AK DEVAIAHversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                  [2014] 10 S.C.R. 1021


                       AK DEVAIAH                               A
                            v.
                 STATE OF KARNATAKA
             (Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2007)
                   OCTOBER 14, 2014
                                                                B
   [M.Y. EQBAL AND PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]

    Penal Code, 1860:

     ss.498-A and 304-B /PC and ss. 3, 4 and 6 of Dowry         c
Prohibition Act - Suicide by bride in matrimonial home within
one year of marriage - Acquittal by trial court - Conviction
by High Court - Evidence on record establishing dowry
demand and harassment of bride - High Court has correctly
recorded the finding based on evidence and found appellant      0
guilty - Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 113A and 1138 - Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 - ss.3,4 and 6.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. Section 3048, IPC applies where the             E
death of a woman is caused by any burns, bodily injury
or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances,
within seven years of her marriage and the cause of death
is because the women was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or her husband's family or            F
relatives and such harassment should be in relation to a
demand of dowry. The Section provides the presumption
under which husband or relatives had committed the
offence of dowry death and renders them liable for
punishment unless the presumption is rebutted. [para 15]        G
[1031-E-G]
    Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana 2011 (1) SCR 724 =
(2011) 11 SCC 359; Thanu Ram vs. State of M.P. 2010 (12)

                            1021                                H
    1022    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


             =
A SCR 710 (2010) 10 SCC 353, Rajesh Bhatnagar vs. State
  of Uttarakhand 2012 (5) SCR 895 = (2012) 7 SCC 91 -
  referred to.

      1.2. In the instant case, the sister, brother and sister's
B husband of the deceased along with other witnesses had
  been examined as PWs 1, 2 and 3, who have consistently
  deposed about the demand and acceptance of dowry
  and also about the deceased being subjected to mental
  and physical cruelty by the appellant. The High Court has
  correctly recorded the finding based on evidence and
C found the appellant guilty of commission of offence. The
  judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is wholly
  perverse and based on conjectures and surmises. [para
  19-20] (1034-E-H]

D                       Case Law Reference:
        2011 (1) SCR 724           referred to           para 16
        2010 (12) SCR 710          referred to           para 17
        2012 (5) SCR 895           referred to           para 18
E
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 46 of 2007.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2005 of the
F   High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.
    828 of 1999(A).

        Rajesh Mahale and Krutin R. Joshi for the appellant.

        V.N. Raghupathy, Sanjay R. Hegde for the respondent.
G
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. The instant Criminal Appeal is directed
  against the judgment and order dated 25-8-2005 passed by
  the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal
H No. 828 of 1999 whereby setting aside the judgment of acquittal
       A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     1023
                 [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

 passed by the trial court allowed the appeal filed by State and      A
 the accused-appellant herein has been convicted for the
 offences punishable under Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the Dowry
 Prohibition Act and Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Indian
 Penal Code (in short, 'IPC'). The XXV Additional City Civil and
 Sessions Judge, Bangalore had acquitted the accused of the           B
 offences punishable under aforesaid sections.

        2. The prosecution case in a nutshell is that one Smt.
  Leelavati was married to the appellant on 16.4.1989 and was
  living in the house of the appellant at Konanakunte in Bangalore.
  Besides attending the household chores, she was gainfully           C
  employed in a private company. Even according to the
  Appellant, there used to be wordy altercations between him and
· the deceased since about the three months before her death
  (at the age of 28 years). These altercations between him and
  the deceased, according to the appellant, were regarding there      D
  being no indication of her becoming pregnant after the
  marriage. Further case of the prosecution is that before
  marriage of the deceased with the appellant, negotiations were
  held, wherein the appellant had demanded dowry in the form
  of cash amounting to Rs 15,000/- as well as gold and silver         E
  ornaments. Pursuant to such demand made by the appellant,
  it is stated that a part of the dowry amount was given to the
  appellant before marriage and a further amount was given to
  him at the tifne of the marriage. All the ornaments demanded
  by the appellant, except a pair of gold bangles, were given to      F
  the appellant. The balance of dowry was agreed or promised
  to be given after the marriage. The appellant was also in the
  habit of consuming liquor. After marriage, the deceased had
  been subjected to mental and physical torture over certain
  issues including the one for demand of balance of dowry.            G

      3. The deceased had complained to her brother and sister
 as well as to her brother-in-law about the ill-treatment meted
 out on her by the appellant and ultimately, the deceased being
 unable to bear any more torture of the appellant, committed
                                                                      H
    1024     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 10 S.C.R.


A suicide by setting herself on fire in their house at about 5:00
  AM on 16-3-1990 i.e., within a year of marriage. Appellant
  himself informed about the unnatural death of the deceased to
  the SHO of the jurisdictional Police Station at about 7:10 AM
  and a case regarding the unnatural death was registered.
8 Further investigation of the matter was done by the Investigating
  officer (PW 10) and the inquest proceedings were held on the
  dead body of the deceased by the Taluka Executive Magistrate.
  In the course of such proceedings, he also recorded the
  statement of the blood relatives of the deceased. On the basis
C of the materials disclosed during the inquest proceedings, a
  suo motu case was registered against the appellant for the
  aforesaid offences and FIR was lodged. The dead body of the
  deceased was subjected to postmortem examination by the ·
  Doctor (PW6) on 17.3.1990 and it was found that the dead
  body was partially pugilistic and smelled kerosene. The face,
D chest and upper limbs of the deceased were blackened and
  charred. Second and third degree burns were present all over
  the body, except over both feet. Heat ruptures were present
  over front of the left thigh and back of right middle, ring and little
  finger. The deceased had sustained 97% ante-mortem burns
E and death of the deceased was due to shock as a result of the
  burns sustained. However, the doctor did not find any symptoms
  of pregnancy.

       4. Appellant was arrested on 18-3-1990 and was
F subjected to interrogation by the Investigating Officer (PW 10).
  During the course of interrogation, appellant furnished certain
  information and pursuant to such information, the appellant
  along with Investigating officer, PW A and other panchas went
  to a pawn broker's shop, where, he recovered the ornaments
G of the deceased, which were pledged by the appellant.

        5. In order to substantiate the case, the prosecution
    examined 11 witnesses, whereas in defence, 2 witnesses were
    examined. The appellant, when examined under section 313
    Cr.P.C., has denied all the incriminating circumstances                _
H
      A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     1025
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. He,               A
however, admitted that he furnished the information about
unnatural death of his wife to the police and a case regarding
unnatural death of the deceased was registered at the police
station. On being questioned about the prosecution evidence
adduced in the case, accused-appellant has stated as under:-         B

    "We belong to kodava community. In our community there
    is no custom of giving and taking dowry. In our community
    half the expenses is borne by the bridegroom and half is
    borne by the bride's side. I have never demanded dowry,          C
    I have not harassed my wife for bringing dowry. The
    witnesses are giving false deposition. Even after 9 months
    of marriage my wife did not conceive. There was no
    indication in this regard either and for this reason I
    requested to consult a doctor and she was offended by
    this. For this reason alone she might have committed             D
    suicide."
                                                                /

     6. Considering the material evidence placed on record by
the prosecution and after hearing both sides, the trial court
acquitted the accused-appellant of the charges against him           E
holding that:-

    "The evidence adduced by the prosecution merely raised
    suspicion that something on the part of the accused might
    have prompted the deceased to commit suicide. However,
                                                                     F
    that evidence is not sufficient to positively say that the
    alcoholic behavior of the accused, his demand of dowry,
    his taunts for not conceiving the child has the cumulative
    effect of the deceased leading her to commit suicide."

    7. Dissatisfied and aggrieved by the decision of the trial       G
court, State preferred appeal under Section 378(1) and (3),
Cr.P.C before the High Court. After hearing learned counsel
appearing on either side, perusing the judgment of the trial court
and re-appreciating the evidence on record, High Court, in the
impugned judgment, opined that the trial court has approached        H
    1026     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A the entire matter in a spirit of distrust and prosecution and its
  judgment is based upon conjectures, surmises and suspicions.
  Setting aside the acquittal judgment passed by the trial court
  and allowing the appeal of the State, the High Court convicted
  the appellant for the offences under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of
8 Dowry Prohibition Act and Section 498-A and 304-8, IPC. High
  Court sentenced the accused-appellant for the offence under
  Section 304-8, IPC to undergo imprisonment for a period of 7
  years and for the offence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition
  Act, High Court also awarded sentence of 5 years and fine of
c Rs. 15000/- and in default of payment of such fine, to undergo
  further sentence for a period of 2 years. Appellant was further
  directed to return the dowry amount of Rs 15000/- as well as
  the gold ornaments, failing which, an amount equal to value of
  the gold ornaments and Rs. 15000/- may be recovered as if it
D were the fine imposed by the Court in accordance with the
  provisions contained under Sections 421 and 422, Cr.P.C.
  Hence, present appeal by special leave by the accused.

           8. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant as well
    as for the State of Karnataka and perused the papers placed
E   before us. Learned counsel appearing for the accused-
    appellant submitted that appellant's wife committed suicide in
    the kitchen in early hours of the day by setting herself on fire
    after pouring kerosene on herself, and the appellant within a
    period of two hours reported the incidence of unnatural death
F   to the SHO of the jurisdictional police station. An FIR was
    registered on the statement given at the time of inquest
    proceedings by PWs 1 to 3, who are relatives of the deceased.
    It is contended that the trial court compared the statements of
    these witnesses at the time of inquest with the deposition given
G   in the Court and held that these witnesses had not mentioned
    the facts about dowry harassment etc. The evidence would
    show that the jewellery and cash were given as gifts and to help
    the appellant to meet the marriage expenses and not as dowry.
    It is further contended that the High Court has placed reliance
H   on the deposition of these witnesses without comparing their
      A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                    1027
                [MY EQBAL, J.]

statement given at the time of inquest. The High Court has also     A
not appreciated that there is absolutely no evidence of
harassment or cruelty soon before the death. It is submitted on
behalf of the appellant that the High Court has drawn the
presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act
though the ingredients of the offences were not proved and it       B
was not shown by the prosecution that the appellant treated the
deceased with such cruelty and subjected her to such
harassment to drive her to commit suicide.

     9. It has been further submitted on behalf of the appellant    C
that the deceased and the accused both belonged to Kodava
community and, as admitted by the prosecution witnesses
themselves, there was no such custom of demand and
acceptance of dowry in Kodava community. It has been further
submitted that PWs 1 to 3 are the close relatives cif the
deceased and they are highly interested in the outcome of the       D
prosecution case. Present one is a case where the
independent persons, who were present at the time of the
marriage negotiations, were not examined and there is no
explanation on the side of the prosecution as to why the
independent witnesses were not even cited in the chargesheet.       E
Although PW1 had given description of the gold ornaments, but
he did not give actual amount alleged to have been demanded
by the appellant. Whereas PW2, who was not present at the
time of the marriage negotiations, gave the exact figure of
amount that was demanded by the appellant.                          F
     10. It is also contended on behalf of the appellant that the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses themselves would show
that the amount that was given to the appellant was towards
the expenses for the marriage and that being so, it cannot be       G
termed as dowry. The same is the case with regard to the
ornaments that were alleged to have been given by PW-1 at
the time of the marriage. Their evidence would show that all
these ornaments were given voluntarily as per the custom and
that being so, they cannot be termed as dowry. It is further
                                                                    H
    1028     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A contended that the fact of recovery of ornaments at the instance
  of the accused has only been deposed by the Investigating
  Officer PW-10, but his evidence being incomplete, the same
  is not admissible in law. Further these ornaments were also not
  got identified through PWs 1 to 3. Even the pawnbroker, with
B whom the said ornaments were pledged, has not been
  examined in the case. It is contended on behalf of the appellant
  that the recovery evidence is wholly inadequate and not
  satisfactory.
       11. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that
C although the deceased had died hardly within 11 months of her
  marriage, but there is no evidence on record to show that soOn
  before her death, there was harassment for dowry. The
  evidence of PWs 1 to 3, if scrutinized carefully, besides being
  inconsistent and contradictory, would not establish the essential
D ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 304-8, IPC,
  that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to
  cruelty over a demand for dowry. There is no positive evidence
  on record to show that the accused used to harass the
  deceased in his house in a drunken state. Learned counsel for
E the appellant made his best efforts to persuade us to hold that
  the High Court erred in reversing the judgment and order of
  acquittal passed by the trial court.
        12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
F respondent-State of Karnataka submitted that prior to the
  marriage, the appellant had demanded dowry in the form of
  cash and ornaments etc. and PWs. 1 to 3 have consistently
  spoken about the demand and acceptance of dowry and also
  about the deceased being subjected to mental and physical
  cruelties by the appellant in their house. After the marriage, the
G appellant was coercing his wife to bring the balance of dowry
  and she being unable to bear the torture had committed suicide.
  The appellant had even pledged the ornaments that were given
  to the deceased at the time of marriage. It is vehemently
  contended by the State that PWs. 1 to 3 being the close
H relatives of the deceased were the most competent and natural
      A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                  1029
                [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

witnesses to speak the aforesaid fact and there was no reason     A
to disbelieve them.

     13. As noticed above, the High Court while allowing the
appeal, set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial
court and convicted the appellant for the offences punishable     8
under Sections 498A and 3048, IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Before coming to the
judgment of the High Court, we would like to quote Section 304-
8, IPC and Section 113-A and 113-8 of the Evidence Act.

    "3048, IPC: Dowry death.-                                     C

    (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns
    or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
    circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it·
    is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to D
    cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
    husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
    such death shall be called "dowry death", and such
    husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her
    death.                                                      E
           Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,
           "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section
           2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961 ).

            (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be              F
            punished with imprisonment for a term which shall
            not be less than seven years but which may extend
            to imprisonment for life."

    Sections 113A and 1138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 read         G
as under:-

    "113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
    married woman- When the question is whether the
    commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by
    her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown    H
    1030   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A      that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
       years from the date of her marriage and that her husband
       or such relative of her husband had subjected her to
       cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the
       other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had
B      been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her
       husband. tc "1[113A. Presumption as to abetment of
       suicide by a married woman.-When the question is
       whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been
       abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and
c      it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period
       of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her
       husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her
       to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the
       other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had
       been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her
D
       husband.

              "Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,
              "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section
              498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] tc
E             "Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,
              "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section
              498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

       1138. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the
F      question is whether a person has committed the dowry
       death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
       death such woman has been subjected by such person to
       cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
       demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
       person had caused the dowry death. tc "2[1138.
G
       Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is
       whether a person has committed the dowry death of a
       woman and it is shown that soon before her death such
       woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or
       harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for
H
      A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                    1031
                [M.Y. EQ8AL, J.]

    dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had             A
    caused the dowry death." Explanation.-For the purposes
    of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning
    as in section 3048, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of
    1860).] tc "Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,
    "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in section         8
    3048, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860)."

     14. We also take notice of Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. The word 'Dowry' has been defined in
Section 2 of the Act, which means any property or valuable
security agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one    C
party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage or by the
parents of either party to a marriage. However, it does not
include 'Dower or Mehar' in the case of persons to whom
Muslim Personal Law applies. Section 3 of the Act is a penal
provision which makes giving or taking or abetting the giving       D
or taking of dowry punishable. The demand of dowry directly
or indirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardians of
bride or bridegroom has also been made punishable under
Section 4 of the Act.
                                                                    E
     15. Section 3048, IPC applies where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns, bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her
marriage and the cause of death is because the women was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or her            F
husband's family or relatives and such harassment should be
in relation to a demand of dowry. Section provides the
presumption under which husband or relatives had committed
the offence of dowry death and render them liable for
punishment unless the presumption is rebutted.
                                                                    G
     16. Interpreting the above provision, this Court inBansi Lal
vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359, observed:-

     "19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its
     wisdom has used the word "shall" thus, making a                H
    1032     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A       mandatory application on the part of the court to presume
        that death had been committed by the person who had
        subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with
        any demand of dowry. It is unlike the provisions of Section
        113-A of the Evidence Act where a discretion has been
8       conferred upon the court wherein it had been provided that
        court may presume abetment of suicide by a married
        woman. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the
        accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section
        113-8 relatable to Section 304-8 IPC, the onus to prove
c       shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. The only
        requirements are that death of a woman has been caused
        by means other than any natural circumstances; that death
        has been caused or occurred within 7 years of her
        marriage; and.such woman had been subjected to cruelty
        or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
D
        husband in connection with any demand of dowry."

         17. Section 113A of the Evidence Act and Section 107,
         IPC have also been considered by this Court in the case
         of Thanu Ram vs. State ofM.P., (2010) 10 SCC 353, this
E        Court held as under:-

        "25. In our view, the element of instigation as understood
  within the meaning of Section 107 IPC is duly satisfied in this
  case in view of the provisions of Section 113-A of the Evidence
F Act, 1872, which provides for a presumption to be arrived at
  regarding abetment of suicide by a married woman and certain
  criteria are also laid down therein. The first criterion is that such
  suicide must have been committed within 7 years from the
  date of the victim's marriage. Since Hirabai committed suicide
G in the 4th year of her marriage, such condition is duly satisfied.
  The second condition is that the husband or sucl'I· relative of the
  husband had subjected the victim to cruelty which led to the
  commission of suicide by the victim. Section 113-A indicates
  that in such circumstances, the court may presume, having
  regard to all the circumstances of the case, that such suicide
H
       A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     1033
                 [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

 had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her           A
 husband."

      1-8. In the case of Rajesh Bhatnagar vs. State of
 Uttarakhand, (2012) 7 sec 91, this Court held as under:-
-·'   "15. Before we examine the merit or otherwise of this           B
      contention, it will be useful to state the basic ingredients
      of Section 304-B IPC. The requirement of Section 304-B
      is that the death of a woman be caused by burns, bodily
      injury or otherwise than in normal circumstances, within
      seven years of her marriage. Further, it should be shown        C
      that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty
      or harassment by her husband or her husband's family or
      relatives and thirdly, that such harassment should be in
      relation to a demand for dowry. Once these three
      ingredients are satisfied, her death shall be treated as a      D
      "dowry death" and once a "dowry death" occurs, such
      husband or relative shall be presumed to have caused her
      death. Thus, by fiction of law, the husband or relative would
      be presumed to hiive committed the offence of dowry
      death rendering them liable for punishment unless the           E
      presumption is rebutted. It is not only a presumption of law
      in relation to a death but also a deemed liability fastened
      upon the husband/relative by operation of law.

                              )()()()()()()(
                                                                      F
      34. Furthermore, the entire conduct of the accused is such
      as to lead to only one plausible conclusion i.e. all the
      accused together had caused the death of the .deceased.
      The arguments of the defence are strange because if the
      accused had attempted to save the deceased, then he             G
      would have suffered some burn injuries. But as per the
      above details of injuries, there was not even a single burn
      injury found on the body of the accused Mukesh. These
      injuries were such that one could suffer only if he was
      struggling or fighting with another person, as then alone       H
    1034     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A        could he suffer such bruises or minor cuts. Absence of any
         cooking material in the kitchen is another very important
         circumstance which would belie the stand of the accused."

         19. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnized on 16.4.1989
B   and the incident took place on 16.3.1990 i.e. within a period
    of eleven months only. From the evidence it reveals that the
    altercation between the appellant and the deceased started
    three months before the incident when there was no indication
    of the deceased becoming pregnant after marriage. According
C   to the prosecution, before the marriage of the deceased with
    the appellant, negotiations were held with regard to the
    demand of dowry in the form of cash as well as gold and silver
    ornaments. It further reveals that part of the dowry amount was
    given to the appellant before marriage and further amount was
    given at the time of marriage. The prosecution further led
D   evidence that the appellant was in the habit of consuming liquor
    and further the deceased had been subjected to physical and
    mental cruelty over certain issues including demand of balance
    dowry. The deceased being not in a position to bear more
    torture and cruelty pertaining to demand of dowry committed
E   suicide by setting herself on fire. The sister, brother and sister's
    husband of the deceased along with other witnesses had been
    examined as PWs 1, 2 and 3, who have consistently deposed
    about the demand and acceptance of dowry and also about the
    deceased being subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the
F   appellant in their house.

       20. We have gone though the evidence both oral and
  documentary brought on record. We have also analysed and
  scrutinized the evidence and the material available on record.
G In our considered opinion, the High Court has correctly
  recorded the finding based on evidence and found the appellant
  guilty of commission of offence. The judgment of acquittal
  passed by the trial court is wholly perverse and based on
  conjecture and surmises.
H
        A K DEVAIAH v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                     1035
                  [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]
        21. After giving our thoughtful consideration in the matter,   A
· we are in full agreement with the findings recorded by the High
  Court and in our opinion the impugned judgment needs no
  interference by this Court. The appeal preferred by the accused,
  therefore, stands dismissed.
                                                                       B
 Rajendra Prasad                                   Appeal dismissed.