AMAR SINGHversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN

                       [2010] 9 S.C.R. 526


A                           AMAR SINGH
                                   V.
                      STATE OF RAJASTHAN
               (Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2004 etc.)

                          AUGUST 03, 2010
B
              [R.M. LODHA AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

         Penal Code, 1860: s. 3048 - Dowry death - Held: An
    offence is made out uls. 3048, if the woman was subjected to
C   cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand soon
    before her death - Mere demand of dowry would not attract
    provision of s. 3048 - On facts, prosecution proved beyood
    reasonable doubt that the deceased-wife was tortured by
    appellant-husband on account of demand of scooter/cash, two
D   months prior to her death - Prosecution led sufficient
    evidence to raise presumption uls. 1138 that husband caused
    dowry death of the deceased - Husband did not rebut the
    presumption - He was rightly convicted by courts below -
    However, sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him is
E   reduced to ten years imprisonment since there was no
    evidence as to the actual role played by him in the death of
    deceased - As regards the brother-in-law and mother-in-law,
    prosecution witness could not state exact act of harassment
    and torture caused by them to the deceased - High Court
F   rightly set aside their conviction - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 32,
    1138 - Crime against women - Dowry death - Sentence/
    Sentencing.

       Evidence Act, 1872: s. 32 - Dying declaration - Dowry
  death - Statements made by the deceased several times to
G her mother and brother regarding the dowry demands made
  by her husband - Admissibility of, uls.32 - Held: These were
  statements as to "the circumstances of the transaction which
  resulted in her death" within the meaning of s.32(1) and are
  admissible - Penal Code, 1860 - s.3048.
H                               526
      AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                527


      The prosecution case was that the deceased was         A
married to the appellant-accused. She was found dead,
under abnormal circumstances, in her in-laws's house
within ten months of the marriage. The uncle of the
appellant lodged a report that the deceased got engulfed
in flames when she was boiling water and as a result she     B
died. The father of the deceased lodged a report that the
deceased was harassed and humiliated in connection
with the demand of dowry by her in-laws; and that on
receiving information that she met with an accident, he
rushed to the spot and found the body of deceased in         c
charred condition. The trial court convicted the appellant
and deceased's mother-in-law and brother-in-law under
Sections 498A and 3048 IPC. The High Court confirmed
the conviction of the appellant. It however acquitted the
mother-in-law and the brother-in-law. The appeal was
                                                             D
filed by the appellant-husband challenging his conviction
and sentence under Section 3048 IPC. State also filed
appeal against the order of acquittal of the mother-in-law
and the brother-in-law.

    Partly allowing the accused's appeal and dismissing      E
the State's appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian
Evidence Act provides that statements made by a person
as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the            F
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his
death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death
comes into question, are themselves relevant facts. In the
instant case, the cause of death of the deceased was a
question to be decided and the statements made by the        G
deceased before PW-4 and PW-5 that the appellant-
accused used to taunt the deceased in connection with
demand of a scooter or Rs.25,000/- within a couple of
months before the death of the deceased were
                                                             H
    528     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A statements as to "the circumstances of the transaction
  which resulted in her death" within the meaning of
  Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. The
  prosecution, therefore, was able to establish that soon
  before her'death the deceased was subjected by the
B appellant to taunt in connection with the demand for
  dowry. [Paras 11, 13) [536-F-G; 537-F-G]

      1.2. Section 1138 of the Evidence Act states that
  when the question is whether a person has committed
  the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon
C before her death such woman was subjected by such
  person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection
  with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that
  such person had caused the dowry death. The
  prosecution in the instant case led sufficient evidence
D before the court to raise a presumption that the appellant
  had caused the dowry death of the deceased and it was,
  therefore, for the appellant to rebut this presumption.
  [Para 14) [538-B-D)

E        Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. (1997) 4 SCC 161; Sharad
    Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SOC 116;
    Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor AIR 1939 PC 47; Pawan
    Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309 -
    relied on.
F     Biswajit Halder alias Babu Halder and Others v. State of
  West Bengal (2008)1 SCC 202; Durga Prasad and Another
  v. The State of M.P. 2010 (6) SCALE 18; Latu Mahto and
  Another v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) (2008) 8 SCC 395;
  Smt. Shanti and Another v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC
G 371 - referred to.

        1.3. The statement of the appellant was recorded
    under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The evidence of PW-4 that the
    deceased came to her house many times after marriage
H
      AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                   529


and lastly came to her house prior to her death saying          A
that the in-laws demanded a scooter and that the
appellant said that she came from a poor family, was
brought to the notice of the appellant but he simply
denied the same. The appellant also chose not to                    ,
examine any defence witness to rebut the presumption            B
of dowry death against him under Section 1138 of the
Evidence Act. The trial court and the High Court were thus
right in holding that the appellant was guilty of the offence
under Section 3048 IPC. [Para 15] [538-E-G]

     1.4. For the offence under Section 3048 IPC, the trial
                                                                c
court had imposed the maximum punishment of life
imprisonment saying that the appellant sacrificed the
newly-wed bride with cruelty and harshness to satisfy his
lust of dowry and therefore he did not deserve any mercy
and considering the nature of the offence committed by          D
him and his conduct, he deserved the maximum
punishment of life imprisonment. The High Court
sustained the conviction and punishment of life
imprisonment imposed on the appellant under Section
3048 IPC. The fact remained that the appellant was not          E
charged for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC
presumably because during the investigation, no
materials were available to establish the offence under
Section 302 IPC against the appellant. Since there was
no evidence as to the actual role played by the appellant       F
in the death of the deceased, a punishment of ten years'
imprisonment would suffice in the ends of justice. [Paras
16-17] [538-G-H; 539-A-E]

   Smt. Shanti and Another v. State of Haryana (1991) 1
                                                                G
sec 371 - relied on.
    2. A prosecution witness who merely used the word
"harassed" or "tortured" and did not describe the exact
conduct of the accused which, according to him,
                                                                H
    530     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A amounted to harassment or torture may not be believed
  by the court in cases under Section 498A and 3048 IPC.
  PW-2 (father of the deceased) did not state in his
  evidence before the Court that the brother-in-law and the
  mother-in-law, in any way, subjected the deceased to any
B harassment or cruelty. PW-4 (mother of the deceased)
  stated that the deceased used to complain about the
  demand of a scooter by mother-in-law and harassment
  by her mother-in-law, but PW-4 did not state what was the
  exact act of mother-in-law by which the deceased felt
c harassed. Similarly, PW-5 did not describe the exact
  conduct of the mother-in-law and other in-laws on
  account of which the deceased felt tortured and taunted.
  The High Court rightly took a view that the charges
  against the brother-in-law and the mother-in-law were not
  established beyond reasonable doubt and that their case
0
  was distinguishable from that of the appellant. [Para
  5][Criminal appeal no.1411 of 2010] [541-A-F]

        Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others (2000) 5 SCC
    207 - relied on.
E
                        Case Law Reference:
          Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2004
      (2008)1 sec 202          relied on        Para 3
F     2010 (6) SCALE 18        relied on        Para 3
      (1997) 4 sec 161         relied on        Paras 4, 12
      (2008) 8 sec 395         relied on        Para 5

G     (1998) 3 sec 309         relied on        Paras 7, 13
      (1984) 4 sec 116         relied on        Paras 8,12
      AIR 1939 PC 47           relied on        Para 12

H
      AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                    531


  (1991) 1 sec 371           referred to        Para 17           A
  Criminal appeal no.1411 of 2010

  (2000) s sec 201           relied on          Para 6

    CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal            B
No. 854 of 2004.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 07 .10.2003 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench Jaipur in D.B.
Criminal No. 816 of 1998.
                                                                  c
                            WITH

Crl. A. No. 1411 of 2010.

      Dr. Manish Singhvi, Addi. Adv. General, Neelam Sharma,
Uma Dutta, Kishan Datta, Devanshu Kr. Devesh, Milind Kumar        D
for the appearing parties.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    A.K. PATNAIK, J.
                                                                  E
    CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 854 of 2004

     1. This is an appeal against the judgment dated
07.10.2003 of the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, in
D.B. Criminal Appeal No.816 of 1998.                              F

     2. The facts very briefly are that on 05.05.1992 Santosh
(the deceased) was married to the appellant and on 08.03.1993
she was found dead in her in-laws house. On the same day, a
written report was lodged with the police at the Shivaji Park
Police Station at Alwar, by the uncle of the appellant, Ganga     G
Sahai Saini, saying that while the deceased was boiling the
water she got engulfed in flames and died. On the same day,
another written report was lodged with the police by the father
of the deceased, Babu Lal, that the deceased used to be
                                                                  H
    532      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A harassed and humiliated in connection with demand of dowry
  and on receiving the information that she has died in an electric
  current accident, he rushed to the spot and found the body of
  Santosh in charred condition. On the basis of such information
  given by Babu Lal, the police registered FIR No.53of1993 for
s the offences under Sections 498A and 3048 of the Indian Penal
  Code (for short 'IPC'). The investigation was carried out and
  charge-sheet was filed by the police in the Court of Additional
  Chief Judicial Magistrate No.2, Alwar, against the appellant,
  Jagdish (younger brother of the appellant), Smt. Gordhani
c (mother of the appellant), Khem Chand (sister's husband of the
  appellant), Gyatri Devi (wife of Khem Chand) and Girdhari Lal
  (father of Khem Chand). The case was committed to the
  Sessions Court and tried by the Additional Sessions Judge
  No.2, Alwar, as Sessions Case No.32 of 1998. The Additional
  Sessions Judge framed charges under Section 147, 3048 and
0
  498A IPC against all the accused persons. At the trial, the
  prosecution examined 16 witnesses and exhibited 31
  documents. After statement of the accused under Section 313
  of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.'}, no
  defence witness was examined. The Additional Sessions
E Judge convicted the appellant, Jagdish and Gordhani under
  Sections 498A and 3048 IPC and imposed the sentence of
  three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in
  default to suffer further three months' simple imprisonment for
  the offence under Section 498A IPC and imposed the sentence
F of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default further
  six months' simple imprisonment for the offence under Section
  3048 IPC. On appeal, the High Court acquitted Jagdish and
  Gordhani but confirmed the conviction of the appellant under
  Section 498A and 3048 IPC.
G
       3. Mr. Tara Chandra Sharma, learned counsel for the
  appellant, submitted' that the appellant has already served out
  the sentence under Section 498A IPC and, therefore, his
  challenge in this appeal is confined to the conviction and
H sentence under Section 3048 IPC. He submitted that the main
       AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                     533
                [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]

ingredient of the offence under Section 3048 IPC is that the        A
deceased must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment
in connection with any "demand for dowry" and in this case the
prosecution has not established that the deceased was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant in
connection with any demand for qowry. In suppqrt of his             B
submission, he relied on the decisions of this Court in Biswajit
Halder alias Babu Halder and Others v. State of West Bengal
[(2008)1 SCC 202] and Durga Prasad and Another v. The
State of MP. [2010(6) SCALE 18]. He referred to the evidence
of PW-2 (father of the deceased), PW-4 (mother of the               c
deceased) and PW-5 (brother of the deceased) to show that
there was no demand for dowry made by the appellant and that
the appellant only wanted Rs.10,000/- to start a shop and this
request for a sum of Rs.10,000/- cannot be held to be a
demand tor dowry.                                                   D
     4. He further submitted that there were, in fact, material
contradictions in the testimony of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 with
regard to the demand for dowry and, therefore, their evidence
cannot be relied upon to sustain the conviction of the appellant.
He submitted that in any case the evidence of PW-2, PW-4 and        E
PW-5 on whatever was stated to them by the deceased
regarding demand for dowry and harassment or cruelty were
at best hearsay evidence and not admissible either under
Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or under Section
32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In. support of his             F
submission, he cited Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. [(1997) 4
sec 161].
     5. He finally submitted that the court while recording the
statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did not        G
put any question to enable the appellant to explain any
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. He relied
on Latu Mahto and Anotherv. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand)
[(2008) 8 sec 395] to contend that circumstances about which
the accused was not asked to explain cannot be used against         H
    534     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A   him. According to learned counsel Mr. Sharma, this is not a
    case where the prosecution has been able to establish the
    offence under Section 3048 IPC against the appellant and
    hence the judgment of the High Court should be set aside.

       6. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned counsel appearing for the
8
  State of Rajasthan, in reply submitted that the facts of this case
  would show that the deceased did not die under normal
  circumstances. He referred to the post-mortem report (Ex.P-
  21) which indicated that the deceased suffered 100% burns.
C He submitted that Dr. Mahendra Kr. Gupta (PW-9), who
  performed the autopsy, has opined that the burns on the
  deceased were after strangulation and throttling inasmuch as
  there were fractures of larynx and trachea and the larynx was
  found congested. He submitted that the deceased got married
  on 05.05.1992 and died on 08.03.1993 within ten months of
D the marriage and there was sufficient evidence to show that she
  was subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant and
  other members of his family.

       7. He submitted that the evidence of PW-2, PW-4 and
E PW-5 establishes that there was demand for dowry of a
  Scooter or Rs.25,000-/. He referred to the evidence of PW-4
  and PW-5 to show that the appellant used to taunt the deceased
  saying that she has come from a hungry house and that the
  appellant had himself visited the house of PW-4 and demanded
F a sum of Rs.10,000/-. He vehemently submitted that this is a
  clear case of continuous harassment of the deceased in
  connection with demand of dowry not only by the appellant but
  also by his other family members. He cited Pawan Kumar and
  Others v. State of Haryana [(1998) 3 SCC 309] to contend that
G such taunting and teasing of a bride for not bringing dowry
  amount to harassment or cruelty within the meaning of Section
  3048 IPC.

       8. In reply to the submission of Mr. Sharma that statements
    made by_ the deceased before PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5
H
      AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                     535
               [A.K. PATNAIK, J.]
regarding harassment and demand of dowry were not A
admissible either under Section 60 or under Section 32 of the
Evidence Act, he submitted that this Court in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [(1984) 4 SCC 116]
has held that Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act is an
exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the B
statement of a person who dies, provided the statement related
to the cause of death or exhibits circumstances leading to the
death. He submitted that in the present case the .statements
made by the deceased to PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 related to
the cause of her death, namely, demand for dowry and therefore.  c
would be admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence
Act, even if the deceased while making the statement was not
expecting the death. He submitted that in the present case the
prosecution has firmly established that soon before her death
the deceased has been subjected to cruelty or harassment by Di
the appellant in connection with demand for dowry and therefore
the Court has to presume under Section 1138 of the Indian
Evidence Act that the appellant has caused the dowry death
and this presumption has not been rebutted by the appellant
by leading any evidence.
                                                                    E
      9. Dr. Singhvi finally submitted that since there were
concurrent findings of fact rendered by the trial court and the
High Court that the deceased died due to asphyxia and was
burnt after strangulation so as to make out a case of accident
and the burns on the body of the deceased were found to be F
100%, this was a case of ghastly murder and therefore not a
fit case in which this Court should either set aside the conviction
of the appellant or reduce the sentence imposed on him by the
High Court.
                                                                    G
      10. We find that the evidence of PW-4 (mother of the
deceased) is that after marriage, the deceased came several
times and she also came about one month prior to her death
and she used to complain about the demand of a Scooter and
harassment by her mother-in-law Gordhani and that she had
                                                                    H
    536      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A also told that the appellant used to taunt her that she has come
  from a hungry house and brought nothing and the last time when
  she came she stayed for two days and returned and one month
  thereafter she was murdered. Similar is the evidence of PW-5
  (brother of the deceased) that whenever the deceased used
B to come home she used to complain that her in-laws have been
  teasing her and she had also stated that they demanded
  Scooter or Rs.25,000/- for a shop and that one month prior to
  her death she came home and complained that her mother-in-
  law and all other in-laws used to torture her and taunt her that
c she did not bring anything and that the appellant also used to
  tease her. It is thus clear from the evidence of PW-4, as
  corroborated by the evidence of PW-5, that the deceased has
  made statements before them that her in-laws as well as the
  appellant have been demanding a Scooter or Rs.25,000/- for
  a shop and have been taunting and teasing her for not meeting
0
  the demand of dowry within a couple of months before her
  death. Such evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 with regard to the
   statements made by the deceased is no doubt hearsay but is
  admissible under clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian
   Evidence Act.
E
       11. Clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act
  provides that statements made by a person as to the cause of
  his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction
  which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that
F person's death comes into question, are themselves relevant
  facts. In the present case, the cause of death of the deceased
  was a question to be decided and the statements made by the
  deceased before PW-4 and PW-5 that the appellant used to
  taunt the deceased in connection with demand of a Scooter or
G Rs.25,000/- within a couple of months before the death of the
  deceased are statements as to "the circumstances of the
  transaction which resulted in her death" within the meaning of
  Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

          12. In Paka/a Narayana Swami v. Emperor [AIR 1939 PC
H
        AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                       537
                 [A.K. PATNf.IK, J.]
  47] Lord Atkin held that circumstances of the transaction which A
  resulted in the death of the declarant will be admissible if such
  circumstances have some proximate relation to the actual
  occurrence. The test laid down by Lord Atkin has been quoted
  in the judgment of Fazal Ali, J. in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
  v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and His Lordship has ~eld that B
  Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the
  ru!e of hearsay evidence and in view of the peculiar conditions
  in the Indian Society has widen the sphere to avoid injustice.
  His Lordship has held that where the main evidence consists
  of statements and letters written by the deceased which are         c
  directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal
  a tell-tale story, the said statements would clearly fall within the
  foor corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible and the
  distance of time alone in such cases would notmake the
   statements irrelevant. The difference in the English Law and the 0
   Indian Law has been reiterated in Rattan Singh v. State of H.
   P. (supra) and it has been held therein that even if the
   deceased was nowhere near expectation of death, still her
   statement would become admissible under Section 32 (1) of
   the Indian Evidence Act, though not as a dying declaration as
                                                                       E
   such, provided it satisfies one of the two conditions set forth in
   this sub-section. The argument of Mr. Sharma, therefore, that
   the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5 ~garding the statements
   made by the deceased before them are hearsay and are not
, admissible is misconceived.
                                                                      F
      13. The prosecution, therefore, has been able to show that
 soon before her death the deceased has been subjected by
 the appellant to taunt in connection with demand for dowry. This
 Court has held in Pawan Kumar and Others v. State of
 Haryana (supra) that a girl dreams of great days ahead with          G
 hope and aspiration when entering into a marriage, and if from
 the very next day the husband starts taunting her for not bringing
 dowry and calling her ugly, there cannot be greater mental
 torture, harassment or cruelty for any bride and such acts of
 taunting by the husband would constitute cruelty both within the     H
    538     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 9 S.C.R.


A   meaning of Section 498A and Section 3048 IPC.

        14. Once it is established by the prosecution that soon
  before her death the deceased was subjected by the appellant
  to harassment or cruelty in connection with demand for dowry,
  the Court has to presume that the appellant has committed the
8
  offence under Section 3048 IPC. This will be clear from Section
  1138 of the Indian Evidence Act which states that when the
  question is whether a person has committed the dowry death
  of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
  woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or
C harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
  the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry
  death. The prosecution in this case had led sufficient evidence
  before the Court to raise a presumption that the appellant had
  caused the dowry death of the deceased and it was, therefore,
D for the appellant to rebut this presumption.

        15. Mr. Sharma has, however, argued that the appellant
  was not given such opportunities to personally explain any
  circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. But we
E find from the statement of the appellant recorded under Section
  313 Cr.P.C. that the evidence of PW-4 that the deceased came
  to her house many times after marriage and lastly came to her
  house prior to her death saying that Girdhari and Khem Chand
  demanded a Scooter and that the appellant said that she came
F from a poor family, was brought to the notice of the appellant
  but the appellant simply denied the same. The appellant has
  also chosen not to examine any defence witness to rebut the
  presumption of dowry death against him under Section 1138
  of the Indian Evidence Act. The trial court and the High Court
G were thus right in holding that the appellant was guilty of the
  offence under Section 3048 IPC.

         16. For the offence under Section 3048 IPC, the trial court
    has imposed the maximum punishment of life imprisonment
    saying that the appellant has sacrificed the newly-wed bride with
H
      AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                      539
               [AK. PATNAIK, J.]
cruelty and harshness to satisfy his lust of dowry illegally and   A
hence he does not deserve any mercy and considering the
nature of the offence cc;nmitted by him and his conduct, he
deserves the maximum punishment of life imprisonment. The
High Court has only sustained the conviction and punishment
of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant under Section        8
3048 IPC. Dr. Singhvi, however, suggested that this was a
case of strangulation of a bride before she was burnt and for
this reason, the High Court sustained the maximum punishment
of life imprisonment.

      17. The fact remains that the appellant was not charged      C
for the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC presumably
because during investigation no materials were available to
establish the offence under Section 302 IPC against the
appellant. In Smt. Shanti and Another v. State of Haryana
[(1991) 1 SCC 371] cited by Mr. Sharma, this Court has held        D
that where there is no evidence as to the actual µart played by
the accused, a minimum sentence of seven years would serve
the ends of justice. In the present case, since there is no
evidence as to the actual role played by the appellant in the
death of the deceased, a punishment of ten years'                  E
imprisonment would suffice in the ends of justice.

     18. In the result, the appec.; is partly allowed and the
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on the appellant under
Section 3048 IPC is reduced to ten years and the impugned          F
judgment of the High Court is modified accordingly. In case the
appellant has undergone the period of ten years imprisonment,
he shall be released forthwith unless he is wanted in any other
case.

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1411 of 2010                                   G

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4389 of 2004)

     1. Leave granted.

    2. This is an appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan against   H
    540      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 9 S.C.R.


A the judgment dated.07.10.2003 of the High Court of Rajasthan,
  Jaipur Bench, in D.B. Criminal Appeal No.816 of 1998
  acquitting Jagdish and Gordhani of the charges under Sections
  498A and 3048 IPC.

       3. The only contention raised by Dr. Manish Singhvi,
8
  learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan, is that although tne
  evidence on record against Amar Singh, Jagdish and Gordhani
  was the same, the High Court too~ the view that Jagdish and
  Gordhani have been implicated because they were members
  of Amar Singh's family and that .the charges against them are
C not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He vehemently submitted
  that no reasons whatsoever have been indicated by the High
  Court in the impugned judgment to show how the cases of
  Jagdish and Gordhani were different from that of Amar Singh.
  According to him, the High Court should have sustained the
D order of the trial court convicting Jagdish and Gordhani.

        4. We are unable to accept this submission of Dr. Singhvi.
  The evidence of PW-2, PW-4 and PW-5 shows that Jagdish
  and Gordhani played a role in the demand of dowry of a
E Scooter or Rs.25,000/- for Amar Singh, but d~mand of dowry
  by itself is not an offence under Section 498A or Section 3048
  IPC. What is punishable under Section 498A or Section 3048
  IPC is the act of cruelty or harassment by the husband or the
  relative of the husband on the woman. It will be also clear from
F Section 1138 of the Indian Evidence Act that only when it is
  shown that soon before her death a woman has been subjected
  by any person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,
  any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
  person had caused the dowry death within the meaning of
G Section 3048 IPC. The act of subjecting a woman to cruelty or
  harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry
  by the accused, therefore, must be established by the
  prosecution for the Court to presume that the accused has
  caused the dowry death.

H         5. PW-2 (father of the deceased) has not stated in his
      AMAR SINGH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN                      541
               [AK. PATNAIK, J.]
evidence before the Court that Jagdish and Gordhani, in any        A
way, subjected the deceased to any harassment or cruelty. PW-
4 (mother of the deceased), however, has stated that the
deceased used to complain about the demand of a Scooter
by Girdhari and harassment by her mother-in-law Gordhani, but
PW-4 has not stated what was the exact act of Gordhani by          B
which the deceased felt harassed. The evidence of PW-5
(brother of the deceased) is that whenever the deceased used
to come home she used to complain that her in-laws have been
teasing her and they were demanding a Scooter or Rs.25,000/
- for a shop and that when the deceased came home one              c
month prior to her death, she complained that her mother-in-
law and all other in-laws used to torture her and taunt her that
she did not bring ar)ything, but PW-5 has not described the
exact conduct of the mother-in-law and other in-laws on account
of which the deceased felt tortured and taunted. On the other      0
hand, the evidence of PV\f-4 is clear that Amar Singh used to
taunt her that she has come from a hungry house. Thus, there
was evidence in the case of Amar Singh about his exact
conduct which caused harassment to the deceased but there
was no such evidence in the case of Jagdish and Gordhani. A
                                                                   E
prosecution witness who merely uses the word "harassed" or
"tortured" and does not describe the exact conduct of the
accused which; accordi~g to him, amounted to harassment or
torture may not be believed by the Court in cases under Section
498A and 3048 IPC. For this reason, the High Court has taken
a view that the charges against Jagdish and Gordhani have not      F
been established beyond reasonable doubt and that their case
is distinguishable from that of Amar Singh and that Jagdish and
Gordhani appear to have been implicated because they were
members of Amar Singh's family.
                                                                   G
     6. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and Others [(2000) 5
sec 207], this Court cautioned that in cases where accusations
of dowry deaths are made, the overt acts attributed to persons
other than the .husband are required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt arid by mere conjectures and implications         H
   542      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 9 S.C.R.

A such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to
  dowry deaths. In the aforesaid case, this Court further observed
  that a tendency has developed for roping in all relations of the
  in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths
  which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the
B prosecution even against the real culprits.

          7. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the
  contention of Dr. Singhvi that the High Court should have
  sustained the conviction of Jagdish and Gordhani and we
C accordingly dismiss this appeal.
   D.G.                                    Appeals disposed of.