1994 Kar 12 (DB) referred to Para 13
AIR 1990 Del 146 referred to Para 13
F
AIR 2005 MP 106 (DB) referred to Para 13
AIR 2010 Ker 157 referred to Para 13
[20051 3 SCR 289 relied on Para 17

G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.11158
of2017.
From the impugned Judgment and Final Order dated 08.05.2017
passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Tis Hazari Court, West
H District, New Delhi in H.M.A. No. I 059 of 2017.
AMARDEEP SINGH v. HARVEEN KAUR 929

K. V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv.(AC), Abhishek Kaushik, Ms. Vrinda A
Bhandari, Mukunda Rao A., Ms. Jaishree Viswanathan, Pradeep Kr.
Mishra, Ashish Upadhayay, T.R.B. Sivakumar, Ashish Virmani, Rohit
Sharma, Harneet Singh Oberoi, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. I. The question which arises B
for consideration in this appeal is whether the minimum period of six
months stipulated under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
(the Act) for a motion for passing decree of divorce on the basis of
mutual consent is mandatory or can be relaxed in any exceptional
situations.
c
2. Factual matrix giving rise to this appeal is that marriage between
the parties took place on l 61h January, 1994 at Delhi. Two children were
born in 1995 and 2003 respectively. Since 2008 the parties are living
separately. Disputes between the parties gave rise to civil and criminal
proceedings. Finally, on 281h April, 2017 a settlement was arrived at to
resolve all the disputes and seeks divorce by mutual consent. The D
·respondent wife is to be given permanent alimony of Rs.2. 75 crores.
Accordingly, HMA No. 1059of2017 was filed before the Family Court
(West), Tis Hazari Court, New Delhi and on 8th May, 2017 statements
of the parties were recorded. The appellant husband has also handed
over two cheques of Rs.50,00,000/-, which have been duly honoured, E
towards part payment of permanent alimony. Custody of the children is
to be with the appellant. They have sought waiver of the period of six
months for the second motion on the ground that they have been living
separately for the last more than eight years and there is no possibility of
their re union. Any delay will affect the chances of their resettlement.
The parties have moved this Court on the ground that only this Court F
can relax the six months period as per decisions of this Court.
3. Reliance has been placed interalia on decision of this Court in
Nikhil Kumar vs. Rupali Kumar wherein the statutory period of six
months was waived by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution
and the marriage was dissolved. G
· The text of Section 13B is as follows:
"13-B. Divorce by mutual consent.- (1) Subject to the
provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage
1
(20 I 6) 13 sec 383
H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district court
by both the parties to a marriage together. whether such
marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement
of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, on the ground
that they have been living separately for a period of one year
or more, that they have not been able to live together and
B
that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be
dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than
six months after the date of the presentation of the petition
referred to in sub-section (1) and not later than eighteen
c months after the said date, if the petition is not withdrawn in
the meantime, the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing
the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that
a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in
the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the
D marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the
decree."
4. There is conflict of decisions of this Court on the question
whether exercise of power under Article 142 to waive the statutory
period under Section I 3B of the Act was appropriate. In Manis/1 Goel
E versus Rohini Goe/2 , a Bench of two-Judges of this Court held that
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 could not be used to waive
the statutory period of six months for filing the second motion under
Section 13 B, as doing so will be passing an order in contravention of a
statutory provision. It was observed :
"14. Generally, no court has competence to issue a direction
F contrary to law nor can the court direct an authority to act in
contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant
to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or
directions which are contrary to what has been injected by
law. (Vide State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla[(f 994) I SCC
G 175), State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra [(1996) 9 SCC 309),
Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. [(1996) 4
SCC 453), University of Allahabad v. Dr. Anand Prakash
Mishra [(1997) JO SCC 264) and Karnataka SRTC v.
Ashrafu/la Khan [(2002) 2 SC 560)
2
H (201o)4 sec 393
AMARDEEP SINGH v. HARVEEN KAUR 931
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

15. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prem Chand Garg A
v. Excise Commr.[AIR 1963 SCC 996] held as under: (AIR p.
1002, para 12)
"12 . ... An order which this Court can make in order to do
complete justice between the parties, must not only be
consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the B
Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the
substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. "
(emphasis supplied)
The Constitution Benches of this Court in Supreme Court Bar
Assn. v. Union of India {(1998) 4 SCC 409] and E.S.P.
Rajaram v. Union of India {(2001) 2 SCC 186] held that under C
Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court cannot altogether
ignore the substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders
concerning an issue which can be settled only through a
mechanism prescribed in another statute. It is not to be
exercised in a case where there is no basis in law which can D
form an edifice for building up a superstructure. "
5. This Court noted that power under Article 142 had been
exercised in cases where the Court found the marriage to be totally
unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and broken down
·irretrievably. This power was also exercised to put quietus to all litigations E
and to save the parties from further agony3• This view was reiterated
in Poonam versus Sumit Tanwar'.
6. In Neeti Malviya versus Rakesh Malviya 5, this Court .
observed that there was conflict of decisions in Manish Goel (supra)
and Anjana Kishore versus Puneet Kishore6. The matter was
F
3 Para 11 ibid, noting earlier decisions inRomesh Chander v. Savitri (1995) 2 SCC 7;

KanchanDevi v. PromodKumarMittal(J996)8SCC90;AnitaSabharwal v. Anil
Sabharwal (1997) 11SCC490; Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) 4 SCC
226; Kiron v. Sharad Dutt (2000)10 SCC 243; Swati Verma v. Rajan Verma (2004)
1 SCC 123; Harpit Singh Anand v. Stale of W.B. (2004) 10 SCC 505; Jimmy
S11darshan P11rohit v. S11darshan Sharad P11rohit (2005) 13 SCC 410; Durga G
Prasanna Tripathy v. Arttndhali Tripathy (2005) 7 SCC 353; Naveen Kohli v.
Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558; Sanghamitra Ghosh v. Kaja/ K11mar Ghosh (2007)
2 SCC 220; Rishikesh Sharma v. Saroj Sharma (2007) 2 SCC 263; Samar Ghosh v.
Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 51 J and Salish Sitole v. Ganga (2008) 7 SCC 734
• c2010) 4 sec 460
.' c2010) 6 sec 413
'(2002) lo sec 194 H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A referred to bench of three-Judges. However, since the matter became
infructuous on account of grant of divorce in the meanwhile7 •
... .7. Without any reference to the judgment in Manish Goel (supra),
imWer under Article 142 Qf the Constitution has been exercised by this
Court in riillnber of cases8 even after the said judgment.
· 8. We find that itiAnjana Kishore (supra), this Court was dealing
with a transfer petition and the parties reached a settlement. This Court
waived the six months period under Article 142 in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In Anil Kumar Jain versus Maya Jain',
one of the parties withdrew the consent. This Court held that marriage
c had irretrievably broken down and though the civil courts and the High
Court could not exercise power contrary to the statutory provisions, this
Court under Article 142 could exercise such power in the interests of
justice. Accordingly the decree for divorce was granted.
9. After considering the above decisions, we are of the view that
D since Manish Goel (supra) holds the field, in absence of contrary
decisions by a larger Bench, power under Article 142 of the Constitution
cannot be exercised contraty to the statutory provisions, especially when
no proceedings are pending before this Court and this Court is approached
only for the plltpose <1f waiver of the statute.
E I 0. However, we find that the question whether Section 13B(2) is
to be read as mandatory or discretionary needs to be gone into. In
Manish Goel (supra), this question was not gone into as it was not
raised. This Court observed :
"23. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not able to
F advance arguments on the issue as to whether. statutory period •
prescribed under Section 13-B(J) of the Act is mandatory or

7
Order dated z3n1 August, 2011 in Transfer Petition (Civil)No. 899 of2007
'Priyonka Singh v. Jayant Singh(2010) 15 SCC 390; Sarita Singh v. Rajeshwar
G Singh ~2010) 15 SCC 374; HarpreetSingh Popli v. Manmeet K11ur Pople (2010) 15
SCC 316; Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar (2011) 5 SCC 234; Veena v. State
(Govt of NCT of Delhi) (2011) 14 SCC 614; Priyanka Khanna v. Amit Khanna
(2011) 15 SCC 612;DevinderSingh Narula v. Meenakshi Nangia (2012) 8 SCC 580;
Vimi Vinod Chopra v. Vinod Gulshan Chpra (2013) 15 SCC 54 7; Priyanka Chawla v.
Amit Chawla (2016)3 SCC 126; Nikhil Kumar v. Rupali Kumar (2016) 13 SCC 383
•(2009) 10 sec 415
H
AMARDEEP SINGH v. HARVEEN KAUR 933
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.)

directory and if directory, whether could be dispensed with A
even by the High Court in exercise of its writ/appellate
jurisdiction. "
. '
11. Accordingly, vi de order dated 18th Au~st, 20 l 7i we passed
the following order : · · .. ..
"List the matter on 23rd August, 2017 to consider the:'(Juestitm B
whether provision of Section 13B of the Hindu Ma'rriage, Act,
1955 laying dOWfl COO/ing off period of six monf/js'·iS a
mandatory requirement or it is open to the Family Court to
waive the same having regard to the interest of justice in an
individual case.
c
Mr. K. V. Vishwanathan, senior counsel is appointed as Amicus
to assist the Court. Registry to furnish copy of necessary
papers to learned Amicus ".
12. Accordingly, learned amicus curiae has assisted the Court.
We record our gratitude for the valuable assistance rendered by learned
amicus who has been ably assisted by S/ShriAbhishekKausliik, Vrinda D
Bhandari and Mukunda Rao Angara, Advocates. · "
13. Learned amicus submitted that waiting perio4.~~sh,rirre;4 under
Section l 3(B)2 of the Act is directory and can be waiveg by tlie court
where proceedings are pending, in exceptional situations. This view is
supported by judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in_ K. E
Omprakash vs. K. Nalini10, Karnataka High Court in Roopa Reddy
vs. Prabhakar Reddy", Delhi High Court in Dhanjit Vadra vs. Smt.
Reena Vadra 12 and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dinesh Kumar
Shukla vs. Smt. Neeta 13• Contrary view has been taken by Kerala
'High Court in M. Krishna Preetha ·vs. Dr. Jayan Moorkkanatt 14•
!twas submitted that Section 13B{l) relates to jurisdiction of the Court F
and the petition is maintainable only if the parties are living separately
for a period of one year or more and if they have not been able to live
together and have agreed that the marriage be dissolved. Section l 3B(2)
is procedural. He submitted that the discretion to waive the period is a
guided discretion by consideration of interest ofjustice where there is no G

" AIR 1986 AP 167 (DB)
11
AIR 1994 Kar 12 (DB)
" AIR 1990 Del 146
13
AIR 2005 MP I 06 (DB)
14
AIR 2010 Ker 157
H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 8 S.C.R.

A chance of reconciliation and parties were already separated for a longer
period or contesting proceedings for a period longer than the period
mentioned in Section 13B(2). Thus, the Court should consider the
qm;stio~:
i) How long parties have been married?
B ii) How long litigation is pending?
ill) How long they have been staying apart?
iv) Are there any other proceedings between the parties?
v) Have the parties attended mediation/conciliation?
c vi) Have the parties arrived at genuine settlement which
takes care of alimony, custody of child or any other
pending issues between the parties?
14. The Court must be satisfied that the parties were living
separately for more than the statutory period and all efforts at mediation
D and reconciliation have been tried and have failed and there is no chance
of reconciliation and further waiting period will only prolong their agony.
1S. We have given due consideration to the issue involved. Under
the traditional Hindu Law, as it stood prior to the statutory law on the
point, marriage is a sacrament and cannot be dissolved by consent. The
Act enabled the court to dissolve marriage on statutory grounds. By
E way of amendment in the year 1976, the concept of divorce by mutual
consent was introduced. However, Section 13B(2) contains a bar to
divorce being granted before six months of time elapsing after filing of
the divorce petition by mutual consent. The said period was laid down
to enable the parties to have a rethink so that the court grants divorce by
F mutual consent only if there is no chance for reconciliation.
16. The object of the provision is to enable the parties to dissolve
a marriage by consent ifthe marriage has irretrievably broken down and
to enable them to rehabilitate them as per available options. The
amendment was inspired by the thought that forcible perpetuation of
G status of matrimony between unwilling partners did not serve any purpose.
The object of the cooling off the period was to safeguard against a
hurried decision if there was otherwise possibility of differences being
reconciled. The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage or
to prolong the agony of the parties when there was no chance of
reconciliation. Though every effort has to be made to save a marriage,
H if there are no chances of reunion and there are chances of fresh
AMARDEEP SINGH v. HARVEEN KAUR 935
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless in enabling the parties A
to have a better option.
17. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or
directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to have
the regard to the context, the subject matter and the object of the provision.
This principle, as formulated in Justice GP. Singh's "Principles of B
Statutory Interpretation" (9th Edn., 2004), has been cited with approval
in Kai/ash versus Na11hku a11d ors.'5as follows:
"The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead to
formulation of any universal rule except this that language
a/One most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to C
the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory
provision in question, in determining whether the same is
mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord
Campbell said: 'No universal rule can be laid down as to
whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory
only or obligatory with an implied nullification for D
disobedience. It is the duty of courts ofjustice to try to get at
the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to
the whole scope of the statute to be considered. '
" 'For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature', points
out Subbarao, J. 'the court may consider inter alia, the nature E
and design of the statute, and the consequences which would
follow from construing it the one way or the other; the impact
of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with
the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances,
namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-
compliance with the provisions; the fact that the non- F
compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some -
penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow
therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation
. will be defeated or furthered'. If object of the enactment will
be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed G
as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious
general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons
without very much furthering the object of enactment, the
same will be construed as directory. "

"(2oos) 4 sec 480 H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A 18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the
view that where the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case
is made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13B(2), it can
do so after considering the following :

~ the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in
B addition to the statutory period of one year under Section l 3B( 1)
of separation of parties is already over before the first motion
itself;

ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of
c Order XXXIIA Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9
of the Family Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and
there is no likelihood of success in that direction by any further
efforts;

iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including
D alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between
the parties;

iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.

19. The waiver application can be filed one week after the first
E motion giving reasons for the prayer for waiver.

20. If the above conditions are satisfied, the waiver of the waiting
period for the second motion will be in the discretion of the concerned
Court.
F
21. Since we are of the view thatthe period mentioned in Section
13B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the Court to
exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case where
there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there are
chances of alternative rehabilitation.
G
22. Needless to say that in conducting such proceedings the Court
can also use the medium of video conferencing and also permit genuine
representation of the parties through close relations such as parents or
siblings where the parties are unable to appear in person for any just and
valid reason as may satisfy the Court, to advance the interest of justice.
H
AMARDEEP SINGH v. HARVEEN KAUR 937
[ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

23. The parties are now at liberty to move the concerned court A
for fresh consideration in the light of this order.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Devika Gujral Appeal disposed of.