ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIANversusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 208
- Decided
- 8 May 2012
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- A K PATNAIK
Holding
A conviction based on a sole trustworthy eyewitness, corroborated by other evidence, and on the admissible portion of a confession that led to the recovery of the weapon, is valid under Indian law.
Summary
Alagupandi was convicted for murdering his step‑mother Tamilarasi. The prosecution relied on the testimony of the deceased's brother (PW‑1), corroborative statements of other witnesses, forensic evidence linking the accused's blood to the crime scene, and a confession that led to the recovery of the knife. The appellant challenged the reliability of PW‑1 as an interested witness, the admissibility of the confession, and the absence of child witness testimony. The Supreme Court held that a sole eyewitness can form the basis of conviction if his testimony is trustworthy, reliable and corroborated by other evidence, and that only the part of the confession that led to the recovery of the weapon is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Court affirmed the lower courts' findings, noting that motive, while relevant, is not essential, and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- The credibility and admissibility of the testimony of PW‑1, a relative of the deceased, as a sole eyewitness.
- The admissibility of the accused's confession under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the lack of recorded testimony from child witnesses warrants a retrial.
- Whether the circumstantial and forensic evidence sufficiently proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- The relevance of motive in establishing the accused's guilt.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2012] 4 S.C.R. 342
A ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN
v.
STATE OF TAMIL NADU
(Criminal Appeal No. 1315 of 2009)
MAY 8, 2012
B
[A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
c s.302 - Accused committing murder of his step mother
- Conviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded by
trial court, affirmed by High Court - Held: The prosecution
case is to a very limited extent, based upon circumstantial
evidence and largely there exists ocular and documentary
evidence to support the prosecution case - The evidence of
0
the brother of the deceased, whose presence in the house was
natural, supported by evidence of t,·,e witnesses, medical
evidence, the recovery weapon of crime made on disclosure
statement of accused, the serological reports and the motive
E for the crime, lead to the irresistible conclusion that the
accused had committed the crime - The concurrent findings
of fact recorded by the courts below based on proper
appreciation of evidence clearly prove the guilt of the accused
- In the circumstances, there is no reason to interfere with the
finding of guilt as well as the order of sentence -
F Circumstantial evidence.
Criminal Law:
Motive - Existence of a motive for committing a crime
G is not an absolute requirement of law but it is always a relevant
factor, which will be taken into consideration by the courts as
it will render assistance to the courts while analysing the
prosecution evidence and determining the guilt of the
accused.
H 342
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 343
TAMIL NADU
Evidence Act, 1872: A
s. 27 - Disclosure statement of accused while in police
custody leading to recovery of weapon of crime - Accused
a/so stating that he stabbed her step mother - Held: Except
the part of the disclosure statement of the accused which led
8
to the recovery of the knife, the rest of the statement of the
accused would be inadmissible in evidence as per s. 27.
Evidence:
Evidence of sole witness - Held: Court can record a c
finding of guilt while entirely or substantially relying upon the
statement of the sole witness, provided his statement is
trustworthy, reliable and finds corroboration from other
prosecution evidence.
Witnesses: D
Child witnesses - Stated to have seen their mother being
murdered - Trial court after putting certain questions to them,
did not permit recording of their statements - Held: It has not
been claimed by either party that these two child witnesses E
should have been examined and that their non-examination
has caused any prejudice to any of the parties in the appeal.
RELATED WITNESS - Evidence of deceased's brother -
Every witness, who is related to the deceased cannot be said F
to be an interested witness who will depose falsely to implicate
the accused - In the instant case, the presence of the witness
at the house of his sister is natural - His evidence is worthy
of credence.
The appellant was prosecuted for committing the G
murder of his step-mother. The prosecution case was
that the deceased, after the death of her husband and
father of the accused, was enjoying the properties left by
him and collecting the rent from the properties, and
because of this there used to be quarrels between her H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A and the accused; that on the night of the incident, when
the deceased was sleeping with her two sons, the
accused entered the house with a knife and caused
injuries to her which resulted in her death on the spot;
that P.W.1, the brother of the deceased, who was sleeping
B outside the house, heard the screams of the victim and
when he entered the house, he saw the accused coming
out with a knife in his hand. He found his sister lying in a
pool of blood. He went to the village headman and also
to the Sarpanch. He was directed to go to the police
c station where he lodged the FIR. The accused also made
a confessional statement on the basis of which the
weapon of crime, viz., a blood stained knife and a blood
stained shirt were recovered. The trial court convicted the
accused u/s 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life. The High Court upheld the conviction and the
0
sentence.
In the instant appeal filed by the accused, it was
contended for the appellant that P.W.1 being the
interested witness and himself an accused in another
E murder case, his evidence should not have been relied
upon by the courts below; and that there was no
corroboration to the statement of PW1, a number of
witnesses had turned hostile and there existed serious
doubt as to the presence of PW1 at the place of
F occurrence.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. According to PW-1 and as per the case
of the prosecution, the occurrence had taken place after
G 12 a.m./midnight on 13/14.1.2002. The FIR was registered
at 0130 hrs. on 14.1.2002. The presence of PW1 at the
house of his sister can hardly be doubted. He saw the
accused running away after stabbing his sister and met
the Sarpanch of the village and then the Police Officer
H within a short period of· occurrence, which facts have
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 345
TAMIL NADU
been proved from the evidence on record. Keeping in A
view the close relationship between the parties, there is
no reason to disbelieve PW-1 in this regard. In fact any
suggestion of this kind was not even put to him in the
cross-examination on behalf of the accused. [para 9-10]
[352-E-H; 353-C-D] B
1.2. PW-1 also stated that on hearing the noise, the
neighbors 'RM', 'R', 'M', 'P' and 'MT' also reached the
place of occurrence. 'RM' and 'M' had not been examined
while 'R', examined as PW-4, and 'MT' as PW-2, were C
declared hostile. 'P' was examined as PW-3 and he stated
that he was living near the house of the deceased who
had cried loudly and then he went and saw that some
people had come there and the deceased was bleeding
from her injuries. The police had come and they collected D
the earth from the spot and he signed Exts. P-4 and P-5.
Nothing adverse came on record in the cross-
examination of this witness. PW-3, thus, has not only
supported the case of prosecution, but even provided
due corroboration to the statement of PW-1. [para 11-13]
[353-D-G] E
1.3. When the accused was taken into custody, he
made a statement on 17.1.2002 and narrated the complete
history of his family and about his bitter relationship with
the deceased. He stated that he had stabbed the F
deceased. He also made a disclosure statement upon
which the weapon of crime, i.e. the knife, M.0.6, was
recovered.Except the part of the disclosure statement of
the accused which led to the recovery of the knife, the
rest of the statement of the accused would be G
inadmissible in evidence as per s. 27 of the Evidence Act,
1872. The courts, relying upon the admissible part of the
statement of the accused, held that the recovery of knife
had been effected in accordance with law. [para 13,14 and
20] [353-G; 354-A-B-D; 362-F]
H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 2.1. It is incorrect to say that PW1 is the sole and
interested witness and, therefore, his statement cannot
be relied upon by the court for returning the finding of
conviction. It is a settled principle of law that the court
can record a finding of guilt while entirely or substantially
s relying upon the statement of the sole witness, provided
his statement is trustworthy, reliable and finds
corroboration from other prosecution evidence. The
statement of PW1 inspires confidence and is truthful and
reliable. His statement does not suffer from any material
c contradictions. On the other hand, it gives a correct
version of what this witness saw. He did not claim to have
witnessed the scene of stabbing of the deceased by the
accused. He only stated that the crime was witnessed by
the two minor children of the deceased and he had
merely seen the accused running out from the house of
0
the deceased with a knife in his hand. Where a sole
witness has stated exactly what he had actually seen and
the said statement otherwise fits into the case of the
prosecution and is trustworthy, the court normally would
E not be inclined to reject the statement of such witness.
[para 16-17] [356-B-D; 358-8-0]
Govindaraju @ Govinda v. State of Sriramapuram P. S.
& Anr., 2012 (4) sec 722 - relied on.
F 2.2. It also cannot be said that the statement of PW-
1 cannot be relied upon for the ground that he is an
interested witness. The presence of PW1 at the house of
his sister is natural. He was working as a cleaner and was
staying with his sister in the same village. He was
G sleeping outside the house of the deceased and went
towards the house upon hearing her screams. Every
witness, who is related to the deceased cannot be said
to be an interested witness who will depose falsely _to
implicate the accused. In the instant case, the accused
is also related to PW1 and there could be no reason for
H
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 347
TAMIL NADU
PW1 to falsely implicate him. The statement of PW1 is A
worthy of credence. [para 17-18] [358-E-G]
Mano Dutt & Anr. v. State of UP. 2012 (4) SCC 79 -
relied on.
3.1. Importantly, the injuries found on the person of B
the deceased have been recorded in the post-mortem
report Ext. P.12 by PW-14, the doctor who conducted the
post-mortem upon the body of the deceased. He opined
that the deceased would have died due to shock and
haemorrhage because of the injuries sustained by her. C
According to him, he had found multiple injuries on the
person of the deceased and that too, at the vital parts as
noted in the post-mortem report. This clearly shows that
the accused had come to the house of the deceased with
the definite intention to kill her, and by inflicting the D
multiple injuries on vital parts of her body, ensured that
she died instantaneously. [para 4, 14 and 19] (351-B-C;
354-D; 361-F-G; 362-A-B]
3.2. There appears dual motive for the accused to E
commit the crime. Firstly, the deceased was his step-
mother, whose behaviour towards him was not
acceptable to the accused. Secondly, the entire
properties left by the father of the accused and husband
of the deceased, were being enjoyed by the deceased
herself. Existence of a motive for committing a crime is F
not an absolute requirement of law but it is always a
relevant factor, which will be taken into consideration by
the courts as it will render assistance to the courts while
analysing the prosecution evidence and determining the
guilt of the accused. (para 19] (362-8-E] G
3.3. Further, it has come in evidence in the statement
of the Investigating Officer, PW-16, that the blood-stained
earth was collected from the place of occurrence and was
subsequently sent for chemical examination to the H
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A Forensic Science Laboratory. According to PW-16, the
accused took the police to the place where he got
recovered the bloodstained knife M.0.6, and the
bloodstained shirt worn by him, M.0.7, hidden in the
bushes. They were sent to the Regional Forensic
B Science Laboratory. The serological report, Ext. P-9, with
regard to M0-7 (the shirt) showed that it contained human
blood of group 'A'. It has come in evidence that the blood
group of the deceased was 'A'. The same blood group
was also found on the saree, jacket and gunny bag which
C were seized by the Investigating Officer from the place of
occurrence. This clearly connects the accused with the
commission of crime. This is a very material and
significant piece of evidence and was put to the accused
during his statement u/s 313 CrPC, but except vague
denial, he said nothing more. This is clinching evidence
0
against the accused which fully supports the case of the
prosecution. [para 22-23] [363-B-F]
3.4. The prosecution case is, to a very limited extent,
based upon circumstantial evidence and largely there
E exists ocular and documentary evidence. The statement
of PW1 supported by the statements of PW-11, PW 16,
PW6, PW14 and the recovery of the weapon of crime as
per Ext M.O. 6, upon disclosure statement of the accused,
as well as the report of the chemical examination and the
F serology report, Exts.8 and 9, respectively, complete the
chain of event and clearly establish the material facts that
lead to the irresistible conclusion that the accused had
committed the murder of his step-mother. The concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the courts below, based
G upon proper appreciation of evidence clearly prove the
guilt of the accused. In these circumstances, there is no
reason to interfere with the finding of guilt as well as the
order of sentence. [para 15, 20, 27 and 28) [355-H; 356-
A; 362-F; 364-H; 365-A-B]
H
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 349
TAMIL NADU
4. PW-7 and PW-8 are said to be child witnesses who A
had seen the occurrence. They are sons of the deceased.
When they appeared before the trial court, it put certain
questions to them to form an opinion whether they would
be able to depose, and did not permit recording of their
statements. Legality or correctness of this direction of the B
trial court was not questioned either by the State or by
the accused in their appeal before the High Court and
even before this Court. It has not been claimed by either
party that these two child witnesses should have been
examined and that their non-examination has caused any c
prejudice to any of the parties in the appeal. [para 23, 24
25-26) (363-F-G; 364-E-F]
Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997)
5 SCC 341 and Panchhi v. State of U.P. 1998 (1) Suppl.
SCR 40 = (1998) 7 SCC 177 - referred to. D
Case Law Reference:
2012 (4) sec 122 relied on Para 16
2012 (4) sec 79 relied on Para 18
E
(1997) s sec 341 referred to para 23
1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 40 referred to para 23
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 1315 of 2009. F
From the Judgment & Order dated 28.02.2007 of the High
Court of Madras, Madurai Bench in Criminal Appeal (MD) No.
47 of 2004.
B. Sridhar for the Appellant. G
B. Balaji, M. Anbalagan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. The present appeal is
directed against the judgment of the Madras High Court, H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A Madurai Bench dated 28th February, 2007, affirming the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 19th July,
2004 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai holding
the accused/appellant guilty of an offence under Section 302
IPC and awarding sentence of life imprisonment and also to
B pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for one year.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of the appeal can be
stated as follows:-
C Tamilarasi, the deceased, was the second wife of one
Karuppaiah. After the death of her husband, she was residing
at Sikkandarchavadi and was enjoying the properties left by her
deceased husband and collecting the rent from the properties.
Accused Alagupandi is the son of Karuppaiah, from his first
wife. Accused, after the death of his father, used to demand
0
money from his step mother for which there used to be quarrel
between them.
3. On the midnight of 13th/ 14th January, 2002, when the
deceased was sleeping with her two sons namely Prabakaran,
E PW7, and Vinothkumar, PW8, the accused entered into the
house with a knife and caused injuries on her stomach, chest
and thigh. Because of this assault, Tamilarasi died on the spot.
4. PW-1, P. Selvaraj, is the brother of the deceased and
lived at Theni Village. He was staying with the deceased (his
F sister) and was working as a cleaner in the lorry. On the fateful
day, he was sleeping on a rock stone outside the house when
he heard the distressing cry of his sister. When he went inside
the house, he saw the accused coming out of the house with a
knife in his hand. The accused ran towards the western side.
G Thereupon, he went inside the house and saw his sister lying
in a pool of blood. PW-1 then proceeded to the village
headman and also to the village Panchayat President. Then,
he was directed to go to the police station. He went to the
police station, gave the complaint Ext. P-1 to Sub-Inspector of
H Police, PW-11. On the basis of this complaint, the Police
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 351
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
registered a case being Cr. No. 6/2002 under Section 448 and A
302 IPC. The FIR Ext. P-10 was registered and sent to the
Court. The Inspector of Police, PW-16 took up the investigation
and proceeded to the scene of occurrence, made investigations
in presence of the witnesses, prepared the Observation
Mahazar Ext. P-4 and sketch, Ext. P-15. Thereafter, the dead B
body was sent for autopsy. Dr. Alavudeen, PW-14 attached to
the Government Hospital, conducted the post mortem upon the
body of the deceased and gave the post mortem report, Ext.
P-12, wherein he opined that the deceased would have died
due to shock and haemorrhage because of injuries sustained c
by her. Upon his arrest, the accused also made a confessional
statement in presence of the witnesses vide Ext. P-17. On the
basis of this statement, M.0.6., knife and M.0.7., blood stained
shirt were also recovered vide Ext. P-18. All the material objects
were sent for chemical examination by the forensic department
0
which issued two certificates, Exts. P-8 and P-9, the chemical
examination report and the Serological report, respectively.
5. It may be noticed at this stage itself that PW-7 and PW-
8, the two minor children of the deceased had seen the incident,
but their examination was not permitted by the trial court as is E
evident from the judgment of the trial court and the evidence
produced before the Court.
6. The accused was committed to the Court of Sessions
for trial under Sections 448 and 302 IPC and finally vide F
judgment dated 19th July, 2004, he was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment and fine, as afore-noticed.
7. Upon appeal preferred by the accused, the High Court
sustained the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the
appeal of the accused vide its judgment dated 28th February, G
2007, giving rise to the present appeal.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
contended that :-
H
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A (a) PW-1 is the sole witness on whose statement the
courts have returned the finding of conviction
against the accused. PW-1 being an interested
witness and himself being an accused in another
murder case, it is not safe to rely upon the
B statement of such witness as, it is neither reliable
nor truthful. Thus, the judgment of conviction is liable
to be set aside.
{b) The courts below have failed to appreciate the
evidence in its correct perspective. The prosecution
c has not been able to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt. A number of witnesses had
turned hostile and there is no corroboration to the
statement of PW-1. Even the confessional
statement recorded by the police is inadmissible.
D There exists serious doubt as to the very presence
of PW-1 at the place of occurrence. Resultantly, the
appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
9. First and foremost, we may deal with the contention as
E to the presence of PW-1 at the place of occurrence and whether
the statement of the said witness is reliable and can form the
basis of conviction of the accused. According to PW-1 and as
per the case of the prosecution, the occurrence had taken
place after 12 a.m./midnight on 13th/14th January, 2002. The
F FIR, Ext. P-·10 was registered on the basis of the statement of
PW-1. As per the details given in the said Exhibit, it was
registered at 0130 hrs. on 14th January, 2002. Thus, at best,
there is nearly one hour gap between the time of occurrence
and registration of the FIR. The presence of PW1 at the house
of his sister can hardly be doubted. If PW1 was not present
G there, then it could not have been possible for him to see the
accused running away after stabbing his sister and also he
could not have met the Sarpanch of the village and then the
Police Officer within a short period of occurrence, which facts
have been proved from the evidence placed on record. PW-1
H
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 353
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
stated the entire facts before PW-11, the Sub-Inspector, A
whereupon the FIR was registered. According to PW-1, he was
staying at the house of his sister and was working as a cleaner
in a lorry. Keeping in view the close relationship between the
parties, we do not see any reason to disbelieve PW-1 in this
regard. Firstly, there is no delay in lodging the FIR and even the B
delay of 1 and 1Y:z hour is fully explained by the conduct of PW-
1.
10. As far as his presence at the place of occurrence is
concerned, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has C
not been able to refer to any evidence that could create even a
reasonable doubt as to the presence of PW-1 at the place of
occurrence. In fact when PW-1 was cross-examined by the
accused, any suggestion of this kind was not even put to him
in the cross-examination.
D
11. PW-1 also stated that on hearing the noise, he ran
towards the house of his sister and thereupon the neighbors
Rajammal, Radha, Murugan, Palanimuthu and Muthaiah had
also come there. It is correct that Rajammal and Murugan had
not been examined by the police, while Radha, PW-4 and E
Muthaiah, PW-2 did not speak favorably for the prosecution and
were declared hostile with the leave of the court.
12. Palanimuthu, was examined as PW-3 and he stated
that he was living near the house of Tamilarasi, the deceased. F
She had cried loudly and then he went and saw that some
people had come there and the deceased was bleeding from
her injuries. The police had come and they collected the earth
from the spot and he signed Exts. P-4 and P-5.
13. Nothing adverse came on record in the cross- G
examination of this witness. PW-3, thus, has not only supported
the case of prosecution, but even provided due corroboration
to the statement of PW-1. When accused was taken into
custody, he made a statement on 17th January, 2002 and stated
that when he was five years old, there was a quarrel between H
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A his mother and father and his father had brought him to
Sikkandarchandi. When he was 10 years old, his father
contracted a second marriage with the deceased. He stated
the complete history of his family and about his bitter
relationship with the deceased. He also stated that he had
stabbed the deceased. Then, he proceeded to say that he had
8
hidden the knife with which he had committed the offence on
the side of the local tank situated at Sikkandarchavadi and he
could get the same recovered. In furtherance to this statement,
the knife, M.0.6, was recovered. Out of the witnesses to this
C confession statement, one attesting witness, P.Rajendran, was
not examined, however, the other witness M. Solaimuthu, was
examined as PW-15.
14. The courts, relying upon the admissible part of the
statement of the accused, held that the recovery of knife had
D been effected in accordance with law. Importantly, we may
notice the injuries found on the person of the deceased by Dr.
Alavudeen PW-14, who conducted the post-mortem upon the
body of the deceased. The injuries on the person of the
deceased were described by the said witness as follows:-
E
"1. An oblique stab wound on left breast 5 cm below
and medical to the left nipple 3 cm x 1 cm. both ends
pointed with regular margine. On dissection the
wound passes obliquely backwards and upwards
and inwards, piercing the underlying intercostals
F
muscles, vessels and nerves and left ventricle 2 cm
x 0.5 cm entering into cavity.
2. An oblique stab wound on left hyppchondrium 5 cm
below the left costal margin 4 cm x 1 cm x entering
G into abdominal cavity through which the loops of
small bowel found protruding out. Both ends pointed
with regular margin. On dissection the wound
passes obliquely, backwards and inwards.
3. An oblique stab wound 3 cm x 1 cm x entering into
H
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 355
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
abdominal cavity on the right side of upper A
abdomen 4 cm below the right costal margin
through which loops of small bowel found protruding
out, both ends pointed with regular margins. On
dissection the wound passes obliquely downwards,
backwards and medially. B
4. A vertical oblique stab wound 3 cm x 1 cm on the
outer aspect of the left thigh 13 cm from left anterior
superior liiac spine. Both ends pointed, margins
regular. On dissection the wound passes
backwards, medially and upwards, piercing the C
underlying muscles, nerves and vessels and ends
as a point.
5. An oblique stab wound on the back of left side of
abdomen 3 cm above the left ilisc crest 3 cm x 1 D
cm. both ends pointed with regular margins. On
dissection: the wound passes upwards, forwards
and medially piercing the underlying tissues,
entering the peritoneal cavity.
E
6. An oblique out injury on the back of left forearm 6
cm above the wrist 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep cutting
the underlying muscles, vessels, nerves and bones.
7. An oblique out injury on the front of left forearm 10
cm above the wrist 8 cm x 2 cm x bone deep cutting F
the underlying muscles, vessels, nerves and bones.
8. An oblique out injury on front of left forearm, 3 cm
below injury No. 7 - 8 cm x 2 cm x bone deep
cutting the underlying muscles, vessels and nerves." G
15. The case of the prosecution clearly indicates that the
present case is, to a very limited extent, based upon
circumstantial evidence and largely there exists ocular and
documentary evidence to support the case of the prosecution.
H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 4 S.C.R.
A The statements of PW1, PW6, PW14 as well as the report of
the chemical examination and the serology report, Exts.8 and
9, respectively, clearly establish the material facts that lead to
the irresistible conclusion that the accused had committed the
murder of his step-mother, Tamilarasi.
B
16. We are not impressed with the contention that PW1
is the sole and interested witness and, therefore, his statement
cannot be relied upon by the. Court for returning the finding of
conviction. It is a settled principle of law that the Court can
record a finding of guilt while, entirely or substantially, relying
C upon the statement of the sole witness, provided his statement
is trustworthy, reliable and finds corroboration from other
prosecution evidence. In the case of Govindaraju@ Govinda
v. State of Sriramapuram P.S. & Anr., [Crl. Appeal No. 984 of
2007 decided on March 15, 2012], this Court held as under:
D
"11. Now, we come to the second submission raised on
behalf of the appellant that the material witness has not
been examined and the reliance cannot be placed upon
the sole testimony of the police witness (eye-witness). It
E i::. a settled proposition of law of evidence that it is not the
number of witnesses that matters but it is the substance.
It is also not necessary to examine a large number of
witnesses if the prosecution can bring home the guilt of the
accused even with a limited number of witnesses. In the
case of Lal/u Manjhi and Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand
F
(2003) 2 SCC 401, this Court had classified the oral
testimony of the witnesses into three categories:-
a. Wholly reliable;
G b. Wholly unreliable; and
c. Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
12. In the third category of witnesses, the Court has to be
cautious and see if the statement of such witness is
H corroborated, either by the other witnesses or by other
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 357
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
documentary or expert evidence. Equally well settled is the A
proposition of law that where there is a sole witness to the
incident, his evidence has to be accepted with caution and
after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by
other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The
evidence of a sole witness should be cogent, reliable and B
must essentially fit into the chain of events that have been
stated by the prosecution. When the prosecution relies
upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness, then such
evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy.
Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be c
doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict
with the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such
a statement as a foundation of the conviction of the
accused. These are the few principles which the Court has
stated consistently and with certainty. Reference in this
0
regard can be made to the cases of Joseph v. State of
Kera/a (2003) 1 SCC 465 and Tika Ram v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (2007) 15 SCC 760. Even in the case
of Jhapsa Kabari and Others v. State of Bihar (2001) 10
SCC 94, this Court took the view that if the presence of a
witness is doubtful, it becomes a case of conviction based E
on the testimony of a solitary witness. There is, however,
no bar in basing the conviction on the testimony of a solitary
witness so long as the said witness is reliable and
trustworthy.
F
13. In the case of Jhapsa Kabari (supra), this Court noted
the fact that simply because one of the witnesses (a 14
years old boy) did not name the wife of the deceased in
the fardbayan, it would not in any way affect the testimony
of the eye-witness i.e. the wife of the deceased, who had G
given graphic account of the attack on her husband and
her brother-in-law by the accused persons. Where the
statement of an eye-witness is found to be reliable,
trustworthy and consistent with the course of events, the
conviction can be based on her sole testimony. There is H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 4 S.C.R.
A no bar in basing the conviction of an accused on the
testimony of a solitary witness as long as the said witness
is reliable and trustworthy."
17. In view of the settled position of law, we find that the
statement of PW1 inspires confidence and is truthful and
8
reliable. His statement does not suffer from any material
contradictions. On the other hand, it gives a correct eye-version
of what this witness saw. If PW1 intended to lie, nothing
prevented him from saying that he was also an eye-witness to
the scene of stabbing of the deceased by the accused. He only
C stated that this crime was witnessed by the two minor children
of the deceased and he had merely seen the accused running
out from the house of the deceased with a knife in his hand.
Where a sole witness has stated exactly what he had actually
seen and the said statement otherwise fits into the case of the
D prosecution and is trustworthy, the Court normally would not be
inclined to reject the statement of such sole witness.
Furthermore, it is contended that the statement of PW-1 cannot
be relied upon by the Court also for the ground that he is an
interested witness. This argument is equally without merit. The
E presence of PW1 at the house of his sister is natural. He was
working as a cleaner and was staying with his sister in the
same village. He was sleeping outside the house of the
deceased and went towards the house upon hearing her
screams. Every witness, who is related to the deceased cannot
F be said to be an interested witness who will depose falsely to
implicate the accused. In the present case, the accused is also
related to PW1 and there could be no reason for PW1 to falsely
implicate the accused.
G 18. We have already discussed that the statement of PW1
is worthy of credence. In the case of Mano Dutt & Anr. v. State
of UP. [Crl. Appeal No. 77 of 2007 decided on 29th February,
2012], a Bench of this Court held that it is not the quantity but
the quality of the evidence which would bring success to the
case of the prosecution or give benefit of doubt to the accused.
H
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 359
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Statement of every related witness cannot, as a matter of rule, A
be rejected by the Courts. This court, in the aforesaid case, held
as under:
"19. Another contention raised on behalf of the accused/
appellants is that only family members of the deceased
B
were examined as witnesses and they being interested
witnesses cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the
prosecution did not examine any independent witnesses
and, therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish its
case beyond reasonable doubt. This argument is again
without much substance. Firstly, there is no bar in law in C
examining family members, or any other person, as
witnesses. More often than not, in such cases involving
family members of both sides, it is a member of the family
or a friend who comes to rescue the injured. Those alone
are the people who take the risk of sustaining injuries by D
jumping into such a quarrel and trying to defuse the crisis.
Besides, when the statement of witnesses, who are
relatives, or are parties known to the affected party, is
credible, reliable, trustworthy, admissible in accordance
with the law and corroborated by other witnesses or E
documentary evidence of the prosecution, there would
hardly be any reason for the Court to reject such evidence
merely on the ground that the witness was family member
or interested witness or person known to the affected party.
There can be cases where it would be but inevitable to F
examine such witnesses, because, as the events
occurred, they were the natural or the only eye witness
available to give the complete version of the incident. In
this regard, we may refer to the judgments of this Court,
in the case of Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, [(2007) G
14 SCC 150]. This Court drew a clear distinction between
a chance witness and a natural witness. Both these
witnesses have io be relied upon subject to their evidence
being trustworthy and admissible in accordance with the
law. This Court, in the said judgment, held as under: H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A "28. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that
Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of
witnesses. Neither the legislature (Section 134 of
the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates
that there must be particular number of witnesses
B to record an order of conviction against the
accused. Our legal system has always laid
emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence
rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of
witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court
c to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and
record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the
accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses
if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.
The bald contention that no conviction can be
recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness, therefore,
D
has no force and must be negatived.
29. It was then contended that the only eyewitness,
PW 6 Sopan was none other than the son of the
deceased. He was, therefore, "highly interested"
E witness and his deposition should, therefore, be
discarded as it has not been corroborated in
material particulars by other witnesses. We are
unable to uphold the contention. In our judgment, a
witness who is a relative of the deceased or victim
F of a crime cannot be characterised as "interested".
The term "interested" postulates that the witness
has some direct or indirect "interest" in having the
accused somehow or the other convicted due to
animus or for some other oblique motive."
G
20. It will be useful to make a reference of another judgment
of this Court, in the case of Satbir Singh & Ors. v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, [(2009) 13 SCC 790], where this Court
held as under:
H "26. It is now a well-settled principle of law that only
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 361
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
because the witnesses are not independent ones A
may not by itself be a ground to discard the
prosecution case. If the prosecution case has been
supported by the witnesses and no cogent reason
has been shown to discredit their statements, a
judgment of conviction can certainly be based B
thereupon. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, at
least Dhum Singh (PW 7) is an independent
witness. He had no animus against the accused.
False implication of the accused at his hand had
not been suggested, far less established." c
21. Again in a very recent judgment in the case of Balraje
@ Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC 673],
this Court stated that when the eye-witnesses are stated
to be interested and inimically disposed towards the
accused, it has to be noted that it would not be proper to D
conclude that they would shield the real culprit and rope in
innocent persons. The truth or otherwise of the evidence
has to be weighed pragmatically. The Court would be
required to analyse the evidence of related witnesses and
those witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the E
accused. But if after careful analysis and scrutiny of their
evidence, the version given by the witnesses appears to
be clear, cogent and credible, there is no reason to
discard the same."
F
19. It will now be appropriate to refer to the statement of
PW14, the doctor, who performed the autopsy upon the body
of the deceased. According to this witness, he had found
multiple injuries on the person of the deceased and that too, at
the vital parts. We have already noticed the injuries caused, in G
some detail. The accused inflicted injury on the breast of the
deceased wherein it pierced into the left ventricle of the heart.
Another stab injury was caused by him on the left side of the
rib through which the samall intestine had protruded out. Still,
another injury was caused on the right side of the rib through H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A which also the small intestine had come out. This is besides
the injuries he caused on the left hip, wrist and stomach of the
deceased. This clearly shows that the deceased had come to
the house of the deceased with the definite intention to kill her.
The accused, by inflicting these multiple injuries on vital parts
B of her body, ensured that she died instantaneously. There
appears dual motive for the accused to commit the crime.
Firstly, the deceased was his step-mother, whose behaviour
towards him was not acceptable to the accused. Secondly, the
entire properties left by the father of the accused and husband
c of the deceased, were being enjoyed by the deceased herself.
Furthermore, every time the accused had to ask for money from
the deceased and more often than not, she refused to give him
the money. These circumstances emerging from the record
clearly show reason for some kind of animosity and ill-will on
the part of the accused towards the deceased. Existence of a
0
motive for committing a crime is not an absolute requirement
of law but it is always a relevant factor, which will be taken into
consideration by the courts as it will render assistance to the
courts while analysing the prosecution evidence and
E determining the guilt of the accused.
20. Statement of PW1, supported by the statements of
PW11, PW6, PW14 and the recovery of the weapon of crime
vide Exhibit M.0. 6, upon disclosure statement of the accused,
completes the chain of events as stated in the case of the
F prosecution. Except the part of the disclosure statement of the
accused which led to the recovery of the said knife, the rest of
the statement of the accused would be inadmissible in evidence
as per Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
G 21. Still, there is another very vital aspect of the case of
the prosecution on which the discussion is necessary. It has
come in evidence in the statement of the Investigating Officer,
PW-16, the Sub-Inspector who recorded the complaint of PW-
1, PW-11 and the witness to the recovery, PW-6 that blood-
stained earth was collected from the place of occurrence and
H
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 363
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
was subsequently sent for chemical examination to the Forensic A
Science Laboratory.
22. According to PW-16, after the arrest of the accused,
the accused had taken the police to Sikkandarchavadi where
he got recovered the wooden-handled bloodstained knife
B
M.0.6, and the bloodstained shirt worn by him, M.0.7, hidden
in the bushes. They were taken into custody by the Investigating
Officer in presence of the attesting witnesses. The recovered
items, along with blood stained blue, green and white check
shirt which the accused was wearing at the time of commission C
of offence, were sent to the Director, Regional Forensic
Science Laboratory, Madurai for examination vide Ext. P-7. The
serological report, Ext. P-9, was submitted to the Court by the
laboratory. This report provided the result of M0-7 (the said
shirt) at serial No.8 of the report. As per the report, it contained
human blood of group 'A'. It has come in evidence that the D
blood group of the deceased was 'A'. The same blood group
was also found on the saree, jacket and gunny bag which were
seized by the Investigating Officer from the place of occurrence.
This clearly connects the accused with the commission of crime.
This is a very material and significant piece of evidence and E
was put to the accused during his statement under Section 313
CrPC, but except vague denial, the accused said nothing more.
23. This is clinching evidence against the accused which
fully supports the case of the prosecution. PW-7 and PW-8 are F
said to be child witnesses who had seen the occurrence. They
are sons of the deceased. When they appeared before the
Court, the Court put certain questions to both these witnesses
to form an opinion whether they would be able to depose. It
granted the permission to PW-7, but his statement was not G
recorded. The Court declined permission for examining PW-
8. As such, the statement of both these witnesses was not
recorded. It is a settled principle of law that a child witness can
be a competent witness provided statement of such witness is
reliable, truthful and is corroborated by other prosecution
H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A evidence. The Court in such circumstances can safely rely upon
the statement of a child witness and it can form the basis for
conviction as well. Further, the evidence of a child witness and
credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of
each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in
s mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that
the witness must be reliable one and his/her demeanour must
be like any other competent witness and that there exists no
likelihood of being tutored. There is no rule or practice that in
every case the evidence of such a witness be corroborated by
C other evidence before a conviction can be allowed to stand but
as a rule of prudence the Court always finds it desirable to seek
corroboration to such evidence from other reliable evidence
placed on record. Further, it is not the law that if a witness is a
child, his evidence shall be rejected, even if it is found reliable.
(Ref. Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra [(1997)
0
5 SCC 341] and Panchhi v. State of UP. [(1998) 7 SCC 177].
24. This aspect of the case need not detain us any further,
inasmuch as the Trial Court did not permit recording of
statement of these witnesses being child witnesses. Legality
E or correctness of this direction of the Trial Court was not
questioned either by the State or by the accused in their appeal
before the High Court and even before this Court.
25. No arguments have been addressed even before us
F by either party that these two child witnesses should have been
examined and that it has caused any prejudice to any of the
parties in the present appeal.
26. According to PW-1, these children had seen the
accused murdering their mother. Despite this statement if these
G witnesses have not been examined and parties have not raised
any objection in that regard, we see no reason to record any
findings on this aspect of the case.
27. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts
H below, based upon proper appreciation of evidence clearly
ALAGUPANDI @ ALAGUPANDIAN v. STATE OF 365
TAMIL NADU [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
prove the guilt of the accused. The statement of PW-1 is fully A
corroborated by other witnesses, expert evidence and the
medical evidence.
28. In these circumstances, we see no reason to interfere
with the finding of guilt as the well as the order of sentence. 8
Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.
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