Holding

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC and its order quashing the cognizance was set aside.

Summary

The case arose from the murder of Tamanna Khatoon, for which her husband Mukhtar filed an FIR against two accused. During investigation, witnesses under Section 164 of the CrPC alleged that Mukhtar himself killed his wife. The CJM took cognizance of the murder and related offences after reviewing the charge‑sheet and statements. The High Court, invoking its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, quashed the cognizance order, prompting a special leave appeal by private parties Amanullah and Anr. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellants had locus standi and whether the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. It held that the CJM had a prima facie case and that the High Court erred in interfering with the cognizance order, especially given the gravity of the murder charge. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and remitted the matter to the CJM for further proceedings.

Issues considered

Whether the appeal is maintainable by the private parties on the ground of locus standi
Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the cognizance order
What appropriate order should be passed by this Court

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 26
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155, s. 156, s. 164, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murdercognizanceSection 482locus standiinherent powerquashing of criminal proceedingsArms ActCriminal Procedureprivate party appealprima facie case

Judgment

[2016] 2 S.C.R. I 027

AMANULLAH AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 299 of2016)
APRIL 12, 2016 B
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 - Quashing of
cognizance order - Appeal against, maintainability - Murder of
woman - FIR by husband of victim-deceased alleging that murder
was committed by appellant no. 2 and another person - During c
investigation, witnesses deposed before CJM that the husband of
deceased killed the deceased - Charge sheet against 4 persons -
After filing of charge sheet, husband started harassing the witnesses
- With a view to threaten, he went to the house of appellant no. I
with pistol and dagger - FIR was lodged against him under Arms
D
Act - Supplementary charge sheet filed against husband and other
accused persons - CJM took cognizance of offence against them -
Petition filed uls.482 for quashing cognizance order - High Court
quashed the cognizance order - Appeal against - Whether
maintainable and whether High court exceeded its jurisdiction while
exercising inherent power uls.482 - Held: The material placed on E
record revealed that the CJM took cognizance of the offences alleged
against the accused-persons after perusal of case diary, chargesheei
and other material placed before the court - The cognizance was
taken, as a prima facie case was made out against the accused-
persons - The evidence collected by the I. 0. by recording the
F
statement of prosecution witnesses a/ongwith the chargesheet was
duly considered by the CJM before taking cognizance and, therefore,
the same should not have been interfered with by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent power uls.482 - Further, High Court failed
to take into consideration another important aspect that the case at
hand related to the grave offence of murder and that the criminal G
proceedings related thereto should not lightly be interfered with.
Criminal law: Cognizance of offence - Duty of court at the
stage of taking cognizance of offence - Held: At the stage of taking
cognizance, the court should not get into the merits of the case
made out by the police, in the chargesheet filed by them, with a view H
1027
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A to calculate the success rate of prosecution in that particular case
- At this stage, the courts duty is limited to the extent offinding out
whether from the material placed before it, offence alleged therein
against the accused is made out or not with a view to proceed further
with the case.
B locus slandi of a person tu 111uve cuurt in cri111inal cuse -
Power to allow third party to maintain appeal - Held: It is the duty
of the State to get the culprit booked for the offence commilled by
him - The Court should be liberal in allowing any third party, having
bonafide connection with the matter. to maintain the appeal with a
view to advance substantial justice -· Ho11•ever, this power of
c allowing a third party to maintain an appeal should be exercised
with due care and caution - Persons, unconnected with the matter
under consideration or having personal grievance against the
accused should be checked.
Words and phrases: Locus stamli - Meaning of - Discussed.
D
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the CrPC. It has erred in quashing the cognizance
order passed by the CJM without appreciating the material placed
E before it in correct perspective. The High Court ignored certain
important facts, namely, that on 17.10.2008, appellant no.1 was
allegedly threatened by the accused for which FIR was registered
against him for offences punishable under Sections 25 and 26 of
the Arms Act, 1959. Further, there were statements of various
witnesses made under Section 164 of the CrPC, before a judicial
F magistrate, to the effect that the deceased was murdered by none
other than her husband. The evidence collected by the 1.0. by
recording the statement of prosecution witnesses, filed alongwith
the chargeshcet was duly considered by the CJM before taking
cognizance and therefore, the same should not have been
G
interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power
under Section 482 of the CrPC. Further, the High Court failed to
take into consideration another important aspect that the case at
hand related to the grave offence of murder and that the criminal
proceedings related thereto should not lightly be interfered with.
Thus, the High Court failed to appreciate the material placed
H before it and exceeded its jurisdiction while exercising its power
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1029

under Section 482 of the CrPC. [Paras 27 to 29] [1046-A-E] A
P.S.R Sadhanantham v. Arunanchalam ( 1980) 3 SCC 141;
Ramakant Rai r. Madan Rai & Ors 2003 (4) Suppl.
SCR 17 : (2003) 12 SCC 395; State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 :1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335; Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapour 2013 (3) B
SCR 52 : (2013) 3 SCC 330 - relied on.
Esher Singh v. State of A.P. 2004 (2) SCR 1180 : (2004)
11 SCC 585; Ramakant Verma v. State of U.P. 2008
(16) SCR1013 : (2008) 17 SCC 257; Ashish Chadha
v. Asha Kumari & Ors. 2011 (13) SCR 417 : (2012) 1
SCC 680 ; J.K. International v. State (Govt. of Delhi)
c
and Ors. 2001 (2) SCR 90: (2001) 3 SCC 462; HDFC
Bank Ltd. & Anr. v. Nagpur District Security Guard
Board & Anr. 2008 Cri. L.J. 995 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
D
(1980) 3 sec 141 relied on Para 15
2003 ( 4) Suppl. SCR 17 relied on Para 15
2004 (2) SCR 1180 referred to Para 15
2008 (16) SCR 1013 referred to Para 15
E
2011 (13) SCR 417 referred to Para 15
2001 (2) SCR 90 referred to Para20
2008 Cri. L.J. 995 referred to Para20
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 relied on Para 21 F
2013 (3) SCR 52 relied on Para26
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 299 of2016.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2010 of the High Court
G
of Judicature at Patna in Cr. Misc. No. 5777 of2009.
Neeraj Shekhar, Ashutosh Thakur, Rana Prashant, Roh it Kr. Singh, (

Animesh Kumar, Advs. for the Appellants.
Gopal Singh, Shivam Singh, Ms. Varsha Poddar, Shishir Pinaki,
Sanjay Jain, Ad vs. for the Respondents. H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the
impugned judgment and order dated 08.12.2010 in Crl. Misc. No. 5777
of 2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna whereby it
B allowed the said criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the respondent
nos.2 to 9 herein, by setting aside the cognizance order dated 10.11 .2008
passed by the learned Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rosera, Bihar in
Singhia Police Case No.37/2008 and quashed the criminal prosecution.
3. Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder to appreciate the
c rival legal contentions urged on behalfofthe parties:
The case of the prosecution is that on 29 .03 .2008, the informant-
Mukhtar went to the house of his relative at village-Navdega and stayed
there. On 30.03.2008, at about 12.00 noon, his uncle Md. Hasim informed
him on telephone that his wife's condition was serious and slie was
D being taken to Singhia for treatment. Mukhtar was asked to reach Singhia.
It is alleged by the informant that on reaching Singhia, he neither found
his wife nor his uncle. On enquiry from his uncle, he was informed about
the death of his wife. Thereafter, he reached his house and saw the
dead body of his wife. His uncle disclosed him that his wife-Tamanna
Khatoon (since deceased) had gone to maize field wherein she was
E found lying with her mouth and nose tied with her dupatta. She was
spotted by one Hira Sada (PW-2), who was returning with her daughter.
Upon hearing the noise made by the deceased she raised alarm and
upon hearing the same informant's uncle-Md. Hasim along with others
reached the spot and took Tamanna Khatoon to Singhia for treatment.
F She died on the way to Singhia. On 30.03.2008 FIR was lodged by
Mukhtar, husband of the deceased against Md. Raju and Md. Halim@
Man gnu- appellant no.2 herein for the offences punishable under Sections
302 and 120B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
"IPC").
4. During investigation, many witnesses deposed before the
G Judicial Magistrate, Rosera under Section 164 of the CrPC wherein it
has been alleged that Mukhtar, husband of the deceased has killed his
wife.
5. On 30.09.2008 charge sheet no.11112008 in respect of FIR No.
37/2008 was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Rosera
H by the police against Md. Hasim, Md. Noor Hasan, Md. Safique and
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1031
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

Jhothi Sada. ·A
6. After filing of the charge sheet, Mukhtar started threatening
the witnesses. With a view to threaten the appellant no. I on 17.10.2008,
he reached his house with pistol and dagger. The appellant no. l raised
hue and cry and upon hearing the same, co-villagers caught Mukhtar
with arms. after a chase. FIR No. 104/08 was registered against him for B
the offence punishable under Sections 25 and 26 of the Arms Act, 1959
at Singhia Police Station.
7. On 3 I. l 0.2008, a supplementary charge sheet no.126/2008, in
respect of FIR No. 37/2008 was filed before the learned CJM by the
police against Md. Mukhtar@ Munna, Md. Nazre Alam and Md. Farukh. C
8. The learned CJM after considering the material placed before
him vide order dated I 0.11.2008.took cognizance under Sections 302
and 120B read with Section 34 of the !PC against Mukhtar and other
accused-persons.
9. Aggrieved by the cognizance order passed by the learned CJM D
in PS Case No. 37/2008, respondent nos. 2 to 9 approached the High
Court of Judicature at Patna by preferring Crl. Misc. No .. 5777/2009
under Section 482 of Cr.PC for quashing the order of learned CJM
dated I 0.11.2008.
I 0. The High Court by its order dated 08.12.20 I 0 allowed the said E
petition by setting aside the cognizance order passed by the learned
CJM and also quashed the criminal prosecution. Aggrieved by the said
order, the appellants herein, who are interested private parties, have
filed this appeal urging various grounds.
11. Mr. Neeraj Shekhar, the learned counsel for the appellants F
·contended that the High Court has failed to appreciate that the FIR and
the charge sheet establish a prima-facie case against the respondent
nos. 2-9. He submitted that when the allegations made against the
accused person show a prima-facie case, criminal proceedings ought
not to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power
G
under Section 482 of Cr.PC.
12. It was further contended that the High Court has erred in
setting aside the cognizance order passed by the learned CJM as the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction
to act according to whim or caprice. He further submitted that the power
H
I 032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C .R.

A of quashing criminal proceedings is to be exercised sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in rarest of rare cases.
13. It was further contended by the learned counsel that at the
stage of taking cognizance of the offence it would not be proper, simply
on the basis of material placed before the court by investigating agency,
B to determine whether a conviction is sustainable ornot. The High Court
has erred in appreciating the same by quashing the cognizance order
passed by the learned CJM. He further submitted that the inherent power
to quash the proceedings can be exercised only in a case where the
material placed before the court does not disclose any offence or the
allegations made therein are found frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. At
c this stage there should not be any meticulous analysis of the case, before
the trial, to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.
14. It was further contended that in the instant case the charge
sheet and FIR clearly establish the involvement and active participation
of the accused-persons which the High Court has failed to appreciate.
D
15. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the
appellants have locus standi to maintain this appeal for the reason that
the appellants have connection with matter at hand as appellant no. I
was threatened by the informant-Mukhtar and appellant no.2 was falsely
implicated by the informant-Mukhtar in the case of murder of his wife.
E Both the appellants are aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the
High Court setting aside the cognizance order passed by the Trial Court.
In support of the aforesaid he placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench
decision of this Court in the case of P.S.R Sm/lu111a11tlw111 v.
Aru11a11clialam'. He fu1ther placed reliance upon the decisions of this
Court in Ra11111ka11t Rai v. Mat/1111 Rai & Ors', Esher Singh v. State
F
of A.P. 3, Ra11111km1t Verma v. State of U.P." and Ashish Clwtllw v.
Asha Kumar/ & Ors'.
16. Per contra, Mr. Shivam Singh, the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondents contended that the answering respondents
have not been named in the FIR. The FIR in this case is based on the
G statement of Mukhtar against two persons, namely Md. Raju and Md.
Halim for the murder of his wife and it was registered under Sections
'(1980)3SCCl41
' (2003J 12 sec 395
' (2004l 11 sec 585
' (2008J 11sec251
H ' (2012) 1sec680
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1033
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

302 and l20B read with Section 34 of the !PC. He further submitted A
that on 11.04.2008, the informant-Mukhtar filed a protest petition before
the learned C.IM, Rosera. In the said protest petition it was brought to
the notice of the court that originally he had given a written complaint to
the police about the murder of his wife against five persons, na~ely Md.
Raju. Md. Halim@Mangnu, Khalid Guiab, Abu Quaiyum and Md.Amid
B
Hussain for offences under Sections 376, 302 read with Section 34 of
the !PC. However, the local police in collusion with the accused-persons
dropped the names of three accused persons and also dropped charge
under Section 376 of the !PC against them knowingly and intentionally.
The course of investigation was diverted in wrong direction to falsely
implicate the respondent nos. 2-9. c
17. It was further contended by the learned counsel that the instant
case is a unique case as the accused-persons are made prosecution
witnesses and apart from them another set of tutored witnesses have
been introduced in the case, who are not eye witnesses to the incident
and have in their deposition under Section 164 of the CrPC, before the
D
Judicial Magistrate deposed that the informant-husband might have killed
his wife. The High Court has rightly taken a very serious view of the
whole matter and after proper scrutiny of the documents and material
placed on record has come to an appropriate finding that the case against
the respondent nos.2-9 is merely based on suspicion and therefore, it
has rightly quashed the proceedings against them. E
18. He fu11her submitted that after the incident Manjoor Alam
father of the deceased in his statement before the police did not blame
Mukhtar husband of the deceased for the murderof his daughter. As far
as other respondents are concerned, apart from the informant, they all
are strangers to the matter and have been falsely implicated in this case
F
by the local police at the behest of the real accused persons.
19. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that the father
and mother of the deceased have given their statement on a stamp paper
before the Notary Public that their daughter was having a cordial
matrimonial life with her husband and she was not being tortured by her
husband or his family members in connection with any dowry demand. G

20. By placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in J.K.
lntemational v. State (Gov/. of Delhi) and Ors' and HDFC Bank
Ltd. & A11r. v. Nagpur District Security Guard Board & A11r.', it
,, \2001) 3 sec 462
' 2008 Cri. L.J. 995 H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A was further submitted by the learned counsel that the appellants have
failed to disclose their bonafide connection with the cause of action, to
be precise with the victim and thus, have no locus standi to maintain this
appeal. Therefore, this appeal deserves to be dismissed on this score.
21. While concluding his contentions he submitted that the order
B passed by the High Court is a well reasoned order and the same does
not suffer from any ambiguity. The.decision of the High Court is also
justified in the light of decision of this Court in the case of State of
Haryana v. Bfwjm1 Lal'· Therefore, no interference of this Court is
required in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
c 22. After considering the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of
both the parties, following issues would arise for our consideration:
I. Whether this appeal is maintainable by the appellants on
the ground of the locus standi?
2. Whether the High Court, in the instant case, has exceeded
D its jurisdiction while exercising its inherent power under
Section 482 of the CrPC?
3. What order?
Answer to Point No.1
23. The term 'focus standi' is a latin term, the general meaning
E of which is 'place of standing'. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary,
IO" Edn., at page 834, defines the term 'locus standi' as the right or
capacity to bring an action or to appear in a court. The traditional view
of 'locus standi' has been that the person who is aggrieved or affected
· has the standing before the court, i.e., to say he only has a right to move
the court for seeking justice. Later, this Court, with justice-oriented
F
approach, relaxed the strict rule with regard to 'locus standi', allowing
any person from the society not related to the cause of action to approach
the court seeking justice for those who could not approach themselves.
Now turning our attention towards the criminal trial, which is conducted,
largely, by following the procedure laid down in the CrPC. Since, offence
G is considered to be a wrong committed against the society, the prosecution
against the accused person is launched by the State. It is the duty of the
State to get the culprit booked for the offence committed by him. The
focal point, here, is that if the State fails in this regard and the party
having bonafide connection with the cause of action, who is aggrieved
H "1992 Supp(Il sec 335
! \ AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1035
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

by the order of the court cannot be left at the mercy of the.State and A
without any option to approach the appellate court for seekingjustice. In
i this regard, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of P.S.R.
Sadltanantltam's case (supra) has elaborately dealt with the aforesaid
I fact situation. The relevant paras 13, 14 and 25 of which read thus:
I I

I "13. lt is true that the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process
of the court, especially at .the expensively exalted level of the
B .I
Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily meddlesome ,I
I
bystanders should not be granted "visa". It is also true that in the
!I'
criminal jurisdiction this strictness applies a fortiori since an adverse
verdict from this Court may result in irretrievable injury to life or
liberty. c ''
14. Having said this, we must em11hasise that we are living in
times when many societal 11ollutants create new -nroblems of
II

i
I unredressed grievance when the State becomes the sole renositon:
'
f for initiation of £riminal action. Sometimes, nachydermic
'indifference of bureaucratic officials, atothertimes noliticisation D l
I of higher functionaries may result in refusal to take a case to this
Court under Article 136 even though the justice of the lis may
well justifr it. While "the criminal law should not be used as a
weanon in 1:1ersonal vendettas between 11rivate individuals", as
,. '

Lord Shawcross once wrote, in the absence of an independent
E '
11ro~ecution authority easily accessible to even: citizen, a wider
connotation of the exnression "standing" is necessan: for Article
136 to further its mission. There are jurisdictions in which 11rivate
I
individuals - not the State alone - ma:. it statute criminal
nroceedings. The Law Reforms Commission (Australia) in its
:I
I,
''
Discussion Paper No. 4 on "Access to Courts-I Standing: Public F
Interest Suits" wrote:
"The general rule, at the present time, is that anyone may
commence proceedings and prosecute in the Magistrate court.
The argument for retention of that right arises at either end of
lhe spectrum .....: the great cases and the frequent petty cases.
G
The great cases are those touching Government itself - a
Watergate or a Poulson. However independent they may legally
be any public offidal, police or prosecuting authority, must be
subject to some government supervision and be dependent on
Government funds; its officers will inevitably have personal
•
links with government. They win be part ofthe 'establishment'. H

j
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A There may be cases where a decision not to prosecute a case
having political ramifications will be seen, rightly or wrongly,
as politically motivated. Accepting the possibility of occasional
abuse the Commission sees merit in retaining some right of a
citizen to ventilate such a matter in the courts."
B Even the English System, as pointed by the Discussion Paper
permits a private citizen to file an indictment. In our view the
narrow limits set in vintage English Law, into the concept of person
aggrieved and "standing" needs liberalisation in our democratic
situation. In Dabholkar case this Court imparted such a wider
meaning. The American Supreme Court relaxed the restrictive
C attitude towards "standing" in the famous case of Baker v. Carr.
Lord Denning, in the notable case of the A1torney-Ge11eral of
the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N"jie, spoke thus:
" ... the words "person aggrieved" are of wide import and should
not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not
D include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things
which do not concern him;"
Prof. S.A. de Smith takes the same view:
"All developed legal systems have had to face the problem of
adjusting conflicts between two aspects of the public interest
E -the desirability of encouraging individual citizens to participate
actively in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability
of encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome
interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in matters that
do not concern him."
Prof. H. W.R. Wade strikes a similar note:
F
"In other words, certiorari is not confined by a narrow
conception of locus standi. It contains an element of the actio
popularis. This is because it looks beyond the personal rights
of the applicant; it is designed to keep the machinery ofjustice
in proper working order by preventing inferior tribunals and
G public authorities from abusing their powers."
In Dabho!kar case, one of us wrote in his separate opinion:
"The possible apprehension that widening legal standing with
a public connotation mav unloose a flood of litigation which
may overwhelm the Judges is misplaced because public resort
H
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BlHAR AND ORS. 1037
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

to court to suppress public mischief is a tribute to the justice A
syste1n."
This view is echoed by the Australian Law Reforms Commission.
xx xx xx
25. In India also, the criminal law envisages the State as a
prosecutor. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, the machinery B
of the State is set in motion on information received by the police
or on a complaint filed by a private person before a Magistrate. If
the case proceeds to trial and the accused is acquitted, the right to
appeal against the acquittal is closely circumscribed. Under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the State was entitled to appeal
to the High Court, and the complainant could do so only if granted
c
special leave to appeal by the High Court. The right of appeal
was not given to other interested persons. Under the Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973, the right of appeal vested in the States
has now been made subject to leave being granted to the State by
the High Court. The complainant continues to be subject to the D
prerequisite condition that he must obtain special leave to appeal.
The fetters so imposed on the right to appeal are prompted by the
reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a
competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension
of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a
E
superior court. The Law Commission oflndia gave anxious thought
to this matter, and while noting that the Code recognised a few
exceptions by way of permitting a person aggrieved to initiate
proceedings in certain cases and permitting the complainant to
appeal against an acquittal with special leave of the High Court,
expressed itself against the general desirability to encourage F
appeals against acquittal. It referred to the common law
jurisprudence obtaining in England and other countries where a
limited right of appeal against acquittal was vested in the State
and where the emphasis rested on the need to decide a point of
law of general importance in the interests of the general
G
administration and proper development of the criminal law. nut
simultaneously the Law Commission also noted that if the right to
appeal against acquittal was retained and extended to a complainant
the law should logically cover also cases not instituted on complaint.
It observed: ·
H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A ·'Extreme cases of manifest injustice, where the Government
fails to act, and the party aggrieved has a strong feeling that
the matter requires further consideration, should not, in our
view, be left to the mercy of the Government. To inspire and
maintain confidence in the administration ofjustice, the limited
right of appeal with leave given to a private party should be
B
retained, and should embrace cases initiated on private
complaint or otherwise at the instance of an aggrieved person."
However, when the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was enacted
the statute, as we have seen, confined the right to appeal, in the
case of private parties to a complainant. This is, as it were, a
c material indication of the policy of the law."
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
24. Further, this CcitU1 in the case of Ranutkant Rai's case (supra)
has held thus:
D "'12. A doubt has been raised about the competence of a private
pa1ty as distinguished from the State, to invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia, 1950 (in
short "the Constitution") against a judgment of acquittal by the
High Court. We do not see any substance in the doubt. The
appellate power vested in this Court under Article 136 of the
E
Constitution is not to be confused with the ordinary appellate power
exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific
statutes. lt is a plenary power, "exercisable outside the purview
of ordinary law" to meet the pressing demands of justice (see
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh). Article 136 of the
F Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyoi]e from invoking the
Court's jurisdiction. The power is vested in this Court but the right
to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise
of the power of this Court is not circumscribed by any limitation
as to who may invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by the
G
High Court has led to a serious miscarriage of justice, this Court
cannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain from interfering on
the ground that a private party and not the State has invoked the
Court's jurisdiction. We do not have slightest doubt that we can
entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal by the High Court
H at the instance of interested private parties also. The circumstance
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1039
[Y. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short "the Code"). A
does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against an order
of acquittal by a subordinate court, at the instance of a private
party, has no relevance to the question of the power of this Court
under Article 136. We may mention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit
Singh this Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal by the
B
High Court at the instance of a private party. An apprehension
'was expressed that if appeals against judgments of acquittal at
the instance of private parties are permitted there may be a flood
of appeals. We do not share the apprehension. Appeals under
Article 136 of the Constitution are entertained by specia"! leave
granted by this Court, whether it is the State or a private party c
that invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, and special leave is not
granted as a matter of course but only for good and sufficient
reasons, on well-established practic'e of this Court."
In Esher Singh 's case (supra), it has been held by this Court that Article
136 of the Constitution of India neither confers on anyone the right to D
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking it.
The relevant para 29 of the case reads thus:
"29. A doubt has been raised in many cases about the competence
of a private party as distinguished from the State, to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
E
againstajudgmentofacquittal b)'.' the High Court. We do not see
any substance in the doubt. The appellate power vested in this
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused
with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and
appellate tribunals under specific statutes. It is a plenary power
"exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law" to meet the F
pressing demands of justice. (See Durga Shankar Mehta v.
Raghuraj Singh.) A1ticle 136 of the Constitution neither confers
on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor
inhibits anyone from invoking the Court's jurisdiction. The power
is vested in this Court but the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction
G
is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of this Court is not
circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it. Where a
judgment of acquittal by the High Court has led to a serious
miscarriage of justice, this Court cannot refrain from doing its
duty and abstain from interfering on the ground that a private
party and not the State has i_nvoked the Court's jurisdiction. We H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A do not have the slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals against
judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of
interested private parties also. The circumstance that the Code
does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against an order
of acquittal by a subordinate court, at the instance of a private
party, has no relevance to the question of the power of this Court
R
under Article 136. We may mention that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit
Singh this Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal by the
High Court at the instance of a private paity. An apprehension
was expressed that if appeals against judgments ofacquittal at
the instance of private parties are permitted, there may be a flood
c of appeals. We do not share the apprehension. AppeaJs under
Article 136 of the Constitution are entertained by special leave
granted by this Court, whether it is the State or a private party
that invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, and special leave is not
granted as a matter of course but only for good and sufficient
reasons, well established by the practice of this Court."
D
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
Further, in Rama Kant Verma's case (supra) this Court has reiterated
the aforesaid view that the appellate power of this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India is not just an ordinary appellate power
E exercised by appellate courts and appellate tribunals under specific
statutes. It is a plenary power which can be exercised outside the purview
of ordinary law to meet the ends of justice. The relevant para 16 of the
case reads thus:
"16. In Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai it was inter alia observed as
follows: (SCC p. 402, para 12)
F
"12. A doubt has been raised about the competence ofa private
party as distinguished from the State, to invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in
short 'the Constitution') against a judgment of acquittal by the
High Court. We do not see any substance in the doubt. The
G appellate power vested in this Co.urt under Article 136 of the
Constitution is not to be confused with the ordinary appellate power
exercised by appellate courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific
statutes. It is a plenary power, 'exercisable outside the purview
of ordinary law' to meet the pressing demands of justice (see
H Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh). Article
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1041
[Y. GOPALA GOWDA, J.)

136 of the Constitution neither confers on anyone the right to A
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor inhibits anyone from
invoking the Court's jurisdiction. The power is vested in this Court
but the right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction is vested in no one.
The exercise of the power of this Court is not circumscribed by
any limitation as to who may invoke it. Where a judgment of
B
acquittal by the High Court has Jed to a serious miscarriage of
justice, this Court cannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain
from interfering on the ground that a private party and not the
State has invoked the Court's jurisdiction. We do not have slightest
doubt that we can entertain appeals against judgments of acquittal
by the High Court at the instance of interested private parties c
also. The circumstance that the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
(in short 'the Code') does not provide for an appeal to the High
Court against an order of acquittal by a subordinate court, at the
instance of a private party, has no relevance to the question of the
power of this Court under Article 136. We may mention that in
D
Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh this Court interfered with a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court at the instance of a private party. An
apprehension was expressed that ifappeals against judgments of
acquittal at the instance of private parties are permitted there
may be a flood of appeals. We do not share the apprehension.
Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution are entertained by E
special leave granted by this Cou1t, whether it is the State or a
private party that invokes the jurisdiction of this Court, and special
leave is not granted as a matter of course but only for good and
sufficient reasons, on well-established practice of this Court.""
(emphasis supplied by this Court) F
25. After considering the case law relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellants as well as the respondents, in the light of the
material placed on record, we are of the view that the appellants have
locus standi to maintain this appeal. From the material placed on record,
it is clear that the appellants have precise connection with the matter at
G
hand and thus, have locus to maintain this appeal. The learned counsel
for the appellants has rightly placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court, namely, P.S.R Scu/lumant/111m (supra) and other
decisions of this Court in Ra111akm1t Rai, Eslter Singlt, Ramakant
Verma (supra). Further, it is pertinent here to observe that it may not be
possible to strictly enumerate as to who all will have locus to maintain an H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20 I 6] 2 S.C.R.

A appeal before this Court invoking Article I36 of the Constitution oflndia,
it depends upon the factual matrix of each case, as each case has its
unique set of facts. It is clear from the aforementioned case law that the
Court should be liberal in allowing any third party, having bonafide
connection with the matter, to maintain the appeal with a view to advance
substantial justice. However, this power of allowing a third party to
B
maintain an appeal should be exercised with due care and caution. Persons,
unconnected with the matter under consideration or having personal
grievance against the accused should be checked. A strict vigilance is
required to be maintained in this regard.
Answer to Point No.2
c 26. A careful reading of the material placed on record reveals that
the learned CJM took cognizance of the offences alleged against the
accused-persons after a perusal of case diary, chargesheet and other
material placed before the court. The cognizance was taken, as a prima
facie case was made out against the accused-persons. It is well settled
D that at the stage of taking cognizance, the court should not get into the
merits of the case made out by the police, in the chargesheet filed by
them, with a view to calculate the success rate of prosecution in that
particular case. At this stage, the court's duty is limited to the extent of
finding out whether from the material placed before it, offence alleged
therein against the accusid is made out or not with a view to proceed
E further with the case. The proposition of law relating to Section 482 of
the Cr PC has been elaborately dealt with by this Court in Blwjan La/'s
case (supra). The relevant paras 102 and 103 of which read thus:
"I 02. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles
F oflaw enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to
the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories
of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
G exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends ofjustice, though it may not be possible
to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid fonnulae and to give
an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
H
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1043
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

( 1) Where the allegations made in the first information report A
or the complaint, even if they are taken attheir face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose . 8
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156( 1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
c
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused. ·
(4) Where, th.e allegations in the FIR do not constitllte a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
D
no investigation is permitted_ by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is E
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a spec_ific F
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly. attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused G
and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of
quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases;
that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or
inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court
to act according to its whim or caprice."
Further, this Court in the case of Rajiv Tl1flp1tr v. Madan Lal
B Kapoor' has laid down certain parameters to be followed by the High
Court while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC,
in the following manner:
"29. The issue beingexarilined in the instant case is the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Section -IX:' CrPC, if it chooses to quash
the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of
c issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage
of framing of charges. These are all stages before the
commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would
naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested
in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred
D to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch
as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without
allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a
determination must always be rendered with caution, care and
circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material
E
produced by the accused is such that would ·lead to the conclusion
that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable
facts: the 1'naterial produced is such as would rule out and displace
the assertions contained in the charges level Jed against the accused:
and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and
F overrule the veracityofthe allegations contained in the accusations
levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to
rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any
evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should
not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted,
G
being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material
relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a
reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the
accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience
of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under
H '<2013)3 sec 330
AMANULLAH AND ANR. v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 1045
[V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that A
would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends
ofjustice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs.
we would deli neat~ the following steps to determine the veracity
of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the I3
power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:
30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused
is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2. Step tll'o: whether the material relied upon by the accused c
would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled
against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e.
the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to
dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as D
false?
303. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the
accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant:
and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted
by the prosecution/complainant? E
30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result
in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the
ends of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative. the
judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to F
quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested
in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides
doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time,
which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as
well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear
G
that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the
accused."
(emphasis supplied by this Court)
27. After considering the rival legal contentions urged by both the
parties, case law referred to supra and the material placed on record, H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 2 S.C.R.

A we are of the view that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the CrPC. It has erred in quashing the cognizance
order passed by the learned CJM without appreciating the material placed
before it in correct perspective. The High Court has ignored certain
important facts, namely, that on 17.10.2008, the appellant no. I was
B allegedly threatened by the accused-Mukhtar for which FIR No. 104/08
was registered against him for offences punishable under Sections 25
and 26 of the Arms Act, 1959. Further, there are .statements of various
witnesses made under Section 164 of the CrPC, before a judicial
magistrate, to the effect that the deceased has been murdered by none
other than her husband-Mukhtar. The evidence collected by the 1.0. by
C recording the statement of prosecution witnesses, filed alongwith the
chargesheet was duly considered by the learned CJM before taking
cognizance and therefore, the same should not have been interfered
with by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section
482 of the CrPC.
D 28. Further, the High Court has faikJ tu take into consideration
another important aspect that the case at hand relates to the grave offence
of murder and that the criminal proceedings related thereto should not
lightly be interfered with, which is a well settled proposition of law.
Answer to Point No.3
E 29. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that
the High Court in the instant case has failed to appreciate the material
placed before it in the light of law laid down by this Court in Blwjan
Lat's case (supra) and has exceed.edits jurisdiction while exercising its
power under Section 482 of the CrPC. Therefore, the impugned judgment
F and order passed by the High Court is liable to be set aside by this Court.
30. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set
aside and the matter is remitted to the learned CJM for proceeding further
in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed.
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.