Holding

The Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in reading down Regulation 10(f)(iii); the provision remains applicable to the shortlisting of Assistant Professor candidates.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined appeals filed by Allahabad University and its affiliated colleges challenging a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court that had read down Regulation 10(f)(iii) of the UGC 2018 Regulations, holding it inapplicable to the shortlisting of Assistant Professor candidates. The petitioners argued that the regulation, which counts past teaching experience for recruitment, should apply to all posts, while the respondents contended that it was ultra‑vires and discriminatory. The Court held that the High Court had no authority to read down the regulation because it had not found it ultra‑vires and because such reading amounted to judicial legislation. It emphasized that the plain language of Regulation 10(f)(iii) mandates counting of past regular service, subject to salary conditions, and that this provision is relevant for shortlisting under Table 3A. The Court also reiterated the limited scope of the doctrine of reading down and the need for strict adherence to statutory language. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, dismissed the writ petitions, and allowed the appeals without costs.

Issues considered

Whether Regulation 10(f)(iii) of the UGC 2018 Regulations is ultra‑vires the UGC Act or the Constitution.
Whether the High Court was justified in reading down Regulation 10(f)(iii) to exclude its application to Assistant Professor appointments.
Whether the doctrine of reading down can be employed when the provision in question has not been held ultra‑vires.
Whether the shortlisting criteria under Table 3A may incorporate the teaching‑experience marks prescribed in Regulation 10.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reading down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018. Headnotes† University Grants Commission Act, 1956 – University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the

Subjects

Interpretation of StatutesPrinciple of reading downAssistant ProfessorUltra‑viresShortlisting of candidatesService LawSelectionPleadingsSubordinate legislationExecutive ordersBenevolent interpretationPower of CourtRewriting legislation

Judgment

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1795 : 2024 INSC 1003

Allahabad University Etc.
v.
Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 12411-12414 of 2024)
18 December 2024
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reading
down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the University Grants Commission (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic
Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the
Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations, 2018.

Headnotes†
University Grants Commission Act, 1956 – University Grants
Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of
Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges
and other Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in
Higher Education) Regulations, 2018 – Reg.10(f)(iii) – Exception
was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted
by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in
shortlisting candidates for interview for appointment on the
post of Assistant Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10
of the 2018 Regulations – The Division Bench of the High
Court proceeded to read down Reg.10 and held that the same
would apply only where past services are required to be
counted for direct recruitment and promotion under the Career
Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the posts of Associate
Professor and Professor:
Held: First and foremost, the Division Bench of the High Court
has not found Reg.10(f)(iii) to be ultra vires on any of the available
grounds, i.e., either on the ground of legislative incompetence or
that it offends any of the Constitutional rights and/or any provision
of the UGC Act or that there is excessive delegation; rather, the
Division Bench has read down Reg.10(f)(iii) on the specious

* Author
1796 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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ground that the construction it has placed “would obviate the
need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation 10(f)(iii) and
the general instructions appended to the advertisement in that
regard” – This course of action was impermissible – ‘Reading down’
can be resorted to whenever a provision, which is questioned,
is found to be ultra vires by the court but there is scope for the
court to read the same down in a manner so as to save it from
being declared constitutionally invalid – The line of reasoning
weighing with the Division Bench that the need to examine the
challenge would stand obviated if Reg.10(f)(iii) were construed
in the manner it did is, thus, plainly erroneous – Once Reg.10
specifically refers to counting of previous regular service, whether
national or international, inter alia as Assistant Professor, the
Division Bench in the exercise of its judicial review powers could
not have held that Reg.10 has no application to one aspiring for
appointment as an Assistant Professor – Law is well settled that
courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it, which
are not there; at the same time, it cannot also read a statute in
a manner that results in deletion of words which are there – This
is for the simple reason that the court has no power to legislate;
hence, it cannot rewrite the legislation – Bearing this principle in
mind, the Division Bench was wholly unjustified in its approach.
[Paras 42, 43]

Interpretation of Statutes – Intention of the Legislature:
Held: A situation could arise where plain and literal reading of
a statute could lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent
purpose for which the enactment was introduced and, the situation,
necessarily compels the court to adopt that construction which
would carry out the obvious intention of the legislature – The court
would be justified in doing so, but it must be cautious that while it
irons out the creases in the material it does not alter the material
of which the legislation is woven. [Para 18]

Interpretation of Statutes – On the Principle of reading down:
Held: Whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a primary
legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it, a presumption of
constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the courts
would ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being
declared ultra vires; however, there could be situations where the
subordinate legislation (like a rule or a regulation) is challenged
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1797

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

on the ground of excessive delegation or is itself violative of the
enabling/primary legislation under which it is framed or even
breaches constitutional guarantees – ‘Reading down’ of a provision
is a subsidiary rule of interpretation of statutes, which the courts
tend to employ in situations to save the subordinate legislation like
a rule or a regulation, wherever possible and practical, by reading
it down by a benevolent interpretation, rather than declaring it as
unconstitutional or invalid – However, it has been clarified that it is
to be used sparingly, and in limited circumstances – Additionally, it is
clear that the act of reading down a provision, must be undertaken
only if doing so can keep the operation of the statute “within the
purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid”. [Para 27]

Service Law – Selection – Criterion – Whether a selection
Board can fix a higher criterion for shortlisting candidates:
Held: The principle discernible from the various decisions of
this Court is that whenever selection is based solely on the
performance of the aspirants in the interview, it is not open to
the recruiting authorities to dilute in any manner the norms and
standards prescribed by the statutory provisions or executive
orders governing recruitment for screening aspirants to be called
for interview; however, it is always open to them to prescribe
enhanced norms to have the zone of consideration for interview
restricted to those aspirants satisfying the enhanced norms or
higher criteria – In such cases, however, care has to be taken such
that the enhanced norms or higher criteria are not susceptible to
a challenge on the ground of arbitrariness or being contrary to the
statutory provisions or executive orders governing recruitment.
[Para 30]

Pleadings – Grant of relief – Whether, relief can be granted
in the absence of requisite pleadings:
Held: While deciding a writ petition on the basis of affidavits, the
writ court’s enquiry ought to be restricted to the case pleaded by
the parties and the evidence that they have placed on record as
part of the writ petition or the counter/reply affidavit, as the case
may be – Findings of the court have to be based on the pleadings
and the evidence produced before it by the parties – It is well-nigh
impermissible for the writ court to conjecture and surmise and make
out a third case, not pleaded by the parties, based on arguments
advanced in course of hearing. [Para 37]
1798 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur [1986] 1 SCR 383 :
(1986) 2 SCC 237; Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed
Mohideen [2010] 1 SCR 1127 : (2010) 2 SCC 513; Union of
India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1991] 3 SCR 873 : 1992 Supp. 1
SCC 323; CST v. Radhakrishan [1979] 2 SCR 33 : (1979) 2 SCC
249; Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress [1990]
Supp. 1 SCR 142 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 600; B.R. Enterprises v.
State of U.P. [1999] 2 SCR 1111 : (1999) 9 SCC 700; State of
Rajasthan v. Sanyam Lodha [2011] 10 SCR 662: (2011) 13 SCC
262; Subramanian Swamy v. Raju [2014] 9 SCR 283 : (2014) 8
SCC 390; Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu
[2024] 2 SCR 12 : (2024) 6 SCC 641 – relied on.
A.P.J. Abdul kalam Technological University v. Jai Bharath College
of Mngt. & Engg. Technology [2020] 13 SCR 732 : (2021) 2 SCC
564; Visveswaraiah Technological University v. Krishnendu Halder
[2011] 2 SCR 1007 : (2011) 4 SCC 606; Tej Prakash Pathak v.
Rajasthan High Court [2024] 12 SCR 28 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3184; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India [2004] Supp. 1
SCR 841 : (2004) 6 SCC 54; Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v.
Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. [1999] 2 SCR 1078 : (1999) 4
SCC 458; M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar
[1994] Supp. 3 SCR 665 : (1994) 6 SCC 293; Pt. Shamboo Nath
Tikoo v. S. Gian Singh [1995] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (1995) Supp. 2
SCC 266; Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal [2008] 14 SCR 621:
(2008) 17 SCC 491; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v.
Chand Behari Kapoor [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 524 : (1998) 7 SCC
469; Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 1050 :
(1988) 4 SCC 534 – referred to.

List of Acts
University Grants Commission Act, 1956; University Grants
Commission (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers
and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and other
Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education)
Regulations, 2018; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Interpretation of Statutes; Principle of reading down; Assistant
Professor; Interpretation of statutes; Ultra-vires; Shortlisting of
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1799

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

candidates; Service Law; Selection; Pleadings; Subordinate
legislation; Statutory provisions; Executive orders; Benevolent
interpretation; Power of Court; Rewriting legislation.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 12411-
12414 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in WRIT-A No. 580 of 2023, SPLAD
Nos. 187 and 257 of 2022 and CMRA Nos. 398 of 2023
With
Civil Appeal No. 12415 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Nikhil Goel, P.K.S. Baghel, Sr. Advs., Manu Yadav, Rameshwar
Prasad Goyal, Tanmaya Agarwal, Shwetank Silakwal, Wrick
Chatterjee, Mrs. Aditi Agarwal, Ms. Parul Shukla, Ms. Shubhangi
Pandey, Manoj Ranjan Sinha, Vishal Agrawal, Mrigank Prabhakar,
Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

The Challenge
1. Assail in these civil appeals is to the common judgment and order
dated 18th January, 20241passed by a Division Bench of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad,2 whereby the High Court disposed
of a writ petition, two special appeals and one review petition.3 All but
one of the proceedings were at the instance of Gitanjali Pandey.4 The

1 impugned order
2 High Court, hereafter
3 Writ-A No. 580 of 2023, Special Appeal Defective No. 187 of 2022, Special Appeal Defective No. 257 of
2022 and Civil Misc. Review Application No. 398 of 2023
4 Respondent 1
1800 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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remaining one was at the instance of one Brahma Deo (Respondent 1
in Civil Appeal No. 12413/2024).

Resume of Facts
2. Relevant facts, pertinent for disposal of the present appeal, are
summed up as under:
a. Respondent 1was an aspirant for the post of ‘Assistant
Professor’ in Allahabad University and its affiliated colleges.
As per her pleadings, between October 2004 and March 2010
(approximately 5 ½ years), she worked as a contractual faculty in
Jawad Ali Shah Imambara Girls PG College (affiliated to Pandit
Deen Dayal Upadhyay University, Gorakhpur) at a monthly
cash honorarium of Rs. 5000/-. Thereafter, between 2016 and
2021, she claims to have worked as a guest faculty in different
constituent colleges of Allahabad University at different honoraria
ranging from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 50,000/-.
b. Advertisements:
i. On 28th September 2021, Allahabad University published
an advertisement for appointment on the posts of Assistant
Professors in various disciplines. A total of 4 (four) posts
were advertised for Sanskrit. Respondent 1 applied for
appointment on the single advertised post in the unreserved
category.
ii. On 30th August 2022, a constituent college of Allahabad
University, viz. Iswar Saran Degree College (ISDC), issued
an advertisement which, inter alia, invited applications
from eligible candidates for appointment on the post of
Assistant Professor in Sanskrit.
iii. On 28th November 2022, another constituent college of
Allahabad University, viz. Allahabad Degree College (ADC),
issued a similar advertisement.
c. Pursuant to all the above advertisements, Respondent 1 duly
applied for appointment on the posts.
d. The requisite qualifications for appointment on the posts of
Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor are
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1801

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

prescribed by the University Grants Commission (Minimum
Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic
Staff in Universities and Colleges and other Measures for the
Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations,
2018.5 Clause 4 thereof provides for the minimum qualifications
required for the post of Assistant and Associate Professor. It is
not in dispute that Respondent 1 does possess the requisite
educational qualifications for appointment as Assistant Professor
in Sanskrit.
e. The procedure for shortlisting candidates for interview is given
in the note to Reg.4.1, which provides for shortlisting on the
basis of an academic score prepared in accordance with Table
3A (for universities) and 3B (for colleges). Hence, for shortlisting
candidates for the purposes of interview, Allahabad University
would score candidates as per the criteria laid down in Table
3A and the affiliated colleges in Table 3B.
f. As per clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, 2 (two) marks are to
be granted to a candidate for every year of his/her teaching
experience or Post Doctoral experience. Since the contents of
both the tables are similar, we propose to reproduce Table 3A
later in this judgment.
g. Despite Respondent 1 fulfilling the eligibility criteria, she was
not shortlisted for the interview as her score did not reach the
cutoff marks. This happened because she was not awarded any
marks under clause 7 in Table 3A for “Teaching/Post Doctoral
experience”. Her past teaching experiences on contractual
basis and as a guest faculty were not counted as ‘teaching
experience’ by Allahabad University.
h. According to Allahabad University, past teaching experience
as a guest lecturer and on contractual basis do not fulfill the
conditions provided under Reg.10(e) and (f)(iii), respectively;
hence, it could not be counted as ‘Teaching/Post Doctoral
experience’.
i. As per clause 10(e), previous service as a ‘guest lecturer’ would
not count as ‘teaching experience’. Furthermore, as per clause

5 2018 Regulations, hereafter
1802 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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10(f)(iii), previous service of a lecturer on contractual basis
would count as ‘teaching experience’ only if the incumbent was
drawing total gross emoluments not less than the monthly gross
salary of a regularly appointed Assistant Professor, Associate
Professor and Professor, as the case may be. Reg.10, in its
entirety, would also be reproduced at a latter part of this judgment
for the sake of completeness of understanding.
j. As mentioned above, Respondent 1 had served as a guest
lecturer and on contractual basis before. Furthermore, as per
the records, she was also not drawing a salary/honorarium
equivalent to the monthly gross salary of a regularly appointed
Assistant Professor, which at the relevant time was Rs. 35,654/-.
Therefore, Respondent 1 was not granted any marks for her past
services as guest lecturer and on contractual basis. Falling short
of marks, she was not shortlisted for interview.
k. Thereafter, litigation commenced with the following cases being
presented by the Respondent 1:
i. Upon the advertisement dated 28th September 2021 being
issued and her experience not being marked, Respondent
1 invoked the writ jurisdiction by filing a petition6 praying
that Allahabad University be directed to grant her marks
for her teaching experience as ‘contractual faculty’ while
shortlisting candidates for interview. Her petition was
rejected by the Single Judge on 20th May 2022. Challenging
the same, she filed the Special Appeal (Defective).7
ii. In respect of advertisement dated 30th August 2022,
Respondent 1 filed another petition8 wherein, inter alia,
she prayed for a declaration that Reg.10(f)(iii) of the
2018 Regulations be declared ultra vires Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, 1950. This petition was dismissed
on 2nd August 2023 in light of the pendency of the Special
Appeal (Defective) filed earlier. Against the order dated 2nd

6 Writ-A no. 7114 of 2022
7 Special Appeal (D) No. 187 of 2022
8 W.P. 16585 of 2022
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1803

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

August 2023, Respondent 1 preferred Civil Misc Review
Application.9
iii. Insofar as the advertisement dated 28th November 2022
is concerned, Respondent 1 filed another petition 10
challenging the vires of Reg.10(f)(iii) of the 2018
Regulations.
iv. Relying upon the judgment dated 20th May 2022 (rendered
in Writ-A No.7114 of 2022), the Single Judge dismissed
the petition 11 of the said Brahma Deo. Aggrieved by
such dismissal, Brahma Deo also filed a Special Appeal
(Defective).12
v. As noted above, vide the impugned order, all the
abovementioned four proceedings were disposed of.

Impugned Order
3. The High Court noted the question arising for decision in paragraph
17 of its decision and commenced its discussion from paragraph 23.
We consider it appropriate to reproduce verbatim the same hereunder:
“17. The short question raised in this bunch of petitions
is as to whether regulation 10(f)(iii) would be applicable
while awarding marks for the teaching/post-doctoral
experience, in terms of clause 7 of table 3A for shortlisting
of candidates, to be called for interview for the post of
Assistant Professors in universities? As a sequel, it has
to be seen as to whether regulation 10(f)(iii) is ultra vires
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
***
23. The counting of past services under regulation 10,
however, would be relevant and directly co-related to
the post on which direct appointment orpromotion under
CAS itself is sought. Since, past services are required

9 Civil Misc. Application No. 398 of 2023
10 W.P. No. 580 of 2023
11 Writ-A No. 6927 of 2022
12 Special Appeal (D) no.257 of 2022
1804 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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for appointment to the post of Associate Professor
and Professor only in the regulations, the relevance of
regulation 10 would be restricted to these posts alone.
24. No previous teaching experience (including Assistant
Professor) since is required as eligibility condition for
appointment to the post of Assistant Professor, as such
regulation 10 would have no direct applicability/relevance
for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor.
***
29. Regulation 10 specifically deals with a defined exigency
i.e. counting of past services for direct recruitment and
promotion under CAS. This exigency is not attracted in the
present set of cases. Regulation 10 has a direct nexus with
the object sought to be achieved i.e. direct recruitment and
promotion under CAS. Since past services are mandatorily
required for appointment to the post of Associate Professor
and Professor only, therefore, regulation 10 would have
relevance only for appointment and promotion to such posts.
30. Reference of past services on the post of Assistant
Professor for appointment to the post of Assistant
Professor appears to be a surplusage since the eligibility
for the post of Assistant Professor does not require
any teaching experience. Counting of past services as
Assistant Professor for appointment to the post of Assistant
Professor serves no purpose in the scheme contained in
the regulations. Regulation 10 of the regulations, therefore,
has no applicability in the case of direct appointment to
the post of Assistant Professor.
31. We are persuaded to take such a view as reference
to teaching experience in table 3A has to be read in
conjunction with post-doctoral experience as they constitute
a composite class in itself. In the event regulation 10
conditions teaching experience, as is suggested by the
respondents, the term post-doctoral experience would also
have to be necessarily conditioned by regulation 10. This,
however, does not appear to be the intent of the scheme
contained in the regulations.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1805

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

32. Limiting teaching experience to the experience of
teaching as an Assistant Professor, by drawing emoluments
not less than the monthly gross salary of a regularly
appointed Assistant Professor would clearly be reading
something more than what is specified in the regulations
itself. Counting of past services for direct recruitment or
promotion under CAS to the post of Assistant Professor
otherwise is not contemplated. Such a construction would
also be unworkable once a condition of the kind is attached
to the post-doctoral experiences also.
33. Post-doctoral experiences can be of different kinds,
including research activity, teaching activity etc. If the
provisions of regulation 10 are applied while awarding
marks in clause 7 of table 3A then an anomalous situation
may arise, inasmuch as teaching experience gathered by
a post-doctoral candidate would entitle him to two marks if
teaching by him is considered as post-doctoral experience
but such marks would be denied if it is treated as teaching
experience only. It is for this reason that table 3A of the
regulations does not refer to or rely upon regulation 10. The
interpretation drawn by the respondents to read regulation
10 in table 3A, which specifically lays down the criteria
for short-listing of candidates for interview for the post of
Assistant Professors, therefore, cannot be approved.
34. In our opinion, regulation 10 of the regulations would
be attracted only where past services are required to be
counted for direct recruitment and promotion under CAS.
It cannot be transposed to be made applicable in criteria
for short-listing of candidates to be called for interview, to
the post of Assistant Professor, by any recognized process
of interpretation. Such construction otherwise is not culled
out from the scheme contained in the regulations nor it
helps in short-listing of candidates to be called for interview.
35. Table 3A specifies the marks to be awarded to a
candidate on different parameters specified therein. Apart
from awarding marks for graduation; post-graduation;
M.Phil.; NET with JRF or NET; SLET/SET the table provides
for teaching/post-doctoral experience of two marks for each
1806 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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year. Since the term teaching/post-doctoral experience is
not defined in the regulations the ordinary/commonsensical
meaning would have to be assigned to it.
36. Teaching experience as a full time teacher in a
recognized university or its affiliated or constituent
colleges with requisite qualification as per regulations for
the post of Assistant Professor would sufficiently entitle a
candidate to award of two marks for each year of teaching
experience in clause 7 of table 3A. Nature of appointment
i.e. substantive/adhoc/guest lecturer etc. or the amount of
salary paid having not been specified in clause 7 of the
table 3A are not relevant for the purposes of award of
marks in clause 7 of table 3A for short-listing of candidates.
Regulation 10 would otherwise not be applicable for the
reasons recorded above. This construction would obviate
the need to examine the challenge laid to the regulation
10(f)(iii) and the general instructions appended to the
advertisement in that regard. It would also effectuate the
cause of calling best candidates for interview, inasmuch
as teaching experience of a candidate would be counted
towards his merit for short-listing.
37. The interpretation assigned in this judgment to clause 7
of table 3A would subserve the object of short-listing the
best candidates to be called for interview to the post
of Assistant Professors. The selections already made,
however, would not be reopened or challenged on the
ground that short-listing of candidates was not done in
the manner indicated in this judgment. This is so as the
selected candidates are not a party to this bunch of petitions
nor their selections otherwise have been assailed. The
respondents would, henceforth, short-list the candidates to
be called for interview for the post of Assistant Professor
in the manner indicated in this judgment. On these terms
the writ petition, special appeal and the review application
are disposed of. No order is passed as to costs.”

Submissions on behalf of the appellants
4. Learned senior counsel and counsel for Allahabad University and
Allahabad Degree College, respectively, submitted that the High
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1807

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

Court erred in substituting its opinion to the mandatory methodology
followed by them. To persuade us to reverse the impugned order,
they argued that:
a. For award of marks under clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B, Reg.10
would apply, even for appointment on the post of Assistant
Professor, as the post ‘Assistant Professor’ is expressly
mentioned therein;
b. The process of shortlisting as adopted by the appellants is
extremely important for them, considering that thousands of
candidates apply for a few posts;
c. Even if Reg.10 is assumed to be not applicable, the appellants
are entitled to adopt the methodology given therein as there
is no specific bar in the 2018 Regulations. Hence, it is open
for them to supplement such regulations so long as they are
not illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to the 2018
Regulations;
d. The Division Bench while being seized of the writ petition ought
to have noticed that respondent 1 had not averred anomaly in
respect of clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B and in the absence
thereof, and particularly when ‘post-doctoral experience’ had
not been defined, could have sought clarification from the
University Grants Commission13 or the appellants as to what
is meant by such expression but instead thereof, allowed itself
to be guided by a perceived anomaly which was not even the
pleaded case of respondent 1;
e. In practice, ‘post-doctoral experience’ refers to post-doctoral
fellowship programmes awarded by various Government
organizations like UGC, Indian Council of Social Science
Research, Department of Science and Technology, etc.,
not including teaching activity, yet, it would appear from the
impugned order that the Division Bench has proceeded to return
findings which are based on mere assumptions;
f. There are decisions of this Court, viz. A.P.J. Abdul kalam
Technological University v. Jai Bharath College of Mngt.

13 UGC
1808 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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& Engg. Technology14 and Visveswaraiah Technological
University v. Krishnendu Halder15 where it has been laid
down that while dilution of published norms is not permissible,
prescribing enhanced norms is permissible without defeating
any right of an aspirant for a post;
g. The decision of recent origin of the Constitution Bench of this
Court in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court16 also
puts beyond any shadow of doubt that any procedure that
is transparent, non-discriminatory/non-arbitrary and having a
rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved can be
devised for taking a recruitment process towards its logical end
by the recruiting bodies.

Submissions on behalf of Respondent 1
5. Learned senior counsel for respondent 1 submitted that the Division
Bench of the High Court has rightly read down Reg. 10(f)(iii) of the
2018 Regulations to save it from being struck down as arbitrary and
hence there is no need for interference. He argued that:
a. Emoluments-based distinction under Reg.10(f)(iii) violates Article
14 of the Indian Constitution as the distinction between Assistant
Professors, who are serving on contractual basis, and those
who are appointed on regular basis, has no direct nexus with
the objective of ensuring quality education;
b. Exclusion of candidates, who otherwise are qualified and have
ample teaching experience (even though on contractual basis),
undermines the objective of ensuring quality education;
c. The Division Bench has rightly held that since ‘Assistant
Professor’ is an entry level post, there is no need for any
previous experience;
d. Although respondent 1 has since lost the right to participate in
the process initiated by Allahabad University due to passage
of time, the impugned order still holds good for the colleges
where the process is yet to be concluded and it was urged that

14 (2021) 2 SCC 564
15 (2011) 4 SCC 606
16 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3184
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1809

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

a well-qualified candidate like respondent 1 should not lose the
opportunity to compete with the whole lot of candidates aspiring
for appointment in the manner directed by the Division Bench.

Pleading of respondent 1 in support of her claim that Reg. 10(f)(iii)
is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution

6. In Writ-A No. 580 of 2023, respondent 1 prayed that Reg.10(f)(iii) be
declared ultra vires since the same was in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. She submitted that the said regulation is discriminatory
as it creates a hierarchy among teachers (in other words, creates
class amongst class) on the basis of salary drawn by them. This
adversely impacts other equally qualified and experienced candidates,
as they do not get any marks for their past teaching experience just
because they were not drawing salary equivalent to gross monthly
salary of a regular Assistant Professor. She further submitted that the
salary a teacher receives does not have any visible correlation with
the teaching experience. Reg.10(f)(iii) is, thus, liable to be declared
ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
7. Significantly, apart from the emoluments aspect, neither have we
been able to trace any other point that respondent 1 sought to
urge to invalidate Reg.10(f)(iii), nor was any other part of the 2018
Regulations subjected to challenge.

The Issue
8. Exception was taken by the High Court to the methodology adopted
by Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College in shortlisting
candidates for interview for appointment on the post of Assistant
Professor in Sanskrit in terms of Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations.
Since the High Court did not declare Reg.10(f)(iii) as ultra vires the
Constitution or the parent enactment, i.e., the University Grants
Commission Act, 195617 (in terms whereof the 2018 Regulations
were framed) but read Reg.10 down, we are primarily tasked to
decide whether the High Court was correct in reading it down in the
manner it did. Should the answer be in the negative, allowing the
appeal of Allahabad University and Allahabad Degree College is the
logical conclusion; and since the appeals would thus succeed, as

17 UGC Act, hereafter
1810 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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a corollary, there would be no impediment for the appellants to be
guided, inter alia, by Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations for the purpose
of shortlisting. On the contrary, if these appeals fail, all the universities
and colleges across the country would be precluded from shortlisting
candidates seeking appointment on the posts of Assistant Professor
for interview in terms of Regs.4 and 10 read with Tables 3A and 3B
of the 2018 Regulations. This is a conclusion that would logically
follow from the view expressed in paragraph 22 of the decision of
this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India18 and
the ramifications, to say the least, could be significant.

Observations/Findings of the High Court while reading down Reg.
10(f)(iii)
9. To recapitulate, the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded to
read down Reg.10 and held that the same would apply only where
past services are required to be counted for direct recruitment and
promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS), i.e., to the
posts of Associate Professor and Professor. The Division Bench took
the view that marking candidates for their past teaching experiences
in order to shortlist them for interview for appointment on the post
of Assistant Professor was a surplusage, since the eligibility for the
post of Assistant Professor does not require any teaching experience.
Therefore, counting of past services on such posts serves no tangible
purpose. In the absence of such a requirement, the applicability of
Reg.10 to direct recruitment on the posts of Assistant Professor would
not arise, thus, restricting the operation of Reg.10 only to posts which
demanded prior experience i.e. Associate Professor and Professor.
10. The Division Bench further opined that ‘Teaching experience’ as
provided under clause 7 of table 3A has to be read in conjunction with
‘Post-doctoral experience’. They form a composite class. Resultantly,
if ‘teaching experience’ is allowed to be conditioned by Reg.10, then
‘post-doctoral experience’ mentioned in the same clause will also
necessarily have to be conditioned by the said regulation. This will
result into an anomalous situation. According to the Division Bench,
‘post-doctoral experiences’ can be of many kinds including research
activity, teaching activity, etcetera and that if teaching experience of a
post-doctoral candidate (who is not drawing gross monthly equivalent

18 (2004) 6 SCC 54
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1811

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

to that of a regular Assistant Professor) is counted as ‘post-doctoral
experience’, then such candidate would be entitled to two marks
per year of his/her experience; however, if it is counted as ‘teaching
experience’, then the candidate would not be entitled to the marks
as he/she as a teacher was not drawing salary as aforesaid. Hence,
for the same candidate, two different markings are possible based
on the interpretation chosen. This perceived anomaly guided the
High Court to ultimately read down Reg.10.

Judicial Precedents and the Principles flowing therefrom
11. It would be of profit to read precedents and to deduce the principles
of law laid down therein, having a bearing on the issue which we
are tasked to decide.

On Interpretation of Statutes
12. Hon’ble O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) in
Girdhari Lal & sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur,19 in His Lordship’s
inimitable style, had the occasion to emphasize:
“6. It may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this stage
certain well-known principles of interpretation of statutes:
Words are but mere vehicles of thought. They are meant
to express or convey one’s thoughts. Generally, a person’s
words and thoughts are coincidental. No problem arises
then, but, not infrequently, they are not. It is common
experience with most men, that occasionally there are no
adequate words to express some of their thoughts. Words
which very nearly express the thoughts may be found but
not words which will express precisely. There is then a
great fumbling for words. Long-winded explanations and,
in conversation, even gestures are resorted to. Ambiguous
words and words which unwittingly convey more that one
meaning are used. Where different interpretations are
likely to be put on words and a question arises what an
individual meant when he used certain words, he may
be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say
that he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the
legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws

19 (1986) 2 SCC 237
1812 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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and difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has
said, a legislature cannot be asked to sit to resolve those
difficulties. The legislatures, unlike individuals, cannot
come forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties
of interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws
by finding out what the legislature meant is allotted to the
courts. Now, if one person puts into words the thoughts
of another (as the draftsman puts into words the thoughts
of the legislature) and a third person (the court) is to find
out what they meant, more difficulties are bound to crop
up. The draftsman may not have caught the spirit of the
legislation at all; the words used by him may not adequately
convey what is meant to be conveyed; the words may be
ambiguous: they may be words capable of being differently
understood by different persons. How are the courts to set
about the task of resolving difficulties of interpretation of
the laws? The foremost task of a court, as we conceive it,
in the interpretation of statutes, is to find out the intention
of the legislature. Of course, where words are clear and
unambiguous no question of construction may arise. Such
words ordinarily speak for themselves. Since the words
must have spoken as clearly to legislators as to judges,
it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended
what the words plainly say. This is the real basis of the
so-called golden rule of construction that where the words
of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect must be
given to them. A court should give effect to plain words,
not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness
of such words but because plain words may be expected
to convey plainly the intention of the legislature to others
as well as judges. Intention of the legislature and not the
words is paramount. Even where the words of statutes
appear to be prima facie clear and unambiguous it may
sometimes be possible that the plain meaning of the words
does not convey and may even defeat the intention of the
legislature; in such cases there, is no reason why the true
intention of the legislature, if it can be determined, clearly
by other means, should not be given effect. Words are
meant to serve and not to govern and we are not to add
the tyranny of words to the other tyrannies of the world.”
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1813

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

13. Another crisp and enlightening passage is found in Reserve Bank
of India (supra), where His Lordship observed as follows:
“33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context.
They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the
text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither
can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best
which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual.
A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was
enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first
as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause,
phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked
at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the
sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and
appear different than when the statute is looked at without
the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we
must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each
section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant
and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire
Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that
every word has a place and everything is in its place. … ”
14. Reiteration of the principles of interpretation of statutes and elucidation
of the approach to be adopted, as suggested by the Hon’ble Judge,
are so lucid that we feel hesitant to say anything more. However, while
proceeding with the task entrusted to us, certainly these principles
will have a strong bearing.

Whether, words can be added to or deleted from a statute?
15. Though Reg.10 of the 2018 Regulations expressly refers to “Assistant
Professor” as one of the three posts to which the same would apply,
the effect and import of the impugned order of the Division Bench
of the High Court is that henceforth, Reg.10 has to be read as if
it does not apply to the post of Assistant Professor. The following
decisions would throw light on whether the approach of the High
Court was right or not.
1814 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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16. In Sri Jeyaram Educational Trust v. A.G. Syed Mohideen,20 this
Court held:
“11. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute
should have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain
and straight, without adding, substituting or omitting any
words. While doing so, the words used in the provision
should be assigned and ascribed their natural, ordinary
or popular meaning. Only when such plain and straight
reading, or ascribing the natural and normal meaning to
the words on such reading, leads to ambiguity, vagueness,
uncertainty, or absurdity which were not obviously intended
by the legislature or the lawmaker, a court should open
its interpretation toolkit containing the settled rules of
construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning
of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the
court should remember that it is not the author of the statute
who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to
change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter
cannot alter or amend the law. It can only interpret the
provision, to make it meaningful and workable so as to
achieve the legislative object, when there is vagueness,
ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is
not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should
be, but to make it what the legislature intended it to be.”
(emphasis supplied)

17. This Court, in Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal,21 had
the occasion to lament by observing that:
“14. We are at a loss to understand the reasoning of
the learned Judges in reading down the provisions in
paragraph 2 in force prior to November 1, 1986 as ‘more
than five years’ and as ‘more than four years’ in the same
paragraph for the period subsequent to November 1, 1986.
It is not the duty of the court either to enlarge the scope
of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when

20 (2010) 2 SCC 513
21 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1815

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous.
The court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation
for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.
The power to legislate has not been conferred on the
courts. The court cannot add words to a statute or read
words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a
defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature
the court could not go to its aid to correct or make up
the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and
not what it should be. The court of course adopts a
construction which will carry out the obvious intention of
the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke
judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment is
subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of
instrumentalities……….”
(emphasis supplied)

18. The legal position is, thus, clear. A situation could arise where plain
and literal reading of a statute could lead to a manifest contradiction
of the apparent purpose for which the enactment was introduced and,
the situation, necessarily compels the court to adopt that construction
which would carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. The
court would be justified in doing so, but it must be cautious that while
it irons out the creases in the material it does not alter the material
of which the legislation is woven.

On The Principle of Reading Down
19. Examining the reasons assigned by the High Court for reading
down Reg.10(f)(iii) of the 2018 Regulations would necessitate an
understanding of what the principle of ‘reading down’ is all about.
Precedents on ‘reading down’ of a provision are legion and only a
few of them are referred to here.
20. In CST v. Radhakrishan,22 this Court held:
“15. … In considering the validity of a statute the
presumption is in favour of its constitutionality and the

22 (1979) 2 SCC 249
1816 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has
been a clear transgression of constitutional principles. For
sustaining the presumption of constitutionality the court
may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,
matters of common report, the history of the times and may
assume every state of facts which can be conceived. It must
always be presumed that the Legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of its own people and that
discrimination, if any, is based on adequate grounds. It is
well settled that courts will be justified in giving a liberal
interpretation to the section in order to avoid constitutional
invalidity. These principles have given rise to rule of reading
down the sections if it becomes necessary to uphold the
validity of the sections. … ”
(emphasis supplied)

21. Hon’ble P.B. Sawant, J. (as His Lordship then was) in his concurring
judgment in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress23
captured the rule of ‘reading down’ as follows:
“255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of
recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It
is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being
struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an
extension of the principle that when two interpretations
are possible — one rendering it constitutional and the
other making it unconstitutional, the former should be
preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either
the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute
or from its violation of any of the provisions of the
Constitution. The second situation which summons its
aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and
ambiguous and it is possible to gather the intentions of
the legislature from the object of the statute, the context
in which the provision occurs and the purpose for which it
is made. However, when the provision is cast in a definite
and unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it

23 (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 600
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1817

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such
recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience.
In such circumstances, it is not possible for the court to
remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and
leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What
is further, if the remaking of the statute by the courts is
to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously
avoided. One of the situations further where the doctrine
can never be called into play is where the statute requires
extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part
of the court’s duty to undertake such exercise, but it is
beyond its jurisdiction to do so.”
(emphasis supplied)

Hon’ble K. Ramaswamy, J. (as His Lordship then was), in a separate
concurring opinion, had the occasion to consider authorities on
statutory interpretation and observed:
323. In Craies Statute Law (7th edn., Chapter 5 at page
64) it is stated that where the words of an Act are clear,
there is no need for applying any of the principles of
interpretation which are merely presumptions in cases
of ambiguity in the statute. The safer and more correct
course of dealing with the question of construction is
to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at
their meaning without in the first place referring to cases.
Where an ambiguity arises to supposed intention of the
legislature, one of the statutory constructions, the court
propounded, is the doctrine of reading down. Lord Reid
in Federal Steam Navigation Co. v. Department of Trade
and Industry [(1974) 2 All ER 97, 100] (as also extracted
by Cross Statutory Interpretation, Butterworths’ edition,
1976 at page 43 in proposition 3) has stated thus:
‘… the judge may read in words which he considers
to be necessarily implied by words which are already
in the statute and he has a limited power to add to,
alter or ignore statutory words in order to prevent a
provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally
unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable
with the rest of the statute.’
1818 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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324. At page 92 of the Cross Statutory Interpretation, the
author has stated that: ‘The power to add to, alter or ignore
statutory words is an extremely limited one. Generally
speaking it can only be exercised where there has been
a demonstrable mistake on the part of the draftsman or
where the consequence of applying the words in their
ordinary, or discernible secondary, meaning would be utterly
unreasonable. Even then the mistake may be thought
to be beyond correction by the court, or the tenor of the
statute may be such as to preclude the addition of words
to avoid an unreasonable result.’
Therefore, the Doctrine of Reading Down is an internal
aid to construe the words or phrase in statute to give
reasonable meaning, but not to detract, distort or
emasculate the language so as to give the supposed
purpose to avoid unconstitutionality.
***
326. It is, thus, clear that the object of reading down is
to keep the operation of the statute within the purpose of
the Act and constitutionally valid. …”
(emphasis supplied)

22. The question of ‘reading down’ a provision arises if it is found that
the provision is ultra vires as it stands. This is the law laid down in
Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue Deptt., Govt.
of A.P..24
23. An instructive passage is found in B.R. Enterprises v. State of
U.P.,25 reading thus:
“81. … Thus, where there are two possible interpretations,
one invalidating the law and the other upholding, the
latter should be adopted. For this, the courts have been
endeavouring, sometimes to give restrictive or expansive
meaning keeping in view the nature of legislation, maybe

24 (1999) 4 SCC 458
25 (1999) 9 SCC 700
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1819

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

beneficial, penal or fiscal etc. Cumulatively it is to subserve
the object of the legislation. Old golden rule is of respecting
the wisdom of legislature that they are aware of the law and
would never have intended for an invalid legislation. This
also keeps courts within their track and checks individual
zeal of going wayward. Yet in spite of this, if the impugned
legislation cannot be saved the courts shall not hesitate
to strike it down. Similarly, for upholding any provision, if
it could be saved by reading it down, it should be done,
unless plain words are so clear to be in defiance of the
Constitution. These interpretations spring out because of
concern of the courts to salvage a legislation to achieve its
objective and not to let it fall merely because of a possible
ingenious interpretation. The words are not static but
dynamic. This infuses fertility in the field of interpretation.
This equally helps to save an Act but also the cause of
attack on the Act. Here the courts have to play a cautious
role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course,
without infringing the Constitution. For doing this, the
courts have taken help from the Preamble, Objects, the
scheme of the Act, its historical background, the purpose
for enacting such a provision, the mischief, if any which
existed, which is sought to be eliminated……….”
(emphasis supplied)

24. In State of Rajasthan v. Sanyam Lodha,26 this Court was considering
whether absent a challenge to the law/rule, the same could be read
down. Answering in the negative, Hon’ble R. V. Raveendran, J. (as
His Lordship then was) speaking for the bench held:
“12. It is true that any provision of an enactment can be
read down so as to erase the obnoxious or unconstitutional
element in it or to bring it in conformity with the object of
such enactment. Similarly, a rule forming part of executive
instructions can also be read down to save it from invalidity
or to bring it in conformity with the avowed policy of the
Government. When courts find a rule to be defective or

26 (2011) 13 SCC 262
1820 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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violative of the constitutional or statutory provision, they
tend to save the rule, wherever possible and practical,
by reading it down by a benevolent interpretation, rather
than declare it as unconstitutional or invalid. But such
an occasion did not arise in this case as there was no
challenge to the validity of Rule 5 and the parties were not
at issue on the validity of the said Rule. We are therefore of
the view that in the absence of any challenge to the Relief
Fund Rules and an opportunity to the State Government
to defend the validity of Rule 5, the High Court ought not
to have modified or read down the said Rule.”
25. Caution has been sounded in Subramanian Swamy v. Raju 27 in
the following words:
“61. Reading down the provisions of a statute cannot
be resorted to when the meaning thereof is plain and
unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear. The
fundamental principle of the ‘reading down’ doctrine
can be summarised as follows. Courts must read the
legislation literally in the first instance. If on such reading
and understanding the vice of unconstitutionality is
attracted, the courts must explore whether there has been
an unintended legislative omission. If such an intendment
can be reasonably implied without undertaking what,
unmistakably, would be a legislative exercise, the Act may
be read down to save it from unconstitutionality. The above
is a fairly well-established and well-accepted principle of
interpretation which having been reiterated by this Court
time and again would obviate the necessity of any recall
of the huge number of precedents…”
26. On the question as to whether harshness of a provision could afford
reason for reading down the same, we find that a three-Judge
bench of this Court in Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v.
Shanmugavelu 28 speaking through Hon’ble J.B. Pardiwala, J. has
held as follows:

27 (2014) 8 SCC 390
28 (2024) 6 SCC 641
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1821

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

“100. Thus, the principle of ‘Reading Down’ a provision
emanates from a very well-settled canon of law, that is,
the courts while examining the validity of a particular
statute should always endeavour towards upholding its
validity, and striking down a legislation should always be
the last resort. “Reading Down” a provision is one of the
many methods, the court may turn to when it finds that a
particular provision if for its plain meaning cannot be saved
from invalidation and so by restricting or reading it down,
the court makes it workable so as to salvage and save
the provision from invalidation. Rule of ‘Reading Down’ is
only for the limited purpose of making a provision workable
and its objective achievable.
101. The High Court in its impugned order resorted to
reading down Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules not
because its plain meaning would result in the provision
being rendered invalid or unworkable or the statute’s
objective being defeated, but because it would result in
the same harsh consequence of forfeiture of the entire
earnest-money deposit irrespective of the extent of default
in payment of balance amount.
102. However, harshness of a provision is no reason to
read down the same, if its plain meaning is unambiguous
and perfectly valid. A law/rule should be beneficial in the
sense that it should suppress the mischief and advance the
remedy. The harsh consequence of forfeiture of the entire
earnest-money deposit has been consciously incorporated
by the legislature in Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules
so as to sub-serve the larger object of the SARFAESI
Act of timely resolving the bad debts of the country. The
idea behind prescribing such a harsh consequence is not
illusory, it is to attach a legal sanctity to an auction process
once conducted under the SARFAESI Act from ultimately
getting concluded.”
(emphasis supplied)

27. Thus, what follows from the above authoritative discussions is
this. Whenever a court is seized of a question of vires of a primary
1822 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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legislation/ subordinate legislation or a part of it, a presumption of
constitutionality is attached to the impugned provision and the courts
would ordinarily strive to save the impugned provision from being
declared ultra vires; however, there could be situations where the
subordinate legislation (like a rule or a regulation) is challenged
on the ground of excessive delegation or is itself violative of the
enabling/primary legislation under which it is framed or even
breaches constitutional guarantees. ‘Reading down’ of a provision
is a subsidiary rule of interpretation of statutes, which the courts
tend to employ in situations to save the subordinate legislation like
a rule or a regulation, wherever possible and practical, by reading
it down by a benevolent interpretation, rather than declaring it as
unconstitutional or invalid. However, it has been clarified that it is
to be used sparingly, and in limited circumstances. Additionally, it is
clear that the act of reading down a provision, must be undertaken
only if doing so can keep the operation of the statute “within the
purpose of the Act and constitutionally valid”.

Whether,a selection board can fix a higher criterion for shortlisting
candidates?

28. One would find a catena of decisions answering the question, as
posed, and the legal position has never been in doubt. The decisions
cited by the appellants are apt. However, without unnecessarily
burdening our judgment with authorities, reference is made to only
one decision of this Court which has a factual resemblance with the
present case.
29. In M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar,29 this
Court upheld shortlisting of candidates by the relevant Public Service
Commission. In this case, for the purpose of shortlisting, a longer
period of experience than the minimum prescribed was used as a
criterion by it to call candidates for an interview. Relevant passages
from such decision are reproduced below:
“6. The question which is to be answered is as to whether
in the process of short-listing, the Commission has altered
or substituted the criteria or the eligibility of a candidate
to be considered for being appointed against the post of

29 (1994) 6 SCC 293
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1823

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

Presiding Officer, Labour Court. It may be mentioned at the
outset that whenever applications are invited for recruitment
to the different posts, certain basic qualifications and criteria
are fixed and the applicants must possess those basic
qualifications and criteria before their applications can be
entertained for consideration. The Selection Board or the
Commission has to decide as to what procedure is to be
followed for selecting the best candidates from amongst
the applicants. In most of the services, screening tests
or written tests have been introduced to limit the number
of candidates who have to be called for interview. Such
screening tests or written tests have been provided in the
concerned statutes or prospectus which govern the selection
of the candidates. But where the selection is to be made
only on basis of interview, the Commission or the Selection
Board can adopt any rational procedure to fix the number
of candidates who should be called for interview. It has
been impressed by the courts from time to time that where
selections are to be made only on the basis of interview,
then such interviews/viva voce tests must be carried out in a
thorough and scientific manner in order to arrive at a fair and
satisfactory evaluation of the personality of the candidate.
****
8. The sole purpose of holding interview is to search and
select the best among the applicants. It is obvious that it
would be impossible to carry out a satisfactory viva voce
test if large number of candidates are interviewed each
day till all the applicants who had been found to be eligible
on basis of the criteria and qualifications prescribed are
interviewed. If large number of applicants are called for
interview in respect of four posts, the interview is then
bound to be casual and superficial because of the time
constraint. The members of the Commission shall not
be in a position to assess properly the candidates who
appear before them for interview. It appears that Union
Public Service Commission has also fixed a ratio for calling
the candidates for interview with reference to number of
available vacancies.
*****
1824 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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13. The High Court has taken the view that raising the
period from five years to seven and half years’ practice for
purpose of calling the candidates for interview amounted to
changing the statutory criteria by an administrative decision.
According to us, the High Court has not appreciated the
true implication of the short-listing which does not amount
to altering or changing of the criteria prescribed in the rule,
but is only a part of the selection process. … As we have
already pointed out that where the selection is to be made
purely on the basis of interview, if the applications for such
posts are enormous in number with reference to the number
of posts available to be filled up, then the Commission or
the Selection Board has no option but to short-list such
applicants on some rational and reasonable basis.”
(emphasis supplied)

30. The principle discernible from the above decision as well as those
cited on behalf of the appellants is that whenever selection is based
solely on the performance of the aspirants in the interview, it is not
open to the recruiting authorities to dilute in any manner the norms
and standards prescribed by the statutory provisions or executive
orders governing recruitment for screening aspirants to be called for
interview; however, it is always open to them to prescribe enhanced
norms to have the zone of consideration for interview restricted to
those aspirants satisfying the enhanced norms or higher criteria. In
such cases, however, care has to be taken such that the enhanced
norms or higher criteria are not susceptible to a challenge on the
ground of arbitrariness or being contrary to the statutory provisions
or executive orders governing recruitment.

Whether, relief can be granted in the absence of requisite pleadings?
31. The necessity for appropriate pleadings in a writ petition cannot be
overemphasized, particularly when such petitions are mainly decided
on affidavit evidence and not witness action.
32. Without a doubt, a court cannot in the absence of the requisite
pleadings grant relief claimed by a party. We first propose to notice
two decisions which arose out of pure civil proceedings and then
two decisions arising out of writ proceedings.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1825

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

33. In Pt.Shamboo Nath Tikoo v. S. Gian Singh,30 this Court held as
follows:
“20. No doubt, the finding recorded by the learned third
Judge (Farooqi, J.) that two rooms of Dharamshalla had
been granted by Maharaja Partap Singh in favour of the
Sikh community-defendants, accords with the finding of
another learned Judge (Jalal-ud-Din, J.). But, that finding, in
our view, becomes wholly unsustainable being altogether a
new case made out for the defendants by him, in that, such
case is not in any way traceable to the pleas of defence of
the defendants set out in their written statements against
their ejectment from the said two rooms.”
34. Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal 31 is a decision where one finds a
neat discussion on the object and purpose of pleadings. The relevant
passages read as follows:
“12. The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is
to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues
clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded
or grounds being shifted during trial. Its object is also to
ensure that each side is fully alive to the questions that are
likely to be raised or considered so that they may have an
opportunity of placing the relevant evidence appropriate
to the issues before the court for its consideration. This
Court has repeatedly held that the pleadings are meant
to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so
that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is
really at issue between the parties, and to prevent any
deviation from the course which litigation on particular
causes must take.
13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings
the questions or points required to be decided by the courts
so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When
the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to
seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the

30 (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 266
31 (2008) 17 SCC 491
1826 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own
attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate
issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity
to place the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate
or challenge such a claim or relief. Therefore, the court
cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the
case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question
before a court is not whether there is some material on the
basis of which some relief can be granted. The question
is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant
had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by
the court could not be granted. When there is no prayer
for a particular relief and no pleadings to support such
a relief, and when the defendant has no opportunity to
resist or oppose such a relief, if the court considers and
grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice.
Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that
is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to
grant any relief.”
35. In Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari
Kapoor,32 this Court noted the settled legal position and interfered
with the impugned decision by ruling as follows:
“8. … It is too well settled that the petitioner who approaches
the court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the
court under Article 226 must fully aver and establish his
rights flowing from the bundle of facts thereby requiring
the respondent to indicate its stand either by denial or by
positive assertions. But in the absence of any averments
in the writ petition or even in the rejoinder-affidavit, it is
not permissible for a court to arrive at a conclusion on
a factual position merely on the basis of submissions
made in the course of hearing. The High Court, therefore,
in our view committed serious error in coming to the
conclusion that there existed vacancies in the post of Field
Supervisor on the materials produced before it. In fact the
respondents herein who were the petitioners in the High

32 (1998) 7 SCC 469
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1827

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

Court had not produced any material in support of their
stand that vacancies existed and yet appointments have
not been made. We are of the considered opinion that the
conclusion of the High Court that there existed vacancies
is unsustainable in law and is accordingly set aside.”
(emphasis supplied)

36. The difference in pleading in respect of civil proceedings and a writ
petition was succinctly noticed in Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana33
and expressed in the following words:
“13. …, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law
is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising
the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove
such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ
petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-
affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in
support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or
to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the court will
not entertain the point. In this context, it will not be out of
place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction
between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and
a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading,
that is, a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not
evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition
or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the
evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and
annexed to it. …”
37. Based on the aforesaid authorities, we hold that while deciding a writ
petition on the basis of affidavits, the writ court’s enquiry ought to be
restricted to the case pleaded by the parties and the evidence that
they have placed on record as part of the writ petition or the counter/
reply affidavit, as the case may be. Findings of the court have to be
based on the pleadings and the evidence produced before it by the
parties. It is well-nigh impermissible for the writ court to conjecture
and surmise and make out a third case, not pleaded by the parties,
based on arguments advanced in course of hearing.

33 (1988) 4 SCC 534
1828 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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Analysis and Reasons
38. Allahabad University and, for that matter, Allahabad Degree College
are both bound by the UGC Act and the 2018 Regulations. Normally,
if compliance with certain statutory provisions of a central statute bring
about adverse result for a citizen, the said result has to be accepted
by him/her because the statutory provisions are nothing but the will of
the people of India expressed by the Parliament. The only exception is
if the vires of the relevant statutory provision is challenged on either of
the two available grounds of challenge, i.e., legislative incompetence
and manifest repugnancy with any of the Constitutional rights, and
the challenge succeeds on any one of such grounds. In such a case,
rights of the affected party invaded by the impugned statutory provision
is protected by the courts in the manner considered just and proper
bearing in mind the facts and circumstances before it.
39. The 2018 Regulations are subordinate legislation and not per se
part of the central statute, i.e., the UGC Act. However, nothing much
turns on it. The authority to craft subordinate legislation is derived
from the enabling/primary legislation and it is imperative that such
legislation harmonises with the provisions outlined in the enabling/
primary legislation. Thus, grounds for challenging a subordinate
legislation to ultimately succeed would, normally, be the same. The
only additional ground available is that if the subordinate legislation
offends any provision of the enabling/primary legislation, that too
would provide room for the courts to hold the impugned provision
ultra vires such enactment.
40. Respondent 1, for succeeding in her claim, challenged Reg.10(f)(iii)
of the 2018 Regulations. However, it is noteworthy that she did not
challenge any other regulation. At this juncture, we consider it useful to
read Regs.4 and 10 together with Table 3A. Since there is no dispute
that respondent 1 possesses requisite eligibility for consideration of
her candidature for appointment on the post of Assistant Professor,
we refrain from reproducing the eligibility criteria. The other relevant
provisions are reproduced hereunder:
“4.0. Direct recruitment
4.1. For the disciplines of Arts, Commerce, Humanities,
Education, Law, Social Science, Sciences, Languages,
Library Science, Physical Education, and Journalism &
Mass Communication.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1829

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

I. Assistant Professor:
Eligibility (A or B):
A. ***
OR
B.***
Note: The Academic score as specified in Appendix II
(Table 3A) for Universities, and Appendix II (Table 3B)
for Colleges, shall be considered for short-listing of the
candidates for interview only, and the selections shall be
based only on the performance in the interview.”
(emphasis supplied)

“10.0. Counting of Past Services for Direct Recruitment
and Promotion under CAS.

Previous regular service, whether national or international,
as Assistant Professor, Associate Professor or Professor or
equivalent in a University, College, National Laboratories
or other scientific/professional organisations such as the
CSIR, ICAR, DRDO, UGC, ICSSR, ICHR, ICMR and DBT,
should count for the direct recruitment and promotion under
the CAS of a teacher as Assistant Professor, Associate
Professor, Professor or any other nomenclature, provided
that:
(a) The essential qualifications of the post held were not
lower than the qualifications prescribed by the UGC for
Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor,
as the case may be.
(b) The post is/was in an equivalent grade or of the pre-
revised scale of pay as the post of Assistant Professor
(Lecturer), Associate Professor (Reader) and Professor.
(c) The Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and
Professor concerned should possess the same minimum
qualifications as prescribed by the UGC for appointment
to the post of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor
and Professor, as the case may be.
1830 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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(d) The post was filled in accordance with the prescribed
selection procedure as laid down in the Regulations of
the University/State Government/Central Government/
Institutions concerned, for such appointments.
(e) The previous appointment was not as guest lecturer
for any duration.
(f) The previous Ad hoc or Temporary or contractual
service (by whatever nomenclature it may be called)
shall be counted for direct recruitment and for promotion,
provided that:
(i) the essential qualifications of the post held were
not lower than the qualifications prescribed by the
UGC for Assistant Professor, Associate Professor
and Professor, as the case may be;
(ii) the incumbent was appointed on the recommendation
of a duly constituted Selection Committee/Selection
Committee constituted as per rules of the respective
university;
(iii) the incumbent was drawing total gross emoluments
not less than the monthly gross salary of a regularly
appointed Assistant Professor, Associate Professor
and Professor, as the case may be.
(g) No distinctions shall be made with reference to the
nature of management of the institution where previous
service was rendered (private/local body/government) while
counting the past service under this clause.”
Table 3A is reproduced below:
“Table 3A”

S.N. Academic Record Score
1. Graduation 80% & 60% to 55% to 45% to
Above less than less than less than
= 15 80% =13 60%=10 55%=05
2. Post Graduation 80% & 60% to 55% (50% in case
Above less than of SC/ST/OBC (non-
= 25 80% =23 creamy layer)/PWD)
to less than 60%=20
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1831

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

3. M.Phil. 60% & 55% to less than 60% = 05
above
= 07
4. Ph.D. 30
5. NET with JRF 07
NET 05
SLET/SET 03
6. Research 10
Publications
(2 marks for
each research
publications
published in Peer-
Reviewed or UGC-
listed Journals)
7. Teaching/ 10
Post Doctoral
Experience (2
marks for one
year each)#
8. Awards
International/ 03
National Level
(Awards given
by International
Organizations/
Government of
India/Government
of India recognized
National Level
Bodies)
State-Level 02
(Awards given by
State Government)

#However, if the period of teaching/Post-doctoral
experience is less than one year then the marks shall
be reduced proportionately.
1832 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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Note:
(A) (i) M.Phil + Ph.D Maximum – 30 marks
(ii) JRF/NET/SET Maximum – 07 marks
(iii) In awards category Maximum – 03 marks
(B) Number of candidates to be called for interview shall be
decided by the concerned universities
(C) Academic Score - 80
Research Publications - 10
Teaching Experience - 10
Total - 100
(D) Score shall be valid for appointment in respective State
SLET/SET Universities/Colleges/Institutions only.

41. For reasons more than one, we hold that the Division Bench of the
High Court was in error.
42. First and foremost, the Division Bench of the High Court has
not found Reg.10(f)(iii) to be ultra vires on any of the available
grounds, i.e., either on the ground of legislative incompetence or
that it offends any of the Constitutional rights and/or any provision
of the UGC Act or that there is excessive delegation; rather, the
Division Bench has read down Reg.10(f)(iii) on the specious ground
(paragraph 36 of the impugned order, extracted supra) that the
construction it has placed “would obviate the need to examine the
challenge laid to the regulation 10(f)(iii) and the general instructions
appended to the advertisement in that regard”. In our view, this
course of action was impermissible having regard to the authorities
noted above. ‘Reading down’ can be resorted to whenever a
provision, which is questioned, is found to be ultra vires by the
court but there is scope for the court to read the same down in
a manner so as to save it from being declared constitutionally
invalid. The Division Bench without even recording any prima facie
opinion, much less final opinion, that Reg.10(f)(iii) is ultra vires,
chose to sidestep the issue of examining the vires by observing
what we have noted above. The line of reasoning weighing with
the Division Bench that the need to examine the challenge would
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1833

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

stand obviated if Reg.10(f)(iii) were construed in the manner it did
is, thus, plainly erroneous.
43. Moving on, we have no hesitation to hold that in construing Reg.10(f)
(iii) in the manner it did and observing that Reg.10 has no application
in relation to appointment on the post of Assistant Professor (since
reference to past services in Tables 3A and 3B appears to be
surplusage and serves no purpose in the scheme of the 2018
Regulations), the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction by resorting to a sort of judicial legislation.
Once Reg.10 specifically refers to counting of previous regular service,
whether national or international, inter alia as Assistant Professor,
the Division Bench in the exercise of its judicial review powers
could not have held that Reg.10 has no application to one aspiring
for appointment as an Assistant Professor. Law is well settled that
courts cannot add words to a statute or read words into it, which
are not there; at the same time, it cannot also read a statute in a
manner that results in deletion of words which are there. This is for
the simple reason that the court has no power to legislate; hence,
it cannot rewrite the legislation. Bearing this principle in mind, the
Division Bench was wholly unjustified in its approach.
44. That apart, clause (f) and other clauses of Reg.10 lay down the
conditions to be satisfied for an aspirant to claim marks for past
service, read with Tables 3A and 3B. If what the Division Bench has
held regarding past service is upheld, that is, past service as Assistant
Professor, or whatever other nomenclature, is a surplusage, that
would result in candidates answering all the conditions referred to
in clauses (a)-(g) being deprived of marks for teaching experience.
Certainly, this could not have been the intention of the UGC while it
framed the 2018 Regulations. We have been shown that even the
predecessor regulations had similar such provisions for shortlisting
of candidates. It is, therefore, as a matter of policy, that the UGC
has laid down qualifications mandatory in nature for eligibility as
well as marks for teaching experience earned from past service of
the nature ordained which, of course, is in the nature of a desirable
quality and is such that the 2018 Regulations permit for being taken
into consideration for shortlisting of candidates, more particularly
when the proportion of candidates applying for the number of posts
available is quite high.
1834 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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45. Even otherwise, we find no justification to uphold the view taken by
the Division Bench of the High Court. It was never the intention to
deprive aspirants of marks for their teaching experience as Assistant
Professors, albeit for shortlisting purposes. Conditions of eligibility
for entitlement to secure marks, which have been laid down, are
matters of policy over which the courts have no expertise. Judicial
review would not extend to cases of the present nature where
regulations are framed by experts having a fair measure of idea of
what is required and what is not for appointment on teaching posts.
The Division Bench overstepped its limits and treaded a territory,
which was forbidden.
46. Besides, even on a plain reading of Reg.10, we have failed to
comprehend why the High Court embarked on reading down
Reg.10(f)(iii). After reading Reg.4, one had to first read Reg.10, as
a whole, and then, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by
word. Had Regs.4 and 10 been so read, there could be no difficulty
in ascertaining the intent behind incorporation of Reg.10 (f)(iii) in
the 2018 Regulations. The whole lot of aspirants having served
nationally or internationally as Assistant Professor in institutions,
as specified, were entitled to have such service counted for direct
recruitment as an Assistant Professor on fulfilment of conditions
in clauses (a)-(e), f(i), f(ii) and (g) with which the Division Bench
High Court had no reservation. The Division Bench only had
reservation qua clause f(iii). In expressing its reservation about
clause f(iii), the Division Bench appears to have overlooked that
an aspirant having previous experience, even while working on
ad hoc/temporary/contractual basis internationally, could claim that
his past service be counted subject, of course, to producing proof
that his total gross emoluments were not less than the monthly gross
salary of a regularly appointed Assistant Professor. Whatever was
applicable to previous regular service rendered internationally by
an aspirant was made applicable equally to service rendered within
the nation. Allahabad University has placed on record applications
of multiple aspirants who were shortlisted for interview. Learned
senior counsel, referring to the contents thereof, showed that all
such aspirants’ past teaching experience gained on the basis of
contractual service were taken into consideration since they had
been drawing salary in the pay scale for academic level prescribed
by the UGC/7th Central Pay Commission, i.e., drawing salary equal
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1835

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

to that of a regularly appointed faculty. Respondent No. 1 could
not dispute the same before us and this, ex facie, has the effect of
removing the plinth of her claim for declaring Reg.10(f)(iii) invalid.
While focusing on Reg. 10(f)(iii) singularly, the Division Bench missed
the woods for the trees and the interpretation placed by it would
certainly have the effect of (a) robbing aspirants having previous
teaching experience of the nature specified from such experience
being counted for the purpose of shortlisting and (b) requiring the
selectors to be engaged in a long drawn process of interview of a
large number of candidates aspiring for appointment on very few
vacant posts of Assistant Professor.
47. Above, we have assigned reasons why the High Court was not
justified in its approach. Independent thereof, there is one equally
weighty reason for allowing the instant appeals. As discussed in
M.P. Public Service Commission (supra), a recruiting authority
is well-nigh entitled to adopt a method for shortlisting candidates
on some rational and reasonable basis when selection is required
to be made only on the basis of an interview. In the present case,
‘Note’ to Reg.4.1 relating to Assistant Professor ordains that after
shortlisting of candidates based on academic score specified in Tables
3A and 3B, “the selections shall be based only on the performance
in the interview”. In course of hearing, we were informed by learned
senior counsel for Allahabad University that 69 candidates were
shortlisted and called for interview (the cut-off marks being 87.17),
who were competing against each other for appointment on only
one unreserved vacancy. Respondent 1 had secured 81 marks
and between 87.17 and 81 marks, there were 147 candidates. It is
true that these facts and figures are not on record but appointment
in furtherance of the advertisement dated 28th September, 2021
having been made, the High Court directed that appointment already
made need not be reopened. It is for this reason that we do not
disbelieve the instructions provided to learned senior counsel for
Allahabad University. However, considering the disproportionate
number of applications received in comparison to the number of
vacancies available to be filled up, Allahabad University narrowed
the zone of consideration by adopting a marking scheme in the way
it did with the obvious ultimate objective of permitting candidates
with higher teaching experience to enter the zone of consideration.
This methodology was perfectly in sync with Regs.4 and 10 read
1836 [2024] 12 S.C.R.

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with Table 3A. The Division Bench, therefore, ought not to have
been swayed in its decision-making process by reason of teaching
experience not being a mandatory eligibility criterion.
48. We are also of the view that the criteria for shortlisting of candidates
as engrafted in Tables 3A and 3B were in furtherance of the entire
scheme framed by the UGC for appointment on the post of Assistant
Professors in universities as well as in colleges. Clause 7 of Tables
3A and 3B, having direct relation with Reg.10, did not call for any
observation from the Division Bench of the High Court of the nature
noticed above. An aspirant satisfying the conditions in Reg.10 would
be entitled to marks either for teaching experience or post-doctoral
experience for which a cap of 10 (ten) marks is imposed. Reg.10,on
its very terms, makes it clear that rendering of past services is not a
sine qua non for direct recruitment. If indeed a candidate has served
in the past and answers all the conditions that Reg.10 envisages,
read with clause 7 of Tables 3A or 3B, as the case may be, he/
she would be entitled to marks for teaching experience. In such
circumstances, we hold that the Division Bench completely erred in
appreciating the contentious issues in the proper perspective vis-à-
vis the law applicable thereto and returned findings which are not
only unwarranted but are wholly unacceptable.
49. Finally, we consider it essential to say a few words about the
approach adopted by the Division Bench in relation to ‘post-doctoral
experience’, referred to in clause 7 of Tables 3A and 3B. It is plain
and clear that respondent 1 did not question the same. In fact, the
noun ‘anomaly’ had not even been referred to by respondent 1 in
her writ petition. In the absence of any definition of ‘post-doctoral
experience’ as well as a complete lack of pleadings in regard to
such experience earning marks, but assuming that there was good
reason for the Division Bench to notice a grey area, either the
UGC or the appellants ought to have been asked to clarify. Without
seeking any clarification, it was not open to the Division Bench to
surmise and conjecture and to be guided to a particular direction
based on a ‘perceived anomaly’ while giving its decision. We are
inclined to the view that the Division Bench, in the absence of the
requisite pleadings and the ramifications that are closely associated
with its decision, ought to have adopted a hands-off approach in
this regard.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1837

Allahabad University Etc. v. Geetanjali Tiwari (Pandey) & Ors. Etc. Etc.

Conclusion
50. In our opinion, for the foregoing reasons, the impugned order is
unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. Consequently, the
impugned order is set aside and the writ petition of Respondent 1 is
dismissed. Also, the special appeal filed by Respondent 1 challenging
dismissal of her writ petition, filed earlier, stands dismissed and the
order of the Single Judge is affirmed. The review petition filed by
Respondent 1 also stands dismissed.
51. The writ petition filed by the said Brahma Deo also stands dismissed.
52. All the appeals stand allowed, without order for costs.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan