Holding

The 7 March 1989 promotion policy amendment is within the statutory powers of the SBI Central Board, is not arbitrary or illegal, and the petitioners failed to prove any mala fide intent or procedural vitiation.

Summary

The All India State Bank Officers Federation filed writ petitions under Article 32 challenging the State Bank of India's 7 March 1989 promotion policy for moving officers from Senior Management Grade Scale V to Top Executive Grade Scale VI. The petitioners argued that the policy was arbitrary for raising the minimum service period to four years, eliminating the "zone of consideration" ratio, altering interview weightage, and using two different appraisal reports, and alleged that the changes were made in mala fide to benefit certain officers. The Supreme Court held that the Central Board had authority under the SBI Act to amend the policy, that the modifications were reasonable, that the government guidelines under the Banking Regulation Act did not bind SBI, and that the allegations of mala fide were unsupported and the petitioner’s president had made false affidavits. Consequently, the promotions were not vitiated, the perjury allegations were noted but not prosecuted, and the petitions were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether the Central Board of the State Bank of India could validly amend the promotion policy by raising the minimum service requirement and removing the zone of consideration.
Whether the government guidelines issued under the Banking Regulation Act are binding on the State Bank of India.
Whether the change in interview weightage and the use of two types of appraisal reports render the promotion process arbitrary or discriminatory.
Whether the petitioners proved mala fide intent behind the policy amendment and whether the accused must be impleaded.
Whether the false statements made in affidavits constitute perjury warranting prosecution.

Legislation cited

Banking Regulation Act, 1949
Constitution of Indias. Article 32
State Bank of India Act, 1955s. 17, s. 18, s. 43

Subjects

promotion policyservice lawState Bank of Indiazone of considerationappraisal systeminterview marksmala fideperjurywrit petitionArticle 32employment law

Judgment

ALL INDIA STATE BANK OFFICERS FEDERATION AND ORS. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 13, 1996
B
[.T.S. VERMA AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.]

Service Law :

State Bank of India Officers (Detenni11atio11 of Tenns and Conditions
of Service) Order, 1979: Paragraph 17. c
Promoti01r-Ca11didates--From post of Senior Managemeizt Grade
Scale V to Top Executive Grade Scale VI in State Bank of India-Zone of
consideration--Omission to limit number of candidate-Validity
of--Origiizally minimum two years' se1vice in the previous grade/scale required D
and zone of co11sideration limited to three to four times the number of
vacancies-However, promotional policy dated 7.3.1989 discontinued limita-
tio11 of zone of consideration a11d raised mi11imum se1vice from two to four
years-Held: promotio11al policy not illegaf-State Ba11k of I11dia (Supe1vising
Staff) Se1vice Rules, 197~State Bank of1ndia Act, 195~Ss. 17 and 43.
E
Promoti01r-Candidates-From Senior Management Grade Scale V to
Top Executive Grade Scale VI-Eligibility of-Promotional polity dated
7.3.1989-Modification in nonns of-Held: promotional policy not ar-
bitrary-Eligibility 1101111s made on realistic basis-To choose best talents to
man critical positions-Cozm could not sit in appeal to decide what was good F
for Bank.

Promotion-From Senior Management Grade Scale V to Top Execu-
tive Grade Scale VI-Inte1view-Candidates-Number of-Guidelines dated
23.6.1986 issued under Regn. 17-Limited 11umber of candidates to be inter-
viewed to three to four times of vacancies-Applicability of-Held : applicable G
011/y to Nationalised Banks and not to State Bank of l11dia--Furthe1111ore,
said guidelines could not be regarded as directions under Sectio11 18 of State
Bank of India Act-Govemment of India, Mi11istry of Fi11a11ce Guidelines
dated 23.6.1986-0fficers Se1vice Regulations Regn. 17-Banking Regulation
Act; 1949. H
255
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Pronwtion--4:andidate~From Senior Management Grade Scale V to
Top Executive Grade Scale VI-Eligibility of-Promotional policy dated
7.3.1989-Modification in 1wmzs of-Made by Central Board of State Bank
of India-Allegedly motivated to benefit certain candidate~onditions
precedent for such allegations to succee~Held : person making such allega-
tion must conclusively show that intended benefici01ies wielded influence over
B all members of Board-Neither this condition fulfilled nor Chairnian or
Directors impleade~Hence, petitioners could not be allowed to raise said
allegations of mala [ides.

Promotion--4:andidate~From Senior Management Grade Scale V to
C Top Executive Grade Scale VI--4:onsideration of past record~Absence of
unif01111 appraisal system-Annual Confidential Rep01ts-Replaced by assign-
ment appraisal system throughout the Bank not simultaneously but in a
phased manner from 1986 to 1990-Consequently, in case of some officers
annual confidential rep01ts considered while in case of others assignment
D appraisal reports considered-Held: absence of wzifornz appraisal system did
not vitiate selection--4:onsideration of two types of repolts did not result in
discrimination--4:onstitution of India, 1950, Alt. 14.

Promotion--4:andidate~From Senior Management Grade Scale V to
Top Executive Grade Scale VI-Past record for period which exceeded min-
E imum length of service in post immediately below--Co11sideration
of-Whether vali~Held : consideration of peifomzance of six years while
minimum service for eligibility was four years did not cause prejudice to any
officer.

Promotion--4:andidate~From Senior Management Grade Scale V to
F Top Executive Grade Scale VI--lnterview-Prescribed minimum 60% marks
as eligibility criterion-Validity of-Held : inte1view marks represented only
25% of aggregate mar~No exaggerated weightage given to marks prescribed
in interview.

Practice and Procedure :
G
Affidavit-False allegation in--4:hallenge of promotion to Top Execu-
tive Grade Scale VI in State Bank of India in writ petition by petitione,-
Federation-ln rejoinder affidavit, the then President of petitioner-Federa-
tion deposed that in fact only V, an officer of B01zk, had allotted marks on
H the individual promotion appraisal f onns on basis of which list of candidates
ALL INDIA STATE BANK OFFICERS FEDERATION v. U.O.l. 257

- prepared and signed by three members of Screening Committee-Supreme A
Court directed the then President to verify on affidavit the said allegation
specifying precise source of infonnation-Supreme Cowt also wamed that if
allegation was found false that also would have its own consequences-Presi-
dent filed additional affidavit deposing that he derived infonnation from V
himself and another officer of Bank-Cliief General Manager (Personnel) of
Bank as well as two' officen~ refe1Ted to in said additional affidavit, filed their B
own affidavits denying said allegation-Fwthennore, allegation not substan-
tiated by photo copies of appraisal fonns of promotees-Held : In such
circumstances, said allegation in rejoinder affidavit of the then President
absolutely false-Tiie then President already apologised to Supreme Cowt for
some mis-statements in an earlier affidavit-Supreme Court expressed its c
disapproval and anguish over that matter-But did not dismiss petition in
view of offer of Bank to contest the case on nwits-Since the then President
once again made false statements in his affidavit despite said observations of
Supreme Cowt, he dese1ved to be prosecuted-Howeve1; since he was no
longer President of Federation and since prosecution might take fwther time,
D
instead of direct~ng him to be prosecuted, the petition dismissed with costs,
quantified at Rs. 20,000 of which Rs. 10,000 to be paid by him personal-
• ly-Constitution of India, 1950, A1t. 32-'-Judicial strictures.

The petitioner-Federation filed a writ petition before this Court
challenging the new promotional policy framed by the respondent-Bank on E
7 3.1989 relating to the promotion from the post of Senior Management
Grade Scale V' to Top Executive Grade Scale VI. The said Policy was
framed by the Central Board under paragraph 17 of the State Bank of
India Officers (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order,
1979 which had been framed under Section 43 of the State Bank of India F
Act, 1955. The State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, 1975
framed under Section 43 of the Act, dealt with various grade and scales of
officers, conduct rules, salary, seniority, promotion, etc. From 1975 on-
wards the Central Board approved a promotion policy under which assign-
ment appraisals and interviews were made the two components of the
selection procedure. According to the petitioners zone of consideration G
from amongst the eligible officers had been varying from time to time.
From 8.6.1982 onwards two years' service in the previous grade/scale
became a condition of eligibility for promotion but the zone of considera-
., tion was limited to three to four times the number of vacancies. In the
policy framed on 7.3.1989 the Central Board made three modifications H

\
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A which were as follows :
(i) The minimum service in the previous grade/scale for being
eligible for promotion was raised to four years.

(ii) The maximum marks for interview and performance appraisal
B were refixed as 50 and 150 instead of 100 and 100 respectively.

(iii) The limitation of the zone of consideration was discontinued.

From 1986 onwards the system of writing of annual confidential
~
reports was substituted by a new appraisal system in which the appraisee
c got an opportunity of writing self appraisal. However, this new system was
not introduced throughout the Bank simultaneously but was completed
in a phased manner only in 1990.

The main contention of the petitioners was that it was unreasonable
D not to limit the zone of consideration to three to fqur times of the number ,_
of vacancies. It was further contended by the petitioners that the change
in the policy was completely arbitrary and without any reason; that the
guidelines dated 23.6.1986 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of
Finance under Regulation 17 of the Officers Service Regulations men-
tioned that the number of persons to be considered for promotion from
E one scale to another should normally be restricted to three or four times
the number of vacancies; that the promotion policy should not have been
in conflict with the said guidelines; that the change in policy in 1989 was
motivated with a view to benefiting respondents 4 and 5; that uniform
system of appraising the work was not followed in that in case of some
F employees annual confidential reports were considered and in case of
others assignment appraisal reports were considered which had caused '
prejudice to a section of the employees of the Bank; that with the change
in the eligibility norm to four years instead of the actual five/six service
there was a need for reducing the consideration of period of appraisal from
six years to four years; that as this had not been done the junior officers
G who were considered were at an advantageuus position because their
performance in Scale V as well as in the lower Scale IV was considered
whereas in the case of senior officers their performance in Scale V alone
was considered because they had rendered more than five to six years
service in that grade; that prescribing of 60 per cent marks for the
~
H interview as an eligibility craeria was arbitrary, unfair and unjust; and
ALL INDIA STATE BANK OFFICERS FEDERATION v. U.0.1. 259

that the percentage of marks in the viva voce examination should not have A
not more than 15 per cent.

Dismissing the petition, this Court

HELD : 1. Having a reasonable eligibility condition, as four years in
the present case, 8'ay become meaningless if all the eligible officers are not B
considered for promotion. By increasing the number of years from two to
four the field has been somewhat restricted and considering that selection
has to be made only on the basis of merit, it is not unreasonable to give
an opportunity to all the eligible officers to compete with each other and
for the best persons to be selected. Therefore, it cannot be held that the C
change of the policy brought by the Board in its meeting on 7.3.1989 in this
regard is in any way bad in law. [271-G-H]

Asliok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, [1985) 4 SCC 417; VJ.
Thomas & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 7 and S.B.
Mathur & Ors, v. Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, [1989] Supp. 1 SCC 34, D
held inapplicable.

2. There is nothing wrong if the bank devised a policy defining the
eligibility norms on a realistic basis and devised a system whereby the best
available talent would be chosen to man the critical positions. Keeping this
objective in view t~e changes in the promotion policy have been made. It
E
is always for the employer to see how to promote and utilise the best talent
available in the organisation. The promotion policy originally framed in
the year 1975 has been amended from time to time. The changes have now
been made in 1989 keeping in mind the requirement of the bank and based
on the experience of the bank in regard to making selection for promotion. F
The changes so made cannot be regarded as arbitrary and the Court
cannot sit in appeal and decide as to what is good for the institution. Under
the new policy the petitioners are also eligible for consideration and they
cannot have any grievance because certain persons who were eligible under
the old policy, but in practice were not considered for promotion, are now G
considered under the new policy. The object of the new policy seems to be
not only to redress the injustice to those officers resulting on account of
the difference between the rules and the practice but also with the object
of selecting the best talent for the top executive posts. [274-H; 275-A-C]

3. The guidelines in question have been issued by the Government H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A under the Regulations framed under the Banking Regulations Act, 1949
which Act does not apply to the State Bank of India. The said guidelines
dated 23.6.1986 are addressed to the Chief Executi•:es of twenty
nationalised banks and only a copy of the same was marked to the
Chairman of the respondent bank. Furthermore as far as State Bank of
India is concerned paragraph 17 of the State Bank of India Officers
B (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979 em·
powers the Central Board or the Executive Committee to lay down a policy
regarding promotion to all grades of officers in the Bank. The aforesaid
guidelines which have been issued expressly relate to the nationalised
banks, and not to the State Bank of India, and cannot be regarded as
c directions which are issued under Section 18 of the State Bank of India
Act, 1955 as was sought to be suggested by the petitioners. [272-C-F]

4.1. The modification was approved by the Chairman and all the
Directors who were present in the meeting of the Board. For an a!Iegation
of ma/a fide to succeed it must be conclusively shown that respondents 4
D and 5 wielded influence over all the members of the Board who were present
in the said meeting. No such allegation has been made. The decision to
modify the promotion policy was taken by a competent authority, namely,
the Central Board in a duly constituted meeting held on 7.3.1989 and it is
not possible to accept that this change in the policy was brought about
E solely with a view to help respondents 4 and 5. [274-C-D]

4.2. Moreover, the person against whom mala fides are alleged must
be made a party to the proceeding. The allegation that p.olicy was amended
with a view to benefit respondents 4 and 5 would amount to the petitioners
contending that the Board of Directors of the Bank sought to favour
F respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the proposal put before it.
Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who were present in the said
meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This being so the petitioners
cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of Mala fide. [274-E-F]

5. It is no doubt that in the case of some employees annual confiden·
G tial reports were considered and in the case of other employees assignment
appraisal reports were considered. However, this cannot be a gdod ground
for holding that the selection is vitiated. No particulars have been given in
the writ petition in order to show that the officers in whose case that annual
confidential reports were considered had suffered a disadvantage. Each
H report of an officer, whether an annual confidential report or assignment
ALL INDIA STATE BANK OFFICERS FEDERATION v. U.O.I. 261

appraisal report, bad to be considered on its own and the performance A
assessed. There is nothing to suggest that such assessment on the basis of
the annual confidential report or the assignment appraisal report could
not have been given. It is, therefore not possible to hold that the considera·
tion of two types of reports had resulted in any discrimination.
(275-G; 276-C-D-E]
B
6. The procedure of considering the assignments in respect of the
positions held during the past six years was in vogue even when the
eligibility criteria was two years which has how been revised to four years.
Furthermore even in the case of some senior officers the assignments would
cover a portion of their tenure as Scale IV officers. In considering such C
reports what has to be seen is whether the assignment targets which are set
have been satisfactorily met or not. It would not be very material as to in
which scale the officer was while adjudging this aspect. Normally in order
to assess the merit of an officer a period covering three assignments was
considered to be necessary. This being so six years annual assignment
reports had to be considered and such consideration could not be said to D
have caused any prejudice to any officer. This contention, therefore, is
without any substance. (277-F; G; HJ

7.1. There can be no rigid or hard and fast rule that the interview
marks can only be 15 per cent and no more. The percentage of marks for E
viva voce or interview which can be regarded as unreasonable will depend
on the facts of each case. What the interview or viva voce marks should be,
may vary from service to service and the office or position or the purpose
for which the interview is to be held. But the interview marks should not
be so high as to give an authority unchecked scope to manipulate or act
in an arbitrary manner while making selection. Where merit can be best F
judged by holding an interview there such marks may be high but each
case will have to be judged on its own facts. Interview marks may be the
minimal in such cases as relating to admission to a college. (278-B-C-D]

Periakarnpan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1971] 1SCC38 and Ajay Hasia G
v. Kalid Mujib Sehrawardi, (1981] 1 SCC 722, relied on.

7.2. In the present case, the interview marks represent only 25 per
cent of the aggregate, i.e. 200 marks. In order to be eligible a candidate is
required to obtain 60 per cent of these fifty marks. Considering the fact
that the selection has to be made for appointment to the top executive H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A cadre and keeping in view the job requirements and the nature of respon-
sibility the bank has raised the minimum qualifying percentage from 50
per cent to 60 per cent. At the same time the total number of interview
marks have been reduced from 100 to 50. Under the circumstances it
cannot be contended that exaggerated weightage has been given to the
marks to be obtained in the interview. [279-G-H; 280-A]
B
Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, [1981] 4 SCC 159; State of U.P. v.
Rafiquddin, [1987] Supp. SCC 401 and Mehmood Alam Tariq & Ors. v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1988] 3 SCC 241, relied on.

C 8.1. In the rejoinder affidavit the then President of the petitioner-
Federation deposed that in fact only V, an officer of the Bank had allotted
the marks on the individual promotion appraisal forms on the basis of
which a list of candidates was pr~pared by three members of the Screening
Committee. This Court directed the then President to verify on affidavit
D specifying the precise source of information from which the said allega-
tion was derived. This Court also warned that if the allegation was found •
false that also would have its own consequences. The then President filed
an additional affidavit deposing that he had derived the information from
V himself and another officer of the Bank. The Chief General Manager
(Personnel) of the Bank as well as the two officers, referred to in the said
E additional affidavit, filed their own affidavits, denying the said allegation.
Furthermore, the allegation was not substantiated by photo copies of the
appraisal forms of the promotees. In such circumstances, the said allega-
tion in the rejoinder affidavit of the then President of the petitioner-
Federation is absolutely false. [280-A]
F
8.2. The then President had alre;ldy "tendered an unqualified appol-
ogy" to this Court for some mis-statements made in an earlier affidavit.
This Court expressed its disapproval and anguish over that matter but did
not dismiss the petition in view of the offer of the respondent-Bank to
contest the case on merits. Since the then President had once again made
G false statements in his affidavit despite the said observations of this Court
he deserved to be prosecuted for having committed perjury. However, since
he is no longer the President of the Federation and considering that
prosecution may take further time, instead of directing him to be
prosecuted, this writ petition is dismissed with costs which are quantified
H at Rs. 20,000 of which Rs. 10,000 will be paid by him personally. [284-E-F]
ALLINDIASfATEBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.O.L [KIRPAL,J.) 263

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 507 of A
'1989.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)

', WITH
B
Writ Petition (C) No. 1260 of 1989.

Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

Rajinder Sachher, R. Vasudevan, D.S. Chauhan, K.D. Saini for
Lawyers Inn for the Petitioners. C
Dr. AF. Julian and A Mariarputham for the Petitioner.

Shanti Bhushan, Shanti Swamp Sharma, Sanjay Kapur, Rajiv Kapur,
AV. Rangam and A Ranganathan for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

- KIRPAL, J. The All India State Bank Officers Federation, which is
registered as a trade union of the officers of the State Bank of India
working throughout the country, is seeking to challenge a new promotional
policy framed by the respondent bank on 7th March, 1989 relating to the E
promotion from the post of Senior Management Grade Scale V to Top
Executive Grade Scale VI.

The respondent bank was established by the State Bank of India Act,
1955 (for short 'the Act') and according to Section 17 of the said Act its
Management is entrusted to the Central Board constituted under the Act. F
Under Section 43 of the said Act the Bank is empowered to appoint such
number of officers, advisers and employees as it considers necessary or
desirable for the efficient performance of its functions. Sub-section (1) of
Section 43 gives the bank the power to determine the terms and conditions
of the appointment of such persons. G
The bank framed State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service
Rules, 1975, in exercise of its powers under Section 43 of the Act. These
rules deal with various grades and scales of officers, conduct rules, salary,
seniority, promotion etc. Again, under Section 43 of the Act, the Central
Board of the bank framed the State Bank of India Officers (Determination H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order 1979 (hereinafter referred to
as 'DTCS Order'). This Order deal~ with various grades and scales of
officers, salary perquisites, appointments, probation, confirmation, promo-
tio~, age of retirement rules, terminal benefits etc. The grades and scales
of officers are as follow :
B "From 1.10.79 From 1.2.84
(consequent upon revision (consequent upon
of service conditions) wage revision)
c
Junior Management Grade I Junior Management Gr. I
and all officer Gr. II
c
Middle Management Middle Management
Grade Scale II Grade Scale II

Middle Management Middle Management
Grade Scale II.I Grade Scale III
D
Senior Management Senior Management
Grade Scale IV Grade Scale IV

Senior Management Senior Management
E Grade Scale IV-A Grade Scale V

Senior Management Top Executive Grade Scale VI
Grade Scale V Dy. General Manager

Top Executive Grade Scale Top Executive Grade Scale VII
F VI General Managers - General Managers

Top Executive Grade Scale Top Executive Grade Special
VII Chief General Managers Scale I-Chief General Managers

Top Executive Grade Special Top Executive Grade Special
G Scale I Dy. Managing Directors Seale II- Dy. Managing
Directors"

Paragraph 17 of the DTCS Order specifically deals with promotion
of staff and is as under :

H "Promotions to all grades of officers in the Bank shall be made
ALLINDIASTA1EBANKOFFICERSFEDERA110Nv. U.0.1. (KIRPAL,J.) 265

in accordance with the policy laid down by the Central Board or A
the Executive Committee from time to time."

In exercise of the powers under this paragraph the Central Board of
the Bank has, from time to time, been determining the policy for promotion
to various grades of scales of officers. The policy for promotion from
Senior Management Grade Scale V to Top Executive Grade Scale VI, with B
which we are concerned in the present petition, and Top Executive Grade
Scale VI to Top Executive Grade Scale VII was framed by the Central
Board in its meeting held on 28th November, 1975. Prior to 1975 the
promotion policy which was in force for promotion to Top Executive
Grade Scale VI and to Scale VII did not provide for any selection proce- c
dure. From 1975 onwards the Central Board approved a promotion policy
under which assignment appraisals and interviews were made the two
components of the selection procedure. Ac,cording to the petitioners zone
of consideration from amongst the eligible officers had been varying from
time to time. Generally the Bank had been following a ratio of 1 : 3 or 1 : D
4 between the number of vacancies and the number of candidates. The
Central Board at its meeting held on 8th June, 1982 approved a modifica-
tion in the promotion policy in terms of which officers with two years
service in Senior Management Grade Scale V were to be eligible for
promotion to Top Executive Grade Scale VI and officers with two years
service in Top Executive Grade Scale VI were to be eligible for promotion E
to Top Executive Grade Scale VII. It is an admitted fact that as the zone
of consideration was restricted to three to four times the number of
vacancies, the candidates who were actually considered for promotion to
Top Executive Grade Scale had put in a minimum five to six years of
service in Scale IV, even though the minimum eligibility condition was of
only two years service. F

- In its meeting held on 7th March, 1989, the Central Board of the
Bank made two modifications in the then existing policy which were as ·
follow:
G
(i) The eligibility criterion for consideration for promotion to Top
Executive Grade Scale VI was refixed at four years service in the previous

-· grade/scale, instead of the existing two years service.

(ii) Previously evaluation of the eligible officers was done by allot-
ment of marks on the performance appraisal and interview. An aggregate H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A of 200 marks were being allotted; 100 marks used to be allotted for
performance appraisal and another 100 marks for interview. The qualifying
marks both for performance appraisal and interview were 60 per cent. Now
as a result of the modification made on 7th March, 1989 out of the
aggregate of 200 marks, 150 marks were now allotted for performance
B appraisal (in lieu of the earlier 100 marks) and 50 marks (in lieu of the
earlier 100 marks) had been allotted for interview. The qualifying marks
for performance appraisal had been changed from 60 per cent to 80 per
cent, while the qualifying marks for interview remained unaltered at 60 per
cent.

C The manner in which the performance has been appraised has also
undergone a change from time to time. Since long there had been in force
a system of writing annual confidential reports. Since 1974 or 1975 a system
of assignment appraisal was also introduced by the bank. In the year 1986,
according to the petitioners, the bank brought about further change in the
D system of performance appraisal. The old system of writing of annual
confidential reports was substituted by a new and more open and par-
ticipatary appraisal system. According to the writ petition in this new
system the appraisee got an opportunity of writing self appraisal. However,
this new system was not introduced throughout the bank simultaneously.
The old system of recording of annual confidential reports remained in
E position till that was gradually replaced by the self appraisal system. We
were informed that now since 1990 the system invoked is ortly that of self
appraisal and the old system of writing annual confidential reports no
longer exists.

The writ petition has been filed challenging the aforesaid modifica-
F
tion in the promotion policy which was approved by the Central Board in
its meeting held on 7th March, 1989. There are various grounds of attack
to the resolution approving the new promotion policy. It is also the case of
the petitioners that the manner in which the process of promotion has been
undertaken was defective.
G
The main thrust of arguments of Mr. Rajindar Sachar, learned senior
counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, was that it was unreasonable
not to limit the zone of consideration to three to four times the number of
vacancies. As a result of the new policy, it was submitted, a much larger
H number of relatively junior officers have been considered and promoted.
ALLINDIASfA'IEBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.O.I. (KIRPAL,J.] 267

In order to show that injustice had been done to senior eligible officers, as A
a result of the change in the policy, our attention was drawn to the
following statement with regard to the filling up of 58 vacancies in Scale
VII on selection made in 1989 :

No. of officers No. of officers No. of
who qualified who qualified officers B
with 70% marks with 60% marks promot
in the past in the interview ed
.performance
Total number of
officers considered c
under the impugned
policy and belonging to 270 104 58
the 1982, 1983 1984
and left over of earlier
batches. D
498
Number of officers
belonging to the 1982
and left over of earlier
102 62 16
batches out of the total E
of 498 officers
considered.
212

The contention on behalf of the petitioners was that eligible candidates p
after the 1982 batch should not have been considered and if the zone of
consideration had been limited to three to four times then the filed of
choice would have been restricted and only those officers who were in
Scale V in the year 1982 or earlier would have been considered and
promoted. In support of his contention that doing away with the zone of
consideration was not reasonable, reliance was placed on the decision of G
this Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, [1985) 4
sec 417.
Ashok Kumar Yadav's case was concerned with the recruitments
made by the Haryana Public Service Commission to 61 posts in Haryana H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Civil Service (Executive) and other allied services. The relevant rules
provided that a competitive examination was to be held consisting of
written examination in different papers having an aggregate of 700 marks
ahd a vive voce examination carrying 200 marks. The rules, inter alia,
further provided that no candidate was eligible to appear in the vive voce
B test unless he obtained 45 per cent marks in aggregate in all the subjects.
In response to the said advertisement 6000 candidates applied and ap-
peared for the written examination and out of these over 1300 secured 45
per cent marks and had thus qualified for being called for the interview or
the vive voce examination. Though originally the recruitment was only for
C 61 posts but during the time when the selection process was under way a
total number of 119 posts became available. The Haryana Public Service
Commission invited all the 1300 and odd candidates who had qualified for
the viva voce test and the interview lasted for almost half a year. On the
basis of the total marks obtained in the written examination as well as viva
voce test 119 candidates were selected and recommended by the Commis-
D sion to the State Government. Some of the candidates who were not
selected filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court
challenging the said selection. Five of the selected candidates, including
Ashok Kumar, were impleaded as respondents.

E The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition and
held that the Haryana Public Service Commission should not have called
for interview all the candidates who had obtained more than 45 per cent
marks in the written examination and the number of candidates to be called
for interview should not have exceeded twice or thrice the number of
vacancies required to be filled. This was one of the grounds on which the
F
selection of Ashok Kumar and other candidates was quashed. Thereupon
appeals were filed by Ashok Kumar Yadav and the State of Haryana. Their
appeal was allowed by this Court and the selection made by the Haryana
Public Service Commission was upheld. While dealing with the submissions
relating to the Haryana Public Service Commission calling the 1300 and
G odd candidates for viva voce test, who had secured 45 per cent or more
marks in the written examination for only 61 seats, it was observed by this
Court that merely because minimum qualification for eligibility to appear
at the viva voce test for a candidate was to obtain at least 45 per cent marks
in the aggregate in the written examination the Haryana Public Service
H Comn1ission was under no obligation to call for viva voce test all the
ALLlNDIASTAIBBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.0.1. [KIRPAL,J.) 269

. candidates who satisfied the minimum eligibility requirements. It was open A
to the Commission to call for viva voce test a limited number of candidates
who figured at the top of the list. After referring to Kothari Committee's
Report on "Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods for the Civil Service
Examination" at page 447 it was observed as follows :

"We are therefore of the view that where there is a composite test
B
consisting of a written examination followed by a viva voce test,
the number of candidates to be called for interview in order of the
marks obtained in the written examination, should not exceed twice
or at the highest, thrice the number of vacancies to be filled. The
Haryana Public Service Commission in the present case called for C
interview all candidates numbering over 1300 who satisfied the
minimum eligibility requirement by securing a minimum of 45%
marks in the written examination and this was certainly not right,
but we may point out that in doing so, the Haryana Public Service
Commission could not be said to be actuated by any mala fide or D
oblique motive, because it was common ground between the par-
ties that this was the practice which was being consistently followed
by the Haryana Public Service Commission over the years and what
was done in this case was nothing exceptional."
E
Relying upon the aforesaid passage it was strongly contended by Mr.
Sachar that the policy of 7th March, 1989 which did away with the concept
of zone of consideration was clearly contrary lo the aforesaid observations
of this Court in As/wk Kumar Yadav's case.

In our opinion Aslzok Kumar Yadav's case can be of no assistance to
F
the petitioners. It is no doubt true that this Court did make the aforesaid
observation that the number of candidates to be called for interview should
not exceed twice or at the highest thrice the number of vacancies to be
filled. Nevertheless after making this observation the Court posed a ques-
tion as to "whether this had any invalidating effect on the selections made G
by the Haryana Public Service Commission". The answer to this was
provided in the subsequent paragraph in the following words "We do not
think that the selection made by the Haryana Public Service Commission
could be said to be vitiated merely on the ground that as many as 1300 and
more candidates representing more than twenty times the number of H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996} SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A available vacancies were called for mterview, though on the view taken by
us that was not the right course to follow and not more than twice or at
the highest thrice the number of candidates shoulcl have been called for
the interview. Something more than merely calling an unduly large number
of candidates for interview must be shown in order to invalidate the
B selections made."

It is clear from the aforesaid that this Court 'Vas of the opinion that
while it was desirable that the number of candidates who were called for
viva voce examination should not be unduly large but it did not agree with
the conclusion of the High Court that calling large number of candidates
C invalidated the selection. In other words not having a restricted zone of
consideration was not regarded as illegal or bad in law. An unduly large
number of candidates to be intervie~ed may make it impossible to carry
out a satisfactory viva voce test and the interview may tend to be casual,
superficial or sloppy. The above quoted observations are only words of
D caution lest the viva voce test be reduced to farce. Notwithstanding the fact
that the Court did not approve of a large number of candidates being called
for interview, nevertheless the selections so made by the Haryana Public
Service Commission were not invalidated by this Court and the judgment
of the High Court was set aside and tl!e selection made was upheld.
E
Whereas in As/wk Kumar Yadav's case for 61 vacancies, which were
originally notified, 1300 and 9dd candidates were called for viva voce
examination and this Court held that this was not invalid, in the present
case for 58 vacancies only 498 eligible officers were considered for promo-
tion. Applying the ratio of decision of As/wk Kumar Yadav's case to the
F facts of the present case it cannot be said that the policy of considering all
the eligible officers for promotion, without having a restricted zone of
consideration is in any way bad in law. In fact in this manner no eligible
officer can have a grievance, which may be legitimate, that he was not
considered even though he was eligible.
G
Our attention was also drawn to the case of V.J. Thomas and Ors. v.
Union of India and Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 7. The decision in this case has
no application here because there the Court was concerned with a case
where it was held that if the vacancies were few, and the candidates were "'
H disproportionately large in number, department could make a classification
AU...INDIASfA1EBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.0.1. (K.IRPAL,J.] 271

amongst eligible candidates on the basis of their lenght of experience so as A
to restrict the examination only for those having longer service leaving
others to appear in the next examination. Similarly the decision in S.B.
Mathur and Ors. v. Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and Ors., [1989] Supp.
1 SCC 34 holding that the zone of consideration or field of choice can be
limited to a multiple of number of vacancies, on the basis of seniority, has B
no application to the point in issue here. In fact the Court referred to the
decision in Ashok Kumar Yadav's case (supra) and, in principle to the
observation on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Sachar, and in was
observed at page 51 para 19 as under :

"The Bench however, went on to hold that, in its view, merely C
because the Haryana Public Service Commission had called all the
1300 candidates who obtained 45 per cent or more marks in the
written examination to appear in the interview that did not in-
validate the selection made. This decision points out that the
minimmn eligibility qualification has to be kept distinct from the D
-zone of consideration and even if there are a large number of
candidates who satisfy the minimum eligibility requirement it is not
always required that they should be included in the zone of
consideration, it being open to the authority concerned to restrict
the zone of considera!ion amongst the eligible candidates in any E
reasonable manner."

Our attention has not been drawn to any decision or observation of
this Court which has taken a contrary view. Having a reasonable eligibility
condition, as four years in the present case, may become meaningless if all
the eligible officers are not considered for promotion. By increasing the F
numbers of years from two to four the field has been somewhat restricted
and considering that selection has to be made only on the basis of merit,
it is not unreasonable to give an opportunity to all the eligible officers to
compete with each other and for the best persons to be selected. Moreover,
this case relates to in-service promotion while Ashok Kumar Yadav was a G
case of direct recruitment. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the
petitioners that the charge of the policy brought by the Board in its meeting
on 7th March, 1989 in this regard is in any way bad in law.

It was then contended that on 23rd June, 1986 the Government of
India, Ministry of Finance, had issued guidelines under Regulation 17 of H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the Officers Service Regulation. In the said guidelines it was mentioned
that the number of persons to be considered for promotion from one scale
to another should normally be restricted to three to four times the numbers
of vacancies for which the promotions are being considered. The modifica-
tion on 7th March, 1989 in the promotion policy, it was submitted, should
not have been done in a way which was in conflid with the said guidelines
B and, therefore, doing away with the zone of consideration was not war-
ranted.

We do not find any merit in this contention, for more reasons than
one. Firstly, these guidelines have been issued by the Government under
C the Regulations framed under the Banking Regulations Act, which Act
does not apply to the State Bank of India. The said letter of 23rd June,
1986, enclosing the guidelines, is addressed to the Chief Executives of
twenty nationalised banks and only a Copy of the same was marked to the
Chairman of the respondent bank. As far as the State Bank of India is
D concerned the central Government can issue directions under Section 18
of the State Bank of India Act, 1955 and no directions in this behalf have
been issued. Furthermore as far as State Bank of India is concerned
paragraph 17 of the DTCS Order of 1979, which has been quoted earlier,
empowers the Central Board or the Executive Committee to lay down a
policy regarding promotions to all grades of officers in the Bank. The
E aforesaid guidelines which have be~n issued expressly relate to the
nationalised banks, and not to the State Bank of India, and cannot be
regarded as directions which are issued under Section 18 of the State Bank
of India Act, as was sought to be suggested by the counsel for the
petitioners.
F
It was then contended by Mr. Sachar that the change in the policy
in 1989 was motivated with a view to benefit respondents 4 and 5. .The
allegation in the writ petition in this regard was that respondent No. 4 was
working as Chief Officer (Industrial Relations) in the central office of the
bank and was of 1984 batch officer in scale IV. Respondent No. 5 was also
G a scale V officer of 1983 batch and was working as Private Secretary to the
Chairman of the Bank at Central Office, Bombay. It was alleged that on
account of the positions so held they wielded a lot of power in determining
the personal policies of the bank. These respondents, it was alleged,
succeeded in getting some imaginary hardships of junior scale IV officers
H highlighted in the conference of Chief General Managers held in January,
ALLINDlASfATEBANKOFFICERSl<".EDERATIONv. U.0.1. [KIRPAL,J.] 273

1988. In proof of the influence which respondents 4 and 5 had, it was A
submitted· that the memorandum dated 2nd March, 1989 containing the
proposal for the amendment in the promotion policy was not included as
an agenda item of the meeting of the Central Board which was to be held
on 7th March, 1989, and was not circulated in advance. This memorandum
was presented before the Boai;d as a table item and the Chairman, it was B
contended, ought not to have allowed the introduction of this memoran-
dum without its being included as a regular item on the agenda.

The allegations relating to mala ft.des so made in the writ petition
have been denied in the affidavit failed on behalf of the respondent bank.
It has been explained therein that the Chief General Managers and other C
top ex:!wtives are concerned with the development of human resources.
As such, all po!icy matters, before being formulated, are discussed with
Chief General Managers at an appropriate forum. It is after such a con-
ference was held that various suggestions and views had emerged. They
were examined by a group headed by a Senior Managing Director and D
other !'eni.or functionaries. A report submitted by the group was then
examin.?d by the Central Management Committee of the bank which
decided that the recommendations of the Cadre Management Group,
relating to promotions to Top Executive Grade Scale VI and VII, be
accepted and shuuld be implemented from the current year itself. This
decision was taken by the Central Management Committee in late E
February, 1939. As certain vacancies in these Scales VI and VII: d been
identified, the Central Management Committee felt that these positions
should be fitted up as early as possible so that important positions in the
bank do not remain vacant. On 2Jd March, 1989 the Deputy Managing
Director (Pc,rsonnel and Systems) prepared and signed a memorandum F
seeking the approval of the Central Board of the said policy. A meeting of
the Central Board had already been fixed for 7th March, 1989 and the next
meeting was expected to be held after one and a half on two months. With
a view to t;xpedite the consideration of the change in the policy the Deputy
Managing Director sent the memorandum to the Managing Director and
the Chairman. The Chairman and the Managing Director agreed that the G
memorandum be put to the Central Board at its meeting to be held on 7th
March, 1989. By that time the usual agenda items fixed earlier for the
Central Board meeting had already been circulated. It was in these cir-
cumstances that the item was placed as a table item at the Central Board
meeting held on 7th March, 1989 with the consent of the Chairman and H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the Directors who were present at the meeting. It was also denied that the
policy had been modified wit~ a vi~w to help respondents 4 and 5. Allega-
tions of mala fides were denied.

In view of the aforesaid explanation of the respondent bank, which
we see no re~son to disbelieve, it is clear that the petitioners have made
B baseless and reckless allegations of mala fide. Respondents 4 and 5 ob-
viously had no direct or indirect wle to play either in the formulation of
the policy or in the memorandum being placed as a table item to be taken
up for consideration in the meeting held on 7th March, 1989. The modifica-
. tion was approved by the Chairman and all the Directors who were present
C in the meeting of the Board. For an allegation of mala fide to succeed it
must be conclusively shown that respondents 4 and 5 wielded influence
over all the members of the Board who were present in the said meeting.
No such allegation has been made. The decision to modify the promotion
policy was taken by a competent authority, namely, the Central Board in a
D duly constituted meeting held on 7th March, 1989 and we are unable to
accept that this charge in the policy was brought about solely with a view
to help respondents 4 and 5.

There is yet another reason why this contention of the petitioners
must fail. It is now settled law that the person against whom ma/a fides are
E alleged must be made a party to the proceeding. The allegation that the
policy was amended with a view to benefit respondents 4 and 5 would
amount to the petitioners contending that the Board of Directors of the
Bank sought to favour respondents 4 and 5 and, therefore, agreed to the
proposal put before it. Neither the Chairman nor the Directors, who
F present in the said meeting, have been impleaded as respondents. This
being so the petitioners cannot be allowed to raise the allegations of mala
fide, which allegations, in fact, are without merit.

It was also submitted that the change in the Policy was completely
arbitrary and without any reason. We are unable to accept this contention.
G The respondent bank is a business organisation and it must identify the
best available talent in the organisation for.holding challenging assignments
in the top executive grades. There is nothing wrong if the bank devised a
policy defining the eligibility norms on a realistic basis and devised a system
whereby the best available talent would be chosen to man the critical
H positions. Keeping this objective in view the changes in the promotion
ALLINDIASTATEBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.0.1 [KIRPAL,J.) 275

policy have been made. It is always for the employer to see how to promote A
and utilise the best 'talent available in the organisation. The promotion
policy originally framed in the year 1975 has been amended from time to
time. The changes have now been made in 1989 keeping in mind the
requirement of the bank and based on the experience of the bank in regard
to making selection for promotion. The changes so made cannot be
B
regarded as arbitrary and the Court cannot sit in appeal and decide as to
what is good for the institution. Under, the new policy the petitioners are
also eligible for consideration and they cannot have any grievance because
certain persons who were eligible under the old policy, but in practice were
not considered for promotion, are now considered under the new policy.
The object of the new policy seems to be not only to redress the injustice c
to those officers resulting on account of the difference between the rules
and the practice but also with the object of selecting the best talent for the
top executive posts.

It was next contended that a uniform system of appraising the work D
was not followed which has caused prejudice to a section of the employees
of the bank. Prior to April 1986 appraisal used to be on the basis of the
annual confidential reports. With effect from April, 1986 a new system
known as annual appraisal system was introduced. Under the new system
the appraisal report states with the writing by 1.n employee himself, which
is called self appraisal. It is then forwarded to the superior authorities who E
record their own remarks on the performance of the employee concerned.
At already noticed this self appraisal system was not applicable in respect
of all the candidates. The comparative merit was assessed by taking into
consideration the annual confideRtial reports in the case of some
employees and the new performance appraisal reports in the case of others. F
Alleging that this has caused prejudice to those employees whose annual
confidential reports were considered the submission made was that the
procedure so adopted was discriminating.

It is no doubt true that in the case of some employees annual
confidential reports were considered and in the case of other employees G
assignment appraisal reports were considered. In our opinion, however,
this cannot be a good ground for holding that the selection is vitiated.
Firstly, no particulars have been given is the writ petition in order to show
that officers in whose case the annual confidential reports were con~idered
and suffered a disadvantage. If the petitioners were serious in raising this H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A contention they would have given particulars as to how many of the 58
officers who were selected were those in whose case annual confidential
reports were considered and how many were those in whose case the
assignment appraisal reports were considered. In the absence of this basic
fact it cannot be presumed thatthe section of the employees whose annual .
confidential reports were considered had suffered a disadvantage. Further-
B more confronted with the situation whether the performance of the officer ·
was recorded in two different types of reports the managements had, as of
necessity, to consider the same and evaluate them. Even though the assign-
ment appraisal reporting system may be an improvement in the existing
system of writing annual confidential reports, the performance of the
c officer concerned could have been determined from the annual confiden-
tial reports. In fact this was being done before the gradual introduction of
appraisal reporting system. Each report of an officer, whether an annual
confidential report or assignment appraisal report, had to. be considered
on its own and the performance assessed. It is only if they received 70 per
D cent marks on the basis of this assessment that they were eligible for being
called for the interview. There is nothing to suggest that such assessment,
and assignment of marks, on the basis of the annual confidential report on
the assignment appraisal report could not have been given. it is, therefore,
not possible to hold that the consideration of two types of reports had
resulted in any discrimination.
E

F

ln reply the respondent bank in its affidavit has explained as follows: ~

"So far as assignment appraisal are eoncerned the assignment in
respect of positions held during the past 6 years are assessed
H irrespective of the posts held. This has been followed even under
AILINDIASfA1EBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.0.1. (KIRPAL,J.] 277

the pre-revised promotion policy, i.e., when eligibility criterion was A
2 years of same continued even when officers were considered after
516 years. For the impugned promotion as well the same thing has
been followed. There was no need to reduce the period of assign-
ment. Appraisal to be considered from 6 years to 4 years. It is
reiterated that the Annual Confidential reports for 5 years and B
Assignment Appraisal for 6 years irrespective of the assignment
held have been uniformly assessed in respect of officers. Since 5
years Annual Confidential Reports were to be considered, reports
starting from as on 31.12.84 to 31.12.88 on thereafter were con-
sidered in respect of all officers. As such, even in respect of an
officer in Senior Management Grade Scale V of 1.8.84 batch C
reports as Scale V have only been assessed. So far as the Assign-
ment Appraisal Reports are concerned, it is submitted that, an
assignment covers generally a period of two to three years. Since
the last 6 years assignment appraisal is taken into consideration,
the oldest assignment will relate to the year 1983 assignment would D
normally cover a period commencing from 1980-81: Thus even in
respect of a 1.8.82 batch Scale V officer, assignment could and
would cover a portion of his assignment as Scale IV officer. Thus
the contention that respondent Nos. 4 and 5 (or other Scale V
offic~rs of 1.8.83 and 1.8.84 batches) have got any special ad-
vantages are not well founded." E

The aforesaid explanation clearly shows that the procedure of con-
sidering the assignments in respect of the positions held during ~e past six
years was in vogue even when the eligibility criteria was two years which
has now been revised to four years. Furthermore even in the ca~e of some F
senior officers the assignments would cover a portion of their tenure as
Scale IV officers. In considering such reports what has to be seen is
whether the assignment targets which are set have been satisfactqrily met
or not. It would not be very material as to in which scale the officer was
while adjudging this aspect. It was submitted by Mr. Shanti Bhushan,
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that each assignment G
covers two years. Normally in order to assess the merit of an officer a
period covering three assignments was considered to be necessary.. This
being so six years annual assignment reports had to be considered and we
do not find that such consideration could have caused any prejudice to any
officer. This contention, therefore, is without any substance. H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A It was also contended that prescribing of 60 per· cent marks for the
interview as an eligibility criteria was arbitrary, unfair and unjust. It was
further submitted that the percentage of marks in viva voce examination
should not have been more than 15 per cent.

We do not find any merit in this contention. There can be no rigid
B
or hard and fast rule that the interview marks can only be 15 per cent and
no more. The percentage of marks for viva voce or interview which can be
regarded as unreasonable will depend on.the facts of each case. Decisions
of this Court show that no rigid rule, relating to percentage of marks for
interview of general universal application can .or has been laid down. What
c the interview on viva voce marks should be may vary from service to service
and the office or position or the purpose for which the interview is to be
held. But the interview marks should not be so high as to give an authority
unchecked scope to manipulate or act in an arbitrary manner while making
selection. Where merit can be best judged by holding an interview there
D such marks may be high but each case will have to be judged on its own
facts. Interview marks may be the minimal in such cases as relating to
admission to a college as held by this Court in Periakarnpan v. State of
Tamil Nadu, [1971] 1 SCC 38 and Ajay Rasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehrawardi,
[1981] 1 SCC 722. In Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, [1981] 4 SCC 159 this
Court, on the other hand, held that in some cases relating to recruitment
E from amongst persons of matured personality holding of an interview may
be the only way subject to basic and essential requirements being satisfied.
The following observations in this regard made in Lila Dhar's case are very
apposite:

F "There are of course, many services to which recruitment is made
from younger candidates whose personalities are on the threshold
of development and who show signs of great promise, and the
discerning may in an interview test, catch a glimse of the future
personality. It the case of such services, where sound selection must
combine academic ability with personality promise, some weight
G has to be given, though not much too great a weight, to the
interview test. There cannot be any rule of thumb regarding the
precise weight to be given. It must vary from service to service
according to the requirements of the service, the minimum
qualifications prescribed, the age group from which the selection
H is to be made, the body to which the task of holding the interview
ALL INDIA SfAIB BANK OFFICERS FEDERATION v. U.0.1. (KIRPAL, J.) 279

testis proposed to be entrusted and a host of other factors. It is A
a matter for determination by experts. It is a matter for research.
It is not for courts to pronounce upon it unless exaggerated weight
has been given with proven or obvious oblique motives. The
Kothari Committee also suggested that in view of the obvious
importance of the subject, it may be examined in detail by the
B
Research Unit of the Union Public Service Commission. (emphasis
supplied)"

Again in the State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin Ors., [1987) Supp. SCC 401
dealing with a case relating to U.P. Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules,
1951 the prescription of 35 per cent qualifying minimum marks for viva C
voce test was upheld. In this connection it was observed that if any
minimum marks either in the written test or in viva voce test are fixed by
the Public Service Commission so as to determine the suitability of a
candidate the same has to be respected.

It is not necessary to multiply the number of cases in this regard D
except to notice the decision of this Court in Mehmood Alam Taliq and
Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1988] 3 SCC 241. This case related to
recruitment by the Public Service Commission to certain branches of
service under the State by a scheme of competitive examination. The
Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court had declared the rules which E
required that a candidate must secure a minimum of 33 per cent of the
marks prescribed for the viva voce examination as being unconstitutional.
While allowing the appeal arising from the said judgment this Court held
that considering the nature of the services for which the recruitment was
to be made the provision in the rules requiring the candidate to obtain a
minimum of 33 per cent of marks in viva voce test could not be regarded F
as bad in law.

Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions in this case we find that
the interview marks represent only 25 per cent of the aggregate, i.e., 200
marks. In order to be eligible a candidate is required to obtain 60 per cent G
of these fifty marks. Considering the fact that the selection has to be made
for appointment to the top executive cadre and keeping in view the job
requirements and the nature of responsibility the bank has raised ti~~
minimum qualifying percentage from 50 per cent to 60 per cent. At the
same time the total number of interview marks have been reduced from
100 to 50. Under the circumstances it cannot be contended that exag- H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A gerated \\'~ight has been given to the marks to be obtained in the interview.

As already noticed the process of selection contemplates the assess-
ment of the annuai reports. In the rejoinded affidavit filed by one Sh. Urned
Singh, the then President of the petitioner Federation, it was conteded as
follows:
B
"In fact iri the impugned promotions only one person Shri V.K.
Mehrotra, General Manager has allotted marks on the individual
(
promotion appraisal forms. A list of candidates was prepared and
the marks allotted by Shri Mehrotra were copied and then the list
was got signed by the three Deputy Managing Directors. This can
c be ascertained form the records itself."

In view of the aforesaid averment this Court in its order dated 27th
July, 1990 noted that this was a very serious allegation and as the Court
did not firid from the affidavit the basis on which this allegation was made,
D it directed Sh. Urned Singh "to verify on affidavit this allegation and to state
specifically whether the allegations have been made on his personal
knowledge or on the basis of information believed to be true and the preuse
(sic) source of the information from whom the information was derived will
have to be specifically stated as otherwise credence whatever can be given
to allegation of this type. If the allegation is to be found false that also will
E have its own consequences." By this order the Court also required that the
file containing the photo copies of the appraisal records of all the persons
promoted should be tendered in the Registry and the same was required .
to be kept by the Registrar in a sealed cover.

F ·Pursuant to the aforesaid order a further affidavit dated 10th August,
1990 was filed in this Court by Sh. Urned Singh. In paragraph 2 of this
affidavit he stated that the averments made by him in his rejoinder affidavit
were based on the information derived by him from Sh. V.K. Mehrotra and
one Sh. R.P. Rastogi, the then Deputy General Manager, Central Office,
Bombay. Elaborating this it was stated that the deponent had met Sh. V.K.
G Mehrotra in the room of the P.A. to the General Manager (Planning), State.
Bank of India, New Delhi on or around 28th April, 1989. It is at that time
Sh. V.K. Mehrotra is alleged to have informed Sh. Urned Sing that he had
been called by the Central Office in connection with the awarding of marks
for promotion appraisals. It was further stated in this affidavit of Sh. Urned
H Singh that Sh. R.P. Rastogi had told him that marks on the individual
ALLINDIASTAIBBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIONv. U.0.1. [KIRPAL,J.J 281

promotion appraisal forms were awarded by Sh. V.K. Mehrotra and the A
statement of marks in respect of various candidates was signed by the
Screening Committee comprising of the three Deputy Managing Directors.

In response to the aforesaid additional affidavit of Sh. Urned Singh
a counter affidavit dated 12th October, 1990 of Sh. M.N. Sheorey, Chief
General Manager (Personnel) of the respondent bank was filed. In this B
affidavit Sh. Sheorey stated that Sh. Umed Singh was incorrect in stating
that Sh. V.K. Mehrotra had allotted marks on individual appraisal forms.
Explaining the procedure which was actually followed Sh. Sheorey, in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of this affidavit observed as follows :

''That in March 1989 an office order to the following effect had
c
been issued by the Chairman of the State Bank of India which is
being set out hereunder :

"As per the extant procedure, the recommendations received
from the Circles and Central Office departments, for promo- D
tion to Top Executive Grade Scale, VI and VII are processed
by Personnel Department, as per the laid down norms.
Thereafter, the officers who fulfil the norms are called for
interview. From the current year, it is proposed to have a
second stage screening of all these reports after they are E
processed by the Personnel Department. The list of the offi-
cials to be interviewed will be finalised thereafter. The com-
mittee comprising Shri B. Gupta, Deputy Managing Director
(OSD), Shri M.C. Sharma, Dy. Managing Director (Agricul-
ture & Rural Banking), and Shri B.K. Mazmudar, Deputy
Managing Director (Personnel & Systems) will be the mem- F
hers of the Screening Committee. The necessary secretarial
support will be provided by the Chief General Manager
(Personnel & HRD)."

Each and every promotion appraisal form was scrutinised by the
Screening Committee consisting of 3 Deputy Managing Directors G
and it was the Screening Committee which used to finally deter-
mine the marks to be given to different officers in respect of each
promotion appraisal form. What the deponent as Chief General
Manager (Personnel and HRD), since redesignated as Chief
General Manager (Personnel), did was to provide assistance to the H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A deliberations of the Screening Committee. The final marksheet was
accordingly signed by all the 3 members of the Screening Commit-
tee.

It is submited that, I, as Chief General Manager, Personnel and
HRD, in view of about 500 candidates' appraisal forms being
B involved, had taken assistance in arranging/processing the papers
from Shri R.P. Rastogi who was the Dy. General Manager (Per-
sonnel Administration) as also Shri V.K. Mehrotra·who had earlier
been the Chief Officer (presently known as Dy. General Manager)
of Personnel Administration Dept. before putting them up to the
c Screening Committee."

Along with this an, affidavit of Sh. V.K. Mehrotra was also filed where,
while referring to the earlier statement of Sh. Urned Singh alleging that Sh.
V.K. Mehrotra had allotted marks on the individual promotion appraisal
forms, it was categorically stated that the said statement was absolutely
D false. Sh. R.P. Rastogi, another officer mentioned in the affidavit of Sh.
Urned Singh, has also filed an affidavit in this connection in which he has
stated as follows :

"Mr. Urned Singh never asked me at any time any question relating
E to the processing of the promotion papers nor told me anything
as to what Mehrotra told him. These allegations are pure figments
of deponent's imagination. With regard to furt~er allegation that
I told the deponent that while marks on the individual promotion
forms were awarded by Shri V.K. Mehrotra these were copied in
a separate paper and signed by three Deputy Managing Directors,
F firstly. I never told anything to Mr. Urned Singh and secondly the
second fact itself is not true."

The photo copies of the documents including the appraisal forms
which have been filed in Court have also been examined by us. No docu-
G ment in these two volumes which have been filed has been shown to us to
be in the handwriting of Sh. V.K. Mehrotra. In other words the documents
so filed do not show that Sh. V.K. Mehrotra had any role, as alleged, to
play in awarding marks on the individual appraisal forms. Furthermore the
affidavits filed by Mr: Sheorey, Sh. Mehrotra and Sh. Rastogi clearly belie
the allegations made by Sh. Urned Singh in his rejoind.er affidavit. There
H is no reason as to why the affidavits filed by these senior officers of the
ALLINDIASTAlEBANKOFFICERSFEDERATIUNv. U.0.I. [KIRPAL,J.J 283

bank should be di~believed. This is more so when we find that the allega- A
tion with regard to Sh. Mehrotra has been made at a late stage. The writ
petition was filed in this Court on 21st April, 1.989. The alleged conversa-
tion between Sh. Urned Singh and Sh. V.K. Mehrotra is stated to have
taken place on or about 28th April, 1989. It is not till the filing of the
rejoinder affidavit on 23rd October, 1989 that an allegation regarding B
alleged conversation with Sh. V.K. Mehrotra was made in this Court. If
such a conversation, as alleged, had taken place one would have expected
the petitioners to approach the Court at the earliest either with a view to
amend the writ petition or to file an additional affidavit making allegations
raised in the rejoinder affidavit and thereby giving an opportunity to the
respondents to file the reply. This conduct of Sh. Urned Singh shows that C
the bald allegation regarding Sh. V.K. Mehrotra assigning the marks, as
contained in the rejoinder affidavit, is an afterthought. We have, therefore,
no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the averments made by Sh.
Urned Singh in his rejoinder affidavit of 23:td October, 1989 and the further
affidavit of 10th August 1990 with regard to Sh. V.K. Mehrotra are ab-
solutely false. While on this subject it will be pertinent to note that the D
respondents in their counter affidavit had taken an objection to the effect
that the writ petition should be dismissed because the petitioners had
suppressed certain material facts from this Court and had also tried to
abuse the process of the Court, attention of the Bench of this Court was
drawn to the affidavits of Sh. Urned Singh which had been filed in this case. E
In the order dated 16th April, 1990, the Bench went into the question as
to whether some of the statements made in the writ petition as well as in
the affidavit are correct or not. It also took note of an affidavit filed by Sh.
Urned Singh in which he had purported to "tender an unqualified appol-
ogy." for some mis-statements made in an earlier affidavit. Ultimately the
Bench came to the conclusion that "apart from mis-statements in the F
affidavit filed before this Court, the petitioner Federation has clearly
resorted to tactics which can only be described as abuse of the process of
the Court." The Bench also further expressed its anguish in the following
words:

"We have set out the facts in this case at some length and passed G
a detailed order because we are deeply grieved to come across
such conduct on the part of an association, which claims to repre-
sent high placed officers of a premier bank of this country. One
expects such officers to fight their battles fairly and squarely and
not to stoop low to gain, what can only be, temporary victories by H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A keeping away material facts from the Court. It is common
knowledge that, of late, statements are being made in petitio~s and
affidavits recklessly and without proper verification not to speak
of dishonest and deliberate mis-statements. We, therefore, take
this opportunity to record our strong and emphatic disapproval of
the conduct of the petitioners in this case and hope that this will
B be a lesson to the present petitioner as well as to other litigants
and that atleast in future people will act more truthfully and with
a greater sense of responsibility."

The petition was not dismissed on account of mis-statements and suppres-
c sion of material facts because of the concession made by the counsel for
the bank that he was appearing for a public sector undertaking and was
prepared to contest the petition on merits and that the preliminary objec-
tion was primarily intended to bring to the notice of the court the conduct
of the petitioners in this regard.

D It is indeed unfortunate that despite the aforesaid observations made
by the Bench in its order dated 16th April, 1990, Sh. Urned Singh has not
batted an eye lid and has, once again made false statements in his affidavit
dated 10th August, 1990. Normally we would have ordered the prosecution
of Sh. Urned Singh for having committed perjury. We are, however, in-
E formed that he is no longer the President of the Federation and considering
that prosecution may take further time, it will not be practical to initiate
such proceedings in this connection ~t this stage.

For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition is dismissed with costs
which are quantified at Rs. 20,000 of which Rs. 10,000 will be paid by Sh.
F Urned Singh personally.

Writ Petition No. 1260 of 1989

For the reasons stated in the judgment in writ petition No. 507 of
G 1989, this writ petition is also dismissed.
v.s.s. Petitions dismissed.