Holding

The resolution suspending the petitioners is void for violating natural justice, though the suspension does not infringe Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) or 21.

Summary

Six members of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly were suspended for ten days of the next session and denied salary after a Privileges Committee found them guilty of breaching the House's privileges. They challenged the resolution under Article 32, alleging violations of Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 14, and 21, and contending that the Committee breached natural justice by not providing a copy of the video evidence on which it relied. The Supreme Court held that the curtailment of a legislator's speech does not infringe Article 19(1)(a) because the freedom of speech in the legislature under Articles 105 and 194 is a distinct constitutional right, not a fundamental right, and that being an MLA is not an "occupation" under Article 19(1)(g). The deprivation of salary does not amount to a violation of Article 21. However, the Court found that the Privileges Committee violated the principles of natural justice and Article 14 by denying the petitioners a reasonable opportunity to view and contest the video. Consequently, the second resolution was set aside and the petitioners' salaries and benefits were restored. The writ petition was allowed.

Issues considered

The suspension and denial of salary to the petitioners violate the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
Whether participation in legislative proceedings constitutes a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) (occupation).
Whether the deprivation of salary and other benefits infringes the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.
Whether the Privileges Committee complied with the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to examine the video evidence, under Article 14.
Whether the Assembly's resolution is ultra vires of Articles 105/194 and the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules.
Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable to challenge internal legislative disciplinary actions.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 105, s. Article 118, s. Article 12, s. Article 14, s. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(1)(g), s. Article 194, s. Article 208, s. Article 21, s. Article 211, s. Article 32, s. Article 33
Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Ruless. Rule 121(2), s. Rule 226, s. Rule 229
Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951

Subjects

Legislative privilegeFreedom of speechArticle 19Article 21Natural justiceArticle 14Suspension of legislatorsWrit petitionArticle 32Tamil Nadu Legislative AssemblyPrivileges CommitteeVideo evidenceSalary deprivation

Judgment

[2016] 6 S.C.R. 611

ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ & OTHERS ; A
v.
TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVEASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS
SECRETARY & ANOTHER
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 455 of2015) B
· FEBRUARY 12, 2016
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
Constitution of India - Arts.14, 19(/){g), 21, 105, 194 -
Members of State Legislative Assembly - Suspension for breach of · C
privileges - First assembly resolution whereby suspension of
nineteen members including petitioners, from the House for the
remainder period of the current Session - Members allegedly
obstructed proceedings of the assenibly - Thereafter, constitution
of Privileges Committee which held that the actions of the petitioners
amounted to breach of privilege, and recommended the action to be D
taken against them - Second Assembly Resolution passed whereby
suspensiOn of the petitioners for ten days of the next session of the
House - Members not to be paid their salaries or given other benefits
- Writ petition challenging the second Resolution - Held: By
preventing the legislator from participating in the proceedings of
E
the House, though there is a curtailment of the petitioner-members'
right of free speech in the Legislative Assembly to which they are
entitled u!Art. 194 but the impugned order does not violate
fundamental rights of petitioners guaranteed under!A'd. 19(/)(a). -·
Right to participate in the proceedings of the legis/ptive. bodies is
not a fundamental right falling u/Art. 19(/)(g) - Member of the. F
legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing an 'occupation' ·
u!Art. 19(/)(g) - Further, the only material relied upon by the
Privileges Committee to identify all the members and recommend
action against them for breach of privilege was the video recording
- It was the legal obligation of the Committee to ensure that a copy
G
of the video recording was supplied to the members·- Failure to
supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to
the petitioners to view the video recording resulted in the violation
of the principles of natural justice-denial of a reasonable
opportunity to meet the case - Thus, the second resolution passed
H
611
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A by the State Legislative Assembly set aside - Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly Rules - r.121(2) - Principles of natural justice.
Arts. 105, 194, 19(l)(a) - Freedom of ~peech available to a
member of the legislative body and freedom of speech inhering in a
citizen - Scope and amplitude of - Held: Are totally different -
B Citizen has a right to enter the legislative body and exercise his
freedom of speech after he gets elected to a legislative body - After
the cessation of the membership of the legislative body, legislator
would not continue to enjoy the freedom of speech contemplated
u/Arts. 105 and 194.
c Judicial review - Scope of- In matters relating to action taken
against members by the legislative bodies - Held: Is limited -
Non-compliance with the principles of natural justice is one of the
limited grounds.
Allowing the writ petition, the Court
D HELD: 1.1 It is clear from the scheme of Articles 105 and
194 of the Constitution that the constitutional declaration of
freedom of speech in the legislative bodies creates a constitutional
right in favour of the members of such legislative bodies. The
dimensions and contours of such right are greatly different from
E the dimensions and contours of the fundamental right of speech
and expression guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a). Therefore, the
scope and amplitude of the freedom of speech inhering in a citizen
and available to a member of the legislative body are totally
different. No citizen has a right to enter the legislative body and
exercise his freedom of speech unless he first gets elected to
F such a legislative body in accordance with law. No legislator would
continue to enjoy the freedom of speech contemplated under
Articles 105 and 194 after the cessation of the membership of
the legislative body. [Para 18) [622-A-B; 623-C; 624-A-B)
1.2 No doubt, when a legislator is prevented from
G participating in the proceedings of the House during the currency
of the membership .by virtue of some proceedings taken against
such a legislator, there would be a curtailment of the legislator's
constitutional right of free speech in the House of which such
legislator is a member. But such curtailment is sanctioned by
Constitution in view of the fact that such a right is made subject
H
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU 613
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY

to other provisions of the Constitution, the rules and standing A
orders regulating the procedure of the legislative bodies.
Therefore, though there is a curtailment of the petitioners' right
of free speech in the Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu to which
they are entitled under Article 194 by virtue of the impugned
order, the said impugned order does not, violate the fundamental
B
rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19(l)(a). [Paras
19, 20] [624-B-D]
1.3 The right to contest an election to the legislative bodies
established by the Constitution is held not to be a fundamental
right. Therefore, logically it would be difficult to accept that the
right to participate in the proceedings of the legislative bodies
c
can be a fundamental right falling under Article 19(l)(g). No citizen
is entitled as of right either to become or continue for the whole
lifetime as member of a legislative assembly. Acquisition of the
membership depends on the decision of the electorate and is
conferred by a process established by law. Even after election, D
the tenure is limited. Fundamental rights do not come into
existence upon the volition of others. They inhere in the citizens
and are capable of being exercised independently without the
need for any action or approval of others subject only to the
restrictions imposed by law. Any member of a legislative assembly
holds office until such membership comes to an end by some E
process established by law. Any monetary benefit incidental to
the holding of such offices is only to compensate for the time and
energy expended by the holder of the office in the service of the
nation. It is for this very reason that a member of a legislative
assembly cannot be treated as holding office for the purpose of F
eking out a livelihood. The economic underpinnings of an
'occupation' under Article 19(1 )(g) and the transient and incidental
nature of economic benefits flowing from the office of a legislator
must inevitably lead to the conclusion that a member of the
legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing an 'occupation'
under Article 19(1)(g). [Para 25, 26) [628-B-G] G

1.4 This Court in Raja Ram Pal case held that salary and
other benefits to which the members of a legislative body are
entitled to during their tenure are purely incidental to the
membership and they don't even create an independent and
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R.

A indefeasible constitutional right. Therefore, the the deprivation
of their salaries and other benefits incidental to the membership
of the legislative assembly during the period of suspension
amounted to deprivation of fundamental right under Article 21
does not arise.[Para 29] [629-DJ
B 1.5 The scope of judicial review in matters relating to action
taken against members by the legislative bodies is limited.
However, the non-compliance with the principles of natural justice
is one of the limited grounds on which judicial review could be
undertaken against the internal proceedings of the legislative
bodies in appropriate cases. (Para 30) (629-F)
c 1.6 From the writ petition, it appears that there was
considerable correspondence between the Privileges Committee
and the petitioners. The Privileges Committee called for an
explanation from the six petitioners as to why action could not be
taken against them, though it is not clear from the record as to.
D the basis on which the six petitioners were chosen out of the 19
MLAs who were suspended initially. Each of the petitioners gave
their explanation by separate letters. After consideration of the
explanation, the Privileges Committee concluded that there was
indeed breach of privilege, and recommended action against them.
This recommended action formed the basis of the assembly
E resolution. (Para 31) (630-B-D)
1.7 From the minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting,
it is clear that the only material relied upon by the Committee to
identify all the six petitioners and recommend action against them
for breach of privilege was the video recording. The minutes of
F the Privileges Committee meeting clearly show that the
video-recording played an important role in arriving at the
conclusions that the Privileges Committee did. The video
recording was specifically shown to the members of the Privileges
Committee "since some of them would have forgot only the video
G recordings were shown again", which indicates that the
Committee was not willing to rely solely on the memory of the
members of the Committee. The video recording served as the
common factual platform for all the members of the Privileges
Committee, from where the members discussed the actions of
the six petitioners, and recommended action against them. (Paras
H 35, 38) (632-C, G; 633-A-B)
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU 615
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY

1.8 The Pl"ivileges Committee should have necessarily A
offered the opportunity to see the video recording to the
petitioners in order to make the process adopted by it with the
requirements of Article 14. Perhaps they might have had an
opportunity to explain why the video r<;cording does not contain
any evidence/material for recommending action against all or some
8
of them or to explain that the video recording should have been
interpreted differently. It is not the petitioners' burden to request
for a copy of the video recording. It is the legal obligation of the
Privileges Committee to ensure that a copy of the video recording
is supplied to the petitioners in order to satisfy the requirements·
of the principles of natural justice. The failure to supply a copy of c
the video recording or affording an opportunity to the petitioners
to view the video recording relied upon by the committee clearly
resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. a
denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case. Therefore,
the impugned resolution passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative
D
Assembly is set aside. The consequence thereof, is that the salary
and other benefits incidental to the membership of the assembly
stand restored to the six petitioners. [Paras 42, 43) [634-B"E)
Raja Ram Pal v. Hon 'ble Speaker. Lok Sabha & Others
2007 (1) SCR 317:(2007) 3 SCC 184; Gujarat State
Financial Corporation v. Lotus Hotel AIR 1983 SC 848: E
(1983) 3 SCC 379; Air India Statutory Corpn. v. United
Labour Union AIR 1997 SC 645: (1997) 9 SCC
377:1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579; P. V. Narasimha Rao v.
State (CBJISPE) 1998 (2) SCR 870:(1998) 4 sec 626;
T.MA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 (3) F
Suppl. SCR 587:(2002) 8 SCC 481; Sodan Singh v.
New Delhi Municipal Committee 1989 4 SCC 105; Jagjit
Singh v. State of Haryana 2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 521:
(2006) 11 sec 1 - referred to.
Case Law Reference G
20Q7. (1) SCR317 referred to Para9
AIR 1983 SC 848 referred to Para 12
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 579 referred to Para 12
H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.k.

A 1998 (2) SCR 870 referred to Para 18
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 587 referred to Para22
1989 4 sec 105 referred to Para 23
2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 521 referred to Para 40
B CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 455
of2015.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia.
Jaideep Gupta, Sanjay R. Hegde, Sr. Advs., S. Nithin, Prabhu
Ramasubramaniam, Babu M, Anil Kumar Mishra-I, Advs. for the
c Appellant.
Shekhar Naphade, Subramonium Prasad, Sr. Advs., B. Balaj i, Ms. Meha
Aggrawal, Muthukishan, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D CHELAMESWAR, J. I. This is a petition filed by six petitioners
invoking Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia. They are members of
the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly representing different
constituencies. By a resolution of the assembly dated I 9.02.2015,
nineteen members of the assembly, including the six petitioners, have
E been suspended from the House for the remainder of the period of the
then current Session. The resolution suspended the nineteen members
for allegedly obstructing the proceedings of the legislative assembly.
Sl!bsequently, a Privileges Committee was constituted to inquire into
whether the conduct of the members during the incident dated I 9.02.2015
amounted to a breach of privilege. The Privileges Committee held that
F the actions of the six petitioners were a breach of privilege, and
recommended the action to be taken against the six petitioners. Such a
recommendation was passed by a resolution of the assembly dated
31.03.2015. Through this resolution, the petitioners were suspended for
a period of ten days of the next session of the House. Further, it was
G resolved that the petitioners should not be paid their salaries or given
other benefits which are due to them as members of the Legislative
Assembly for the period of suspension.
2. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed the instant writ
petition praying as follows:-
H
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 617
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY (J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

a) Issue a writ of order declaring the impugned resolution A
dated 31.03.2015 passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly, as unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.
b) Issue a writ of order and strike down the suspension
beyond the second period.
c) Issue a writ of order and pem1it the petitioners to use the B
office and their residential premises.
d) Issue a writ of order and restore all benefits other than that
which is connected with the house.
e) Issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records pertaining c
to the resolution of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly
dated 19.02.2015 and 31.03.2015 in awarding multiple
punishments to the petitioners on the file of the first
respondent so as to quash the same.
f) Issue a writ of order declaring the proceedings of breach D
of privilege against the petitioner herein, right from
commencement of the proceedings by the 2nd respondent
herein under Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative
Assembly framed under Article 208 of Constitution oflndia
to the subsequent proceedings carried out by the privilege
committee under rule 229 of the rules including the E
resolution of the house under rule 229( d) dated 19.02.2015
and 31.03.2015 respectively are illegal, failure to comply
with the principles ofnaturaljustice, perverse, irrational and
violative of the petitioners statutory right under the Tamil
Nadu payment of salaries Act, 1951.
F
g) Pass such other/further order as this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
present case."
3. All the six petitioners are members ofa political party known
as DMDK. G
4. The basic facts leading to the present writ petition are as follows:-
On 19.2.2015, the petitioners allegedly resorted to unruly conduct
while the session was in progress. When the Speaker directed the
Marshalls to evict the first petitioner from the House because of the
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A alleged unruly conduct, the remaining petitioners ran to the Speaker's
podium allegedly to attack the Speaker. However, they were prevented
by the Marshalls. Thereafter, the Speaker passed an Order suspending
19 members of the Legislative Assembly belonging to the DMDK party
from the Assembly for the remainder of the Session with immediate
effect.
B
5. Such a decision was taken by the Speaker allegedly in exercise
of the power under Rule 121 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Assembly Rules.
6. The Speaker also referred to the Privileges Committee of this
Assembly the incident dated 19.02.15 to identify those members who
c attempted to assault the Speaker and the Watch and Ward Staff. The
Privileges Committee, after an inquiry, recorded a conclusion that the
conduct of the six petitioners was in breach. of the privileges of the
House and, therefore, recommended to the House that these six
petitioners be removed from the Assembly for 10 days from the
commencement of the next session of the Legislative Assembly and
D also that during the said period, the petitioners be not paid the salary and
be given other benefits to which the members of the House are entitled.
Hence, the writ petition.
7. Various submissions are made on behalf of the petitioners which
can be summarized as follows:-
E
(i) That the decision to suspend the petitioners not only for the
current session in which the alleged breach of privilege
occurred but also for a certain period of the next session is
beyond the authority of the House and the Speaker under
Article 194.
F
(ii) The incidents which took place outside the premises of the
Legislative Assembly could not form the basis for taking
action on the ground that such incidents resulted in the
breach of the privileges of the House.
(iii) The non-supply of certain material (video recording) to the
G
petitioners which was relied upon to record the conclusion
that the petitioners are guilty amounted to denial of a
reasonable opportunity and, therefore, non-compliance with
the principles of natural justice vitiating the assembly
resolution dated 31.03.2015.
H
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMlL NADU LEGISLATIVE 619
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

(iv) The State legislature and the Speaker do not have the A
authority to seize the office and the residential premises in
the legislative hostel allotted to the petitioners by virtue of
their membership in the Legislative Assembly.
· 8. At the very threshold, the petitioners were cal led upon to satisfy
this Court regarding the maintainability of the instant writ petition as for B
the maintenance ofa writ petition under Article 32, the petitioners must
demonstrate that there is an infraction of one of the fundamental rights
guaranteed to the petitioners under Part lil of the Constitution.
9. The response of the petitioners is twofold.
(!) That the petitioners' fundamental rights guaranteed under c
Articles 19( 1)(a), 19( 1)(g), 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution
have been violated by the impugned resolution;
(2) This Court in the case of R"ja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker,
Lok Sablta & Otllers, (2007) 3 SCC 184, examined the
constitutionality of the proceedings of the Speaker of the Lok · D
Sabha in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, the present petition also is
maintainable.
I 0. We shall first deal with the second submission of the petitioners.
The question whether a petition under Article 32 is maintainable to E
determine the legality of the action by legislative bodies against its
members on the ground that they indulged in conduct which is in breach
of the privileges oft~e House was never raised either by the respondents
nor did the Court go into that question in Raja Ram Pal case. On the
other hand, it appears from the said judgment that this Court was not F
only dealing with the writ petitions filed under Article 32 but certain
transferred cases though exact details of those cases and from where
they were transferred are not available from the judgment. In our opinion,
Raja Ranr Pal case is not an authority for the proposition that a writ
petition such as the one on hand is maintainable under Article 32. The
question must be examined independently. G
11. Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the rightto move this
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of rights conferred
by Part III of the Constitution. Article 32 insofar as it is relevant for the
present purpose reads as follows:-
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R.

A "32. (I) The right to move the Supreme Comt by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this
Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
B mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever
may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part."
I 2. The jurisdiction ofthis Court under Article 32 in contradistinction
to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 is limited. While
c the High Courts in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 can
issue writs for the enforcement of any right conferred by Part Ill and
for"any other purpose", the jurisdiction under Article 32 is only confined
to the enforcement of the rights conferred under Part III of the
Constitution. This distinction is wel I recognised by this Comt in number
of cases'. Therefore, in order to maintain the present petition, the question
D whether there is any breach of fundamental rights of the petitioners is
required to be examined.
13. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned
action is violative of the petitioners' fundamental right of speech and
expression guaranteed under Article 19( I )(a) and their fundamental right
E to carry on an occupation guaranteed under Article 19( 1)(g). It is also
the·case of the petitioners that the alleged non-compliance with the
requirement of the principles of natural justice in the process of enquiry
into the alleged unruly conduct of the petitioners and award of the
punishment is violative ofArticle 14. It is also argued that the impugned
F action insofar as it deprives (although for a limited period) the petitioners
of their salary and other facilities attached to their membership of the
house is a violation of their fundamental right under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
I 4. We proceed to examine the claim of the petitioners that by the
G impugned action their fundamental rights under Articles 19( I )(a) and (g)
are violated.
15. It is well settled now that the fundamental rights guaranteed
1
See. G1ifarat State Financial Corporation v. lotus Hotel, AIR 1983 SC 848: ( 1983) 3
SCC 379: Air India Starutory Corpn. 1: Cnited labour L"nion, AIR 1997 SC 645. 680
H : (1997) 9 sec 377.
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 621
ASSEMBLYREP.BYITSSECRETARY[J.CHELAMESWAR,J.]

under Article 19 are available only to the citizens of this country whereas A
the other fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 are available to
every person who is subjected to the laws of this country. The six
freedoms enumerated under Article I 9 of the Constitution inhere in all
the citizens, by virtue of their citizenship without the need for anything
further.
B
16. Two questions are required to be examined in the context; (i)
when a member of a State Legislature participates in the proceedings of
the House, is that member exercising a fundamental right of speech and
expression under Article 19(1 )(a)? (ii) Whether any action, either of that
legislative body or any other authority, acting pursuant to any law, disabling
either temporarily or otherwise a member from participating in tlie
c
proceedings of the legislative body, amounts to deprivation of the
fundamental rightto freedom of speech under Article 19( 1)(a) of such a
legislator?
17. To answer the above question, a closer scrutiny of some of
the provisions of the Constitution is required. Articles 105 and 194 are D
relevant in the contexf. These two articles deal with the Parliament
and the State Legislature respectively. They declare inter alia that
"there shall be freedom of speech" in the said legislative bodies. Articles
I 05(2) and 194(2) further declare that no member of either the Parliament
or the State Legislature "shall be liable to any proceedings in any court E
in respect of any thing said" in such legislative bodies or any committee
thereof.

2
Relevant portions of the Articles:
Article I 05. (I) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and
standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament. there shall be freedom of F
speech in Parliament.
(2) No member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect
ofany thing said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and
no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of
either House of Parliament of any report, paper. votes or proceedings.
Article 194. (I) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and
standing orders regulating the procedure of the Legislature. there shall be freedom of G
speech in the Legislature of every State.
(2) No member of the Legislature ofa State shall be liable to any proceedings in any
court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any
committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the publication by or
under the authority of a House of such a Legislature of any report, paper, votes or
proceedings. H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A I 8. It is clear from the scheme of these two articles that the
constitutional declaration of freedom Q.f speech in the legislative bodies
creates a constitutional right in favour of the members of such legislative
bodies. Such a freedom had its origin in the privileges of the House of
Commons'. The dimensions and contours of such right are greatly
different from the dimensions and contours of the fundamental right of
8
speech and expression guaranteed under Article I 9( I )(a).
(i) While the fundamental right of speech guaranteed under Article
19( I )(a) inheres in every citizen, the freedom of speech contemplated
under Articles 105 and 194 is not available to every citizen except the
members of the legislative bodies, though, by virtue of the operation of
c other provisions of the Constitution, citizenship of this country is a
condition precedent for acquiring the membership of the legislative bodies;
· the constitutional right of free speech· in the legislative bodies is not
inherent to the citizenship but is to be acquired by getting elected to
those bodies.
D (ii) The fre_~dom of speech contemplated in Articles I 05 and 194
is available only during the tenure of the membership of those bodies.
No citizen can be deprived ofits citizenship and therefore the fundamental
right under Article I 9( I )(a) is inalienable.
(iii) The constitutional right of free speech under Articles I 05 and
E 194 is limited to the premises of the legislative bodies. Whereas, the
freedom of speech under Article 19(1 )(a) has no such geographical
limitations.
(iv) While the freedom of speech guaranteed under Article 19(1 )(a)
is subject to reasonable restriction that could be imposed by law which is
F compliant with the limitations specified under Articles 19( I )(2), the right
3
PV Narasimlia Rao v. State (CBJISPE) (1998) 4 SCC 626
'11 o. xx.xx xxxxx xx.xx xxxx
The privileges of the House of Commons, as distinct from those of the House of Lords,
were defined as
G "the sum of the fundamental rights of the House and of its individual Members as
against the prerogatives of the Crown, the authority of the ordinary courts of law
and the special rights of the House of Lords".
The privileges of the House of Commons included the freedom of speech, which had
been claimed in 1554. This comprised the right of the House to provide for the due
composition of its own body, the right to regulate its own proceedings, the right to
exclude strangers, the rightto prohibit publication of its debates and the right to enforce
H observation of its privileges by fine. imprisonment and expulsion.
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 623
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

of free speech availabl.~ to a legislator, either under Articles 105 or 194, A
is not subject to any such limitation that could be imposed by law.
However, such a freedom, as it appears from the opening clauses of
these two· articles, is subject to "other provisions of the Constitution and
to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of the legislative
bodies"•. One express limitation on such freedom is found under Articles
B
121 and 211 which prohibit, in express terms, any discussion in the
legislative bodies with respect to the conduct of any Judge of Supreme.
Court or of the High Court in the discharge of his duties. Further, Articles--
118 and 208 authorise the legislative bodies to make rules for regulating
their procedure and the conduct of their business;
Therefore, the scope and amplitude of the freedom of speech
c
inhering in a citizen and available to a memberofthe legislative body are

'PV N"r"simll" Rao C(ISe. (1998) 4 SCC 626
27. Clause (I) secures freedom of speech in Parliament to its Members. The said
freedom is '"subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing
orders regulating the procedure of Parliament''. The words "subject to the provisions of
D
this Constitution" have been construed to mean subject to the provisions of the
Constitution which regulate the procedure of Parliament, viz., Articles 118 and 12 L
(See: .1/.5.Jl. Sharma, .. Sri Krishna Sinha SCR at p. 856 and Special Reference Xo. I
of 1964 also known as the Legislative Privileges case SCR at p. 441.) The freedom of
speech that is available to Members of Parliament under Article I05( I) is wider in
amplitude than the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article E
19( I )(a) since the freedom of speech under Article I 05( I) is not subject to the limitations
contained in Article 19(2)
109. By reason of sub-article (I) of Article 105, Members of Parliament enjoy freedom
of speech subject only to the provisions of the Constitution and the rules and standing
orders regulating the procedure of Parliament. That express provision is made for
freedom of speech in Parliament in sub-article (I) of Article 105 suggests that this
freedom is independent of the freedom of speech conforred by Article 19 and unrestricted F
by the exceptions contained therein. This is recognition of the fact that Members need
to be free of all constraints in the matter of what they say in Parliament if they are
effectively to represent their constituencies in its deliberations. Sub-article (2) ofArticle
I 05 puts negatively what sub-article (I) states affirmatively. Both sub-articles must be
read together to determine their content. By reason of the first part of sub-article (2) no
Member is answerable in a court of law or any similar tribunal for what he has said in
Parliament. This again is recognition of the fact that a Member needs the freedom to say G
what he thinks is right in Parliament undeterred by the fear of being proceeded against.
J 10. :\.""\."\.."\..'- XXX:":X :\...""\."'\."'\.""\ X\.\."\..'-'X
The provisions of Article 194(2). therefore. indicated that the freedom of speech referred
to in sub-article (I) thereof was different from the freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19( I )(a) and could not be cut down in any way by any law
contemplated by Article 19(2).
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A totally different. No citizen has a right to enter the legislative body and
exercise his freedom of speech unless· he first gets elected to such a
legislative body in accordance with law. No legislator would continue to
enjoy the freedom of speech contemplated under Articles'I05 and 194
after the cessation of the membership of the legislative body.
a 19. No doubt, when a legislator is prevented from participating in
the proceedings of the House during the currency of the membership by
virtue of some proceedings taken against such a legislator, there would
be a curtailment of the legislator's constitutional right of free speech in
the House of which such legislator is a member. But such curtailment is
sanctioned by Constitution in view of the fact that such a right is made
c subject to other provisions of the Constitution, the rules and standing
orders regulating the procedure of the legislative bodies.
20. Therefore, we are of the opinion that though there is a
curtailment of the petitioners' right of free speech in the Legislative
Assembly ofTamil Nadu to which they are entitled under Article 194 by
D virtue of the impugned order, the said impugned order does not, in the
context, violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under
Article 19( I )(a).
21. Our view is fully supported by an opinion of this Court In re
under Article 143 of Constitution ofIndia, AIR 1965 SC 745 5 , which
E
'31. It will be noticed thatthe first three material clauses of Article I 94 deal with three
different topics. Clause (I) makes it clear that the freedom of speech in the legislature
of every State which it prescribes, is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and
to the rules and standing orders, regulating the procedure of the legislature. While
interpreting this clause, it is necessary to emphasise that the provisions of the
Constitution to which freedom of speech has been conferred on the legislators, are not
F the general provisions of the Constitution but only such of them as relate to the
regulation of the procedure of the legislature. The rules and standing orders may regulate
the procedure of the legislature and some of the provisions of the Constitution may
also purport to regulate it; these are. for instance. Articles 208 and 2 I I. The adjectival
clause '"regulating the procedure of the legislature" governs both the preceding clauses
relating to "the provisions of the Constitution" and "the rules and standing orders".
Therefore, clause (I) confers on the legislators specifically the right of freedom of
G
speech subject to the limitation prescribed by its first part. It would thus appear that
by making this clause subject only to the specified provisions of the Constitution, the
Constitution-makers wanted to make it clear that they thought it necessary to confer
on the legislators freedom of speech separately and. in a sense, independently of Article
I 9( I )(a). !fall that the legislators "·ere entitled to claim was the freedom of speech and
expression enshrined in Article 19( J)(a), it would have been unnecessary to confer the
H same right specifically in the manner adopted by Article I 94( I); and so, it would be
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 625
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

view was reiterated by a Constitution Bench in Raja R"m Pal'i Hon'ble A
Speaker, Lok Sabha & Others, (2007) 3 SCC 184 6 and in P. V.
Narasimha Rao v. State (CBIISPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626 7 •
22. According to the petitioners, the tenn 'occupation' under Article
19(1 )(g) is of the widest amplitude, and includes the office ofa member
oflegislative assembly: B
For this proposition, the counsel places reliance on Paragraph 239
of the T.M.A P"i Foundation v. State of K"rn"t"ka, (2002) 8 SCC
481.
"239 ...... Article 19 confers on all citizens rights specified in sub-
clauses (a) to (g). The fundamental rights enshrined in sub-
c
clause (g) of clause (I) of Article 19 of the Constitution are to

legitimate to conclude thatArticle 19( I)(a) is not one of the pro\'isions of the Constitution
which controls the first part of clause O) of Article 194.
32. Having conferred freedom of speech on the legislators, clause (2) emphasizes the
fact that the said freedom is intended to be absolute and unfettered. Similar freedom is
D
guaranteed to the legislators in respect of the votes they may give in the legislature or
any committee thereof. In other words, even if a legislator exercises his right of freedom
of speech in violation, say, of Article 211, he would not be liable forany action in any
court. Similarly, ifthe legislator-by his speech or vote, is alleged to have violated any of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part Ill of the Constitution in the Legislative
Assembly. he would not be answerable for the said contravention in any court. If the E
impugned speech amounts to libel or becomes actionable or indictable under any other
provision of the law, immunity has been conferred on him from any action in any court
by this clause. He may be answerable to the House for such a speech and the Speaker
may take appropriate action against him in respect ofit; but that is another matter. It is
plain that the Constitution-makers attached so mu.ch importance to the necessity of
absolute freedom in debates within the legislative chambers that they thought it necessary
to confer complete immunity on the legislators from any action in any court in respect F
of their speeches in the legislative chambers in the wide terms prescribed by clause (2).
Thus, clause (I) confers freedom of speech on the legislators within the legislative
chamber and clause (2) makes it plain that the freedom is literally absolute and unfettered.
'' Powers, privileges am/ immu11ities-Genert1lly
130. Taking note of Pandit Sharma fl) it was reiterated in L".P. Assembly case
(Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) that clause (I) of Article 194 no doubt makes a G
substantive provision of the said clause subject to the provisions of the Constitution;
but in the context. those provisions cannot take in Article 19( l)(a). because the latter
article does not purport to regulate the procedure of the legislature and it is only such
provisions of the Constitution which regulate the procedure of the legislature which are
included in the first part of Article 194( I).
7
See FIN 4 supra
H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 6 S.C.R.

A practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or
business. We are concerned here with the right to establish
educational institutions to impart education at different levels,
primary, secondary, higher, technical, professional etc. Education
is essentially a charitable object and imparting education is, in my
view, a kind of service to the community, therefore, it cannot be
B
brought under "trade or business" nor can it fall under "profession".
Nevertheless, having regard to the width of the meaning of the
term "occupation" elucidated in the judgment of the Hon'ble the
Chief Justice, the service which a citizen desires to render by
establishing educational institutions can be read in "occupation".
c This right, like other rights enumerated in sub-clause (g), is
controlled by clause (6) of Article 19. The mandate of clause (6)
is that nothing in sub-clause (g) shall affect the operation of any
existing law, insofar as it imposes or prevents the State from making
any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable
restrictions 'on the exercise of right conferred by the said sub-
D clause and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shal I affect
the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to or prevents
the State from making any law relating to: (i) the professional or
technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession
or carrying on any occupation, trade or business; or (ii) the carrying
E on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the
State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the
exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Therefore,
it may be concluded that the right of a citizen to run educational
institutions can be read into "occupation" falling in sub-clause (g)
of clause (I) ofArticle 19 which would be subjectto the discipline
F
of clause (6) thereof."

In our opinion, it does not, in any way, support the claim of the
petitioner that the impugned action is violative of their fundamental right
under Article 19( I )(g). To decide the correctness of the submission, we
need to examine both the etymological and contextual meaning of the
G
expression occupation occurring in Article 19( I )(g).
23. This Court in Soda11 Si11gli v. New Del/ii Municipal
Committee, 1989 4 SCC I 05, had an occasion to examine the question
and held; -
H
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 627
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

"The guarantee under Article 19( I )(g) extends to practice any A
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
'Profession' means an occupation carried on by a person by virtue
of his personal and specialized qualifications, training or skill. The
word 'occupation' has a wide meaning such as any regular
work, profession, job, principal activity, employment,
B
business or a calling in which an individual is engaged.
'Trade' in its wider sense includes any bargain or sale, any
occupation or business carried on for subsistence or profit, it is an
act of buying and selling of goods and services. It may include
any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or
mercantile. 'Business' is a very wide term and would include c
anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man
for the purpose of profit. It may include in its form trade,
profession, industrial and commercial operations, purchase and
sale of goods, and would include anything which is an occupation
as distinguished from pleasure. The object of using four
D
analogous and overlapping words in Article 19(l)(g) is to
make the guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible
to include all the avenues and modes through which a man
may earn his livelihood. In a nutshell the guarantee takes
into its fold any activity carried on by a citizen of India to
earn his living. The activity must of course be legitimate and E
not anti-social like gambling, trafficking in women and the like." 8

Thus, it can be seen that the essence of the right is to pursue an
activity which enables a citizen to earn livelihood.
24. In T.M.A Pai Foundation (supra), this court held that F
"Article 19( I )(g) employs four expressions viz. profession,
occupation, trade and business .... Article 19(1 )(g) uses the four
expressions so as to cover all activities of a citizen in respect of
which income or profit is generated, and which can consequently
be regulated under Article 19(1 )(6)". 9 G
The amplitude of the tenn 'occupation' is limited by the economic
iµiperative of livelihood generation. Therefore, all the activities
contemplated under Article 19( I )(g) are essentially activities which enable
' Paragraph 28.
• Paragraph 20. H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 6 S.C.R.

a citizen to generate economic benefits. The primary purpose and thrust
of Article 19( 1)(g) is to generate economic benefit and to protect the
fruits of one's Jabour.
25. The right to contest an election to the legislative bodies
established by the Constitution is held not to be a fundamental right.
B Therefore, logically it would be difficult to accept the submission that
the right to participate in the proceedings of the legislative bodies can be
a fundamental right falling under Article 19(1 )(g). No citizen is entitled
as ofright either to become or continue for the whole lifetime as member
of a legislative assembly. Acquisition of the membership depends on the
deciSton of the electorate and is conferred by a process established by
c law. Even after election, the tenure is limited. Fundamental rights do
not come into existence upon the volition of others. They inhere in the
citizens and are capable of being exercised independently without the
need for any action or approval of others subject only to the restrictions
imposed by law. Any member of a legislative assembly holds Qffice until
D such membership comes to an end by some process established by law.
Constitutional offices commencing from the office of the President of
India are meant for and established for securing the goals adumbrated in
the preamble to the Constitution.· Each of these offices is a component
in larger machinery established to make it possible forthe people of this
country to realise the goals indicated in the preamble of the Constitution.
E Any monetary benefit incidental to the holding of such offices is only to
compensate for the time and energy expended by the holder of the office
in the service of the nation. It is for this very reason that a member of
a legislative assembly cannot be treated as holding office for the purpose
of eking out a livelihood.
F 26. The economic underpinnings of an 'occupation' under Article
19(1 )(g) and the transient and incidental nature of economic benefits
flowing from the office of a legislator must inevitably lead to the conclusion
that a member oftfie legislative assembly cannot be treated as pursuing
an 'occupation' under Article 19( 1)(g). We, therefore, reject the
G contention that the issue at hand involves the rights of the petitioners
under Article 19(1 )(g).
27. Coming.to the question of violation offundamental right under
Article 21 of the petitioners, the case of the petitioners is that by virtue
of the impugned action the petitioners have been deprived of their salaries
H
and other benefits incidental to the membership ofthe legislative assembly
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 629
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

during the period of suspension and, therefore, it is violative of their A
fundamental right under Article 21.
28. No clear authority is cited before us, nor any tenable submission
is made to demonstrate that there is violation of Article 21 except a bare
assertion. On the other hand, in Raja Ram Pal case, it was argued that
such depravation resulting from the expulsion of a member from the B
house would result in violation ofthe 'constitutional rights' of the members
of the parliament 10 and therefore the expulsion would be bad.
29. This Court repelled the submission and held:
" ... in the present case, where there is a lawful expulsion, the
Members cannot claim that the provisions relating to salaries and
duration of the House create such rights for the Members that
c
would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House."
In other words, this Court held that salary and other benefits to
which the members of a legislative body are entitled to during their tenure
are purely incidental to the membership and they don't even create an
independent and indefeasible constitutional right. Therefore, the question D
that the deprivation of such benefits amounted to deprivation of
fundamental right under Article 21 does not arise at all.
30. We now deal with the submissions of the petitioners that the
impugned proceedings are violative of the fundamental right of the
petitioners under Article 14. According to the petitioners, the said E
proceedings have been taken in violation of the principles of natural
justice. It is settled law that the scope of judicial review in matters
relating to action taken against members by the legislative bodies is limited.
However, it is likewise well settled that the non-compliance with the
principles ofnaturaljustice is one of the limited grounds on which judicial
review could be undertaken against the internal proceedings of the F
legislative bodies in appropriate cases.''

'"Para 151. lt was further argued by the petitioners. that provisions in the Constitution
relating to salary and the term for which they serve in the House are constitutional
rights of the Members and the power of expulsion, by termin~ting their membership
violates these constitutional rights. G
II Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) II sec I. "We may hasten to add that

howsoever limited may be the field of judicial review, the principles of natural justice
have to be complied with and in their absence, the orders would stand vitiated." - Para
14.
See also paragraphs 671 and 672 of Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and
Others, (2007) 3 SCC 184. H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A 31. We now examine the petitioners' claim that there has been a
violation of the principles of natural justice. It is rather difficult to cull
out from the body of the clumsily drafted writ petition (the counter is no
better though very long) the precise factual grievance of the petitioners.
The substance we could cull out is that a copy of the videograph relied
upon by the Privileges Committee was not provided to them. From a
B
reading of paragraphs 3 .12 to 3 .18 of the writ petition, it appears that
there was considerable correspondence between the Privileges
• Committee and the petitioners. The Privileges Committee called for an
explanation from the six petitioners herein as to why action could not be
taken against thein, though it is not clear from the record as to the basis
c on which the six petitioners were chosen out of the 19 MLAs who were
suspended initially. Each of the petitioners gave their explanation by
separate letters. After consideration of the explanation, the Privileges
Committee concluded that there was indeed breach of privilege, and
recommended action against the six petitioners. This recommended action
formed the basis of the assembly resolution dated 31.03.2015.
D
32. It is argued before us that the Privileges Committee relied
upon certain video recordings for arriving at the conclusion that the
petitioners are guilty of conduct which is in breach of the privileges of
the house but a copy of the video recording was not provided to the
petitioners".
E
33. It is clear from the record that the video recording played a
crucial role in the deliberations of the Privileges Committee. 13 Upon

"Apart from the vague reference in Para 3.12 of the facts, the petitioners take it as a
ground (Ground No. 38) in the instant writ. Para 3.12 reads ''The petitioner No. I sent
F his reply to the letter seeking explanation by the Privilege Committee; The letter was
received by the Petitioner only on 23.2.2014, but the explanation was sought for on or
before 27.2.2015. Further, the petitioner sought permission to give further explanation
immediately when the video clipping of the incident. A true copy of the letter sent by
Petitioner No. I to Secretary of the Legislative Assembly dated 27.2.2015 is annexed
herewith and marked as Annexure-P7." Ground No. 38 reads "The respondents never
gave a copy of the alleged videography''. Apart from this one sentence. the petitioners
G do not elaborate any further.
13
From a perusal of the minutes of the privileges committee meeting dated 20.02.2015,
it is evident that the viewing of a video recording of the incident dated 19.2.2015
formed the basis for application of mind by the members of the privileges committee
Tellingly, the minutes read
[Chairman of the Privileges Committee]-
H '·After viewing the video clippings each member can record their own opinion''
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHANRAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 631
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

viewing the recording of the incident dated 19.02.2015 in which nineteen A
members belonging to the DMDK party were allegedly involved, the
Privileges Committee reached a conclusion that the conduct of the six
petitioners is in breach of the privilege of the house. The proceedings of
the Privileges Committee make repeated references to video recording.
34. FIR No. Cr. No. 09/2015 dated 20.2.2015 filed by Mr. Vijayan, B
[Chairman of the Privileges Committee]·
'"After viewing the video clippings each member can record their own opinion·•
[Chairman of the Privileges Committee]-
'"! request the members of the committee that before recording your opinion I request
to view the video recordings taken on 19.02.2015 in the House. I request you to
record your opinions after viewing the video recordings" c
''This meeting is held to find out the members who are all have involved in the
undue acts after viewin2 the video records and to decide as to what action can be
taken _l!gainst them"

"Let [us] first view the video footage and then the committee shall come to a conclusion"
[Mr. J.C.D. Prabhakar. member. privileges committec]-
.. Here you showed the video recording to the members clearly .. :· D
This member then goes on to discuss the events as depicted in the. video recording and
individuates the six petitioners as indulging in actions which amount to a breach of
privilege.
[Mrs. S. Vijayadharani. member. privileges committee]-
·'The expressing of the anger by V.C. Chandira Kumar is very clearly seen from the
video clipping··. E
This member then goes on to record her opinion that one of the petitioners is not
involved in the scume.
[Mr. A. Lasar, member, privileges committee]-
"We have seen the video footage with respect to that incident. Hence we are speaking
here in the way that in this regard that hereafter these types of incidents should not
happen"
[Mr. K.S.N. Venugopalu. member. privileges committee]- F
" ... I saw from my seat that the incident happened yesterday on 19.02.2015 was very
much brutal. We have again see in in the video .... I give the opinion that the 6 members
who involved in this terrible act namely Mr. Alagapuram R. Mohan Rah, Mr. V.C.
Chandra Kumar. Mr. C. H. Sekhar. Mr. K. Dinakaran. Mr. S.R. Parthiban. Mr. L.
Venkatesan should be suspended for one year in such a way that they should not come
to the house.".
[Mr. Challenger Dorai@ Doraisamy]· G
··we have also seen the incident in the video footage also .. :·. ·
[Hon'ble leader of the house]·
··All the members present here all arc included in the Legislative Assembly. Hence you
would have seen the incidents happened with your eyes Not only was that, the
video recordings also shown. Since some of them would have forgot only the
video recordings were shown again"
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A a special sub-inspector deployed in the Tamil Nadu legislative assembly,
which is one of the pieces of evidence used against the petitioners,
mentions the names of only two· of the six petitioners (Petitioner No. 4
and Petitioner No.5). In his FIR, Mr. Vijayan makes an omnibus statement
that all members belonging to the DMDK party rushed to the Speaker's
chair in an unruly fashion and were ordered to be sent out of the house
B
for that reason. He then proceeds to specifically state the two accused
(Petitioner No. 4 and Petitioner No.5) attacked him.
35. In this light, the question is: How did the Privileges Committee
identify six members as having breached the privilege of the house?
From the minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting, it is clear that
c the only material relied upon by the Committee to identify all the six
petitioners and recommend action against them for breach of privilege
was the video recording.
36. The petitioners' case, though not elegantly pleaded, is that they
have not been granted the opportunity to watch the video recording or
D comment on the content and authenticity of the video. In the questions
of law raised in the writ petition, the petitioners raised the question of
"Whether denial of the right to comment on the video material would
amount to breach of natural justice?" In the grounds taken by the
petitioners, they pray for the writ to be allowed "because on the question
E of authenticity of videography and as to how far it can be pressed into
service, further, the respondents never gave a copy of.. the alleged
videography to the petitioner".
37. It is the case of the respondents, thatthe disciplinary proceedings
are not based solely on the video clippings. At para 76 of the counter
F affidavit, it is stated that the violent incidents on 19.2.2015 had been
witnessed by all Members in the House including those in the Privileges
Committee and thus the videograph is not the sole basis for award of
punishment.'"'
38. The minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting clearly show
G that the video-recording played an important role in arriving at the
conclusions that the Privileges Committee did. The video recording was

14
Even at Para 70'ofthe counter affidavit, the respondents assert that as the incident
on 19.2.2015 happened inside the assembly chamber, the speaker and other present
members were eye-witnesses to the incident, and that the nature of the incident was
known to all members in the house, including the members of the privileges committee.
H
ALAGAAPURAM R. MOHAN RAJ v. TAMIL NADU LEGISLATIVE 633
ASSEMBLY REP. BY ITS SECRETARY [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]

specifically shown to the members of the Privileges Committee "since A
some of them would have forgot only the video recordings were shown
again"';. Giving some allowance for bad translation - the said sentence
only indicates that the Committee was not willing to rely solely on the
memory of the members of the Committee. At the risk of repetition, we
reiterate that the video recording served as the common factual platform
B
for all the members of the Privileges Committee, from where the members
discussed the actions of the six petitioners, and recommended action
against them.
39. This Court in Raja Ram Pal case, while dealing with the
question of the rules of natural justice in the context of proceedings in
the legislative bodies, held as follows:
c
"As already noted the scope of judicial review in these matters is
restricted and limited. Regarding non-grant of reasonable
opportunity, we reiterate what was recently held in Jagjit Singh
v. State of Haryana that the principles of natural justice are not
immutable but are flexible; they cannot be cast in a rigid mould D
and put in a straitjacket and the compliance therewith has to be
considered in the facts and circumstances of each case." 16
40. In Jagjit Singlr ':State of Hllryana, (2006) 11 SCC I, this
Court discussed the scope of the principles ofnaturaljustice in the context
of the proceedings in the legislature (action under X'h Schedule of the E
Constitution) and held thus:
"Undoubtedly, the proceedings before the Speaker which is also
a tribunal albeit of a different nature have to be conducted in a
fair manner and by complying with the principles of natural justice.
However, the principles of natural justice cannot be placed in a F
straitjacket. These are flexible rules. Their applicability is
determined on the facts of each case ... " 11
41. The principles of natural justice require that the petitioners
ought to have been granted an opportunity to see the video recording.
Perhaps they might have had an opportunity to explain why the video G
recording does not contain any evidence/material for recommending

" See F/.N 12.
16
Extracted portion is a part of Paragraph 446 in the judgment.
17
The extracted portion is a part of paragraph 44 in the judgment.
H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 6 S.C.R.

A action against all or some of them or to explain that the video recording
should have been interpreted differently.
42. The Privileges Committee should have necessarily offered
this opportunity, in order to make the process adopted by it compliant
with the requirements of Article 14. Petitioner No. I in his reply letter to
B the notice issued by the Privileges Committee seeks permission to give
further explanation when the video recording is provided to him. The
Petitioner No. 3 in his reply letter states that he beUeves his version of
his conduct will be proven by the video recording. The other petitioners
do not mention the video recording in their reply letters. However, it is
not the petitioners' burden to request for a copy of the video recording.
c It is the legal obligation of the Privileges Committee to ensure that a
copy of the video recording is supplied to the petitioners in order to
satisfy the requirements of the principles ofnaturaljustice The failure
to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an opportunity to the
petitioners to view the video recording relied upon by the committee in
D our view clearly resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice
i.e. a denial of a reasonable opportunity to meet the case. We, therefore,
have no option but to set aside the impugned resolution dated 31.03.2015
passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. The same is accordingly
set aside.

E 43. The consequence of setting aside the impugned resolution of
the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly dated 31.3.2015 is that the salary
and other benefits incidental to the membership of the assembly stand
restored to the six petitioners herein.
44. In view of the conclusion recorded above, we see no need to
F deal with the other submissions advanced by the petitioners.
45. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above.
Nidhi Jain Writ Petition allowed.