Holding

The Deputy Director acted within his statutory powers, Section 11‑C applies, and the High Court’s order vesting the land in the Gaon Sabha is upheld.

Summary

The appellants, Sheo Nano and others, claimed Sirdari rights over several plots by adverse possession, while the Deputy Director of Consolidation, acting under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, found the recorded tenure‑holder Jethu to be a civil death with no heirs and ordered the land to vest in the Gaon Sabha by escheat. The appellants argued that the Gaon Sabha had not filed any objection under Section 9 and that Section 11‑C, which was introduced after the Deputy Director’s order, could not be applied. The Supreme Court held that Section 11‑C imposes a statutory duty on consolidation authorities to record such land in the Gaon Sabha’s name even without an objection, and that the Deputy Director’s power under Section 48 to re‑examine the entire case and correct forged or fictitious revenue entries was valid. Consequently, the High Court’s decision upholding the Deputy Director’s order was affirmed. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The applicability of Section 11‑C, introduced after the Deputy Director’s order, to vest the land in the Gaon Sabha despite no objection filed.
Whether the Deputy Director exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 48 by reopening the entire case and adjudicating claims in villages beyond the specific revision.
Whether land of a tenure‑holder deemed a civil death with no heirs vests in the Gaon Sabha by escheat under the Act and constitutional provisions.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 296
Government of India Act, 1935
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953s. 11-C, s. 48, s. 9

Subjects

EscheatSection 11-CU.P. Consolidation of Holdings ActRevision under Section 48Adverse possessionGaon SabhaCivil death

Judgment

SHEO NANO AND ORS. A
v.
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION
ALLAHABAD AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 3, 20CO
B
(S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND Y.K. SABHARWAL, JJ.]

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953: Sections 9, 11-C (As intro-
duced by Act XXXV of 1974).
c
U.P. Land Records Manual.

Escheat-Land--Recorded tenure-holder-Civil death of-No heirs of
recorded tenure-Holder-Claim by certain persons on the basis of Sirdari
rights by adverse possession-Rejection by Deputy Director of Consolida-
D
tion--Order by Deputy Director that in the absence of lawful claimant property
would vest in the Gaon Sabha by escheat-Order of Deputy Director chal-
lenged before High Court-During pendency of proceedings before High Court
Section 1J..c introduced in the 1953 Act:-New section provided for escheat
even when no objection was filed by ( iovemment or gaun Sabha-Held, it is
E
statutory duty of all authorities to give effect to the provisions of Section 11-C
even if no claim was laid by Gaun Sabhu-Even though the provisions of
Section 11-C were not available to the Deputy Director at the time of the
decision of the revision filed before him, his order that the property should be
recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha could be sustained on the basis of
the provisions of Section 11-C at the time of heanng of the writ petition and F
the High Court was, there[ore, justified in upholding his order.

Section 4&-Revision-l'ower orScope and extent-Powers confe"ed
on Deputy Director to consider legality and correctness of proceedings-Held,
powers have been considered in widest tenns-Power should not be exercised G
to disturb the findings offact unless they are pe1verse--Revenue records-Fic-
titious and forged entries-Deputy Director in such a case has full power' to
re-appraise and re-evaluate the evidence on record-In such a situation he
can re-open the entire case and would be justified in looking into the legality
of entire proceedings. H
619
>

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 1 S.C.R.
A Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 296 Seventh Schedulic-Union
List-Entry 32--state List-Entries 35 and 44.

Escheat of lapse-Bona Vacantia-Real and personal estate--Want of
heir or successor or rightful owner-Vesting of such a property in State
Legislative History of Principle of Escheat discussed.
B
A.G. of Ontario v. Mercer 8 Appeal Cases 767; St. Catherine's Co. v.
The Queen 14Appeal Cases 46; A.G. for Quebec v.A.G.for Canada, (1921)
I A.C. 401; Rex v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, (1924) Appeal
Cases 213 (PC), referred to.
c Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, (1958]
SCR 1122 = AIR (1958) SC 328; Superintendent & Legal Remembrancer
State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1967] 2 SCR 170 = AIR
(1967) SC 997, relied on.

D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1268 of
1992.

From the Judgment and Ordeir dated 21.5.91 of the Allahabad High
Court in C.M.W.P. No. 641of1972.

E T.N. Singh, B.M. Sharma, (C.L. Sahu) (NP), S.N. Singh, B.S. Jain,
R.D. Rathore and Goodwill lndeever for tht: appearing parties.

The following Order of the Court was delivered by

S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. The appellan.ts, who had claimed Sirdari
F rights by adverse possi::ssion ovt:r differi::nt plots in three difforent villages,
were allowi::d that right only in respect of one plot situated in village
J ethupur and their claim in respect of other plots was dismissed by the
Deputy Director of Consolidation at the revisional stage under Section 48
of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings act, 1953 (for short, 'the Act') on a
G consideration of oral & documentary evidence. The Deputy Director, who
carefully scrutinised the Revenue Records, filed by the parties, found many
of the entries forged and fictitious; may other entries were found to have
been made in the Revenue Records without complying with the mandatory
requirements set out in the t.: .P. Land Records Manual. He ultimately
H came to the conclusion that since the recorded tenure-holder, namely,
..

SHEONAND v. DY. DIRECTOROFCONSOUDATION[S.S.AHMAO,J.J 621

Jethu@ Madhoo (respondent No. 12) was not available, having died a civil A
death, his property would. vest in the Gram Sabha. The Deputy Director
had also negatived the claim of Smt. Ganeshia, alleged sister of Jethu who
had also laid claim over the plots belonging to J ethu on the ground that
J ethu who was unmarried and conseqm:ntly had no issue, was not heard
of for more than 10 years and had died a civil death and, therefore, the B
plots which belonged to him would come down to her by inheritance and
she wa5 entitled to be recorded as Sirdar of all those plots. Her claim has
been negatived on account of the fmding that she was not real sister of
Jethu.

Learned counsel for the appellants has raised two contentions. The c
first contention is that the Gaon Sabha had not filed any objections under
Section 9 of the Act and, therefore, it could not be given the plots which
belonged to Jethu and the appellants having been in possession over the
plots since long had acquired Sirdari rights by adverse possession and were,
therefore, entitled to be recorded as such during consolidation proceed- D
ings. This claim was negatived by the High Court on the basis of the
provisions contained in Section 11-C which were introduced in the Act by
U.P. Act No. XXXV of 1974. This Section provides as under :

''11-C. In the course of hearing of an objection under Section
9-A or an appeal under Section 1l, or in proceedings under Section E
48, the (Consolidation Offi.ct:r, th" Sdtkment Officer) (Consolida-
tion) or the Director of Consolidation, as the case may be, may
direct that any land which vests in the State Government of the
Gaon Sabha or any other local body or authority may be recorded
in its name, even though no objection, appeal or revision has been F
filed by such Government, Gaon Sabha, body or authority."

This Section casts a duty on the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement
Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director to record the property in
the name of the Gaon Sabha or the State Government or any other local
body or authority if, during the course of the consolidation proceedings, G
they notice that the property really belonged to any of them notwithstand-
ing that they had not filed any objection, appeal or revision under the Act.
This is the statutory duty of the authorities functioning under the Act and
they cannot act otherwise. If, therefore, the Deputy Director of Consolida-
tion, during the course of the hearing of revision, came to the conclusion H
622 SCPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 1 S.C.R.
A that the claim of the appellants was not correct or that the property which
originally btlongcd to Jethu couild not be given to his sister, Smt. Ganeshia,
who, as a matter of fact, was found to be not his sister, the property had
to be recorded in the name of ·'.he Gaon Sabha in whom it would vest in
the absence of any lawful claimant.

B
It was next contended by the leaned counsel fur the appellants that
the Deputy Director had disposed of the n:vision prior to the introduction
of Section 11-C in the principal Act and, therefore, the plots in question
could not be recorded in the name of Gaon Sabha unkss those plots were
claimed by the Gaon Sabha to have vested in them and objections to that
C effect were filed under Section 9 of the Act. It is contended that the Deputy
Director, in the absence of any statutory provision, was not justified in
recording a finding that the property belonging to fothu would vest in the
Gaon Sabha. This contention is also without any substance.

D
The Deputy Director of Consolidation on a consideration of the oral
and documentary evidence on record had come to the conclusion that
J ethu who was not heard of for more than 7 years and had consequrntly
died a civil death, had not left any heir who could be record as tenure-
E holders of those plots in his place. The property would, therefore, vest in
the Gaon Sabha by Escheat. The decision of the Deputy Din:ctor was
challenged before the High Court and during the pend ency of the writ
petition, the provisions of Section 11-C were introduced in the principal
Act. Consequently, it was the duty of the High Court to give effect to those
F provisions given at the time of the final decision of the writ pt:tition. As
pointed out above, it is the statutory duty of all tht: authoritit:s functioning
under the Act to give effect to the provisions of Section 11-C of the Act
and to record the property as having vested in the Gaon sabha even if no
claim was laid by the Gaon Sabha nor was any petition filed by the Gaon
Sabha under the Act. Even thou1µi the provisions of Section 11-C were not
G available to the Deputy Director at the time of the decision of the revision
filed by the appellants before him, his order that the property should be
recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha could be sustained on the basis
of the provisions of Section 11-C at tht: time of hearing of the writ petition
and the High Court was, thert:forc, justified in upholding his ordec There
H is, thus, no error in the judgment of the High Court.
.

SHEO NANI> v. DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION :s.s. AHMAD, J.J 623

It was m:xt contended that Section 11-C would apply to properties A
which were the properties of the Gaon Sabha from the very inception and
owr which the name of somebody else was recorded. It is contended that
if during the course of the consolidation proceedings, it is noticed by the
Consolidation Authorities that the property in question, which was
recorded in the name of a tenure-holder, did, in fact, belong to the Gaon
B
Sabha, the entry would be deleted and the property recorded in the name
of the Gaon Sabha, notwithstanding that Gaon Sabha may not have filed
any claim or objection in respect of that property. But where the property
belongs to a tenure-holder and is sought to be given to the Gaon Sabha on
the principle of Escheat, namely, where it is found by the Consolidation
Authorities that the tenure-holder, who was dead, had not left any heir who c
could be recorded as tenure-holder in place of that person, the provisions
of Section 11-C would not be applicable and in that situation the Gaon
Sabha, who had not laid any claim over that property, would not be given
the benefit of Section 11-C. The contention is not correct. Where on a
determination of the rights of the claimants before the Consolidation D
Authorities it is found that none of the claimants could be held to be the
tenure- holder of the property in question which, admittedly, belonged to
a third person who was not heard of for more than 7 years and was,
therefore, treated as having died a civil death or who, in fact, was dead
without leaving any heir, the property would vest in the Gaon Sabha. This
is the principle of Escheat. E
• "Escheaf literally means "to revert to the State". This event takes
place in default of heirs or devisees. Under the old feudal system, if the
person to whom the property was let out or who was in possession of that
property, had died intestate or without leaving any heir, the property would F
n::vert to the landlord or Zamindar, but if there was no landlord or
intermediary, the property would vest in the State or, during the British
days, in the Crown (King). This principle was also judicially laid down in
A.G. of Ontario v. Mercer, 8 Appeal Cases 767 as also in St. Chatherine's
Co. v. The Queen, 14 Appeal Cases 45. This was followed and applied in
• A.G. for Quebec v. A.G. for Canada, (1921) 1 A.C. 401. G

In Rex vAttomey-General of British Columbia, (1924) Appeal Cases
213 (PC), it was observed as under :

"Except for the difference between a right to lands, the title to H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 1 S.C.R.
A which is ultimately in the Crown, and a right to personality, which
is complete in a private person if there be a private person entitled,
the principle on which bona vacantia and escheat fall to Crown is
the same, that is, that there being no private persons entitled, the
Crown takes."
B
We may point out that property vesting in the State by the principle
of Escheat is not new and should not surprise the counsel for the appel-
lants. Under the Act of 1853, made by the British Parliament (An Act to
provide for the Government of India (1853), Statute 16 and 17 Victoria, C.
95, S. 27), it was specifically provided as under :
c
"All real and personal estate within the said territories escheating
or lapsing for want of an heir or successor and all property within
the said territories devolving, as bona vacantia for want of a rightful
owner, shall (as part of the rt:venues of India) belong to the East
D India Company in trust for Her Majesty for the service of the
Government of India."

The above provision thus dealt with two situations, namdy, (i) where
there was no heir or successor; and (ii) where there was even no owner of
the property. The first of the two siltuation was described in terms of
E "Escheat or lapse'' and the second in terms of 'bona vacantia''. This
provision was retained in Section 54 of the Government of India Act, 1858.
>
The successor Act, namely, the Government of India Act, 1915, provided
in Section 20(3)(iii) that the revenues of India received for His Majesty
would include all movable or immovable property in British India escheat-
F ing or lapsing for want of an heir or successor, and all property in British
India Devolving as bona vacantia for want of a rightful owner. Thus, the
dichotomy between Escheat or lapse md bona vacantia was retained in this
Act.

A similar provision was contained in Section 174 of the Government
G of India Act, 1935, which provided inti:r alia, as under :
"Subject as hereinafter provided any property in India accruing to
His Majesty by escheat or lapse or as bona vacantia for want of a
rightful owner shall, if it is property situate in a Province, vest in
H His Majesty."
SHEO 'llAND v. DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION (S.S. AHMAD, J.J 625
Thus, in this Act also, it was provided that the property would vest A
by escheat or lapse or as bona vacantia.

Coming now to the Constitution of India, we find a similar provision
contained in Article 296 which provides as under :

"296. Subject as hereinafter provided, any property in the territory B
of India which, if this Constitution had not come into operation
would have accrued to his Majesty or, as the case may be, to the
Ruler of an Indian State by escheat or lapse, or as bona vacantia
for want of a rightful owner, shall, if it is property situate in a State,
vest in such State, and shall, in any other case, vest in the Union." C
Legislative competence to enact legislation as to Escheat is relatable
to the Entries 35 & 44 in the State List and Entry 32 in the Union List set
out in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitntion.

This Court in Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of D
Bombay, [1958) SCR 1122 = AIR (1958) SC 328, as also in Superintendent
& Legal Remembrancer State of West Bengal v. Corporation of Calcutta,
(1967] 2 SCR 170 " AIR (1967) SC 997, has already upheld the property
coming to State by escheat.

Surprisingly, Jethu, who was claimed by the appellants to be dead as E
he was not heard of for more than seven years, and his so-called sister,
Smt. Ganeshia also contended that on account of his absence for more than
seven years, Jethu should be treated to be dead, put in an appearance
before the High Court and filed an application upon which the High Court
observed in its judgment that since the claim put forward by Jethu F
depended upon questions of fact, he may approach the Consolidation
Authorities. In the present appeal also, a counter affidavit has been filed
on behalf of J ethu who has denied the case set up by the appellants and
Smt. Ganeshia, who is said, in the counter affidavit, to be the real sister of
Jethu's father and not of Jethu himself.
G
If Jethu approaches the Consolidation Authorities, his claim would
be investigated and appropriate orders would be passed. In case it is found
that the claims set up by the appellants and Smt. Ganeshia were false and
J ethu was alive whose property could not be recorded in the name of Gaon
Sabha, appropriate action would be taken against the appellants and Smt. H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2CC0] 1 S.C.R.
A Ganeshia for having set up the claim that Jethu, on account of his absence
for more than seven years, had died a civil death.

It was next cuntended by thi;; learm:d counsel for the appellants that
the appellants had fileJ a revision only in respect of one village before the
Deputy Director under Section 48 of the Act and, therefore, the Deputy
B Director ought to have confined himself only to the qm:stion raised in that
revision relating to th<1t specific village. lt is contended that the Deputy
Director reopened the entire case in n:spect of all the thrt;e villages and
adjudicated upon the rights of th,: appellants in respect of land situate in
all the three villag''· This, it is contendi.;d, was beyond the scope of Section
C 48 of the Act anJ consequent!y the judgment passed by the Deputy
Director should be remanded for fresh hearing. We are not prepared to
accept this contention.

Section 48 of the Act provides as ·under :

D ''48. Revision and reference - (I) The Director of Consolidation
may call tor and examine the record of any case decided or
proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of
satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to
the correctness, legality or propriety of any ordt:r other than
interlocutory order passed hy such authority in the case of
E
pron cdint\' and may. alfter allowing the parties concerned an
opportunity nf bEing htcard, make such ordu in the case of
procu:din~s as he thinks fit.

(2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the
F Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub- section
(3).

(3). Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation
may, after, allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being
heard, reftr the record of any case or proceedings to the Director
G of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1).

Explanation. - ( l) For the purposes of this section, Settlement
Officers, (Consolidation), Consolidation Officers, Assistant Con-
solidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall
H be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation.
SHEO NAND v. DY. DIRECTOR OF COJ\SOLJDATION ;s.s. AHMAD, J.) 627

Exptanation. - (2) For the purposes of this section the expres- A
sion 'intt:rlocutory order' in n:lation to a case or proceedings,
means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or
proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect of
finally disposing of such case or proceeding."

B
The Section gives very wide powers to the Deputy Din:ctor. It
enables him either suo motu on his own motion or on the application of
any person to consider the propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of
all the proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders.
These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in tht: widest
terms so that the daims of the parties under the Act may be effectively c
adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of
the parties and the Revenue Records may be prepared accordingly.

Normally, the Deputy Din:ctor, in exercise of his powers, is not
expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the D
Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but
where the findings are perverse, in the sense that they arc not supported
by the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they are against
the weight of evidence, it would be tht: duty of the Deputy Director to ·
scrutinise the whole case again so as to determine the correctm:ss, legality
or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. In E
a case, like the present, where the entries in the Revenue record are
fictitious or forged or they were recorded in contravention of the statutory
provisions contained in the t:.P. Land Records Manual or other allied
statutory provisions, the Deputy Director would have full power undt:r
Section 48 to re-appraise or re-evaluate the evidence on record so as to p
finally determine the rights of the parties by excluding forged and fictitious
revenue entries or entries not made in accordance with law.

If, tht:rt:fore, during the course of the hearing of the revision filed by
the appellant under Section 48 of the Act, the Deputy Director reopened
the whole case and scrutinised the claim of the appellants in respect of two G
other villages, it could not be said that the Deputy Director exceeded his
jurisdiction in any manner. It will be noticed that while scrutinising the
evidence on record, the Deputy Director had noticed that the entries were
fictitious and in recording some of the entries in the revenue record in
favour of the appellants, statutory provisions including those contained in H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2CXXJJ l S.C.R.
A U.P. Land Records Manual were not followed. In that situation, the
Deputy Director was wholly justified in looking into the legality of the
entire proceedings and disposing of the revision in the manner in which he
has done.

For the reason stated above, we find no merit in this appeal which
B is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeal dismissed.