AKHILESH YADAV ETC. ETC.versusVISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 607
- Decided
- 13 December 2012
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- ALTAMAS KABIR
Holding
The Court affirmed its jurisdiction to direct a CBI inquiry but struck down the direction for the CBI to report to the Union of India and ordered the investigation against Smt. Dimple Yadav to be dropped.
Summary
The Supreme Court reviewed a 2007 order that directed the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to inquire into alleged disproportionate assets of a political family and to submit its report to the Union of India. The petitioners sought a review, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction to order a CBI inquiry without a prima facie case, that the direction to report to the Union contravened the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, and that a private individual, Smt. Dimple Yadav, should not be investigated. The Court held that the original order directing a CBI inquiry was within its jurisdiction and not subject to review, but the direction for the CBI to submit a report to the Union of India was beyond the statutory scheme and was deleted. It also ordered that the investigation against Smt. Dimple Yadav be dropped. The review petitions were consequently disposed of with these modifications.
Issues considered
- Whether the Supreme Court/High Court can direct a CBI inquiry without the consent of the concerned State.
- Whether a Court may refer a matter to the CBI without first establishing a prima facie case of offence.
- Whether the Court can order a CBI investigation without invoking its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.
- Whether the writ petition could be entertained as a public interest litigation.
- Whether the 1 March 2007 order directing CBI inquiry and reporting to the Union of India warrants review.
- Whether directing the CBI to submit its inquiry report to the Union of India is permissible under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act.
- Whether a private person (Smt. Dimple Yadav) who does not hold public office can be investigated under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 47
- Constitution of Indias. Article 142, s. Article 21, s. Article 226, s. Article 246, s. Article 32
- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946s. Section 5, s. Section 6
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Subjects
Judgment
[2012] 13 S.C.R. 949
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. ETC. A
v.
VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.
(Review Petition (Civil) No. 272 of 2007 etc.)
IN
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 633 of 2005) B
DECEMBER 13, 2012.
[ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI., AND H.L. DATTU, J.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 47 - Review C
petition - Maintainability, scope and ambit of - Writ petition
(PIL) before Supreme Court for direction to prosecute four
members of a political family (respondent nos. 2 to 5) under
the Prevention of Corruption Act for acquiring assets more
than the known source of their income - Court directing the o
CBI to submit its report with UOI and liberty was given to UOI
to take further steps - Order challenged in review - Held: The
order under review was neither irregular nor without jurisdiction
- Supreme Court has jurisdiction to direct CBI inquiry in the
matter - Review of a judgment is permissible on account of E
error on the face of the record - Such error has to be decided
in the facts of the case - An erroneous decision by itself does
not warrant a review - The judgment under review does not
suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record except
for the directions given in the case of respondent no. 4 -
F
Investigation launched against respondent no. 4 liable to be
dropp(Jd since she was not holding any public office or
Government post, and was essentially a private person - The
Court's direction to CBI to submit its Inquiry Report to UOI is
erroneous since CBI is an independent body and not under
obligation to report to UOI - Such a course is not contemplated G
in the scheme of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act -
Direction given to CBI to take independent action, as it
considers fit - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
949 H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A - Supreme Court Rules, 1966 - Order 40 - Constitution of
India, 1950 - Articles 32 and 137 - Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988.
The Writ petition (PIL) was filed against respondent
Nos. 2 to 5 before this Court seeking direction to
8 prosecute respondent Nos. 2 to 5 under Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 for acquiring assets more than the
known source of their income, by misusing their power
and authority. This Court by order dated 1.3.2007 directed
Central Bureau of Investigating (CBI) to inquire into the
C allegations relating to acquisition of wealth by respondent
Nos. 2 to 5, and to find out as to whether there was any
truth in the allegations. Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 filed
petitions for review of the order.
o The main questions for consideration were whether
the High Court or Supreme Court had jurisdiction to direct
a CBI Inquiry and whether the investigation and/or inquiry
could also be extended to the assets of respondent No.
4, though she neither held any post under the
E Government nor was she involved in the activities of her
husband or father-in-law (two other respondents).
Disposing of the Review Petition, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Review of a judgment on account of some
F mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is
permissible, but an error apparent on the face of the
record has to be decided on the facts of each case, as
an erroneous decision by itself does not warrant a review
of each decision. [Para 1] [955-C-D]
G
1.2 The scope and ambit of a review proceeding is
limited and the order dated 1st March, 2007, in respect of
which review has been sought, was neither irregular nor
without jurisdiction and was passed after considering the
submissions made on b'ehalf of the respective parties.
H
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 951
CHATURVEDI
The review proceedings cannot be converted into an A
appeal. [Para 30] [969-B-C]
2.1 A direction by- the High Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction :.mder Article 226 of the Constitution, to the
CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have 8
been committed within the territory of a State, without-the
consent of that State will neither impinge upon the
federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the
doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law.
Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, C
Supreme Court and the High Courts have not only the
power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect
the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part Ill in general
and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular,
zealously and vigilantly. However, the power which is
vested in the superior courts should be exercised D
sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where
it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instill
confidence in investigations or where the incident may
have national and international ramifications or where
such an order may be necessary for doing complete E
justice and enforcing fundamental rights. [Paras 26 and
27) [967-F-H; 968-A-C]
Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India and
Anr. (1998) 4 sec 409: 1998 (2) SCR 795 - relied on. F
2.2 This Court had jurisdiction to direct the CBI to
make an inquiry into the accumulation of wealth by the
political leader and his family members in excess of their
known source of income, based on the allegations made
in the writ petition. By its judgment dated 1st March, 2007, G
this Court merely directed an investigation into the
allegations made in the writ petition and to submit a report
to the Union Government. [Para 28] [968-D-E]
State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs. The Committee for H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors. 2006
(12) sec 534 - followed.
3. The judgment under review does not suffer from
any error apparent on the face of the record, except for
8 the directions given in the case of respondent No. 4.
When the order under review was passed, respondent
No. 4 in the writ petition had neither held any Public Office
nor Government post and was essentially a private
person notwithstanding her proximity to the two political
C leaders. The investigation launched against her on the
issue of amassing wealth beyond her known source of
income, is liable to be dropped. The Review Petition, so
far as respondent No. 4 is concerned, is, accordingly,
allowed and the investigation conducted by the CBI
against her should, therefore, be dropped. [Paras 29 and
D 31] [968-F-H; 969-A, C-D]
4. While disposing of the writ petition and directing
the CBI to inquire into the alleged acquisition of wealth
by respondent Nos. 2 to 5, the CBI was directed to submit
E a report to the Union of India and on receipt of such
report, the Union of India was given the liberty to take,
further steps depending upon the outcome of the
preliminary inquiry into the assets of the said
respondents. Since, the CBI is an independent body and
F is under no obligation to report to the Union of India in
regard to investigations undertaken by it, the direction to
submit a report of the inquiry to the Union of India and
the liberty given to the Union of India to take further steps
on such report is not contemplated in the scheme of the
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. It is for the
G CBI to decide what steps it wishes to take on the basis
of the inquiry conducted. Therefore, the order dated 1st
March, 2007 is modified and the directions given to the
CBI to submit a report of its inquiry to the Union of India
and the liberty given to the Union of India to take further
H steps on such report, is directed to be deleted from the
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 953
CHATURVEDI
• order. The CBI may take such independent action, as it A
considers fit, on the basis of the inquiry conducted by it
pursuant to the directions given by this Court in the
judgment under review, without seeking any direction
from the Union of India or on the basis of any direction
that may be given by it. [Paras 31 and 32) [969-D-G; 970- B
B]
Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of India
and ors.(1999) 6 sec 667: 1999 (3) SCR 1279; A.R.
Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak(1988) 2 SCC 602:1988 (1) Suppl.
SCR 1; Supreme Court BarAssociation Vs. Union of India C
(1998) 4 SCC 409: 1998 (2) SCR 795; Mohd. Anis Vs.
Union of India (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 145: 1993 (1) Suppl.
SCR 263; Textile Labour Association Vs. OfficialLiquidator
(2004) 9 SCC 741: 2004 (3) SCR 1161; M.S. AhlawatVs.
State of Haryana (2000) 1 SCC 278: 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR D
160;Advance Insurance Company Vs. Gurudasmal (1970) 3
SCR 881 ;Kazi Lhendup Dorzi Vs. CBI (1994) Supp. 2 SCC
116; Prem ChandGarg Vs. Excise Commissioner, U.P.,
Allahabad (1962) Supp. 1 SCR885; State of West Bengal
Vs. Sampat Lal (1985) 1 SCC 317: 1985 (2) SCR 256 ; E
Bihar State Construction Co. Vs. Thakur Munendra Nath
Sinha (1988) Supp. SCC 542; King Emperor Vs. Khwaja
NazirAhmed AIR 1945 PC 18; Bhajan Lal Vs. State of
Haryana (1992)Supp. 1 SCC 335: 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR
259; Parsion Devi Vs.Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715: 1997 F
(4) Suppl. SCR 470; Sir Hari Shankar Pal and Anr. Vs.
Anath Nath Mitter and Ors. (1949) FCR 36 - Cited.
Case Law Reference:
1999 (3) SCR 1279 Cited Para 8 G
1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 Cited Para 9
1998 (2) SCR 795 · Cited Para 9
1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 263 Cited Para 13
H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A 2004 (3) SCR 1161 Cited Para 13
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 160 Cited Para 13
(1970) 3 SCR 881 Cited Para 14
(1994) Supp. 2 sec 116 Cited Para 14
B
(1962) Supp. 1 SCR 885 Cited Para 15
1985 (2) SCR 256 Cited Para 17
(1988) Supp. sec 542 Cited Para 17
c
AIR 1945 PC 18 Cited Para 17
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 Cited Para 17
1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 470 Cited Para 21
D (1949) FCR 36 Cited Para 21
2006 c121 sec 534 Followed Para 25
1998 (2) SCR 795 Relied on Para 27
E CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Review Petition (Civil) No. 272 of 2007 in W.P. {C) No.
633 of 2005.
WITH
F R.P. (C) Nos. 339, 347 and 348 of 2007.
Mohan Parasaan, ASG, Uday U. Lalit, Rakesh Dwivedi,
KTS Tulsi, Gaurav Bhatia, lrshad Ahmad, Faizal Sherwani (for
Bhatia & Co.), A.D.N. Rao, Atul Sharma, Nitesh Jain, Ejaz
G Maqbool, Adarsh Upadhyay (for Bhatia & Co.), Nikhil Sharma
for Bhatia & Co.), T.A. Khan, Arvind Kumar Sharma, S.N. Terdal
Raj Kamal, Santosh Kumar Tripathy, Maheen Pradhan and
Neha Gupta for the appearing parties, Ashutosh Srivastava
(applicant-in-person).
H The Judgment of the Court was delivered
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 955
CHATURVEDI
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. Certain questions of fact and A
law were raised on behalf of the parties when the review
petitions were heard. Review petitions are ordinarily restricted
to the confines of the principles enunciated in Order47 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, but in this case, we gave counsel for
the parties ample opportunity to satisfy us that the judgment and B
order under review suffered from any error apparent on the face
of the record and that permitting the order to stand would
occasion a failure of justice or that the judgment suffered from
some material irregularity which required correction in review.
The scope of a review petition is very limited and the c
submissions advanced were made mainly on questions of fact.
As has been repeatedly indicated by this Court, review of a
judgment on account of some mistake or error apparent on the
face of the record is permissible, but an error apparent on the
face of the record has to be decided on the facts of each case .
0
as an erroneous decision by itself does not warrant a review
of each decision. In order to appreciate the decision rendered
on the several review petitions which were taken up together
for consideration, it is necessary to give a background in which
the judgment and order under review came to be rendered.
E
2. One Vishwanath Chaturvedi, claiming to be an
Advocate by profession and unconnected with any political party
or parties, filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.633 of 2005, inter alia,
for the following relief :-
F
"(a) issue an appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus
directing Respondent No.1 to take appropriate action to
prosecute Respondent Nos.2 to 5 under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, for acquiring amassed assets more
than the known source of their income by misusing their G
power and authority;"
3. In the Writ Petition, the Writ Petitioner provided instances
of the wealth allegedly acquired by the said Respondents
beyond their known source of income. After a contested
hearing, this Court was of the view that the inquiry should not H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A be shut out at the threshold because political elements were
involved. The prayer in the Writ Petition was, therefore,
moulded and the same was disposed of on 1st March, 2007,
with a direction upon the Central Bureau of Investigation,
hereinafter referred to as the "CBI", to inquire into the
B allegations relating to acquisition of wealth by the Respondent
Nos.2 to 5. The CBI was also directed to find out as to whether
there was any truth in the allegations made by the Petitioner
regarding acquisition of assets by the said Respondents
disproportionate to their known source of income and to submit
C a report to the Union of India which could take further steps in
the matter.
4. Soon, thereafter, the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 filed
Review Petitions for review of the aforesaid judgment dated 1st
March, 2007 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.633 of 2005 and the
D same was directed to be posted before the Court on 16th
March, 2007. Subsequently, the Review Petitions were placed
for hearing before the Court on 20th March, 2007 and ultimately
on 10th February, 2009, the Court directed notice to issue
thereupon. On 1st April, 2009, when the Review Petitions were
c taken up for hearing, a submission was made on behalf of the
Review Petitioners that one of the questions, which could have
a vital bearing on the matters, related to the question as to
whether the Court could issue directions to the CBI,
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6 of the Delhi Special
F Police Establishment Act, 1946, which was under consideration
of the Constitution Bench in Civil Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of
2001 filed by the State of West Bengal. The hearing of the
Review Petitions was, therefore, adjourned till a decision was
pronounced by the Constitution Bench in the above Appeals.
G The Constitution Bench ultimately held that the High Court was
within its jurisdiction in directing the CBI to investigate into a
cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the
territory of a State without the consent of that State and the
same would neither impinge upon the federal structure of the
H Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of powers
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 957
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
and would be valid in law. However, a note of caution was also A
given and it was further observed that the extra-ordinary power
conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India
has to be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional
situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility
and instill confidence in investigations or where the incident may B
have national and international ramifications or where such an
order may be necessary for doing complete justice and
enforcing fundamental rights.
5. Thereafter, the Review Petitions were again taken up C
for hearing on 8th February, 2011.
6. Five broad propositions were canvassed on behalf of
the Review Petitioner, Shri Akhilesh Yadav, namely,
(i) Can this Court direct a CBI inquiry without the o
consent of the State concerned?
(ii) Does a Court have jurisdiction to refer the matter
to the CBI for investigation without forming a opinion
as to whether a prima facie case of the
commission of an offence had been made out? E
(iii) Can the Supreme Court order a CBI investigation
without expressly invoking its jurisdiction under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India?
F
(iv) Could the Supreme Court have entertained the Writ
Petition filed by the Respondent No.1 in the Review
Petition under the garb of a public interest litigation?
and
(v) Does the judgment and order dated 1st March, G
2007, passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.633 of
2005 warrant a review thereof?
7. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate,
appearing for the Review Petitioners, Shri Akhilesh Yadav and H
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A Smt. Dimple Yadav did not press the first proposition, since,
as indicated hereinbefore, the said question had been settled
by the Constitution Bench.
8. On the second proposition, Mr. Dwivedi urged that in
B the decision rendered by this Court in Common Cause, A
Registered Society Vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1999) 6 SCC
667], a Bench of three Judges of this Court had specifically
held that the CBI should not be involved in an investigation
unless a prima facie case is found and established against the
C accused. Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that this Court had inter alia
observed that the right to life engrained in Article 21 of the
Constitution means something more than mere survival or
animal existence. A man had, therefore, to be left alone to enjoy
life without fetters and should not be allowed to be hounded
either by the police or CBI only to find out as to whether he had
0
committed any offence or was living as a law abiding citizen.
This Court also observed that even under Article 142 of the
Constitution, this Court could not issue such a direction ignoring
the substantive provisions of law and the constitutional rights
available to a person.
E
9. On the third proposition relating to cases where this
Court had directed the CBI to investigate, Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that there were cases involving gross atrocities and
State apathy and there were also cases which stand on a
F different footing and are concerned with corruption. Learned
counsel submitted that in the present case no prima facie case
of corruption had been established against the review
petitioners and/or any of the proforma respondents and,
accordingly, the direction given to the CBI to conduct
G investigations against them was ex facie illegal. Referring to
various judgments in which directions had been given by this
Court to the CBI to conduct investigation, there were special
reasons for doing so in each case and not without a prima facie
case having been made out against them in such cases. Mr.
H Dwivedi urged that the CBI has no jurisdiction to inquire or
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 959
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
investigate into a matter where there is no material to show A
prima facie that an offence has been committed. Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that in the case of A.R. Antu/ay Vs. R.S. Nayak
[(1988) 2 SCC 602], this Court had held that no jurisdiction can
be conferred beyond the scope of the Act by Courts of law even
with consent. He also urged that in the case of Supreme Court B
Bar Association Vs. Union of India [(1998) 4 SCC 409], this
Court had observed that even the powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution vested in this Court could not be exercised in
a manner which was contrary to the Statute. It is only on account
of special reasons where it was felt that an investigation by the c
local police would prove to be ineffective, that directions had
been given to the CBI to take up the investigation. Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that there were no such special reasons in the instant
case which warranted the directions being given to the CBI to
conduct investigation into the allegations of corruption and o
police excesses as well as human rights violations.
10. As far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is concerned, Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that except for the fact that she is the wife of Akhilesh
Yadav, who had been a Member of Parliament since 2000,
there is no other ground to treat her as a public servant for the E
purposes of inquiry by the CBI. Mr. Dwivedi submitted that Smt.
Dimple Yadav carried on her own business in agricultural
produce and had her own income which had been wrongly
clubbed by the Writ Petitioner with the assets of Shri Akhilesh
Yadav to bring her within the ambit of the investigation by the F
CBI under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It
was further submitted that there is also no allegation that Smt.
Dimple Yadav had, in any way, aided or abetted any public
servant to commit any act which could have attracted the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and including G
Smt. Dimple Yadav i.n the inquiry against those who could be
said to be public servants, amounts to harassment of a private
individual having a separate source of income in respect of
which no offence under the aforesaid Act could be made out.
Mr. Dwivedi contended that the inquiry directed to be conducted H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A by the CBI in relation to the assets held by Shri Adkhilesh Yadav
and Smt. Dimple Yadav was contrary to the procedure
established by law and could not have been ordered even upon
invocation of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and
was, therefore, liable to be set aside in review.
B
11. As far as the fourth proposition is concerned, as to
whether the Supreme Court could have entertained the writ
petition filed by the Respondent No.1 in the review petition in
the garb of Public Interest Litigation, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that
the writ petitioner had not made any specific allegation against
C the review petitioners which merited a direction by the Court
to the CBI to conduct an investigation into the allegations
relating to acquisition of wealth by the Respondent Nos.2 to 5
in the writ petition, beyond their known sources of income.
Furthermore, the Writ Petitioner had links with the Indian
D National Congress, although, he had denied any connections
with the Congress Party. Mr. Dwivedi urged that the
Respondent No.1 herein had no locus standi to maintain the
writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation, since it was more
of a personal enmity rather than a public cause which had
E resulted in the filing of the writ petition. Mr. Dwivedi submitted
that the entire exercise had been undertaken to malign the
Respondent Nos.2 to 5 and was without any factual basis and
the writ petition had been filed only to harass the Respondent
No.2 to 5 therein and to tarnish their reputation amongst the
F people of Uttar Pradesh and also other parts of the country. Mr.
Dwivedi submitted that the writ petition had been filed with the
mala fide intention of discrediting the Review Petitioner and his
family members in the eyes of the local public and to adversely
affect their political fortunes in the State.
G
12. In addition to Mr. Dwivedi's submissions, Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate, who also appeared for Smt.
Dimple Yadav, submitted that merely because she belongs to
a family of politicians, she had been included within the ambit
of the scope of the investigation which was unwarranted, since
H
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 961
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
it did not have any nexus with the objects sought to be achieved A
by such an inquiry.
13. Mr. Rohatgi also submitted that since despite his denial
it was amply clear that the Writ Petitioner, Mr. Vishwanath
Chaturvedi, was a representative of the Congress Party, the B
Writ Petition ought to have been dismissed in limine. Mr.
Rohatgi submitted that the explanation given in the judgment
under review for invoking the Court's powers under Article 142
of the Constitution relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd.
Anis Vs. Union of India [(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 145], needed a C
second look in view of the decision in the Supreme Court Bar
Association case (supra). Mr. Rohatgi submitted that in Mohd.
Anis's case (supra), it had been held that in order to do
complete justice, the Supreme Court's power under Article 142
of the Constitution was not circumscribed by any statutory
provision, and the Supreme Court could direct an investigation D
by the CBI into an offence committed within a State without a
notification or order having been issued in that behalf, in public
interest, to do complete justice in the circumstances of a
particular case. However, in exercise of its powers under Article
142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not direct a E
fishing inquiry without reference to the facts and circumstances
of the offence of disproportionate assets under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988. Mr. Rohatgi urged that subsequently
in the Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra), this Court
held that the powers conferred on this Court under Article 142 F
of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are
complementary to those powers which are specifically
conferred on the Court by various Statutes, though not limited
by those Statutes. These powers exist independent of the
Statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. G
However, the powers conferred on the Court under Article 142
of the Constitution, being curative ·in nature, cannot be construed
as powers which authorize the Court to ignore the substantive
rights of a litigant while dealing with the cause pending before
it. It was further observed that "Article 142, even with the width H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where
none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions
dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something
indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. The very nature of
the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which
B to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to
balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the
litigating parties by 'ironing out the creases' in a cause or matter
before it." It was submitted that the decision in the Supreme
c Court Bar Association case (supra) cannot be reconciled with
the reasoning of the decision in Mohd. Anis's case (supra). Mr.
Rohatgi submitted that all the decisions rendered subsequent
to the decision rendered in the Supreme Court Bar
Association case (supra), following the earlier decision in
D Mohd. Anis's case (supra), were per incuriam. In support of
his submission, Mr. Rohtagi referred to the decision of this
Court in Textile Labour Association Vs. Official Liquidator
[(2004) 9 sec 741] wherein while examining the plenary power
of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, it referred to
the decision in the Supreme Court Bar Association case
E (supra). Mr. Rohatgi concluded on the note that under Article
142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court could always correct
any error made by it and to that effect it could recall its own
order, as was held in M.S. Ahlawat Vs. State of Haryana
[(2000) 1 sec 278].
F
14. Mr. Ashok Desai, learned Senior Advocate, who
appeared for Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Review Petitioner
in Review Petition (C) No.339 of 2007, based his submissions
mainly on the powers of the Supreme Court to direct the CBI
G to conduct an investigation in respect of an offence committed
within a State, without the consent of the State Government as
envisaged in Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1946
Acf. Mr. Desai attempted to distinguish the decisions rendered
H by this Court in the case of Advance Insurance Company Vs.
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 963
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
=
Gurudasmal [(1970) 3 SCR 881 (1970) 1 SCC 633] and in A
the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorzi Vs. CBI [(1994) Supp. 2 SCC
116]. Mr. Desai submitted that while in the first case, the
Government of Maharashtra had given its consent to the
investigation by the CBI, in the latter case the question involved
was not of grant of permission to investigate into the case, but B
withdrawal of such consent which had already been granted.
15. Mr. Desai reiterated the contentions, both of Mr.
Dwivedi and Mr. Rohatgi, that powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution could not be invoked in contravention of the .
provisions of a Statute and a fortiori the provisions of the C
Constitution. Mr. Desai also urged that in the Supreme Court
Bar Association case (supra) not only had the decision in
Mohd. Anis's case (supra) been referred to, but this Co1Jrt had
expressly disapproved the observation made therein by Mr.
V.C. Misra that the law laid down in Prem Chand Garg Vs. D
Excise Commissioner, UP., Allahabad [(1962) Supp. 1 SCR
885], in which it had been observed that despite the width of
the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 142(1),
even this Court could not under the said provision make an
order which was plainly inconsistent with the express statutory E
provisions of substantive law, much less, inconsistent with any
constitutional provision, was no longer good law.
16. Mr. Desai submitted that since the decision in the
Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra) had not been F
considered by this Court while rendering the judgment under
review and the relief had been moulded without any discussion
on such issue, the judgment was liable to be reviewed.
17. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Senior Advocate, who appeared for
the Respondent No.5, Shri Prateek Yadav, reiterated the G
submissions made by Mr. Dwivedi, Mr. Rohatgi and Mr. Desai
in relation to the decision rendered by this Court in the
Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra). Dr. Dhawan
submitted that the CBI, as a statutory body for the purpose of
conducting criminal investigation in extra-ordinary H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S.C.R.
A circumstances with the consent of the State Government, could
exercise powers within the limits and constraints of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which fact had not
been considered in the decisions rendered in State of West
Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal [(1985) 1 SCC 317), Bihar State
B Construction Co. Vs. Thakur Munendra Nath Sinha [(1988)
Supp. SCC 542] and also in Mohd. Anis's case (supra). Dr.
Dhawan submitted that within the constitutional framework, the
CBI could not encroach upon the powers of the police of several
States. Referring to Entry 80 in List I of the Seventh Schedule
c to the Constitution and Article 239AA, Dr. Dhawan submitted
that the Central Government was not entitled to extend the
powers and jurisdiction of the members of the police force
belonging to any area outside the State so as to enable the
police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any
D area outside that State without the consent of the State
Government of that State in which such area is situated. Dr.
Dhawan submitted that it was, therefore, clear that the direction
given by this Court to the CBI, which is a creation of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, to investigate into a
State subject, was contrary to the constitutional safeguards
E engrafted in Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. Reference was also made by Dr. Dhawan to the
principles evolved by the Privy Council in King Emperor Vs.
Khwaja Nazir Ahmed [AIR 1945 PC 18] and Bhajan Lal Vs.
State of Haryana [(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335], wherein it was
F observed that judicial review is subject to the principles of
judicial restraint and must not become unmanageable in other
aspects relating to the power of the Union or State
Governments. Reference was also made to Section 5 of the
1946 Act which listed the classes of offences which may be
G inquired into by the CBI.
18. Dr. Dhawan also contended that while entertaining a
public interest litigation, it was always necessary for the Court
to be extra cautious since at the very initial stage no opportunity
H is given to the Respondent to state his case before notice is
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 965
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
issued and at times it could result in premature reference to A
the CBI on a view short of a prima facie case, particularly where
the public interest litigation was politically motivated to
adversely affect the political consequences of the persons
involved. Dr. Dhawan lastly submitted that the direction given
to the CBI after completion of the inquiry to submit its report to B
the Union of India was clearly contrary to law and could not be
sustained under any circumstances.
19. In addition to the above petitions, we had also
considered I.A. Nos.16 and 17 of 2009 which had been filed C
by one Shri Ashutosh Srivastava, who appeared in-person in
support of his application for being impleaded. Having heard
learned counsel for the Respondents and the Applicant in-
person, 'fie had reserved orders on the same.
20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not D
inclined to implead Shri Srivastava in these proceedings and
his application for being impleaded stands rejected.
21. Appearing for the Writ Petitioner, Vishwanath
Chaturvedi, Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate, E
submitted that every order in which a mistake may be noticed
does not automatically call for a review and that the power of
review could be invoked only in circumstances as contained
in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
Referring to the decision dated 16th June, 2008 of this Court F
in State of West Bengal Vs. Kamal Sengupta and Anr. in Civil
Appeal No.1694 of 2006, Mr. Tulsi submitted that the term
"mistake or error apparent" which finds place in Order 47 Rule
1 CPC, by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident
per se from the record of the case and does not require any
detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts G
or legal position. In fact, in Parsion Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi
[(1997) 8 sec 715] it was observed that if an error is not self-
evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process
of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the
H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 13 S~C.R.
A face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
other words, an order or decision or judgment cannot be
corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the
ground that a different view could have been taken on a point
of fact or law, as the Court could not sit in appeal over its own
B judgment. Similar views were expressed by a Five-Judge
Bench of the Federal Court in Sir Hari Shankar Pal and Anr.
Vs. Anath Nath Mitter & Ors. [(1949) FCR 36], wherein it was,
inter alia, observed that a decision being erroneous in law is
certainly no ground for ordering review.
c 22. Various other decisions were also referred to which
will only serve to duplicate the decisions of this Court on the
said issue.
23. As has been indicated in paragraph 5 of this judgment,
D five broad propositions were canvassed on behalf of the review
petitioner, Shri Akhilesh Yadav, which were mainly confined to
the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court to
direct a CBI inquiry in respect of an offence alleged to have
been committed within a State, without the consent of the State
E concerned. Along with the above, the locus standi of the writ
petitioner to maintain the writ petition was also raised on behalf
of Shri Yadav. While the submissions on behalf of all the review
petitioners were centered around the said two propositions, a
specific issue was raised by Mr. Mukul Rohafgi as to whether
F the investigation and/or inquiry could also be extended to the
assets of Smt. Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav, since
she had neither held any post under the Government nor was
she involved in the activities of her husband or father-in-law, Shri
Mulayam Singh Yadav. The acquisition of wealth by her was
G attributed to her agricultural income and not to any source of
income through her husband and her father-in-law.
24. Same were the submissions made by Dr. Rajiv
Dhawan, appearing for Shri Prateek Yadav, and, in addition, it
was submitted that the said Respondent did not get a
H reasonable opportunity of stating his case before the judgment
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 967
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
was delivered in Writ Petition (C) No.633 of 2005 on 1st March, A
2007
25. As far as the first contention is concerned, the same
has been set at rest by the Constitution Bench in State of West
Bengal & Ors. Vs. The Committee for Protection of Democratic B
Rights, West Bengal & Ors., being Civil Appeal Nos.6249-
6250 of 2001. In the very first paragraph of its judgment the
Constitution Bench set out the issue, which had been referred
to it for its opinion in the following terms :
"The issue which has been referred for the opinion of the C
Constitution Bench is whether the High Court, in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (for
short "the CBI"), established under the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short "the Special D
Police Act"), to investigate a cognizable offence, which is
alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction
of a State, without the consent of the State Go"'.ernment."
26. After considering the various decisions on this point,
E
as also Article 246 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench
ultimately answered the reference in the manner following :
"In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred
is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to the CBI F
to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been
committed within the territory of a State without the consent
of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure
of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation
'Of power and shall be valid in ·law. Being the protectors G
of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High
Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also
an obligation to protect the fundamental rights,
guaranteed by Part Ill in general and under Article 21 of
the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly." H
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 13 S.C.R.
.A 27. A note of caution was also given by the Constitution
Bench, which, in fact, finds place in all the decisions relating to
this issue, namely, that the power which is vested in the superior
courts should be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in
exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide
B credibility and instill confidence in investigations or where the
incident may have national and international ramifications or
where such an order may be necessary for doing complete
justice and enforcing fundamental rights. The said note of
caution is an echo of the observations made by this Court in
C Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Anr.
[(1998) 4 sec 409], that such an inquiry by the CBI could be
justified in certain circumstances to prevent any obstruction to
the stream of justice.
28. That this Court had jurisdiction to direct the CBI to make
D an inquiry into the accumulation of wealth by Shri Mulayam
Singh Yadav and his family members in excess of their known
source of income, based on the allegations made in the writ
petition, cannot be questioned. By its judgment dated 1st
March, 2007, this Court merely directed an investigation into
E the allegations made in the writ petition and to submit a report
to the Union Government. The submissions made on behalf
of the review petitioners in this regard, must, therefore, be
rejected, except in regard to the direction given to the CBI to
submit a report of its inquiry to the Union Government.
F
29. In addition, the submissions made qua Smt. Dimple
Yadav merits consideration, since when the order under review
was passed, she had neither held any public office nor
Government post and was essentially a private person
G notwithstanding her proximity to Shri Akhilesh Yadav and Shri
Mulayam Singh Yadav. On reconsideration of her case, we are
of the view that the investigation launched against her on the
issue of amassing wealth beyond her known source of income,
is liable to be dropped. The review petition, so far as Smt.
Dimple Yadav is concerned, is, accordingly, allowed and the
H
AKHILESH YADAV ETC. v. VISHWANATH 969
CHATURVEDI [ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.]
investigation conducted by the CBI against her should, A
therefore, be dropped.
30. As far as the other revi~w petitioners are conperned,
we have to keep in mind the fact that the scope and ambit of a
review proceeding is limited and th~ order dated 1st March, B
2007, in respect of which review has been sought, was neither
irregular nor without jurisdiction and was passed after
considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective
parties. The review proceedings cannot be converted· into an
appeal.
c
31. The judgment under review does not, in our view, suffer
from any error apparent on the face of the record, except for
the directions given in the case of Smt. Dimple Yadav. There
is another error which we ourselves are inclined to correct.
While disposing of the writ petition and directing tbe CBI to D
inquire into the alleged acquisition of wealth by the Respondent
Nos.2 to 5, the CBI was directed to submit a report to the Union
of India and on receipt of such report, the Union of India was
given the liberty to take further steps depending upon the
outcome of the preliminary inquiry into the assets of the said E
respondents. Since, the CBI is an independent body and is
under no obligation to report to the Union of India in regard to
investigations undertaken by it, the direction to submit a report
of the inquiry to the Union of India and the liberty given to the
Union of India to take further steps on such report is not F
contemplated in the scheme of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946. It is for the CBI to decide what steps
it wishes to take on the basis of the inquiry conducted. We,
therefore, modify the order dated 1st March, 2007, and direct
that the directions given to the CBI to submit a report of its G
inquiry to the Union of India and the liberty given to the Union
of India to take further steps on such report, be deleted from
the order.
32. The review petitions are disposed of with the following
directions : H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012J 13 S.C.R.
A i) The CBI shall drop the inquiry into the assets of the
Respondent No.4, Smt. Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri
Akhilesh Yadav;
ii) The CBI may take such independent action, as it
considers fit, on the basis of the inquiry conducted
B
by it pursuant to the directions given by this Court
in the judgment under review, without seeking any
direction from the Union of India or on the basis of
any direction that may be given by it.
C K.K.T. Review Petitions disposed of.
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