Holding

The Supreme Court held that without proof of a direct or proximate act of instigation or facilitation, the appellant cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC, while the evidence of cruelty suffices to uphold conviction under Section 498A IPC.

Summary

Amalendu Pal, married to Dipika since 1977, began an extramarital relationship with Anita and, after being denied permission to marry her, subjected Dipika to physical and mental torture. He brought Anita to his home three months before Dipika's suicide by hanging on 27 September 1991. The trial court convicted Amalendu under IPC sections 498A (cruelty) and 306 (abetment of suicide); the High Court affirmed the convictions. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the appellant’s conduct satisfied the statutory requirement of active instigation or facilitation under Section 107 IPC for a conviction under Section 306, finding no proximate act linking his behavior to the suicide. Consequently, the Court set aside the conviction under Section 306 but upheld the conviction under Section 498A, finding sufficient evidence of cruelty. The appellant was directed to surrender to serve the remaining sentence for the 498A conviction.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant’s conduct amounts to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC read with Section 34 and Section 107 IPC.
Whether the appellant’s acts constitute cruelty punishable under Section 498A IPC read with Section 34.
Whether the evidence establishes the requisite direct or indirect incitement for conviction under Section 306 IPC.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 109, s. 306, s. 34, s. 498A

Subjects

Abetment of suicideSection 306 IPCSection 498A IPCCrueltyIndian Penal CodeDomestic violenceEvidence assessmentSupreme Court of India

Judgment

[2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.CR. 836

A AMALENDU PAL @ JHANTU
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 2091 of 2009)
NOVEMBER 11, 2009
B
[DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860:
s. 306 - Applicability of - Held: For applicability of s. 306,
there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of
C suicide, person said to have abetted it must have played active
role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate
the commission of suicide - On facts, appellant brought
another woman to his house - Allegations of mental and
physical torture on deceased-wife - After about three months.
o of second marriage by the appellant, deceased committed
suicide - Conviction of appellant by courts below under s.306
not maintainable as from the period of three months which
elapsed in between the incidents of the appellant bringing the
other woman and deceased committing suicide, it can be
inferred that it was not the act of the appellant which instigated
E or provoked deceased to commit suicide - s. 107.
s.498A - Conviction by courts below - Held: Justified as
there was sufficient evidence to prove that cruelty was meted
out to the deceased by her husband- Crime against woman.
F Prosecution case was that appellant-husband was
married to deceased in 1977. He developed extra marital ·
relationship with a woman. When deceased came to know
about such relationship, she objected. The appellant
sought permission of deceased to marry th~ other woman.
G When she refused, appellant started torturing her both
physically and mentally. Three months prior to the date of
incident, appellant allegedly married the other woman and
brought her to his house. A day prior to incident, deceased
was tortured by appellant, the other woman and other

H 836
AMALENDU PAL @ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 837
BENGAL
accused persons. On the fateful day, deceased was found A
hanging from the ceiling of the house of appellant.
:t
Trial court framed charges under Section 498A read
with Section 34 IPC and Section 306 read with Section 34
IPC against the appellant and seven other accused
persons. Trial Court convicted the a·ppellant under B
Sections 498A and 306 IPC and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for three years and for eight years
together with a fine of Rs 1000/- respectively. All the other
} seven accused persons were acquitted. High Court
upheld the order of conviction and affirmed the sentence. c
Hence the present appeal.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Before holding an accused guilty of an
offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must
scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the D
>:
case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in
order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment
meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other
alternative but to put an end to her life. In cases of alleged
abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or E
indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide.
The conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not
sustainable merely on the allegation of harassment
without there being any positive action proximate to the
..._• time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led
or COl)lpelled the person to commit suicide. Therefore, the F
act of abetment by the person charged with the said
offence must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be convicted under Section
306 IPC. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide
when a person instigates any person to do that thing as G
stated in clause firstly or to do anything as stated in
clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 107 IPC. [Paras 15,
J 16 and 17] [845-G-H; 846-A-E]

.. 2.1. A close and careful scrutiny of the oral evidence
of the prosecution witnesses showed that the appellant H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A and the deceased enjoyed a happy married life for 5-6
years from the date of their marriage and that the problems
between the appellant and the ~eceased cropped up and
their matrimonial life got strained only after the appellant
developed an extra-marital relationship during his stay in
. '

Calcutta and the ·said liaison became known to the
B )
deceased.Jt was only when the appellant was denied
permission by the deceased to marry the other woman that ;...
he started torturing the deceased both mentally as well as
physically. The prosecution specifically alleged that the
day prior to the date of commission of suicide by the t
c deceased, she was tortured by appellant, the other woman
and the other accused persons present in the house of the
app~llant, as a result of which the deceased committed
suicide on the next day. The perusal of the record shows ,
that both the trial Court as well as the High Court
~-
D disbelieved the said incident as, according to them, the
statements of the witnesses to establish the said fact were
not reliable and trustworthy. Those findings recorded by 'l'~

the trial Court and the High Court were not challenged
before this Court. It was not the case of the prosecution r
that the case in hand fell within the ambit of clause firstly
E of or Explanation 1 to Section 107 IPC. [Paras 11 and 21]
[838-A-D; 847-C-F]
Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab (2004) 13 SCC 129;·
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. (2007) 10 SCC 797; Kishangiri
Mangalgiri Swami v. State of Gujarat (2009) 4 SCC 52, relied 4
F on. ~

2.2. If the deceased was so perturbed by the act of the
appellant in marrying the other woman and in bringing her ,
to his house that she felt impelled to commit suicide tllen ...
she could have done so on the very day when the other
G woman came to stay with the appellant in his ilouse as
I

naturally at that point of time her annoyance or dismay with 'r
life would have been at its pinnacle. From the period of !- t-'
three months which elapsed in between the incidents of
the appellant bringing the other woman to his house and
H
•
AMALENDU PAL @ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 839
BENGAL
the deceased committing suicide, it can be clearly inferred A
that it was not the act of the appellant which instigated or
provoked the deceased to commit suicide. [Para 23) [848-
B-0]
2.3. It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the
appellant had played any active role either in instigating B
or aiding the commission of suicide by the deceased for
denying to accept the other woman as the wife of the
l
..{ appellant. The second wife of the appellant was brought
by the appellant to his house about three months prior to
the date of the incident of suicide by the deceased and c
therefore, bringing of the second wife to the house by the
appellant cannot be said to have either incited or
facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased. The
contention is far fetched and is not established by the facts
of the present case. [Para 24] [848-E~G]
Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra (2002)
5 sec 177, relied on.
3. The prosecution witnesses in their testimonies
stated that the deceased was tortured both physically and
mentally by the appellant for the first time after his marriage E
with the deceased when he was refused permission for
second marriage. The appellant again, after few days
requested the deceased to accede to his request for
second marriage which request was again refused by the
deceased. Consequent to the said position and due to the
F
adamant position taken by the deceased, cruelty was
meted out to her by the accused which fact was
sufficiently proved from the evidence on record. Therefore,
there is no reason to take a different view than what has
been taken by the trial Court and the High Court as far as
Section 498A IPC is concerned. [Para 26] [850-C-E] G
J Case Law Reference :
(2004) 13 sec 129 relied on Para 13
(2007) 1o sec 797 relied on Para 14
H
840 - SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009J 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (2009) 4 sec 52 relied on Para 14
(2002) 5 sec 111 relied on Para 25
-r -
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2091 of 2009.
B From the Judgment & Order dated 24.07.2008 of the High
Court at Calcutta in Cr. A. No. 359 of 1997.
Pradip K. Ghosh, Soumya Chakraborty, Dharam Bir Raj
Vohra, for the Appellant. {
c Tara Chandra Sharma, Neelam Sharma, Ajay Sharma for
the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Leave granted.
D 2. In the present appeal, the appellant has challenged the
legality of the judgment and order dated 24.07.2008 passed by ...
the Calcutta High Court. The appellant is aggrieved by the
aforesaid judgment and order as by the said judgment, the High
Court has upheld the order of conviction and sentence passed
by the trial Court whereby the appellant was sentenced to
E undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence
punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (in
short "the IPC") and for eight years together with a fine of Rs
1000/- for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC
with a default stipulation. The sentences awarded to the "..
.}, •
F appellant were directed to run concurrently.
3. The facts necessary for the disposal of the present
appeal and as presented by the prosecution may.be set out at
this stage. The appellant - Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu anrl Lile
deceased - Dipika were married in the year 1977. Out of the
G said wedlock, two sons were born. The appellant \1 iC:ts residing
1

in Calcutta in connection with his work and earning. During his
stay in Calcutta, the appellant developed an extra-marital •
~
relationship with one Jyotsna @Anita. The relationship between
the appellant and said Anita became known to the deceased and
H
AMALENDU PAL @ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 841
BENGAL [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
the deceased objected to such illegal relationship. The appellant A
1"
I sought permission of the deceased to marry said Anita, which
was also refused by the deceased. Consequently, the appellant
started torturing the deceased both physically and mentally.
4. After a few days, the appellant again tried to take the
consent of the deceased for marrying said Anita and on refusal B
of the deceased, physical and mental torture was perpetrated
on the deceased. It was alleged that the deceased was provoked
by the appellant to end her life by co,nsuming poison or by
hanging herself. It was also the case that three months prior to
the date of death of the deceased, the appellant brought said c
Anita to his house. Anita was sporting a vermillion mark on her
forehead and was wearing conch bangles on her wrist to indicate
that she is married to the accused. It was also stated that in the
evening prior to the date of the death of the deceased, the
deceased was assaulted by Anita, the appellant and his family
members. On the morning of 27 .09.1991, the deceased was D
found hanging from the ceiling of the house of the appellant.
"'
5. Ashoka Kumar Maity (PW-7) intimated Supr!yo Das,
brother of the deceased (PW-2) about the death of the deceased.
Upon receipt of the aforesaid information, PW-2 arrived at the
house of the appellant where he learnt about the entire incident E
from the villagers who had assembled at the scene of occurrence.
Thereafter, PW,-2 proceeded to the Contai Police Station and
got a complaint registered. On the strength of the complaint, First
? lnfo_rmation Report (in short "the FIR") under Sections 498-A and
306 IPC was lodged on 28.09.1991 at 20.30 hrs. F
6. 'After completion of the investigation, the police filed a
charge sheet against the appellant and seven other accused
persons. On the basis of the aforesaid charge sheet, the trial
Court framed charges under Section 498A read with Section 34
IPC and Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC against the G
appellant and seven other accused persons to which all of them
J pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
7. During the trial, a number of prosecution witnesses were
examined. The defence produced two witnesses in support of
H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (AODL.) S.C.R.

A its case. On conclusion of the trial, the trial Court by its judgment
and order dated 25.11.1997 convicted the appellant under -+
Sections 498A and 306 IPC and sentenced the appellant to ~

undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and for eight
years together with a fine of Rs 1000/- respectively. All the other
seven accused persons were acquitted of the above stated
B
charges framed against them.
8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and
sentence passed by the trial Court, the appellant herein preferred
an appeal before the High Court .. The State, however, did not } ..
,_
c prefer any appeal before the High· Court against the order of
acquittal recorded by the trial Court with regard to the seyen
accused persons who were also charged with the appellant for
the aforesaid offences. The High Court entertained the said
appeal and heard the counsel appearing for the parties. On
conclusion of the arguments, the High Court passed a judgment
D and order upholding the order of conviction and affirming the
sentence awarded to the appellant by the trial Court. The said
,1_
order of conviction upheld by the High Court is under challenge '"P-•

in this appeal.
9. Mr. Pradip K. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing
E on behalf of the appellant, very painstakingly argued the appeal
before us. He submitted that in the absence of cogent and reliable.
evid~nce to establish abetment of suicide by the appellant, the
conviction of the appellant under Section 306 could not be
sustained and was bad in law. He further submitted that the High ·
F Court erred in conv:cting the appellant under Section 306 IPC ~
as the High Court ta:1ed to properly appreciate the evidence on
record. He further strenuously submitted before us that there was
no evidence of inflictir.11 of torture upon the deceased by the
}
appellant immediately prior to the incident of s;.iicide by the
" deceased ahd as such it could not be said that the appellant had
G
incited the deceased to commit suicide.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent State supported the judgments of the +•
courts below.
H
AMALENDU PAL @ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 843
BENGAL [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
11. We have carefully considered the submissions made A
l before us by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
perused the evidence available on record before us. On a close
and careful scrutiny of the oral evidence of the prosecution
witnesses namely, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-7 and PW-9, we find
that the appellant and the deceased had got married in the year
8
1977 and they had enjoyed a happy married life for 5-6 years
from the date of their marriage. The aforesaid prosecution
witnesses have also categorically stated in their testimony before
. the trial Court that the problems between the appellant and the
·deceased cropped up and their matrimonial life got strained only
after the appellant developed an extra-marital relationship with C
one Jyotsna @ Anita during his stay in Calcutta and the said
liaison between the appellant and the said Anita became known
to the deceased. It was only when the appellant was denied
permission by the deceased to marry said Anita that the
appellant started torturing the deceased both mentally as well 0
1. as physically.
12. At the outset, we intend to address the issue regarding
the applicability of Section 306 IPC in the facts of the present
case. Section 306 deals with abetment of suicide and Section
107 deals with abetment of a thing. They read as follows: E
"306. Abetment of suicide.-lf any person commits suicide,
whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine. F
***
107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a
thing, who-
First.-lnstigates any person to do that thing; or G

<J Secondly.-Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an
act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that
conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Third/y.-lntentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
--y
the doing of that thing. •
Explanation 1.-A person who, by wilful misrepresentation,
or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound
to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
B cause or procure, a thing to be· done, is said to instigate the ·
doing of that thing.
***
Explanation 2. -Whoever, either prior to or at the time of
~
c the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate
the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the
commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
13. The legal position as regards Sections 306 IPC which
is long settled was recently reiterated by this Court in the case
D of Randhir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2004) 13 SCC 129 as
follows in paras 12 and 13: )<_

"12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
·person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing.
In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental
E process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that
thing. More active role which can be described as instigating
or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person
can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under
Section 306 IPC. ...
-~
F 13. In State of W.B. vs. Ori/al Jaiswal this Court has
observed that the courts should be extremely careful in
assessing the f<:ds and circumstances of each case and
the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding
whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact
induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it
G
transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and
differences in domestic life quite common to the society to -+•
which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and
differences were not expected to induce a similarly
H
. AMALENOU PAL @ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 845
BENGAL [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
circumstanced individual in a given society to commit A
.. 't-
.; suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied
for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting
the offence of suicide should be found guilty."
14. Further in the case of Kishori Lal vs. State of M. P. (2007)
10 SCC 797, this Court gave a clear exposition of Section 107 B
IPC when it observed as follows in para 6:
"6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thinQ'; The offence
~
~ of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in
IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he
instigates any person to do that thing; or (2)"engages with c
one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing .
of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential ·
to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate"
literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by D
;._ persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional ~id, as provided in the
, three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if
the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment
and there is no provision for the punishment of such
abetment, then the offender is to bf3 punished with the E
punishment provided for the original offence. "Abetted" in
Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore,
the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged
.,
,._ with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence."
[See also Kishangiri Mangalgiri Swami v. State of Gujarat F
(2009) 4 sec5?1
15. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that
before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306
IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and
circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence
G
adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and
1 harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no
other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne
in mind ihat in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must
H
(
..
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission
of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there -i ..
being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence
on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to
commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not
sustainable.
B
16. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section
306 of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission
of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the f-
commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act "
of instigqtion or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission
c of $1,Jicide. Therefor~. the act of abetment by the person charged
with the said offence must be proved and established by the
prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.
17. The expression 'abetment' has been defined under
D Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A
person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person )_
instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause firstly
or to do anything as stated in clauses secondly or thirdly of "
Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted
is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then
E the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for
the original offence.
18. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, however,
clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause
'thirdly' of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According ~
F to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided
for under Section 107 IPC.
19. In view of the aforesaid situation and position, we have
examined the provision of clause thirdly which provides that a
person would be held to have abetted the doing of a thing when
G he intentionally does or omits to do anything in order to aid the
commission of that thing. The Act further gives an idea as to who !

would be intentionally aiding by any act of doing of that thing when +
in Explanation 2 it is provided as follows:

H
AMALENDU PAL@ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 847
BENGAL [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.)
A

"• "Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of
the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate
the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the
commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
20. Therefore, ,the issue that arises for our consideration is 'B
whether any of the aforesaid clauses namely firstly alongwith
explanation 1 or more particularly thirdly with Explanation 2 to
~
Section 107 is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the
~
present case so as to bring the present case within the purview
of Section 306 IPC. c
21. We have already considered a number of decisions of
this Court on the aforesaid aspect and having done so we revert
back to the factual position of the present case. The prosecution
has specifically alleged that on 26.09.1991, the day prior to the
date of commission of suicide by the deceased, the deceased D
,. was tortured by the appellant, Anita and the other accused
persons present in the house of the appellant, as a result of which
the deceased committed suicide on the next day. On a perusal
of the record of the present case, we find that both the trial Court
as well as the High Court have disbelieved the said incident as, E
according to them, the statement of the witnesses to establish
the said fact are not reliable and trustworthy. Those findings
recorded by the trial Court and the High Court have not been
challenged before us. It is not the case of the prosecution that
,.... the case in hand would fall within the ambit of clause firstly of or
~
Explanation 1 to Section 107 IPC.· F

22. The prosecution, however, heavily relies on the clause
thirdly of Secii@ 107 IPC because, according to the prosecution,
the appellant by way of harassment and torturing the deceased
at various point of time and by marrying said Anita for the second
time without the permission and against the will of the deceased, G
intentionally aided the commission of suicide by-the deceased.
J 23. In support of.the aforesaid contention, learned counse.1
forthe prosecution relied upon Explanation 2 to Se~on 107. He
submitted that prior to the commission of suicide by the
H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A deceased, the appellant had, by bringing said Anita as his ,,.
second wife to his house facilitated the commission of suicide •
by the deceased and thus, the appellant intentionally aided the
commission of suicide by the deceased. The evidence on record,
however, does not support such a case. It is pertinent to note that
the appellant had brought Anita to stay with him at his house three
B months prior to the date of the death of the deceased. If the
deceased had been so perturbed by the act of the appellant in
marrying the said Anita and in bringing her to his house that she
}.
felt impelled to commit suicide then she could have done so on
the very day when Anita had come to stay with the appellant in '
c his house as naturally at that point of time her annoyance or
dismay with life would have been at its pinnacle. From the period
of three months which elapsed in between the incidents of the
appellant bringing Anita to his house and the deceased
committing suicide, it can be clearly inferred that it was not the .._
1

act of the appellant which instigated or provoked the deceased
D
to commit suicide. ,l_

24. The perpetration of physical torture on the deceased on
the day prior to the date of the incident which led the deceased '
to commit suicide is the prosecution case all throughout. It is
nowhere the case of the prosecution that the appellant had played
E
any active role either in instigating or aiding the commission of
suicide by the deceased for denying to accept Anita as the wife
of the appellant. Anita, the second wife of the appellant was
brought by the appellant to his house about three months prior
to the date of the incident of suicide by the deceased and ~~
F therefore, bringing of the second wife to the house by the
appellant cannot be said to have either incited or facilitated the.
commission of suicide by the deceased. It is also not the case
of the prosecution as disclosed from the evidence led which we
have scrutinised very minutely. The aforesaid contention, in our
...
G considered opinion, is far fetched and is not established by the
facts of the present case. After carefully assessing the evidence
on record we find that there is no direct evidence to show that
•
--+.--
the appellant had by his acts instigated or provoked the
deceased to commit suicide and has not done any act which
could be said to have facilitated the commission of suicide by
H
AMALENDU PAL @ JHANTU v. STATE OF WEST 849
BENGAL [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
the deceased. A
~

t 25. We now intend to proceed to find out whether a case
under Section 498A IPC is made out against the appellant or
not. In the case of Girdhar Shankar Ta wade vs. State of
Maharashtra (2002) 5 SCC 177, this Court gave a succinct
enumeration of the object and ingredients of Section 498A IPC, B
when it observed as follows in paras 3 and 17:
wt
"3. The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid
~
~
"cruelty" which stands defined by attributing a specific
statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed hereinbefore.
Two specific instances have been taken note of in order to c
ascribe a meaning to the word "cruelty" as is expressed by
the legislatures: whereas Explanation (a) involves three
specific situations viz. (i) to drive the woman to commit
suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb
or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a D
,\
physical torture or atrocity, in Explanation (b) there is
absence of physical injury but the legislature thought it fit to
I
~

- include only coercive harassment which obviously as the
legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the
physical injury: whereas one is patent, the other one is latent
but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute E
·,
since the same would also embrace the attributes of "cruelty"
in terms of Section 498-A.

-f ....
~
17. As regards the core issue as to whether charges under F
Sections 306 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code are
independent of each other and acquittal of one does not
lead to acquittal on the other, as noticed earlier, there
...... appears to be a long catena of cases in affirmation thereto
--t and as such further dilation is not necessary neither are we
.G
inclined to do so, but in order to justify a conviction under
the later provision there must be available on record some
1 material and cogent evidence. Presently, we have on record
two inconsistent versions of the brother and the cousin, as
such no credence can be attributed thereon - the
H
'-
'
r-
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A documentary evidence (namely, those three letters), in our 1 -.
view, falls short of the requirement of the statute: even on
an assumption of the fact that there is no contradiction in
the oral testimony available on record, the cousin goes to
the unfortunate girl's in-laws' place and requests the
husband to treat her well - at best some torture and a
a request to treat her well. This by itself would not bring home
the charge under Section 498-A. Demand for dowry has not "'
seen the light of day." >-~

26. From the evidence ~of record available before us, we find
' ~

c that the prosecution witnesses have in their testimonies stated
that the deceased was tortured both physically and mentally by
the appellant for the first time after his marriage with the
deceased when he was refused permission for marriage with
said Anita by the deceased. On having been ref.used the "'
permission for his second marriage with Anita, the appellant
D again, after a few days requested the deceased to accede to )._
his request for marriage with Anita, which request was again ._..,
refused by the deceased. Consequent to the said position and ·1
due to the adamant position taken by the deceased, cruelty was
meted out to her by the accused which fact is sufficiently proved
E from the evidence on record. Therefore, we find no reason to
take a different view than what ha~ been taken by the trial Court
and the High Court as far as Section :498A IPC is concerned.
27. Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby partly allowed. ....
We hereby set aside the conviction. of the appellant under --\ •
....
F Section 306 but uphold the conviction of the .appellant under
section 498A. As the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand
cancelled .. The appellant is directed .to surrender himself before
the jail authorities within ·15 daysJrom today to serve out the
remaining sentence under Section 498A, failing which the
concerned authority shall proceed against the appeMant in
G accordance with law.
•
Appeal partly allowed.
-f:-
D.G.

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