AJAY KRISHAN SHINGHAL ETC. ETC.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

               AJAY KRISHAN SHINGHAL ETC. ETC.                                  A
                                      v.
                     UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                             AUGUST 6, 1996
                                                                                B
           [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

      Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

       Ss.3(f}, 4(1) and 6-Acquisition of land for 'planned development' of
city of Delhi-Public pwpose-Publication of substance of notification in the C
locality-Held, acquisition of land for planned development of Delhi is a
public pwpose-Whe11 an auth01ity constituted under the Act has initiated the
action for acquisition of a large area of land comp1ising several plots for
planned development, the specification of a pmticular land needed for a
specified purpose inte11ded to be w1deitake11 for the development ultimately D
to be taken up is not a condition precedent to initiate the action for acquisition
nor does the absence and ftather elaboration of the develop1nent have the
effect of rendering the satisfactio11 reached by the Govemor illegal and
publicatio11 of notification u11der s.4( 1) in the Gazette does not get vitiated on
account thereof-The Notification under u/s. 4(1), therefore, is not vitiate4 on
account of the fact that planned developmelll was 110/ specified with par- E
ticul01isation of land sought to be acquired for the public purpose-Record
shows that copy of the notification was affixed at a conspicuous place i11 the
locality in which the lands proposed to be acquired were situated, besides
affixing one copy each outside the cowt of the Deputy Commissioner con-
cemed and the relevant Tehsil office-17ie substance of the notification was F
duly published i11 the locality.

      Evidence Act, 1872:

      S.114(e)-Official acts-Presumptio11 as to the act havi11g been done
properly-Record showi11g that copy of substance of Notificatio11 u/s 4( 1) of   G
Land Acquisition Act, was affixed at a conspicuous place in the locality i11
which the lands proposed to be acquired were situated-Held, official act was
done properly.

      Aflatoon v. Lt. Govemor, [1975] 1 SCR 802, followed.                      H
                                   319
    320                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A        Snit. Ratni Devi and Anr. v. Chief Conunissioner, Delhi and Ors.,
    [1975) 4 SCC 467; Pt. Lila Ram v. 17ze Union of India and Ors., [1975) 2
    SCC 547; Om Prakash v. Union of l11dia, [1988) 1 SCC 356; Ram Chand
    and Ors. v. Union of India and Ois., [1994) 1 SCC 44; State of Tamil Nadu
    and On·. v. L. !Vish11an and Ors., [1996) 1 SCC 250 and Jai Narain and On.
    v. U11ion of India & Ors., [1996] 1 SCC 9, relied on.
B
          Smt. Somarnnti v. State of Punjab, [1963) 2 SCR 774; Klmbchand v.
    State of Rajasthan, [1967) 1SCR973; State of UP. v. Smt. Pista Devi & O""•
    [1986] 4 SCC 251; Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ois., [1995) 2 SCC 528;
    Mahavir and Am" v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., [1995] 5 SCC 335 and
C   Laxmi Enginee1ing Works v. P.S G. Ind11st1ial institute, [1995) 3 SCC 583,
    cited.

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2298 of
    1981 Etc.

D        From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.78 of the Delhi High
    Court in L.P.A. No. 116 of 1975.

             P.N. Lckhi and M.K. Garg for the Appellants.

         Ravinder Sethi, V.B. Saharya, Wasim A. Qadri and B.K. Prasad for
E   the Respondents.

             The following Order of the Court was delivered :

           These appeals by special leave arise from the judgment of the
    Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated October 10, 1978 made in
F   L.P.A. No. 115/75 and batch. The Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble
    Chie'f Justice T.V.R. Tatachari and Hon'ble Justice S. Ranganathan, as they
    then were, in an elaborate judgment rendered by the later running into 129
    pages, considered threadbare two questions of law raised for consideration,
    namely, the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration
    under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act 1of1894 (for.short, the 'Act')
G   acquiring an extent of 3470 acres in Naraina village for public purpose, viz.,
    "planned Development of Delhi" and secondly, whether the substance of
    the notification under Section 4(1) was published in the locality as en-
    visaged under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. The learned Judges
    have upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge and held that the
H   planned development of Delhi is a public purpose and that, therefore,
                         AK.SHINGHALv. U.0.1.                            321

notification was not beset with any vagueness in the likely need of the land    A
for the said purpose. It also held that the substance of the notification was
published in the locality, Naraina. The Division Bench Considered
elaborately various discrepancies pointed out in compliance of the publi-
cation of the substance of the notification as noted in the judgment.
Thereafter, it was held that they were satisfied that the substance of the
                                                                                B
notification was in fact effected as per law.

       The material facts are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act
was published in the Gazette on October 24, 1961. 1'he substance of the
notification was published on November 21, 1961. The declaration under
Section 6 was published oh· December 7, 1966 after efiquiry under Section       C
SA. The first question, therefore, is : whether the land was needed or was
likely to be needed for public purpose as envisaged under Section 4(1) of
the Act?

       The contention of Shri Lekhi, Learned senior counsel for the appel- D
!ants, it that the Lands situated within the Delhi Cantonment are governed
by the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924. The land in its jurisdiction
is required to be developed as per the provisions contained in that act and
the rules made thereunder. The interim General Plan drawn up for
development of Delhi in 1957 and revised Master Plan in 1962 under Delhi
Development Act, 1958 (for short, the 'Development Act') effective from E
September l, 1962 and the further revised plan 1992 which would be
elongated till 2001, do not envisage any development in respect of the
acquired land. The Master Plans do indicate that the land use is "under-
termined" which would indicate that the land was not itemised to the effect
that it was needed for any kind of specified public purpose as required F
under the Master Plan as per the provisions of the Development Act which
requires various steps to be taken thereunder, namely, master Plan,
Regional Plan, Zonal Plan and Zonal Development Plan. In all the steps,
there should be specification of the land required for specified public
purpose. An elaborate study by a group of experts undertook to demarcate G
various lands situated at different places for various purposes mentioned
in the plans appended thereunder. The land in question was not specifically
demarcated for any of the purposes. It would, therefore, be clear that the
land is not needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose.
Accordingly, the acquisition if a colourable exercise of power to deprive
the owners of the land. He further contended that, as a fact, there was no H
                                                                                      -
     322                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the
     Act, in the locality. Publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of
     the Act in the State Gazette and of the substance thereof in the locality
     are mandatory requirements under Section 4(1) of the Act. Non-com-
     pliance thereof renders the entire acquisition void. Three versions on
     publication of the substance en1erge from the record, namely, one, as given
B
     and translated by the counsel for the appellants in the High Court; second,
     as given by the court translator as was got done by the High Court; and
     the third, the affidavit filed by Daryao Singh, who was a peon attached to
     the office of the Land Acquisition Officer. The three versions are diametri-
     cally inconsistent. Consequently, there is no acceptable version found from
c     the record. In those circumstances, unless it is proved to the hilt that
     substance of the notification was in fact published in the locality, the
     acquisition cannot be declared to be valid in law. The benefit of doubt
     should go to the owners in upholding the acquisition as it is an ex-
      propriatory action. The High Court, therefore, had not considered this
D     aspect of the matter in the proper perspective. Consequently, when the
      special leave petitions came to be filed in this Court, this Court had called
      upon the respondents to produce the original record. Since the records
      had not been produced, adverse inference was drawn and unqualified leave
      was granted though notice was limited to 2nd point. These circumstances
      would clearly indicate that there is no compliance of the requirement of
E     publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification in the locality .
      Resultantly, the presu.mption available under Section 114 (e) of the
      Evidence Act stands displaced. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in
      error in holding that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1)
      was published in the locality.
F
             Shri Nambiar, learned senior counsel for the Union of India, con-
      tended that the High Court extensively considered the entire record and
      returned a finding that the notification under Section 4(1) was not only
      published in the Gazette but also its substance was got published in the
      locality as evidenced from the record. The High Court after perusal and
G     elaborate consideration recorded the finding that there are no suspicious
      features in the publication of the substance of the notification. Therefore,
      the presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act would be
      applicable to the facts in this case.

 H          Shri Ravinder Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the Delhi
                         AK. SHJNGHAL v. U.0.1.                          323

Development Authority, has contended that the Master Plan and the A
interim General Plan do indicate that the lands are needed for public
purpose. The entire Naraina area was required for the planned develop-
ment. Except the lands in dispute of an c'1ent of 14 bighas, all the lands
were acquired and the Naraina residential scheme was implemented and
around three lakhs people are living there. Though the land in question is
                                                                             B
partly situated in the Cantonment area, the Development Act stands
attracted to· the area which was not actually needed for the purpose of
Cantonment. The notings regarding the interim General plan at various
places do indicate that the Delhi Development Authority intended to
develop the area of the lands situated within the Cantonment. Under those
circumstances, the public purpose has been specifically envisaged under         c
the notification. This Court consistently has taken a view that planned
residential development is a public purpose. Elaboration thereof after the
acquisition would be undertaken at a later point of time. Therefore, the
public purpose as required under Section 4(1) of the Act has been satisfied.
He, therefore, contends that the Division Bench has correctly interpreted D
the provisions of the Master Plan, Development Act and the Cantonment
Act in arriving at the above conclusion.


       In view of the diverse contentions, the first question that arises for
 consideration is : whether the land in question is needed for a public
 purpose? If the finding is held against the State, it would not be necessary   E
 to go into the second question. "Public purpose" has been defined in
 Section 3(1) of the Act with an inclusive purpose of various developments
 and extension, planned development and improvement of the village etc.
The controversy is no longer res integra. In Allatoon v. Lt. Govemor, [1975]
 1 SCR 802 a Constitution Bench of this Court, (Mathew, J. speaking for         F
the Court) after an elaborate consideration, held that the acquisition for
planned development of Delhi is a public purpose. In the case of an
acquisition of a large extent of land comprising several plots belonging to
different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with refer-
ence to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the case of an
acquisition of a small area, it might be practically difficult to specify the   G
particular purpose for which every item of land comprised in the area is
needed. Under those circumstances, the acquisition of planned develop-
ment was held to be for public purpose. It os not necessary to burden the
judgment with the development of the law in this behalf. Relevant decisions
in this behalf are Smt. Ratni Devi & Anr. v. Chief Comnzissioner, Delhi &       H
    324                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Ors., [1975] 4 SCC 467; Pt. Lila Ram v. The Unio11 of India a11d Ors., [1975]
    2 SCC 547. Om Prakash v. Unio11 of India, [1988] l SCC 356; Ram Chand
    a11d Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1994] 1 SCC 44; State of Tamil Nadu
    and 01'·. v. L. /0islman and Ors., [1996] 1 SCC 250 and Jai Narain & Ors.
    v. Union of India and Ors., [1996) 1 SCC 9. Suffice it to state that when an
    authority comtituted under the Act has initiated the action for acquisition
B
    of a large area of land comprising several plots for plan~ed development,
    the specification of a particular land needed for a specified purjpose
    intended to be undertaken for the development ultimately to be taken up,
    is not a condition precedent to initiate the action for acquisition and
    publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the Gazette
c   does not get vitiated on account thereof. The reasons are not far to seek.
    In dra\ving details, the scheme required detailed examination consistent
    with plans and ecological balance.

          Shri Lekhi sought to place reliance on the judgments of this Court
D in Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab, [1963] 2 SCR 774 and Klzubchand v.
    State of Rajasthan, [1967] l SCR 973. Somavanti's case relates to acquisi-
    tion for a company and Munshi Singh's case \Vas considered and distin-
    guished in Tamil Nadu case Klwbclwnd's case relates to compliance of
    Section 4(1). So it is not necessary to deal with these cases in detail. Suffice
    it to state that each case has to be considered on the facts and circumstan-
E   ces of each case. The planned development of Delhi was held to be a public
    purpose inAflatoon's case (supra) followed by several Judgments including
    the latest judgment of this Court in Joi Narain's case. The question then is
    : whether the interim General Plan 1956, the Master Plan under the
    Development Act brought on statute in 1962 w.e.f. 1.9.1962 and further
F   amended plan in 1990 are required to necessarily specify the purpose for
    which land is needed vis-a-vis the provisions of the Cantonment Act, 1924.
    It is true that when acquisition of the land was within the limits specified
    under Section 4 and declaration under Section 5 of the Cantonment Act
     1924 was published, the Cantonment Board and the authorities constituted
    thereunder get the power and jurisdiction to deal with the lands within its
G   jurisdiction for the development. None of their representatives finds berth
     in planning Council \Jnder Development Act. Equally, under the Develop-
     ment Act the Delhi Development Authority and the various authorities
     constituted thereunder are required to prepare the master plan, the zonal
     plan and the area developmental plan as required for planned development
H    of the land. But one· fact that needs to be emphasized and always kept in
                               AKSHINGHALv. U.0.1.                             325

      mind is that all these are developmental activities to be undertaken sub-       A
     sequent to the acquisition after the land is available. The harping and
     insistence on compliance of details by Sri Lekhi from several provisions in
     various Acts do not need elaborate consideration. As a fact High Court
     had done that exercise and in our view in correct perspective. They need
     reiteration. Once a public purpose has been specified by the Governor in         B
     the notification and on specification obviously on presumptive satisfaction
_J   thereof the Governor issued the notification as required under Section
     4(1); the absence of the specification and further elaboration of the
     development do not have the effect of rendering the satisfaction reached
     by the Governor illegal and the notification under Section 4(1) published
     by the Goveror in exercise of the power of eminent domain is not rendered        C
     void. Therefore, it is not necessary to elaborately deal in detail with the
     manner in which the development has to be undertaken when the land is
     situated \vithin the cantonment area. In fact, Section 12(3)(ii) of the
     Development Act takes care of the development in cantonment area when
     there would be a conflict between the authorities under the Development          D
     Act and the need for prior approval in that behalf of the cantonment, which
     is a local authority, for developing land under the development Act. As a
     fact, except the land in question, the land in Naraina was developed as per
     plan. Under those circumstances, since the High Court has elaborately
     dealt with this aspect of the matter in the judgment running 129 pages, we
     feel it unnecessary to burden this judgment with further discussion in that      E
     behalf. Accordingly, we hold that the notification under Section 4(1) is not
     vitiated on account of the fact that planned development was not specified
     with particularisation of the land in question needed for the public pur-
     pose.
                                                                                      F
            The next question is : whether the mandatory requirements of
     Section 4(1) have been complied with? It is not in dispute that the notifica-
     tion under Section 4(1) was published in the Gazette. Therefore, the first
     limb of the statutory requirement' stands satisfied. The serious dispute is as
     regards the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality.
     In this behalf, the High Court also has spent considerable time and dealt        G
     with in about 20 pages in considering this question. In paragraph 57 of the
     judgment the learned .I udges have slated that the notification under Section
     4(1) as regards the endorsement made on the back of the publication of
     the substance was put in issue and it was noted. The translated copy given
     by the learned counsel for appellant was dealt with in paragraph 58 and          H
    326                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   thereafter in paragraph 59 the contentions raised by the learned counsel
    were dealt with. When there was a dispute, as regards the contents of the
    respondent, the learned Judges felt it expedient to have it translated by the
    Court translator of the Enforcement in Urdu and extracted as under :

            "Received one copy. I shall affix the same to some conspicuous
B           place.

                                                                   Sd/- Illegible
                                                                       21.11."

            "The proclamation shall be got done through the Chowkidar.
c
                                                                   Sd/- Illegible
                                                                       21.l 1."



D                It is submitted that one copy of the notice has been affixed
             outside the court of the Land Acquisition Collector; one copy of
             the notice has been affirmed out-side the Court of Deputy Com-
             missioner, one copy of the notice has been affixed outside the
             Tehsil office at Kashmere Gate, and one copy has been got affixed
E            at the spot in village Naraina through the Lumberdar.

                The report is submitted.

                                                                    Sd/- Illegible
                                                                     21.11.61."
F
          It would be seen that the copy of the notification was received by the
    peon, Daryao Singh and he made an endorsement that he received the copy
    and affixed the same on some conspicuous place. Thereafter, he made an
    endorsement which reads that "A copy of the notice was affixed outside
    the court of the Land Acquisition Collector; one copy of the notice was
G   affixed outside the court of the Deputy Commissioner; one copy of ilhe
    notice was affixed outside the Tehsil office at Kashmere Gate and one copy
    of the notice has been got affixed on the spot through Lumbardar" as was
    read out by our Court officer whose services we requisitioned. The only
    difference in the translated copy of the Court Translator of the Delhi High
H   Court that was explained to us by our Court Officer is that the name of
                                AKSHINGHALv. U.0.1.                          327

    village Naraina was not specifically mentioned at the bottom. It is sought      A
    to be explained by the learned counsel for the Union of India that on the
    top of the front page the village Naraina was found written. Our Court
    Officer also has mentioned that village Naraina was found written on the
'   top. When these endorsements are read together it would be clear that the
    substance of the notification was got affixed in the village Naraina since he
                                                                                    B
    had already made an endorsement that he received the copy and he would
    get the substance of the notification affixed in some conspicuous place as
    endorsed on November 21, 1961.

          The serious contention raised here and also in the High Court was
    that Daryao Singh, the peon of the Land Acquisition Collector's office          C
    made inconsistent statements in his affidavit filed in the year 1978 and the
    endorsement contained thereunder with reference to one endorsement
    dated November 11, 1961. In this behalf, the High Court also had dealt
    with in exlenso and it has concluded in paragraph 62 thus :

            "So there is no reason to suspect any malafides in this interpolation   D
            which adds nothing to the entry in the context of the statutory
            requirements. The second entry similarly records the Lumbardar
            undertaking to proclaim by beat of drum."

           It would thus be seen that the High Court having carefully perused       E
    the record and extensively considered the same had recorded, as a finding
    of fact, thus :

            "We are therefore of opinion that we should accept the record as
            showing that a copy of the notice was affixed at a conspicuous
            place in the locality in which the lands proposed to be acquired        F
            were situated. 11

          After perusing the record and satisfying ourselves and also consider-
    ing various cogent and weighty reasons given by the learned Judges, we are
    of the opinion that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was G
    duly published in the locality. It is not the law and could not and would
    not be the law that publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification
    in the locality should be established beyond shadow of doubt and benefit
    should be extended to the owner or interested person of the land. ObvioQ'
    thereto, presumption under Section 114{e) of Evidence Act has been raised
    that official acts have been properly done unless proved otherwise. We are H
    328                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A satisfied that it was properly done. It is futile to reiterate the settled legal
    position that the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the
    Gazette and substance thereof in the locality are mandatory requirements
    and the omission thereof renders the notification void. In Khub Chand's
    case, this Court had held the same view. But as recorded earlier, since          -'
    substance of the notification was published in the locality , the second limb
B
    of the requirement also stands complied with. Considered from this
    perspective, we are of the considered view that the High Court has not
    committed any error of law.

           Another contention raised by Shri Ravinder Sethi is tl1at the claimant
C   in the first appeal had purchased the property after the declaration under
    Section 6 was published and that therefore he does not get any right to
    challenge the validity of the notification published under Section 4(1).
    Since his title to the property is a void title, at best he has only right to
    claim compensation in respect of the acquired land claiming interest in the
    land which his predecessor-in-title had. In support thereof, he placed
D   reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi
    and 01~., (1986] 4 SCC 251; Gian Chand v. Gopa/a and Ors., [1995] 2 SCC
    528; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Imtitwe, Amravati and Anr., (1995] 5 SCC
    335 and Laxmi Enginee1ing Works v. P.S. G. Indust1ial Institllle, {1995) 3
    SCC 583. We need not deal at length with this issue as is the settled legal
E   position. But since other appellants are owners of the lands who are
     challenging the validity of the notification and since we have upheld the
    validity of the notification though others have challenged its validity, it is
     not necessary to dismiss the appeal of Bahadur Singh on this ground alone
     as we are upholding the notification under Section 4(1) in the appeals of
     other appellants.
F
          The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances,
     without costs.

     R.P.                                                     Appeals dismissed.