AJMER KAURversusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

                            AJMER KAUR                                    A
                                   v.
                   STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

                             MAY 7, 2004

                                                                          B
            [BRIJESH KUMAR AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.]

     Punjab Land Reforms act, 1972; Sections 3(4) and IJ(5) & (7):

      Filing of return regarding land holding by husband and wife-
 Collector ordered certain land as surplus-Application for re-determination C
filed by the applicant almost 5 years after the death of his wife-Collector
held that applicant was not holding any surplus land-On Review, reversed
by the Collector-Revision/Review petitions/writ petition filed by the
daughter of the applicant after the death of her father-Dismissed by the
revenue authorities and the High Court-On appeal, Held: Application for D
re-determination ought to have been dismissed as it was filed by the
application almost 5 years after the death of his wife-Assuming that the
landowner had the right to file the application even then it ought to be
exercised within a reasonable time-Permitting the application at belated
stage would have disastrous consequences and would result in grave E
 injustice-Defeats the object ofthe legislation-Collector was wrong in re-
opening the issue and reversing earlier order.

     Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887; Sections 80, 81 and 82:

     Period of Limitation/review-Held: Maximum period of limitation is
                                                                          F
ninety days-Since appeal against the order of the Collector declaring
surplus land was dismissed and not challenged further, it became final-
lt cannot be re-opened after a lapse of 6 years.

      Father of the appellant, landowner, filed a return along with his G
wife declaring the land owned by them. Collector held 3.12 acres of
the land surplus. The landowner preferred an appeal, which was
dismissed by the Commissioner. In the meanwhile, surplus land was
mutated in favour of the State Government which in turn allotted it
to third parties. The landowner filed an application for re-deter~ination H
                                   601
    602               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A of the land holding almost S year after the death of his wife on the
  ground of succession. The Collector held that there was no surplus
  land. The surplus land declared earlier was restored to him and the
  mutation in favour of the State Government was concelled. The
  Collector, after obtaining necessary permission, reviewed its earlier
B order and held that the owner .was holding surplus land. Appeal filed
  by the owner was dismissed by the Commissioner. After the death of
  the landowner, his daughter filed a Revision Petition, which was
  dismissed by the Financial Commissioner. Aggrieved, she filed a writ
  petition, which was dismissed by the High Court; however, it permitted
C the petitioner to file a Review Petition to raise the questions which were
  sought to be reviewed in the writ petition. Review Application filed by
  her was dismissed by the Financial Commissioner. She challenged the
  order of the Commissioner, which was again dismissed by the High
  Court. Hence the present appeals.

D         It was contended by the appellant that since the order of the
    Collector holding that there was no surplus land had become final, it
    could not have been reviewed/re-opened by the Collector after expiry
    of the limitation period of 90 days; and that the right conferred on the
    land-owner under Section 11 (S) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act could
E   not be defeated by application of sub-section (7) ofSectionll of the Act.

         Respondents submitted that the power to condone delay has been
    vested with the authorities under the provisions of law; and that the
    time to seek review could be extended.

F         Dismissing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1. The bar of limitation does not come in the way of the
  Collector re-determining the permissible land holding of the landowner.
  Clause (b) of sub-section (I) of Section 82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act
G shows that review can be made even after expiry of period of ninety
  days were the Revenue Officer is satisfied about cause for delay. The
  fact that the Commissioner granted permission to the Collector to
  review his order suggests that the hurdle of limitation had been
  successfully crossed. (606-F-G I

H         2.1. On 15th October, 1979, when the wife of the land-holder
                       AJMER KAUR v. STATE                         603
made her Will she was left with no interest or title in the land and A
therefore she could not have made a Will with respect thereto. The
delay of almost 5 years by the landowner in filing the application for
re-determination of the surplus land after death of his wife is fatal for
him and the application for re-determination ought to have been
dismissed on this ground alone. Assuming that he had a right to make B
an application under Section 11(5) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act
but the right had to be exercised within a reasonable time. It cannot
be said that the right under Section 11 (5) of the Act could be exercised
at any time at the sweet will of the applicant. Permitting an application
under Section 11(5) of tlie Act to be moved at any time would have C
disastrous consequences. (606-F, G-H; 607-A)

     2.2. The concept of reasonable time in the given facts would be
most appropriate. An application must be moved within reasonable
time. The facts of the present case demonstrate that re-determination D
under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act almost 5 years after the
death of wife of the applicant and more than 6 years after the order
of the Collector declaring the land as surplus had become final, has
resulted in grave injustice besides defeating the object of the legislation
which was envisaged as a socially beneficial piece of legislation. Thus,
the application for re-determination of Ianll holding filed by the E
landowner under sub-section (5) of Section 11 of the Act was liable
to be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector
was wrong in re-opening the issue and declaring the land as not
surplus. (609-G-H; 610-A-B)
                                                                         F
      3. The provisions regarding appeals etc. contained in Sections
80-82 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made applicable to
proceedings under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972, show that. the
maximum period of limitation in case of appeal or review is ninety
days. The appeal against the final order of the Collector dated 30th G
September, 1976 whereby 3.12 hectares of land had been declared as
surplus was dismissed on 27th March, 1979. The order was allowed to
become final, as it was not challenged any further. Thus the
determination by the Collector becomes final on 27th March, 1979
itself, the same could not be re-opened after a lapse of more than 6 H
    604                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A years by order dated 23rd July, 1985. The subsequent proce.edings
    before the Revenue authorities did not lie. The Collector's order dated
    23rd July, 1985 is non-est. So all the subsequent proceedings fall
    through. (610-C-D-E]

B       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6489-
    6490 of 1998.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.98 of the Punjab and
    Haryana High Court in C.W.P. ~o. 11817-18/98.

c         Manoj Swarup and Ms. Nidhi Agarwal for the Appellant.

         Har Dev Singh, Ms. Madhu Moolchandani, Seeraj Bagga, Mrs.
    Suresh Bagga, Kuldip Singh and Mrs. Naresh Bakshi for the Respondents.

D         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          ARUN KUMAR, J. : These appeals are directed against the judgment
    of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing in limine a Writ Petition
    filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the revenue authorities
E   regarding declaration oh portion of land owner by predecessor in interest
    of the appellant as surplus under The Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972(
    hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). Briefly the facts are that Daya Singh,
    father of the petitioner filed a return regarding his and his wife Kartar
    Kaur's holding of lands under Section 5 of the Act. After scrutinizing the
F   return, the Collector found that the holding in their hands came to 10.12.
    hectares of first quality land. Out of that they were entitled to 7 hectares
    of land. Thus 3.12 hectares of land was found to be surplus which the land
    owners were required to surrender. Daya Singh filed an appeal against the
    said order before the Commissioner. One of the objections taken by Daya
G   Singh in his appeal was that the land held by his wife Kartar Kaur could
    not be clubbed with the land held by him. This objection was turned down
    by the Commissioner. It was observed that according to Section 3(4) of
    the Act a "family" in relation to a person means a person, wife or husband,
    as the case may be, of such person and his or her minor children. The
H   appeal was dismissed by the Commissioner. Kartar Kaur wife of Daya
             AJMER KAUR v. STATE [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                    605

Singh died on 9th October, 1980. In 1982, the surplus land was mutated A
in favour of the State Government and in 1983 it was allotted to third
parties.

      On 21st June, 1985 Daya Singh filed an application under Section
11 (5) of the Act for re-determination of the land holding in view of death B
ofKartar Kaur. The Collector vide his order dated 23rd July, 1985 disposed
of the said application holding that there was no surplus area of land with
Daya Singh. The land declared surplus vide earlier order dated 30th
September, 1976 was ordered to be restored to Daya Singh and the
mutation in favour of the State Government was cancelled. On 19th May, C
1986, the Collector sought permission from the Commissioner to review
the order dated 23rd July, 1985. The Commissioner granted the requisite
permission on 14th August, 1986. In view of the permission granted to him,
the Collector heard the matter all over again and vide his order dated 22nd
December, 1986 held that Daya Singh was in possession of surplus land. D
The order dated 30th September, 1976 passed by the Collector earlier
declaring 3.12 hectares ~f first quality land as surplus was maintained and
the Mutation No. 2760 vide which ownership and possession of surplus
land was sanctioned in favour of the State Government was restored.
Appeal filed by Daya Singh against the said order was dismissed by the E
Commissioner vide his order dated I Ith November, 1987. On 22nd
December, 1987, Daya Singh died. Revision filed by Ajmer Kaur (appellant
herein) before the Financial Commissioner against the order of Commissioner
was dismissed on 27th January/J994. This order of the Financial
Commissioner was challenged in the Punjab and Haryana High Court by
way of a Writ Petition. The Writ Petition was however dismissed on 3rd F
October, 1994 permitting the petitioner to approach the . Fianancial
Commissioner by way of a Review Petition wherein she could raise all the
questions sought to be raised in the Writ Petition. Thus the matter went
back to the Financial Commissioner by way of Review applications. The
review applications were dismissed by the Financial Commissioner vide G
order dated I 0th March, 1998. The order of the Financial Commissioner
was again challenged by way of Writ Petitions filed in the Punjab and
Hayana High Court at Chandigarh. The Writ Petitions were again dismissed
by the High court vide order dated 30th July, 1998. The present appeals
are directed against the said orders of the High Court.                     H
    606                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A         Mr. Manoj Swarup, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
    raised the following points in support of the appeals :

             1.    The order dated 23rd July, 1985 passed by the Collector on
                  application under Section 11(5) of the Act holding that there
B                 was no surplus land had become final and the same could
                  not be reviewed or reopened by the Collector particularly
                  after 90 days in view of Section 81 of the Act.

             2.    Section 11(5) of the Act conferred a right on the land owner
                   which could not be defeated by sub-section (7) of Section
C                  11 of the Act.

        Regarding the first point it was contended that at the most the
  respondents (Revenue authorities) could take the benefit of a period of
  ninety days to file review against the order dated 23rd July, 1985 whereby
  declaration of surplus land was re-determined and it was held that there
D was no surplus land in the hands of Daya Singh. The Collector sought
  review after about nine months which was clearly barred by time. In reply
  the learned counsel for respondents submitted that there is power to
  condone delay with the authorities in exercise of which time to seek review
  can be extended. In support of the submission, our attention was invited
E to Section 82 of the Act which contains provision regarding review of
  orders ofrevenue authorities. According to sub-clause (b) of Section 82(1)
  "no application for review of an order shall be entertained unless it is made
  within ninety days from the passing of the order or unless the applicant
  satisfies the Revenue Officer that he had sufficient cause for not making
F the application within that period." We have considered the rival contentions.
  In our view the bar oft imitation does not come in the way of the Collector
  re-determining the permissible land holding of Daya Singh. A bare reading
  of clause (b) of sub-section (I) of Section 82 shows that review can be
  made even after expiry of period of ninety days where the Revenue Officer
G is satisfied about cause for delay. The fact that the Commissioner granted
  permission to the Collector to review his order suggests that the hurdle of
  limitation had been successfully crossed.

           Coming to the second point a conflict is suggested between sub-
    sections (5) and (7) of Section 11 of the Act. We would like to quote the
H   relevant provisions :
                AJMER KAUR v. STATE [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                   607
                "Section 11                                                   A
                (I)

                (2)

                (3)                                                           B

                (4)

               (5)    Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
         for the time being in force and save in the case of land acquired C
         by the State Government under any law for the time being in force
         or by an heir by inheritance, no transfer or other disposition of
         land which is comprised in the surplus area under the Punjab law,
         the Pepsu law or this Act, shall affect the vesting thereof in the
         State Government or its utilization under the Act.
                                                                              D
         (6) ................ .

         (7) Where succession has opened after the surplus area or any part
         thereof has been determined by the Collector, the saving specified
         in favour of an heir by inheritance under sub-section (5) shall not E
         apply in respect of the area so determined."

      According to sub-section (5) no transfer or other disposition of land
which comprised in the surplus area shall affect the vesting thereof in the
State Government or its utilisation under the Act. However, exception is      F
created in cases of :

(I)   acquisition of land by the State Government;

(2)   inheritance, that is, devolution of interest in the land on account of G
      death etc. in the family which will be a case of involuntary transfer.

        Sub-section (7) seems to take away the benefit conferred by sub-
section ( 5) regarding reopening of determination of surplus land in cases
speci tied in the said sub-section. According to sub-section (7) where
succession opens after the surplus area or any part thereof has been H
      608                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A detennined by the Collector,the exception provided in sub-section (5) shall
      not apply in respect of the surplus land.

            It is argued that sub-section (7) takes away the right conferred by
      sub-section (5), therefore the same has to be ignored. In support of his
B     contention the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a Full Bench
      decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ajit Kaur and ors. v.
      State of Punjab and Ors. (1980) Punjab Law Journal 354. The said
      judgment indicates that the Full Bench posed a conflict between the two
      provisions and tried to resolve the same.

c        In our view, it is not necessary for us to enter into the controversy
  regarding the alleged conflict between the provisions of sub-sections (5)
  and (7) of Section 11 of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, we feel
  that these appeals can be decided on the basis of the fact that the initial
  order whereby the Collector declared 3.12 hectares of land as surplus was
D passed on 30th September, 1976. The appeal against the said order filed
  by Daya Singh, land owner, was dismissed on 27th March, 1979. Kartar
  Kaur wife of Daya Singh, along with whom Daya Singh had filed a joint
  return with respect to the lands, died on 9th October, 1980. The surplus
  lands were mutated in favour of the State Government in the year 1982
E and the State Government allotted the same to third parties including the
  respondents No. 5 to 7 herein in the year 1983. Respondent No. 7 has filed
  an affidavit stating that he is in possession of the land allotted to him. Kartar
   Kaur is said to have made a Will on 15th October, 1979 regarding a portion
  of land declared surplus in favour of a Gurudawara which has been
F impleaded as respondent No.8 in this appeal. On 15th October, 1979 when
  Kartar Kaur made her Will she was left with no interest or title in the land
  and therefore she could not have made a Will with respect thereto. Daya
  Singh filed an application for re-determination of the surplus land under
  Section 11 (5) of the Act only on 21st June, 1985 on the basis of the fact
  that Kartar Kaur had died and succession had re-opened. This application
G was made almost 5 years after the death of Kartar Kaur. In our view, this
  delay in making the application is fatal for Daya Singh and the application
  for re-determination ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone.
  Assuming that Daya Singh had a right to make an application under Section
   11(5) of the Act but the right had to be exercised within a reasonable time.
i-1
  It cannot be said that the right under Section 11 (5) can be exercised at any
              AJMER KAUR v. STATE [ARUN KUMAR, J.]                       609

time at the sweet will of the applicant. The order regarding determination A
of surplus land by. the Collector has serious consequences:

               I.   So far as the land owner is concerned he is divested of
                    the land.

                                                                               B
               2.   The surplus land vests in the State Government.

               3.   The State Government utilizes the surplus land in
                    accordance with law which includes allotment of the
                    surplus land to third parties like landless persons for C
                    purposes of cultivation etc.

      Permitting an application under Section 11 (5) to be moved at any time
would have disastrous consequences. The State Government in which the
land vests on being declared as surplus, will not be able to utilize the same.
The State Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely before putting D
the land to use. Where the land is utilized by the State Government a
consequence of the order passed subsequently could be of divesting it of
the land. Taking the facts of present case by way of an illustration, it would
mean the land which stood mutated in the State Government in 1982 and
which was allotted by the State Government to third parties in 1983, would E
as a result of reopening the settled position, lead to third parties being asked
to restore back the land to the State Government and the State Government
in tum would have to be divested of the land. The land will in tum be
restored to the land owner. This will be the result of the land being declared
by the Collector as not surplus with the land owner. The effect of permitting
such a situation will be that the land will remain in a situation of flux. There F
will be no finality. The very purpose of the legislation will be defeated.
The allottee will not be able to utilize the land for fear of being divested
in the event of deaths and births in the family of the land owners. Deaths
and births are events which are bound to occur. Therefore, it is reasonable
to read a time limit in sub-section (5) of Section 11. The concept of G
reasonable time in the given facts would be most appropriate. An application
must be moved within a reasonable time. The facts of the present case
demonstrate that re-determination under sub-section (5) of Section 11
almost 5 years after the death of Kartar Kaur and more than 6 years after
the order of Collector declaring the land as surplus had become final, has H
    610                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A resulted in grave injustice besides defeating the object of the legislation
  which was envisaged as a socially beneficial piece of legislation. Thus we
  hold that the application for re-determination filed by Daya Singh under
  sub-section (5) of Section II of the Act on 21st June, 1985 was liable to
  be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the Collector was
B wrong in re-opening the issue declaring the land as not surplus in the hands
  of Daya Singh and Kartar Kaur.

        The above reasoning is in consonance with the provision in sub-
  section (7) of Section 11 of the Act. Sub-section (7) uses the words "where
  succession is opened after the surplus area or any part thereof has been
C determined by the Collector....". The words "determined by the Collector"
  would mean that the order of the Collector has attained finality. The
  provisions regarding appeals etc. contained in Sections 80 82 of the Punjab
  Tenancy Act, 1887, as made applicable to proceedings under the Punjab :'.
  Land Reforms Act, 1972, show that the maximum period of limitation in
D case of appeal or review is ninety days. The appeal against the final order
  of the Collector dated 30th September, 1976 whereby 3.12 hectares ofland
  had been declared as surplus was dismissed on 27th March, 1979. The
  order was allowed to become final as it was not challenged any further.
  Thus the determination by the Collector became final on 27th March, 1979.
E The same could not be re-opened after a lapse of more than 6 years by
  order dated 23rd July, 1985. The subsequent proceedings before the
                                                                                 .
  Revenue authorities did not lie. The order dated 23rd July, 1985 is non-
  est. All the subsequent proceedings therefore fall through. The issue could
  not have been reopened.

F          As a result of above discussion, we find no merit in these appeals.
    The same are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their respective
    costs.

    S.K.S.                                                Appeals dismissed.