Holding

The complaint and FIRs against the appellants do not disclose a cognizable offence under Section 420 IPC and must be quashed.

Summary

The complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company, entered into five‑year bottling agreements with Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India, which were later assigned to Atlantic Industries, a Coca‑Cola subsidiary. After Atlantic gave notice that the agreements would not be renewed, the complainant filed a criminal complaint under Section 420 IPC alleging cheating and unfair trade practices against Cadbury and several Coca‑Cola officials, including Ajay Mitra. The magistrate ordered a police investigation and FIRs were registered, but the police report suggested the matter was essentially a civil dispute. The accused filed petitions under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIRs; the High Court dismissed them as premature. The Supreme Court held that the allegations, even if accepted, did not disclose the mens rea required for cheating under Section 420, and therefore no cognizable offence was made out against the appellants. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court order and quashed the complaint and FIRs against the appellants.

Issues considered

The FIR and criminal complaint disclose a cognizable offence under Section 420 IPC?
Whether the absence of mens rea (guilty intention) precludes a charge of cheating under Section 420 IPC?
Whether the High Court erred in holding the petitions under Section 482 CrPC premature.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155(2), s. 156(3), s. 173(2), s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 34, s. 415, s. 420, s. 511

Subjects

Section 420 IPCcheatingmens reaSection 482 CrPCquashing FIRcognizable offencecorporate liabilitybottling agreementcivil vs criminal jurisdiction

Judgment

A AJAY MITRA
v.
STATE OF M.P. AND ORS.

JANUARY 28, 2003

B [S. RAJENDRA BABU, BRIJESH KUMAR AND G.P. MATHUR, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Section 482-Criminal complaint/
FIR-Non-disclosure of commission of a cognizable offence-Quashing of-
C Held, such criminal complaint and FIR registered in pursuance thereof are
liable to be quashed-Penal Code, 1860-Section 420.

Penal Code, 1860-Section 420-Cheating-Essential ingredient-
Discussed

D Complainant company entered into bottling agreements with
company C which were to continue for a term of five years. Either party
could terminate the agreement at the end of initial term by giving 10
months notice in writing to the other side. Subsequently, a wholly owned
indirect subsidiary company of an export corporati_on purchased ~
trademarks from company C and the bottling agreements were assigned
E to it. Subsidiary company then gave written notice to the complainant that
they would not renew the agreement after expiry. Aggrieved, complainant
company filed a criminal complaint against accused persons including
appellants under Section 420 read with Section 511 IPC. Company C was
arrayed as accused No.1 and subsidiary company as accused No.6 in the
F complaint. It was alleged that accused No.6 has adopted unfair trade
practices and has made wrongful gain and accused No.1 has cheated the
complainant by making false representations. Magistrate directed the
police to investigate the offence. Police submitted its report and case was
registered under Sections 420, 120-B, 34 IPC and investigation~ were being
carried out. Appellants then filed petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for
G quashing of FIR and the proceedings of the case before the Magistrate.
High Court holding that the petitions were pre-mature dismissed the
petitions. Hence the present appeal.

Appellants contended that there is no allegation in the complaint
to make out offence against them; and that the allegations even if accepted
H 622
A.IA Y MITRA v. STATE OF M.P. 623

at their face value, do not disclose commission of any offence by appellants, A
--~ therefore, the proceedings of the complaint ca>e and FIRs are liable to be
quashed.

Respondents-State contended that police report stated that it was a
case of violation of agreement for which complainant could seek relief from
civil court, however, in view of subsequent order passed by Magistrate, B
case had been registered at the police station and matter was being
imestigated.

Complainant contended that the allegations in the complaint disclose
commission of an offence under Section 420 IPC by accused persons; and C
that High Court rightly held that the petitions filed for quashing of the
proceedings were pre-mature and the order does not suffer from any error
of law.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELD: I. I. A guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence
of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In other words 'mens rea' on the part
of the accused must be established before he can be convicted ofan offence
of cheating. In the instant case appellants came into picture when various
trademarks and brands of accused No. I were purchased by accused No.6.
They were not at all in picture at the time when the complainant claims E
to have spent money in improvement of its bottling plant on the basis of
the agreement executed with accused No.I, therefore, neither any guilty
intention can be attributed to them nor there can possibly be any intention
on their part to deceive the complainant. Therefore, no offence of cheating
can be said to have been committed by appellants on account of the fact F
that a notice was given to the complainant that the bottling agreements
will not be renewed any further aite.- expiry of the initial term.
(630-F; 631-D-F(

Jeswantrai Manila/ Akhaney v. The State of Bombay, AIR (1956( SC
575; Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1954) SC 724; Hari G
Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha and Ors., AIR (19741 SC 301
and G. V Rao v. l.H. V Prasad and Ors., 120001 3 SCC 693, referred to.

1.2. In the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint is that
accused No.6 has adopted unfair trade practices and has made wrongful
gain and accused No.I has cheated the complainant by making false H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) I S.C.R.

A representations, even if the allegations made in the complaint are accepted
to be absolutely true and correct, appellants cannot be said .to have
committed any offence of cheating as provided in Section 420 IPC. The
complaint filed and the FIRs registered in pursuance thereof are liable to
be quashed, hence the order of High Court is set aside.
1631-F; 632-F; 633-AI
B
Trisuns Chemical Industry v~ Rajesh Agarwal and Ors., 119991 8 SCC
686, distinguished.

State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors., AIR
11982) SC 949 and State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors.,
C AIR 11992) SC 604, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
129 of 2003. -+·
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.1.2002 of the High Court of
D M.P. in MCRLC 202 of 2001.
WITH

Crl. A. Nos. 130-32/2003.

E F.S. Nariman, D.C. Mathur, R.P. Gupta, Sushil Kumar,. Rajan Narian,
Sajan Narian, Amit Bhagat, Ashim Aggarwal, Karan Singh, Vivek Tankha,
Adv. Gen. M.P., Ms. Kamakshi S. Mehlwal, Arvind Kumar, Ms. Laxmi
Arvind, Mrs. Poonam Prasad, Ms. Jaya Sinha, for the appearing p_~rties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F MATHUR, J. Leave granted.

These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment and
order dated January 16, 2002 of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, by which
three Petitions filed by the appellants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were
G dismissed.

Mis Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Private Ltd. entered into three
identical Bottling Agreements with the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company . )..__
Private Limited on March I, 1996 pursuant to a Master Trademark License
entered into by associate companies of Cadbury Schweppes pie. United
H Kingdom and Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Private Limited. In terms
AJAY MITRA v. STA TE OF M.P. [MA THUR, J.] 625

of these three agreements, Mis. Sanjiva Bottling Company was authorised to A
manufacture and sell certain specified beverages under specified trademarks
owned by Cadbury Schweppes pie. U.K. or its associate companies. The

- agreements contained identical clauses with regard to their respective terms
and conditions and provided that they shall continue for an initial term of
five years and for further successive period of five years, unless terminated
by either party by giving to the other not less than .12 calendar months notice
B
in writing to terminate the agreement. On July 29, 1999, Atlantic Industries
(a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of The Coca-Cola Export Corporation,
USA) purchased about 3500 trademarks in I 55 countries from Cadbury
Schweppes pie., upon which the bottling agreements between Cadbury
Schweppes Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. and Sanjiva Bottling Company were C
duly assigned to Atlantic Industries and an information regarding the same
was given to Sanjiva Bottling Company in writing. On February 14, 2000,
Atlantic Industries gave notice in writing to the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling
Company that the bottling agreements shall not be renewed after their expiry
on February 28, 200 I.
D
Sanjiva Bottling Company through its Director, Rajiv Mehta filed a
•
criminal complaint against I I accused including the appellants in the Court
of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhopal on July 24, 2000 for their
prosecution under Section 420 read with Section 511 IPC. The accused no. I
arrayed in the complaint is Cadbury Schweppes Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. E
(A· I) and accused nos.2 to 5 are Chairman, Managing Director and Finance
Director etc. of the said Company. Besides them, Coca Cola India (A-6),
Alex Von Behr, President and Chief Executive Officer (A· 7). Nitin Dalvi,
Vice-Presiden~ Strategic Business, Planning and Information Services (A-8)
and Samip Shah, Vice-President, Business Development of Coca Cola India,
(A·8) Ajay Mitra, Regional Operational Director, Hindustan Coca Cola F
Beverages Pvt. Ltd. (A-10) and Steve M. Whaley, Vice-President and General
Tax Counsel, Atlantic Industries (A·l 1) have been arrayed as accused nos. 6
to 11. The case set up in the complaint is that the complainant is engaged in
the business of bottling soft drinks since 1983 at Bhopal. The complainant
was approached by A·I in 1995 to discontinue its competing brand 'Sprint' G
and a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on October 9, 1995.
Thereafter, an agreement was entered into between the complainant and A·
I on March I, 1996 by which the complainant became one of the bottlers of
A· I, made investments in the bottling plant. and also promoted the sales of
A· I in its area. By a letter dated July 29, 1999, A- I informed the complainant:
that the brands Schweppes, Crush and Canada Dry and associated brands in H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A India would be acquired by a member of the Coca Cola group of companies.
A- I had 19 bottlers in the year 1997 but Coca Cola India (A-6) had reduced
them to 7 and is installing its own bottling plants in different places. The case
of the complainant further is that by the letter dated February 14, 2000, A-

B
6 informed the complainant that they would not renew the agreements on
their expiry on February 28, 2001. In paras 47 and 48 of the complaint, it is
alleged that A-6 is adopting all sorts of unfair trade practices and that it has
-
1T::ic1e wrongful gain of over Rs. I 00 crores. In para 50, it is alleged that A-
l and A-6 have not replied properly to the letters of the complainant and the
accused have, therefore, cheated the complainant by making false
representation.
c
The learned Magistrate before whom the complaint was fiL:d passed an
order under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. on July 27, 2000 directing the police to
investigate the offence as the same was cognizable offence. The police
thereafter submitted a report on October 31, 2000 which reads as under :

D "After the entire inquiry it appears that the Cadbury Schweppes
Company and Coca Cola Company have violated the terms and
conditions of Business Agreement, as a result, the complainant has
suffered financial loss. The complainant was kept in darkness and
supplied confusing iuformation, consequently, Complainant suffered
economic loss. Primafacie a case of business competition and violation
E
of Agreements is made out and the complainant is advised to approach
the Civil Court."

After consideration of the report the learned Magistrate was of the
opinion that the police had not submitted the same in accordance with Section
F 173(2) Cr.P.C. and also in the proforma prescribed in the Rules framed by
the State Government as the same had been submitted on piain paper. The
SHO, PS Govindpura was accordingly directed on November 16, 2000 to
submit a report in the prescribed proforma.

On January I I, 200 I, the Pol ice submitted a report that on the basis of
G the complaint, Case Crime No.5 of 200 I, Case Crime No.13 of 200 I and
Case Crime No.18 of 200 I has been registered under Section 420, 120-B, 34
IPC. On the same date, the learned Magistrate passed an order that the Police
had registered the offence and investigation is being carried on and, therefore,
the complainant should make available Hindi translation of the documents
H and fixed January 30, 200 I as the next date. Thereafter. the apµellants filed
AJAY MITRA v. STATE OF M.P. [MA THUR . .I.] 627

three Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the A
High Court for quashing of the FIR and the proceedings of the case before
the learned Magistrate. After hearing the parties, the High Court held that the

- investigation had not yet commenced in connection with the F!Rs which had
been registered at the Police Station and, therefore, the Petitions were pre-
mature and accordingly all the three Petitions were rejected.

Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel for the appellants has
B
+ submitted that M/s Cadbury Schweppes Bcyerages India Pvt. Ltd. (A-I} had
entered into bottling agreements with the complainant Sanjiva Bottling
Company on March I, 1996 and the said agreements were to continue for a
term of five years. It also contained a clause that either party could terminate C
the agreement at the end of initial term by giving to the other side not less
than 12 calendar months notice in writing. Subsequent to the execution of the
agreement, Atlantic Industries (a wholly owned indirect subsidiary of The
Coca-Cola Export Corporation, USA) purchased the trademarks from Cadbury
Schweppes pie. on July 29, 1999, upon which the bottling agreements between
the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company were duly assigned to Atlantic D
Industries and information regarding the same was also given to the
• complainant. Atlantic Industries thereafter gave notice to the complainant on
February 14, 2000 not to renew the bottling agreements which were to expire
on February 28, 2001 and the agreements with the complainant came to end
on the said date. The learned counsel has further submitted that there is
absolutely no allegation in the complaint that the appellants (A-7 to A-11) E
had at any time made any kind of mis-representation to the complainant or
had asked it to do or omit to do anything and as such no offence under
Section 420 !PC is made out against them. It has thus been urged that the
allegations made in the complaint, even if accepted at their face value, do not
disclose commission of any offence by the appellants and, therefore, the F
proceedings of the complaint case and also the FIRs lodged against the
appellants are liable to be quashed.

The learned Advocate General for the State of Madhya Pradesh has
submitted that as per the order of the learned.Magistrate dated July ?.7, 2000,
the Police had submitted a report that prima facie it was a case of violation G
of agreement for which the complainant could seek relief from the Civil
Court. However, in view of subsequent order passed by the learned Magistrate
on November 16, 2000 a case had been registered at the Police Station and
the matter was being investigated ..

Shri Sushi! Kumar, learned senior counsel for the complainant has H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A submitted that the allegations made in the complaint disclose commission of
an offence under Section 420 IPC by the accused persons and a case has been

..
registered at the Police Station and investigation is being carried out. Learned
counsel has further submitted that the High Court rightly took the view that
the Petitions filed by the appellants for quashing of the proceedings were pre-
B mature and the said order does not suffer from any error of law.

We have given our careful consideration to the submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties. It may be stated at the very outset that the +.
main allegation made in the complaint is against Mis Cadbury Schweppes
Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. (A-1). It is stated in para 5 of the complaint that
C the Technical Directors of A-I approached the complainant and a
Memorandum of Understanding was signed on October 9, 1995 and the
complainant was asked to discontinue competing brand 'Sprint' within six
months of the introduction of'Canada Dry' and it was also asked to carry out
certain jobs at its bottling plant. The complainant thereafter modernised its
bottling plant as per the requirement and satisfaction of A-1. Thereafter, the
D bottling agreements were executed between the complainant and A-1 on
March I, 1996. Coe~ Cola India (A-6) came into picture for the first time
when Atlantic Industries (a wholly owned ;ndirect subsidiary of The Coca-
Cola Export Corporation, USA) purchased 3500 trademarks in 155 countries
from Cadbury Schweppes pie. on July 29, 1999, upon which the bottling
E agreements between A-1 and the complainant. was assigned to Atlantic
Industries. A-I also informed the complainant in writing on July 29, 1999
that the brands Schweppes, Crush and Canada Dry and associated brands in
India will be acquired by a Member of the Coca Cola Group of Companies
and the bottling agreements will be assigned to Atlantic Industries. Clause 19
of the Agreement which was executed between the complainant and A- I on
F March I, 1996 reads as under:-

"This Agreement shall come into operation on the Effective Date and
subject to the terms herein contained shall continue for a term of 5
(five) years therefrom (the "Initial Tenn") and thereafter provided
that the Company has complied with the conditions set out below
G shall continue in force for further successive periods of 5 (five) years
unless and until tenninated by either party giving to the other not less
than twelve calendar months notice in writing to tenninate the same
expiring at the end of the Initial Tenn or any such subsequent period,
the said conditions being :
H
AJAY MITRA v. STATE OFM.P. [MATHUR. J.] 629
(i) that the Company has complied with its obligations during (as the A
case may be) the Initial Term or the relevant subsequent period
(including without limitation its obligations pursuant to Sub-clause
7.l)and

(ii) prior agreement of the parties in writing on the Base Plan to come
into effect at the start of such subsequent period and as to the B
levels of Annual Minimum Aggregate Sales which shall apply
r +· during such subsequent period."

Thereafter on February 14, 2000 a notice was given jointly by Atlantic
Industries, Canada Dry Corporation Limited and Cadbury Schweppes
Beverages Ltd. to the complainant, Sanjiva Bottling Company and it reads as C
under :

"We refer to Agreements (to include any addenda entered into
subsequently) entered into between yourselves ("the Company") in
relation to the production, sale and distribution of "Crush", "Canada D
Dry", "Schweppes", and "Sport Cola" Products with an Effective
Date of 0 I March 1996 ("called the Agreement"). All defined terms
used in the Agreement shall have the same meaning prescribed in this
letter, save as expressly stated otherwise.

Please take this letter as the required 12 months notice, pursuant to E
clause 19 of our intention not to renew this Agreement on expiry on
28 February 2001 ("the Expiry Date"). We would however, require
that you continue to fully carry out all obligations under the terms of
your Agreement until the Expiry Date."

The agreements executed between the complainant and A-1 on March F
I, 1996 were for a period of five years. Though the same could continue for
a further successive period of five years, but either party to the agreement
had a right to terminate the same expiring at the end of the initial term by

- giving not less than 12 calendar months notice in writing. The initial period
of five years would have come to an end on February 28, 200 I but on
February 14, 2000, notice was given to the complainant that the said
agreements would not be renewed after expiry of the initial period i.e. after
G

February 28, 2001. Even when the agreements were executed in March,
1996, the complainant was fully aware that the same may not be renewed
further after expiry of the initial term of five years.
H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A According to the allegations made in the complaint, it was the Technical
Directors of A- I who had approached the complainant and a Memorandum
of Understanding was signed on October 9, 1995. The modernisation of the
bottling plant was done by the complainant as per the requirement and
satisfaction of A- I and thereafter the agreements were executed between
them (Complainant and A-I) on March 1, 1996 in pursuance whereof the
B complainant claims to have spent considerable amount of money in
improvement of the bottling plant. There is no allegation in the complaint
that A-6 to A-11 or anyone on their behalf ever met the complainant or asked
it to invest any money or to do anything for improvement of the bottling
. plant. In fact there is absolutely no reference to A-6 to A-1 I in the complaint
C except that A-6 is installing its own bottling plants and that A-6 gave notice
to the complainant not to renew the agreements after expiry of the initial
term. In paras 33 and 34 of the complaint, the entire allegations are made
against A-1 and it is said that A-I was actuated by dishonest intention to
cheat the complainant and that A-1 has committed the offence of cheating.
In para 4 7 of the complaint it has been alleged that A-6 is adopting all sorts
D of unfair trade practices.
Section 420 IPC says that "Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person ........ shall
be punished with imprisonment... ..... " "Cheating has been defined in Section
E 415 !PC and it says that "Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or
dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally
induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would
not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes
or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation
F or property, is said to "cheat"."

A guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating.
In other words 'mens rea' on the part of the accused must be established
before he can be convicted of an offence of cheating. (See Jeswantrai Manila/
G Akhaney v. The State of Bombay, AIR (1956) SC 575). In Mahadeo Prasad
v. State of West Bengal, AIR (1954) SC 724, it was held as follows :

"Where the charge against the accused is under S.420 in that he
induced the complainant to part with his goods, on the understanding
that the accused would pay for the same on delivery but did not pay,
H if the accused had at the time he promised to pay cash against delivery
AJAY MITRA v. STATE OF M.P. [MATHUR. J.) 631

an intention to do so, the fact that he did not pay would not convert A
the transaction into one of cheating. But if on the other hand he had
no intention whatsoever to pay but merely said that he would do so
in order to induce the complainant to part with the goods then a case
of cheating would be established."

In Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bis/11111 Kumar Surekha and Ors., AIR B
(1974) SC 301 it was held that unless the complaint showed that the accused
+ had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the complainant parted with
the money it would not amount to an offence under Section 420 IPC and it
may only amount to breach of contract. In G. V. Rao v. L.H. V. Prasad and
Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 693, it was reiterated that guilty intention is an essential C
ingredient of the offence of cheating and, therefore, to secure conviction
'mens rea' on the part of the accused must be established. It has been further
held that in order to constitute the offence of cheating the intention to deceive
"·' should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.

So far as the present appellants are concerned, they came into picture D
much later in July 1999, when various trademarks and brands of A· I were
purchased by A-6. The appellants were not at all in picture at the time when
the complainant claims to have spent money in improvement of its bottling
plant on the basis of the agreement executed with Cadbury Schweppes
Beverages India Pvt. Ltd. (A-1 ). Since the appellants were not in picture at E
all at the tin1e when the complainant alleges to have spent 1noney in improving
the bottling plant, neither any guilty intention can be attributed to the1n nor
there can possibly be any intention on their part to deceive the complainant.
No offence of cheating can, therefore, be said to have been committed by the
appellants on account of the fact that a notice was given to the complainant
that the bottling agreements will not be renewed any further after expiry of F
r~ the initial term. Thus, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
accepted to be absolutely true and correct, the appellants cannot be said to
have committed any offence of cheating as provided in Section 420 IPC.

The High Court has held that the Petitions filed by the appellants for G
quashing the complaint and the FIRs registered against them are pre-mature.
The question which arises is that where the complaint or the FIR does not
disclose commission of a cognizable offence, whether the same can be quashed
at the initial stage ? This question was exa1nined by this Court in State of
West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors .. AIR (1982) SC 949
and it was held that the First Information Report which does not allege or H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] I S.C.R.

A disclose that the essential requirements of the penal provision are prima facie
satisfied, cannot form the foundation or constitute the starting point of. a -;.- ~
lawful investigation. It is surely not within the province of the police 1to
investigate into a Report (FIR) which does not disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and the Code does not impose upon them the duty of
B inquiry in such cases. It was further held that an investigation can be quashed
if no cognizable offence is disclosed by the FIR~ The same question has been
considered in State of Hary1ana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., AIR +_
(1992) SC 604 and after considering all the earlier decisions, the category of
cases, in which the Court can exercise its extra-ordinary power under Article
226 of the Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
C either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of
justice, were summarised in para I 08 of the Report and sub-paras I to 3
. thereof are being reproduced hereinbelow :

"I. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted
...
D in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make
out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the F.1.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
E under Section I 56( I) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a case against the
F accused."

As mentioned earlier, the allegations made in the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not
constitute any offence as against the appellants. Therefore, the complaint
tiled by the respondent and the FIRs registered in pursuance thereof are
G liable to be quashed. Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors.,
[ 1999) 8 SCC 686 cited by learned counsel for the complainant is clearly
distinguishable as in the said case the allegation in the complaint was that the
complainant had ·paid in advance a. price higher than the market price for
purchasing "toasted soyabean extracts" but the accused sent the commodity
H which was of most inferior and substandard quality due to which the
AJAY MITRA v. STATEOFM.P. [MATHUR, J.] 633
complainant suffered a loss of Rs.17 lakhs. In view of the allegations made A
in the complaint, the matter required investigation and the proceedings could
not have been quashea on the ground that the dispute was of a civil nature.

In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and
order dated January 16, 2002 of the High Court is set aside and the complaint
filed by the Respondent no.2 and the FIRs registered in pursuance thereof as B
Case Crime Nos.5 of 2001, 13 of 2001 and 18 of 2001, as against the
appellants, are quashed.

N.J. Appeals allowed.

,
:x