Holding

Section 188 sanction is not a condition precedent for taking cognizance of a criminal conspiracy where the agreement was made in India and the offence is a continuing one, so Indian courts have jurisdiction irrespective of overt acts abroad.

Summary

The appellant, an NRI businessman, was charged with criminal conspiracy, cheating and forgery for a scheme hatched in Chandigarh that involved the issuance of foreign letters of credit and forged shipping documents in Dubai, resulting in a loss to Punjab National Bank. The trial court discharged the accused on the ground that the conspiracy and overt acts occurred outside India and that no sanction under Section 188 of the CrPC had been obtained. The High Court set aside the discharge, holding that the conspiracy was hatched in Chandigarh and that the overt acts in Dubai were part of a continuing offence, thus not requiring prior sanction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 188’s sanction requirement applied to a continuing conspiracy where part of the conduct occurred in India. The Court held that conspiracy is a substantive, continuing offence; the agreement was made in India, and any acts in furtherance of it, even if abroad, bring the offence within Indian jurisdiction, rendering Section 188’s sanction unnecessary. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s order affirmed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires prior Central Government sanction to try a charge of criminal conspiracy when overt acts are committed abroad.
Whether a conspiracy is a continuing offence such that jurisdiction attaches in India even if some acts are performed outside the territory.
Whether the offence of conspiracy under Sections 120A and 120B IPC is deemed to have been committed in India under Section 4 IPC despite extraterritorial elements.
Whether the trial court’s discharge of the accused was legally valid.
Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the discharge and directing continuation of trial.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 177, s. 179, s. 188
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120A, s. 120B, s. 4, s. 420, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

criminal conspiracyextraterritorial jurisdictionSection 188 CrPCcontinuing offenceIndian Penal CodeNRIsanction requirementovert actscheatingforgery

Judgment

AJAY AGARWAL A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

MAYS, 1993
B
[K. RAMASWAMY & R.M. SAHAI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860-Sections l 20A, 120B- 'Conspiracy'- 'Criminal
Conspiracy'-Dejinition-Ingrediems-:-Whether conspiracy p1111ishable as a
substamive offence and whether comin11i11g offence-Offences in pursuant to
conspiracy whether separately punishable.
c
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973-Sectio11 l88-Whe11
applicable-Conspiracy hatched at Chandigarh-Part of c011spiracy at
.
. Dubai-Overt acts in furtherance of such conspiracy-Sanction not necessary. .

D
Cbde of Crimi11al Procedure 1973-Section 188, Proviso-
Construction-Requirement:S under.

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973-Section 188, read with Section, 4
IPC-Offe11ce by Indian Citizen olllside India-Effect of
E

Penal Code, 1860-Section 120A, 120B. 468, .471-Charged
under-Conspiracy at Chandigarh-Certain overt acts in furtherance of con-
spiracy done ar Dubai-Sanction under Section 188, Cr. P.C. not
necessary-Jurisdiction of Chandigarh Court-Scope of.
F
Penal Code, 1860-Section 120A, 120B, 468, 471-Charged
under-Conspiracy at Chandigarh-Cerrain Overt acts in fi.trtherance of con-
spiracy done at Dubai /Jy a NRl-Effecr of

The prosecution case was that the appellant, a non-resident Indian at G
Dubai, hatched a conspiracy along with four others to cheat tlJe Bank at
Chandigarh. In furtheram:e of the conspiracy, the appellant got credit facility
by way of Foreign Letters of Credit and issued proforma invoices of his
concern and addressed to the Bank through the establishments of other
accused. The Manager of the Bank, another accused, in confabulation with
H
543
•
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.

A the appellant and other accused, being in-charge of foreign exchange depart·
ment, issued Foreign Letter of Credit in violation of import policy. The Bills
of Lading were addressed to the Bank. The cable confirmation of the Bank
was sent to appellant's concern at Dubai for confirmation of discrepancy. The
alJpellant confirmed correctness thereof. Placing reliance thereon, authority
letter was issued by the Bankand cables were sent subsequent thereto to remit
B the amount.; to the Dubai Bank through one Irving Trust Company, At the
instance ofaccused Anand, The Dubai Bank informed the Bankat Chandigarh
that the discrepancy in the document adaptable to accused Anand and
claimed to have inspected the goods on board in the \'essel. On receipt of the
information from the appellant's concern at Dubai, full amount is US Dollars
4,39,200 was credited against all the three Letters of Credit on discount basis.
c
The investigation established that the vessel was a non-existent one and
three Foreign Letters of Credit were fabricated on the basis of false and
forged shipping documents submitted by the appellant to the Dubai Bank.
Thus the Bank at Chandigarh was cheated of an amount of Rs. 40,30,329.
D
The accused were charge-sheeted under section read with sections 420,
468, and 471, IPC.

The Trial Court discharged all the accused of the offences on the ground
E that conspiracy and the acts done in furtherance thereof had taken place
outside India and. as no sanction under section 188, Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 was produced, the prosecution was not maintainable.

The. High Court. in revision held that the conspiracy fook place at
F Chandigarh and the overt acts committed in pursuance of that conspiracy at
Dubai constituted offences under sections 420, 467 and 471 IPC., and they
were triable at Chandigarh without previous sanction of the Central Govt.
The High Court setting aside the order of discharge of the trial Court,
directed to continue further proceedings in accordance with law. That order
of the High Court was challenged under this appeal under Article 136 of the
G Constitution.

The appellant contended that he was not a privy to the conspiracy and
the conspiracy did not take place at Chandigarh; and that even assuming that
some of the offences were committed in India, by operation ofSection 188 read
H with the proviso thereto with a non-obstanti clause, absence of sanctidn by the
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA 545

Central Govt. barred the jurisdiction of the Courts in India to take cognisance A
of or to enquil'e into or try the accused.

The respondents submitted that the conspiracy to cheat the Bank was
~·· hatched at Chandigarh; that all the accused committed over acts in further-
ance of the conspiracy at Chandigarh and therefore, the sanction of the
B
Central Govt. was not necessary.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: Per K. Ramaswamy,J. c
1.01. Judicial power ofa State extends to the punish,ment of all offences
against the municipal laws of the State by whomsoever committed within the
· territory. lt also h~s the power to punish all such offences wherever commit-
ted .by ibi citizen. The general principle of international law is that every . D
person be it a citizen or foreigner who is found within a foreign State is
"Ubjeued to, and is punishable by, its law. Otherwise the criminal law could
not be administcn'CI according to any civilised system of jurisprudence. (553-
F) .

1.oz. Conspiracy may be considered to be a march under a banner and E
a person may join or drop out in the march without the necessity of the change
in the tf:Xt on the banner. In the comity of International Law, in these days,
committing otTences on international scale is a common feature. The offence
of coft.'>piracy would be a useful weapon and there would exist no contact in
municipal laws and the doctrine of autrefois convict or acquit would extend
to such offences. The comity of nations are duty bound to apprehend the
F
conspirators as soon as they set their feet on the country territorial limits and
nip the ~ffence in the bud. (564-F-G)

2.01. Section 120-A of the l.P.C. defines 'conspiracy' to mean that whe'n
two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act G
which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated as
"criminal conspiracy". No agreement except an agreement to commit an
offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy, unless some act besides the
agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in furtherance
thereof. (557-C)
H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] ~ S.C.R.

A 2.02. Section 120-B of the I.P.C. prescribes punishment for criminal
conspiracy. It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details
of the scheme nor be a participant at every state. It is necessary that the~·
should agree for design or object of the conspir.1cy. Conspir.1cy is conceived
as having three clements: (1) agreement (2) between two or more persons by
whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be ''---"'
B either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one
of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether
this is found in the ultimate objects. (554-E)

2.03. Conspiracy to commit a crime itselfis punishable as a substanth•e
offence and every indh•idual offence committed pursuant to the conspiracy is
c separate and distinct offence to which individual offenders are liable to
punishment, independent of the conspiracy. (556-D)

2.04. The agreement does not come to an end with it-. making, but would
endure till it is accomplished or abandoned or proved aborth·e. Being a
D continuing offence, if any acts or omissions which constitute an offence arc
done in India or outside its territory the conspirators continuing to be parties
to the conspiracy and since part of the acts were done in India, they wotdd
obviate the need to obtain sanction of the Central Govt. All of them need not
be present in India nor continue to remain in India. (556-E)

E 2.05. An agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or
legal acts by illegal means is criminal conspiracy. If the agreement is not an
agreement to commit an offence, it does not amount to conspiracy unless it is
followed up by an overt act done by one or more persons in furtherance of the
agreement. The offence is complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and
unity of purpose between the conspirators to do that illegal act or legal act by
F
illegal means. Conspiracy itselfis a substantive offence and is distinct from the
offence to commit which the conspiracy is entered into. It is undoubted that
the gen~ral conspiracy is distinct from number of separate offences commit-
ted while executing the offence of conspiracy. Each act constitutes separate
offence punishable, independent o0he conspiracy. (563-F-G) ·
G
"Jones' Case, 1832 B & A-D 345; Mulcahy v. Reg., (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 306;
Quinn v. Learhem, 1901 AC495 at528; B.G. Bars{.[)''" T7ie Stale ofBombay, (1962)
2 SCR 229; Yashpal v. T71e State of Punjab, .(1977] SCR 2433; Mohammed Usman,
Mol1atrmiedH11ssainManivar&Anr. v.StateofMaharashtra, [1981] 3SCR 68;Noor

H
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA 547

Mohammad Yastif Monin v. State of Maharashtra, [1971) 1 SCR 119; R.K. A
Da/mia & Anr. ''·The Delhi Admi11istratio11, [1963) 1SCR253; Shivanarayan
laxminarayan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 465 and
Lennart Schussler &Anr. v. Director ofEnforcement &Anr.• [1970) 2 SCR 760,
referred to.

B
2.06. A conspiracy is a continuing om~nce and continues to subsist and
committed whei'e\'er one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts. So
long as it'> performance continues, it is a continuing offence till it is executed
or rescinded m· frustrated by choice or necessity. A crime is complete as soon

--
as the agreement is made, but it is not a thing of the moment. It does not end
with the making of the agreement. It will continue so long as there are two or c
more parties to it intending to carry into effect the design. Its continuance is
a threatto the society against which it was aimed at and would be dealt with
as soon as that jurisdiction can properly claim the power to do so. The
conspiracy designed or agreed abroad will have the same effect as in India, .
when part of the act">, pursuant to the agreement are agreed to be finalised or
done, attempted or even frustrated and vice versa. (564-H, 565-A) D

Abdul Kader v.State. AIR 1964Bombay133; U.S. v. Kissal, 218 US 601; Ford
v. U.S., 273 US 593 at 620 to 622; Director of Public Prosec111io11s ''·Door and
Ors., (1973) Appeal Cases 807 (H.L); Treacy v. Director ofPublic ProseciJtions,
(1971) Appeal Cases 537 at 563 (Fi.L.) and Board of Trade v. Owen. (1957) E
Appeal Cases 602, referred to.

Prof. Williams, Glanville: "Vanue and the Ambit of Criminal law", [1965)
L.Q.R. 518 at 528; Halsbury' s law ofEngland, third edition Vol. 10. page 327,
Para 602; Archobold: Criminal pleadings. Evidence and Practice, 42nd edition, F
[1985) Chapter 23, In para 28-3~ at page 2281; Writ: Conspiracies and
Agreements, at pages 73-74; Smith: Crimes, at page.239 and Russel: Crime,
. 12th edition, page 613, referred to.

2.07. Sanction under section 188 is not a condition precedent to take G
cognizance of the offence. If need be it could be obtained before trial begins.
Conspiracy was initially hatchcit at Chandigarh and though itself is_. a
--... completed offence, being continuing offe,nce, even accepting appellant's case
r that he was at Dubai and.part of conspiracy and overt acts in furtherance

H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11993) 3 S.C.R.
,.
A thereof had taken place at Dubai and partly at Chandigarh; and in conse·
quence thereof other otl'ences had been ensued. Since the offences ha\'C been
committed during the continuing course of transaction culminates in cheating
P.N.B. at Chandigarh, the need to obtain sanction for \'arious officer under
proviso to s. 188 i'> obviated. Therefore, there is no need to obtain sanction
from Central Govt. The case may be different ifthe offences were committed
B out side India and arc completed in themselves without conspiracy.
(566-D-E)

K. Sarwant Si11gf1 v. The State of Punjab, (1960) 2 SCR 89; In Re M.L Verghese,.
AIR 1947 Mad. 352; T. Fakflru/la Khan and Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Mad.
c 326; Kailash Sharma''· State, 1973 Crl. law Journal 1021, distinguished.

Purshottamdas Dalmia v. State of Benga.f. (1962] 2 SCR 101; LN. M11khe1jee ,..
The State of Madras, [1962] 2 SCR 116; R.K. Dalmia v.' Delhi Administration,
[1963] 1SCR253 at 273; Banwari Lal Jlwnjl11111wala and Ors.,., Union of India
aitd Anr., (1963] Supp. 2 SCR 338, referred to.
D

Per R.M. Sahai, J. (Concllrring)

1.1. Language of the section 188, Code of Criminal Procedure.is plain
and simple. It operates where an offence is committed by a citizen of India
E
outside the country. Requirements are, therefore, onc--commission of an
offence; second_.:..b~· an Indian citizen; and third-that it sho~ld ha\•e been
committed outside the country. (567-0)

1.2. Substanti\·e law of extra-territory in respect of criminal offences is
F provided for by Section 4 of the IPC and the procedure to inquire and try it
is contained in Section 188 Cr. P.C. Effect of these sections is that an offence
committed by an Indian citizen outside the country is deemed to have been
committed in India. (567-E)
.,
G 1.3. Since the pro,·iso to Section 188, Cr.P.C. begins with a non obstinate
clause its observance is mandatory. But it would come into·play.only ifthe
principal clause is applicable, namely, it is established that an offence.as
defined in clause 'n' ofSe~tion 2ofthe Cr.P.C. bas been committed and it has -,
been committed outside the country. (567-G)

H
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA • 549

-
r-
1.4. What has to be examined at this stage is ifthe claim of the appellant A
that the offence under Section 1208 read with Section 420 and section 471 of.
the IPC were committed outside the country. An offence is defined in the
Cr.P.C. to mean an Act or omission made punishable by any law for the time
being in force. None of the offences for which the appellant has .been c~~rg~:
has residence as one of its ingredients. (567-H, 568-A)
. ) ,. B
1.5. The-jurisdiction to inquire or try .vests under Section 177 in the
Court in whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed. It is thus the
commission of offence and not the residence of the accused which is decisive
of jurisdiction. When two or more person;, agree to do ~r cause to be done an
illegal act or an act which is illegal by illegal means such agreement is c
designated a criminal conspiracy under Sectio'n 120A of the IPC. The
ingredients of the offence is agreement and not the residence. Meeting of
minds of more than two persons is the primary ·requirement. Even if it is
assumed that the appellant was at Dubai and he entered into an agreement
with his counterpart sitting in India to do an illegal act in India the offence of
conspiracy came intO being when agreement was reached between the two. D
The two minds met when talks oral or ·in writing took place in India.
Therefore, the offence of conspiracy cannot be said to have been committed
outside the country. (568-B-C)

1.6. If a foreign national is amenable to jurisdiction under Section 179 E
of the Cr.P.C. a NRI cannot claim that the offence shall be deemed to hav~
been committed outside the country merely because· he was not physieally
present. (568-F) ' ·· ' - -

Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857, referred to.

1.7. An offence is committed when all the ingredients are satisfied. The
section having used the word 'offence' it cannot be understood as part of the
offence. Section 179 Cr.P.C. empowers a court to try an offence either at a
place where the offence is committed or the consequences ensue. On the
allegations in the complaint the act or omissions were committed in India. In G
any case the consequence of conspiracy, cheating and forging having taken
place at Chandigarh the offence was not committed outside the country
therefore the provisions ofSec.188 Cr. P.C. were not attracted. (569-B)

H
sso SUPREME COURT REPORTS '\1993} 3 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No: 400 of
1993. -......_

From the Judgment and order dated 3.6. 1992 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 443 of 1990. · ·
-- ..MAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDlA ~RAMASWAMY,J.]
..
551

- P.N.B., Chandigarh that the discrepancy in the documeht.adeptable to ~.P. Anand A
and claimed to have inspected the goods on board in vessel, M.V. Atefeh. On
receipt of the information from the Sales International, Dubai, full amount in US
Dollars 4, 39 ,200 was credited against all the three Letters of Credit on discount
basis. During i11vestigation it was found that Vessel M.V. Atefeh was a non-
existent one and three Foreign Letters of Credit were fabricated on the basis of
false and forged shipping documents submitted by the appellant, Ajay Aggarwal B
to the Emirates National Bank, Dubai. Thus the P.N.B. was cheated of an amount
of Rs. 40,30,329. Accordingly charge sheet was laid against the appellant. and
others for offences punishable under sections l 20B read with Sections 420
(Cheating), 468 (Forgery) and 47 l using as genuine (Forged documents), I.P.C.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh by his order dated January ll, l 990
discharged all. the accused of the offences on the ground that conspiracy and the c
acts done in furtherance thereof had taken place outside India and, therMore the
sanction under section 188 Criminal Procedure Code, l 973 for short the 'Code' is
mandatory. Since no such sanction was produced the prosecution is not maintain-
able. On revision, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Revision No.
443 of l 990 by order dated June 3, l 992 held, that the conspiracy had taken place
D
at Chandigarh. The overt acts committed in pursuance of that conspiracy at Dubai
.-~- constituted offences under sections 420, 467 and 471, I.P.C., are all triable at
Chandigarh without previous sanction of the Central Govt. The orderof discharge,
therefore, was set aside and the appellant and other accused were directed to be
prese9t through their counsel in person in the Trial Court\)n July 17, 1992 to enable /
the court to take further proceedings in accordance with law. This appeal has been E
filed by the appellant alone under Art. 136 of the constitution.

Sri Chidambaram, learned Senior counsel contended that the appellant was
not a privy to the conspiracy. He was an N.I.R. businessman at Dubai. He never
visited Chandigarh. Even assuming for the sake of argument that conspiracy had
taken place and all act committe,d in furtherance thereof were also at Dubai. The F
transaction through, bank is only bank to bank transaction. Even assuming that
some of the offences were committed in India since as per the prosecution case
itself that part of the conspiracy and related offences were committed at Dubai, by
operation of Section l 88 read with the proviso thereto with a no11-obstami clause.
absence of sanction by the Central Govt. knocks of the bottom of the jurisdiction G
of the courts in India to take cognisance of or to enquire into or try the accused. He
placed strong reliance on I. Fakltrulla ldlan an<t Ors. v. Emperor AIR 1935 Mad.
326, In reM.L. Verghese AIR 1947 MAD. 352.kailash Sharma v. State[l973 Cr!.
Law Journal 1021 and K. Satwant Singh v. State off'unjab [1960) 2 SCR 89. Sri
Goswami, the learned senior counsel for the respondents contended that the
conspiracy to cheat. PNB was hatched at Chandigarh. All the accused committed H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.

A overt acts In furtherance. Ali the accused committed overt acts in furtherance on
the conspiracy at Chandigarh and, therefore, the sanction of the Central Govt. is
not necessary. The High Court had rightly recorded those finding~. There is no
-
need~to obtain sanction under s. 188 of the Code.

• The diverse contentions give rise to the primary question whether the
1

B sanction of the Central Govt. as required under proviso to s. 188 of the Code is
necessary. Section 188 of the Code reads thus :

•·offence committed outside India-when an offence is committed
outside India -
t
(a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or
}I

,,,11'1

(b) by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft
·1
registered in India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence
as if it had been commilled at any place within India at whiFh he may
D be found:
.[

Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding
sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or
tried in India except. with the previous sanction of the Central
' Government"'.
E

Section 3, IPC prescribes punishment of offences committed beyond, but
which by law may be tried with, India, It provided that any person liable, by any
Indian law, to be tried for an offence committed beyond India shall be dealt with
according to the provisions of this Code for any act committed beyond India in the
F s'ai:ne manner as if such act had been committed within India. Section 4 extends its
t~rritorial operation postulating that IPC shall apply to any offence committed by-

( l) any citizen oflndia in any place without any beyond India;

G (2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in India wherever it may be.

Exnlanation.:_In this section the word 'offence· includes every act commit-
ted outside India which, if committed. in India, would be punishable under thjs
Code.·

H
AJAY AGARWALv. UNION OF INDIA IRAMASWAMY.J.) 553

Illustration-A. who is a citizen of India, commits a murder in Uganda. He A
can he tried and convicted of murder in any place in India in which he may be
found.

The Code of Criminal Procedure extends to whole of India except the State
of Jammu & Kashmir and except chapters 8, 10 and 11, the other provisions of the
Code shall not apply to the State ofNagaland and to the tribal area. However, the B
State Govt. has been empowered, by a notification, to apply all other provisions
of the Code or any of them to the whole or part of the State ofNagaland and such
other tribal areas, with supplemental, incidental or consequential modifications,
as may be specified in the notification. Therefore. the Code also has territorial
operation. The Code is to consolidate and amend the law relating to criminal
procedure. Section 188 was suitably amended pursuant to the recommendation
c
made by the Law Commission. Chapter VIII deals with jurisdiction of the courts
in inquiries and trials. Section 177 postulates that every offence shall ordinarily be
inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed
but exceptions have been en grafted in subsequent sections in the Chapter. Section
l 79 provides venue for trial or enquiry at the place where the act is done or D
consequences ensued. So inquiry or trial may be had by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction such thing has been done or such.consequence has ensued. Section 188
.. by fiction dealt offences committed by a citizen oflndiaor a foreigner outside India
or on high seas or elsewhere or on any ship or aircraft registered in India. Such
person was directed to be dealt with. in respect of such offences, as if be had
committed at any place within India at which he may be found. But the proviso E

-
thereto puts and embargo that notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding
sections of this Chapter have been done such offences shall not be inquired into
or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Govt.

Judicial power of a.State extends to the punishment of all offences against
the municipal laws of the State by whomsoever committed within the territory. It
also has the power to punish all such offences wherever committed by its citizen.
The general principle uf international law is that every person be it a citizen or
foreigner who is found within a foreign State is subjected to, and is punishable by,
its law. Otherwise the criminal law could not be administered according to any
civilised system of jurisprudence. Sections 177 to 186 deal with the venue or the G
place of the enquiry or trial of crimes. Section 177 reiterates the well-established
common law rule that the properand ordinary situs for the trial ofa crime is the area
of jurisdiction in which the acts occurred and are alleged to consti!ute the crime.
But this rule is subject to several well-recognised exceptions and some of those
exceptions have been en grafted in subsequent sections in the chapter of the Code.·
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.

A Therefore, Uie provisions in Chapter VIII are elastic and not peremptory. In
consequence there- with Sections 218 to 223 of the code would also deal with
exceptions engrafted in the Code. Therefore, they do permit enquiry or trial of a
particular offence along with other offences at a common trial in one court so that
the court having jurisdiction to try an offence gets jurisdiction to try other offence
conunitted or consequences thereof ha<; ensued. The procedure is hand maid to
B substantive justice, namely, to bring the offenders to justice to meet out punish-
ment under IPC or special law as the case may be, in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under the Code or special procedure under that Act constituting the
offence.

The question is whether prior sanction of the Central Govt. Is necessary for
c
the offence of conspiracy under proviso to s. 188 of the Code to take cognizance
of an offence punishable under s. 120-B etc. I.P.C. or to proceed with trial. In
Chapter VA, conspiracy was brought on statute by the Amendment Act, 1913 (8
of 1913). Section 120-A of the 1.P.C. defines ·conspiracy' to mean that when two
or more persons ag2"ee to do, or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act which is
D not illegal by illegal means such an agreement is designated as "criminal
conspiracy". No agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall
amount to a criminal conspiracy, unles's some act besides the agreement is done
by one or more parties to such agreement in furtherance thereof. Section 120-B of
the l.P.C. prescribes punishment for criminal conspiracy. It is not necessary that
each conspirator must know all the details or the scheme nor be a participant at
E every stage. It is necessary that they should agree for design or object of the
conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having three elements: (1) agreement (2)
between two or more persons by whom the agreement is effected; and (3) a
criminal object, which may be either the ultimate aim of the agreement, or may
constitute the means, or one of the means by which that aim is to be accomplished.
It is immaterial whether this is found in the ultimate objects. The common law
F definition of ·criminal conspiracy· was stated first by Lord Denman in Jones· case
( 1832 B & A D 345) that an indictment for conspiracy must '"-charge a conspiracy
to do an unlawful act by unlawful means" and was elaborated by Willies, J. on
behalf of the Judges while referring the question to the House of Lords in M11lcahy
· v. Reg {1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 306 and the House of Lords in unanimous decision
reiterated in Q11i1111 v. leatlzem (1901AC495 at 528) as under:
G

"A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, -<

'but in the agreement. of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do
a lawful act by u_nlawful means. So long as such a design rest~ in
intention only it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into
H
A.TAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY.J.) 555

effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the A
parties, promise against promise, actus comra ac111111, capable of
being enforced, if lawful, punishable of for a cri~nal object or for
the use of criminal means".

This Court in B.G. Bars~· v. The State ofBombay [1962] 2 SCR at 229, held
B

"The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties
to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though
the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is an
ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a C
single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of
act~. Under section 43 of the Indian Penal Code, an act would be
illegal if fi~ is an offence or if it is prohibited by law".

In Yashpal v.State of Punjab [1977] SCR 2433 the rule was laid as follows
D

..The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the
offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each
and everydetail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participa-
tors in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many E
devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the
conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain
of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every
collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be
interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may
be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, F
amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences
may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the
others. The on! y relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal
acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object
of the conspiracy even tl1ough there may be sometimes misfire or
G
over-shooting~by some of the conspirators''.

In Mohammed Usman. Mohammad Hussain Manivar & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra [198 ~] 3 SCR 68, it was held that for an offence under section 120-
B IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that.the conspirators expressly
H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. lJ 993 I 3 S.C.R.

A agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act. the agreement may be proved by
necessary implication. In Noor Mohammed Y11s11fMomin v. State ofMaliaraslura
[ 1971) I SCR I I 9, it was held thats. 120-B IPC makes the criminal conspiracy as
a substantive offence which offence postulates an agreement between two or more
persons to do or cause to be done an act by illegal means. If the offence itself is to
commit an offence, no further steps are needed to be proved to carry the agreement
B into effect. In R.K. Dalmia & Anr. v. The Delhi Administration [1963 J I SCR 253,
it was further held that it is not necessary that each member of a conspiracy must
know all the details of the conspiracy. In Shivanarayan Laxmi11araya11 & Ors. v.
State of Maharashtra & Ors. rI980] 2 SCC 465. this court emphasized that a
conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy and it is impossible to adduce direct
evidence of the same. The offence can be only proved largely from the inferences
c drawn from acts (>r illegal omission committed by the conspirators in pursuance
of a common design.

The question then is whether conspiracy is a continuing offence. Conspiracy
to commit a crime itself is punishable as a substantive offence and every individual
D offence committed pursuant.to the conspiracy is separate and distinct offence to
which individual offenders are liable to punishment, independent of the con-
spiracy. Yet, in our considered view, the agreement does not come to an end with
its making, but would endure till it is accomplished or abandoned or proved
abortive. Being a continuing offence, if any acts oromissions which constitutes.an
offence, are done in India or outside its territory the conspirators continuing to be
E parties to the conspiracy and since part of the acts were done in India, they would
obviate the need to obtain sanction of the Central Govt. all of them need not he
present in India nor continue to remain in India. In le1111art Sclz11ssler & Anr. v.
Director of Et{forcemem & Anr. [1970) 2 SCR 760, a Constitution Bench of this
Court was to consider the question or conspiracy in the setting of the facts, stated
thus: '
F
..A. 2 was the Managing Director of the Rayala Corporation Ltd.
Which manufactures Balda Typewriters. A. I was an Export Man-
ager of ASSAB. A. I and A.2 conspired that A.2 would purchase
material on behalf of his Company from ASSAB instead of M/s
G Atvidabergs, which provides raw material. A.2 was to over-invoice
the value of the goods by 40 per cent of true value and that he should
be paid the difference of 40 per cent on account of the a(oresaid
over-invoicing by crediting it to A.2' s personal account at Stockholm
in a Swedish Bank and requested A. I to help him in opening the
account in Swenska Handles Banken, Swedcn·and to have further
ff
AJAY AGARWALv. UNION OF INDIA (RAMASWAMY.J.I 557

deposits to his personal account from ASSAB. A. I agreed to act as A
- requested by A.2 and A.2 made arrangements with ASSAB to
intimate to A. I the various amounts credited to A.2's account and
asked A. I to keep a watch over the correctness of the account and·
to further intimate to f\im the account position from time to time
through unofficial channels and whenever A. l come to India. A. I
agreed to comply with this request. This agreement was entered into B
between the parties in the year 1963 at Stockholm and again in
Madras in the year I 965. The question was whether Sec. 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code was attracted to these facts".

Per majority, Jaganmohan Reddy, J. held that the gist of the offence defined
ins. 120-A IPC, which is itself punishable as a substantive offence is the very
c
agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or
legal act by illegal means, subject, however, to the proviso that where the
agreement is not an agreement to commit an offence, the agreement does not
amount to a conspiracy unless it is followed up by an overt act done by one or more
persons in pursuance of such an agreement. There must be a meeting of minds in D
the doing of the illegal act or the doing of a legal act by illegal means. If, in
......
furtherance of the conspiracy, certain persons are induced to do an unlawful act
without the knowledge of the conspiracy or the plot they cannot be held to be
conspirators, though they may be guilty of an offence pertaining to the specific
unlawful act. The offence of conspiracy is complete when two or more conspira-
tors have agreed to do or cause to be done an act which is itself an offence, in which E
case no overt act need be established. lt was contended in that regard that several
acts which constitute to make an offence under s. 120-B may be split up in parts
and the criminal liability of A. I must only be judged with regard to the part played
by him. He merely agreed to help A.2 to open an account in the Swedish Bank,
having the amounts lying to the credit of A.2 with Atvidaberg to that account and
to help A.2 by keeping a watch over the account. Therefore, it does not amount to F
a criminal conspiracy. While negating the argument, this court held thus:

"It appears to us that this is not a justifiable contention, because
what has to be seen is whether the agreement between A. I arfd A.2
is a conspiracy to do or continue to do something which is illegal G
and, if it is, it is immaterial whether the agreement to do any of the
acts in furtherance of the commission of the offence do not strictly
amount to an offence. the entire agreement must be viewed as a
whole and it has to be ascertained as to what in fact the conspirators
intended to cto or the object they wanted to achieve··.
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.

A Thus, this court, though not in the context ofjurisdictional issue, held that the
agreement not illegal at its inception would become illegal by subsequent conduct
and an agreement to do an illegal act or to do a legal ac! by illegal means, must be
viewed as a whole and not in isolation. It was aiso implied that the agreement shall
continuing till the object is achieved. The agreement does not get terminated by
merely entering into an agreement but it continues to subsist till the object is either
B achieved or terminated or abandoned.

In Abdul Kader v. State AIR 1964 Bombay 133, a conspiracy was formed in
South Africa by appellants to cheat persons by dishonestly inducing them to
deliver money in the Indian currency by using forged documents and the acts of
cheating were committed in India. When the accused were charged with the
c offence of conspiracy, it was contended that the conspiracy was entered into and
was completed in South Africa and, therefore, the Indian Courts had no jurisdic-
tion to try the accused for the offence of conspiracy. The Division Bench held that
though the conspiracy was entered in a foreign country and was completed as soon
as the agreement was made, yet it was treated to be a continuous offence and the
D persons continued to be parties to the conspiracy when they committed acts in
India. Accordingly, it was held that the Indian Courts had jurisdiction to try the
offence of conspiracy. In U.S. v. Kissal 218 US ·601, Holmes, J. held that
conspiracy is a continuous offence and stated "is a perversion of natural thought
and of natural language to call such continuous co-operation of a cinematographic
series of distinct conspiracies rather than to call it a single one ... a conspiracy is
E a pllftnership in criminal purposes. That a5 slfch it may have continuation in time·
is shown by the rule that overt act by one partner may be the act of all without any
newagreementspecificallydirectedto that act". In Fordv. U.S. 273 US593 at620
to 622. Tuft, CJ. held that conspiracy is a continuing offence.

In Director ofPublic Prosecutions v. Doot and Ors. 1973 Appeal Cases 807
F
(H.L.), the five respondents hatched a plan abroad, i.e. Belgium and Morocco and
worked out the details to import cannabis into the United States via England, In
pursuance thereof two vans with cannabis concealed in them were shipped from
Morocco to Southampton; the other van was traced at Liverspool, from where the
vans were to have been shipped to America and the cannabis in it was found. They
G were charged among other offences with conspiracy to import dangerous drugs.
At the trial, the respondents contended that the Courts in England had no
jurisdiction to try them on the count of conspiracy since the conspiracy had been
entered into abroad. While rejecting the contention, Lord Wilberforce held (at
page 817):

H ·'The present case involves international elements the accused are
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY,J.] 559

aliens and the conspiracy was initiated abroad but there can be no A
quescion here of any breach of any rules of international law if they
ar'e prosecuted in this country. Under the objective territorial
principle (I use the terminology of the Harward Research in Inter-
national Law) or the principle of University (For the prevention of

-- .,
the trade in narcotics falls within this description) or both, the courts
of this country have a clear right, if not a duty, to prosecute in
accordance with our municipal law. The position as it is under the
international law it not; however, determinative of the question
whether, under our municipal law, the acts committed amount to a
B

crime. That has to be decided on different principles. If conspiracy
to import drugs were a statutory offence, the question whether
foreign conspiracies were included would be decided upon the c
terms of the statute. Since it is (if at all) a common law offence, this
question must be decided upon principle and authority- In my
opinion, the key to a decision for or against the offence charged· can
be found in an answer to the question why the common law treats
certain actions as crimes. And one answer must certainly be because D
the actions in question are a·threat to the Queen's peace or as we
. would now perhaps say, to society. Judged by this test, there is every
reason for, and none that I can see against, the prosecution. Con-
spiracies are intended to be carried into effect, and one reason why,
in addition to individua! prosecution of each Pai:ticipant, conspiracy

- charges are brought is because criminal action organised and
executed, in concert is ~ore dangerous than an individual breach of
law. Why, then, restrain from prosecution where the relevant
concert was, initially, formed outside the United Kingoom? ... The
E

truth is that, in the normal case of a conspiracy carried out, or partly
carried out, in this country, the location of the formation of the
agreement is irrelevant; the attack upon the laws of this country is F
identical wherever the conspirators happened to commit; the "con-
spiracy" is a complex formed indeed, but not separately completed,
at the first meeting of the plotters".

Viscount Dilhowe at page 823 laid the rule that :
G

"a conspiracy does not end with the making of the agreement. It will
continue so long as there are two or more parties to it intending to
carry out the design. It w_ould be highly unreal to say that the
conspiracy to carry out the Gunpower plot was completed when the
conspirators met and agreed to the plot at Catesby". H

•
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 ~C.R.

A At page 825B it was concluded thus :
,
"The conclusion to which I have come after consideration of these
authorities and Of many others to which the House was referred but
to which I do not think it is necessary to refer is that though the
offence of conspiracy is complete when the agreement to do
B unlawful act is made and it is not necessary for the prosecution to
do more than prove the making of such an agreement a conspiracy
• It continues so long
does not end with the making of the agreement.
--
as the parties to the agreement intended to carry it out... .. I'

s
Lord Pearson at page' 827 held that : ·
c
"a conspiracy involved an agreement express or implied. A con-
spiratorial agreement is not a contract, not legally binding because
it is unlawful. Butas an agreement it has its three stages, namely, (1)
making or formation; (2) performance or implementation ; (3)
D discharge or termination. When the conspiratorial agreement has
been made, the offence of conspiracy is complete, it has been
corrunitted, and the conspirator can be prosecuted even though no
performance had taken place. But the fact that of the offence of
conspiracy is complete at that stage does not mean that the conspira-

E
torial agreement is finished with. It is not dead. If it is being
performed, it is very much alive. so long as the performance
continues, it is operating, it is being carried out by the conspirators,
and it is governing or at any rate influencing their conduct. The
conspiratorial agreement conti.nues in operation and therefore in
existence until it is discharged (terminated) by completion of its
-
performance or by abandonment or frustration or, however, it may
F
be"

Lord Salmon at page 833 observed :

"If a conspiracy is entered into abroad to corrunit a crime in England,
G exactly the same public mischief is produced by it as if it had been
entered into here. It is unnecessary for me to consider what the
position might be ifthe conspirators came to England for an entirely
innocent purpose unconnected With the conspiracy. If however, the
conpirators come here and do acts in furtherance of the conspiracy,
for example, by preparing to corrunit the plan_ned crime, it cannot,
H
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA (RAMASWAMY.J.) 561

in my view, be considered contrary to the rules of international A
comity for the forces of law and order in England to protect the
Queen's peace by arresting the.m and putting them iil trial for
conspiracy whether they .are British subjects or foreigners and
whether or not conspiracy is a crime under the law of the country in
which the conspiracy was born".
B
Al page 835 it wa'> held that the respondents conspired together in England
notwithstanding the fact that they were abroad when they entered into the
agreement which was the essence of the conspiracy. That agreement was and
remained a continuing agreement and they continued to conspire until the offence
they were conspiring to commit was in fact committed. Accordingly, it was held
c
that the conspiracy, though entered into abroad, was committed in England and the
courts in England and jurisdiction. The ratio emphasizes that acts done in
furtherance of continuing conspiracy constitute part of the cause of action and
performance of it gives jurisdiction for English Courts to try the accused.

In Treacyv. Director ofPublic Prosecutions 1971 Appeal Cases 537 at 563 D
<,H. L.), the fact~ of the case were that the appellant therein posted in the Isle of
Wright a let~er written by him and addressed to Mrs. X in West Germany
demanding rnoney with menaces. The letter was received by Mrs. X in West-
Gennany. The appellant was charged with.black mail indictable s. 21 of the Theft
Act, 1968. While denying the offence, it was contended that the courts in England
were de\•oted of jurisdiction. Over-ruling the said objection, Lord Diplock al page E
562 ob~erved :

"The State is under a correlative duty to those who owe obedience
to its laws to protect their interests and one of the purposes of
criminal law is to afford such protection by deterring by threat of
F
punishment conducted by other persons which is calculated to hand
to those interests. Comity gives no right to a State to insist that any
person may with immunity do physical acts in its own territory
which have harmful consequences to persons within the territory of
another state. It may be under no obligation in comity to punish
those acts itself, but it has no ground from complaint in international G
law if the State in which the harmful consequences had their effect
'punishes, when they do enter its territories, persons who did such
acts".

Prof. Williams, Glanville in his article "Venue and 1/te Ambit.of Criminal
law [l 965) L.Q.R. 518 at 528 stated thus : ff
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.

A "Sometimes the problem of determining the place of the crime is
assisted by the doctrine of the continuing crime. Some crimes are
regarded as being of a continuing nature, and they may accordingly
be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which they are partly committed
the partial commission being, in the eye of the law, a total cominis-
sion".
B
In the context ofconspiracy under the caption inchoate crimes" It was ·stated:

"The general principle seems to be that jurisdiction over an inchoate
crime appertains to the State that woulli have had jurisdiction had
c the crime been consummated".

Commenting upon the ratio laid down in Board of Trade v. Owen [ 1957) Appeal
Cases 602, he stated at page 534 thus :

'·The seems to follow owen as logical corollary that our courts will
D assume jurisdiction to punish a conspiracy entered into abroad IO
commit a crime here. Although the general principle is that crime
committed abroad do not become punishable here merely because
their evil effects occur here, there may be an exceptfon for inchoate
crimes aimed against persons in this country. Since conspiracy is
the widest and vaguest of the inchoate crimes, it seems clearly that
E
the rule for conspiracy must apply to more limited crimes of
incitement and attempt also".

At page 535 he further stated that "the rule of inchoate crimes is therefore an
exception from the general principle of territorial jurisdiction. The crime is wholly
F committed in the State A, yet is justiciable also in State B". At page 535 he
elucidated th_at "'certain exceptions are recognised or suggested''. Lord Tucker in
own's case (supra) ill,ustrated that a conspiracy D 2 England to violate the laws·of
a foreign country might be justiciable here if the preferments the conspiracy
charged wou.ld produce a public mischief within the State or injure a person here
by causing him damage abroad". At page 536 be stated that "as another exception
G from the rule in Board o/Trade v. Owen (supra it seems from the earlier decision
that a conspiracy entered into here will be punishable if the conspirators contem-
plates that the illegality may be performed either within British jurisdiction or
abroad even though, in the event, the illegality is performed abroad". His sftltement
of law now receives acceptance by House of Lords in Doot's case:

H
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY,J.J 563

Io Halsbury's Uiw of England, third edition, vol. 10, page 327, para 602, A
while dealing with continuing offence it was stated as under:

"A criminal enterprise may consist ofa continuing act which is done
in more places than one or of a series of acts which are done in
several places. In such cases, though there is one criminal enter-
prise, there may be several crimes, and a crime is committed in each B
place where a complete criminal act is performed although the act
may be only a part of the enterprise".

It was further elucidated in para 603 that :
c
"What constitutes a complete criminal act is determined by the
nature of the crime. Thus, as regards continuing acts, in the case of
sending by post or otherwise a libellous or threatening letter, or a
letter to provoke a breach of the peace, a crime is committed. both
where the letter is posted or otherwise sent, and also where it is
received, and the venue may be laid in either place. ' D

Archbold in Criminal Pleadings, Evidence and Practice, 42nd edition
(1985) Chapter 23, in para 28-32 at p. 2281, Wright on Conspiracies and
Agreements at pages 73-74, Smith on Crimes at page 239 and Ru,ssel on Crime,
'I
' 12th edition, page 613 stated that conspiracy is a continuing offence and liable to
E
prosecution at the place of making the agreement and also in the country where the
acts are committed.

Thus, an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act or legal
acts by illegal means is criminal conspiracy. If the agreement is not an agreement
to commit an offence, it does not amount to conspiracy unless it is followed up by F
an overt acr.,done by one or more persons in furtherance of the agreement. The
offence is complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and unity of purpose
between the conspirators to do that illegal act or legal act by illegal means.
Conspiracy itself is a substantive offence and is distinct from the offence to
commit which the conspirllcy is entered into. It is undoubted that the general
. conspiracy is distinct from number of separate offences committed while execut- G
ing the offence of conspiracy. Each act constitutes separate offence punishable,
independeqt of the conspiracy. The'iaw had developed several or different models
or technics to broach the scope of conspiracy. One such model is that of a chain,
where each party performs even without knowledge of other a role that aids
succeeding parties in accomplishing the criminal objectives of the conspiracy. An H
illustration of a single conspiracy, its parts bound together as links in a chain, is
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [199313 S.C.R.

A the process of procuring anc:J distributing narcotics or an illegal foreign drug for
sale in different parts of the globe. ln such a case, smugglers, middlemen and
retailers are privies to a single conspiracy to smuggle and distribute narcotics. The
smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers; and the retailers knew
that the middlemen must buy of importers of someone or another. Thus the
conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not,
B and could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other enq knew that it had
not begun with their settlers. The accused embarked upon a venture in all parts of
which each was a participant an.ct an abettor in the sense that, the success of the pan
with which he wa-; immediately concerned, wa<> dependent upon the success of the
whqle. It should also be considered as a spoke in the hub. There is a rim to bind
all tl1e i;pokes together in a single conspiracy. It is not material that a rim is found
c only when there is proof that each spoke was aware of one another's existence but
that all promoted in furtherance of some single illegal objective. The traditional
concept of single agrecmen.t can also accommodate the situation where a well-
defined group conspires to commit multiple crimes; so long as all these crimes are
the objects of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship, and
D
the conspiracy continues to subsist though it was entered in the first instance. Take
for instance that three persons hatched a conspiracy in country 'A' to kill 'D' in
country 'B' wi.th explosive substance. As far as conspiracy is concerned, it is
complete in country 'A' one of them pursuant thereto carried the explosive
substance and hands it over to third one in the country 'B' who implants at a place
where 'D' frequents and got exploded with remote control. 'D' may be killed or
E escape or may be diffused. The conspiracy continues-till it is executed in country
'B' or frustrated. Therefore, it is a continuing act and all are liable for conspiracy
in country.'B' though first two are liable to murder with aid of s. 120-B and the last
one is liable under s. 302 or 307 IPC, as the case may be. Conspiracy may be
considered to be a march under a banner and a person may join or drop out in the
march without the necessity of the ch~nge in the text on the banner. In the comity
F of International Law, in these days, ~ommitting offences on international scale is
-
a common feature. The offence of conspiracy would be auseful weapon and there
would exist no conflict in municipal laws and the doctrine of autrefoes convict or
acquit ,would extend to such offences. The comity of nations are duty bound to
apprehend the conspirators as soon as they set their feet on the country territorial
limits and nip the offence in the bud.
G
A conspiracy thus. is a continuing offence and continues to subsist and
committed wherever one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts. So long
· a its performance continues, it is a continuing offence till it is executed or rescinded
o~ frustrated by choice or necessity. A crime is complete as soon as the agreement

H is made, but it is not a thing of the moment. It does not end· with the making of the
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY,J.] 565

agreement. It will continue so long as there are two or more parties to it intending A
to carry into effect the design. Its continuance is a threat to the society against
which it was aimed at and would be dealt with as soon as that jurisdiction can
properly claim the power to do so. The conspiracy designed or agreed abroad will
have the same effect as in India, when part of the acts, pursuant to the agreement
are agreed to be finalised or done, attempted or even frustrated and vice versa.
B
In K. Satwant Singh v,. The State ofPtmjab (1960] 2 SCR 89, a Constitution
Bench of this Court was to consider as to when s. 188 of the Code would be
'applicable to a case. The facts therein was that the appellant had cheated the Govt.
of Burma whose office was at Shimla punishable under s. 420 IPC. The accused
_..._
contended that the part of the act was done at Kohlapur where payment was to be
made and on that basis the court at Shimla had no jurisdiction to try the offence
c
without prior sanction of the political agent. Considering that. question this court
held that if the offence of cheating was committed outside British India, the
sanction would be necessary but on facts it was held that :

"It seems to us, on the facts established in this case, that no part of D
the offence of cheating was committed by the appellan~~utside
British India. His false representation to the Govt. of Burma that
money was due to him was at a place in British India which induced
that govt. to order payment of his claims. In fact, he was paid at
Lahore at his own request by means of cheques on the Branch of the
Imperial Bank oflndia at Lahore. The delivery of the property of the E
Govt. of Burma, namely, the money. was made at Lahore, a place
. in Brithsh India, and we cannot regard, in the circumstances of the
present case, the posting of the cheques at Kohlapur either as
delivery of property to the appellant at Kohlapur or payment of his
claims at Kohlapur. The entire argument founded on the provisions
of S. 188 of the Code, therefore, fails. F

Far from helping the appellant the ratio establishes that if an offence was
committed in India the need to obtain sanction under section 188 is obviated. In
Purshottamdas Dalmia v. State ofWest Bengal [1962] 2 SCR 101,this court, when
the appellant was charged with offences punishable under ss. l 20B, 466 and 477, G
the appellant contended that offence of conspiracy was entered into at Calcutta the
offences of using the forged documents was committed at Madras. Therefore, the
court at Calcutta had no jurisdiction to try the offence under s. 471 read withs. 466,
IPC, even though committed in pursuance of the conspiracy and in course of the
same transaction. This court held that the desirability of trying the offences of allt
H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 3 S.C.R.

A he overt acts committed in pursuance of a conspiracy together is obvious and ss.
177 and 239 of the Co<:Ie leave no manner of doubt that the court which has the
jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal conspiracy has also the jurisdiction to try
all the overt acts committed in pursuance of it even though outside its territorial
juris9iction. In LN. Mu~herjee v. The State of Madras [l 962] 2 SCR 116, it was
further held that the court having jurisdiction to try the offences committed in
B pursuance of the conspiracy, has also the jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal
conspiracy, even th~ugh it was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. This
view was further reiterated in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration [1963] l SCR
253 at 273 and Banwari Lal Jhunjhunwala and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr.
[1963] supp. 2 SCR 338. Therein it was held that the court trying an accused for
offence of conspiracy is competent to try him foroff~nces committed in pursuance
c of that conspiracy irrespective of the fact whether or not overt acts have been
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The charges framed therein under s.
409 read with ss. 120B, 420, IPC ands. 5(1) (D) read withs. 5(2) of the Prevention
of CoriUption Act were upheld.

D Thus we hold that sanction under section 188 is not a condition precedent to
take cognizance of the offence. If need be H could be obtained before trial begins.
Conspiracy was initially hatched at Chandigarh and though itself is a completed
offence, being continuing offence, even accepting appellant's case that he was at
Dubai and part of conspiracy and overt acts in fu~herance thereof had taken place
at Dubai and partly at Chandigarh; and in consequence thereof other offences had
E been ensued. Since the. offences have been committed during the continuing
course of transaction culminated in cheating P.N.B. at Chandigarh, the need to
. obtain sanction for various offences under proviso to s. 188 is obviated. Therefore,
there is no need to obtain sanction from Central Govt. The case may be different ·
if the offences were committed out side India and are completed in themselves
without conspiracy. Perhaps that question may be different for which we express
F no opinion on the facts of this case. The ratio in Fakhrulla Khan has no application
to the faets in this case. Therein the accused were chargedforoffences under s. 420,
419, 467 and 468 and the offences were committed in native State, Mysore. As a
result the courts in British India i.e. Madras province had no jurisdiction to try the
offence wHhout prior sanction. Equally in Verghese's case the offences charged
under s. 409, IPC had also been taken place outside British India. Therefore, it was
G
held that the sanction under s.188 was necessary. The ratio in Kailash Shanna's
case is not good at law. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

R.M. SAHA I J. While agreeing with Brother Ramaswamy, J ., I propose to
add a few words. Prosecution of the appellant under Section l20B read with
H Section 420 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (in brief 'IPC') w~ assailed for
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA [RA.MASWAMY,J.] 567

absence of sanction under Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in brief A
'Cr. P. C.'). Two submissions were advanced, one that even though criminal
conspiracy was itself an offence but if another offence was committed in
pursuance of it outside India then sanction was necessary; second-an offence is
constituted of a number of ingredients and even if one of them was committed
outside the country Section 188 of the Cr. P.C. was attracted.
B
Language of the section is plain and simple. It operates where an offence is
committed by a citizen of India outside the country. Requirements are, therefore,
one-commission of an offence; second - by an Indian citizen; and third-that it
should have' been committed outside the country. Out of the three there is no
dispute that the appellant is an Indian citizen. But so far the othertwo are concerned
the allegations in the complaint are that the conspiracy to forge and cheat the bank
c
was hatched by the appellant and others in India. Whether it was so or not, cannot
be gone into at this stage.

What is the claim then? Two fold one the appellant was in Dubai at the
relevant time when the offence is alleged to have been committed. Second, since D
the bills ofla(ling and exchange were prepared and were submitted to the Emirates
National Bank at Dubai and the Payment too was received at Emirates National
Bank in Dubai, the alleged offence of forgery and cheating were committed
outside India. Is that so? Can the offence of conspiracy or cheating or forgery on
these allegations be said to have been committed outside the country? Substantive
law of extra-territory in respect of criminal offences is provided for by Section 4 E
of the IPC and the procedure to inquire and try it is contained the Section 188
Cr.P.C. Effect of these sections is that an offence committed by an Indian citizen
outside the country is deemed to have been committed in India. Proviso to Section
188 Cr. P.C. however provides the safeguard for the NRI to guard against any
unwarranted harassment by directing, "that, notwithstanding anything in any of
F
the preceding sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or
tried in India except with the previous sanction4:lf the Central Government.''

Since the proviso begins with a non obstinate clause its observance is
mandatory. But is would come into play only if the·p;incipal clause is applicable,
namely, it is established that an offence as defined in clause 'n' of Section 2 of the G
Cr.P.C. has been committed and it has been committed outsida the country.

- What has to be examined at this stage is if the claim of the appellant that the
1lffenceunder Section 120B read with Section420andSection471 of the IPC were
committed outside the country. An offence is defined in the Cr. P.C. to mean an
H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 3 S.C.R.

A act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. None of
the offences for which the appellant has been charged has residence as one of its
ingredients. The jurisdiction to inquire or try vests under Section 177 in the Court
. in whose local jurisdiction the offence is committed. It is thus the commission of
offence and not the residence of the accused which is decisive of jurisdiction.
When two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or an act
B which is illegal by illegal means such agreement is designated a criminal
conspiracy under Section l 20A of the IPC. The ingredients of the offence is
agreement and not the residence. meeting of minds of more than two persons is the
-
primary requirement. Even if it is assumed that the appellant was at Dubai and he
entered into an agreement with his counterpart sitting in India to do an illegal act
in India the offence of conspiracy came into being when agreement was reached
c between the two. The two minds met when talks oral or in writing took place in
India. Therefore, the offence of conspiracy cannot be said to have been committed
outside the country. In MobarikA/iAhmed v. The State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC
857 this court while dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the Courts to try
an offence of cheating committed by a foreign national held that the offence of
cheating took place only when representation was made by the accused sitting in

-
D
Karachi to the complaints sitting in Bombay. The argument founded on cor{Joreal
presence was rejected and it was observed :

"What is, therefore, to be seen is whether there is any re&sbn to think that a
foreigner not corporeally present at the time of the commission of the commission
E of the offence does not fall within the range of persons punishable therefor under
the Code. It appears to us that the answer must be in the negative unless there is
any recognised legal principle on which such exclusion can be founded or the
language of the Code compels such a construction".

If a foreign national is amenable to jurisdiction under Section 179 of the Cr.
F
P.C. a NRI cannot claim that the offence shall be deemed to have been committed
outside the country merely because he was not physically present.

Preparation of bill of lading at Dubai or payment at Dubai were not isolated
acts. They were part of chain activities between the appellant and his associates
G with whom he entered into agreement to cheat the bank at Chandigarh. Any
isolated act or omission committed at Dubai was insufficient to constitute an
offence. The illegal act of dishonestly inducing the bank at Chandigarh was
committed not by preparation of bill at Dubai but its presentation in pursuan~e of
agreement to cheat. The submission thus founded was on residepce or on
preparation of bills of lading or encashment at Dubai are of no consequence.
H
AJAY AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA [RAMASWAMY,J.] 569

Nor is there any merit in the submission that even part of the offence would A
attract Section 188 as the section operates when offence is committed outside
India. An offence is committed when all the ingredients are satisfied. The section
having used the word l)ffence it cannot be understood as part of the offence.
Section 179 Cr.P.C. empowers a court to try an offence either at a place where the
offence is committed or the consequences ensue. On the .allegations in the
complaint the act or omissions were committed in India. In any case the conse- B
quence of conspiracy, cheating and forging having taken place at Chandigarh the
offence was not committed outside the country therefore the provisions of Sec. 188
Cr. P.C. were not attrm:ted.

ORDER
c
For reasons given by us in l)Ur Cl)ncurring but separate orders the appeal fails
and is dismissed.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

VPR. Appeal dismissed.