AJAHAR ALIversusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL

                     [2013] 9 S.C.R. 911


                       AJAHAR ALI                               A
                            v.
                STATE OF WEST BENGAL
            (Criminal Appeal No.1623 of 2013)
                     OCTOBER 4, 2013
                                                                B
      [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]

    PENAL CODE, 1860:

     s. 354 - Criminal force to outrage modesty of woman - c
Accused convicted and sentenced to six months simple
imprisonment with fine - Held: Provisions of s.354 have been
enacted to safeguard public morality and decent behaviour -
If any person uses criminal force upon any woman with the
intention or knowledge that woman's modesty will be outraged, 0
he is to be punished - Courts cannot take lenient view in
awarding sentence on the ground of sympathy or delay as the
same cannot be any ground for reduction of sentence -
Appellant has committed a heinous crime and with the social
condition prevailing, modesty of a woman has to be strongly E
guarded - It is not a fit case so as to give benefit of 1958 Act
to appellant - As appellant had been awarded only six months
imprisonment, considering the matter under the JJ Act, 2000
would not serve any purpose at such a belated stage -
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Delay.                      F

    CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:

    Art. 136 - Criminal appeal - Concurrent findings of three
courts below - Court declines to reappreciate the evidence.   G
    The appellant was convicted u/s. 354 IPC and was
sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months and to
pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for having forcefully caught hold
of a sixteen year old girl on her way and planted a kiss
                             911                                H
    912      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   causing a cut over her lower lip. His appeal and revision
    were dismissed by the Sessions Judge and the High
    Court, respectively.

        In the instant appeal, leniency was pleaded by the
   appellant on the ground that the incident occurred 18
8
  .years back and both the complainant and the appellant
   had settled in their respective lives. It was further
   submitted that on the date of the incident, the appellant
   was a juvenile and in view of the Juvenile Justice (Care
   and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, he ought to have
C been tried before the Juvenile Justice Board; and that,
   in all circumstances, the Court should give the appellant
   the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D
         HELD: 1.1 The complainant who had no enmity
    against the appellant has been very consistent about the
    factual matrix not only in her statement u/s. 161 of CrPC
    but also before the court and had supported the
E   prosecution case fully. Her version was corroborated by
    several other witnesses and the courts below have
    recorded a concurrent finding that the appellant was
    guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the circumstances,
    this Court declines to re-appreciate the evidence. [Para
    7) [917-D-F]
F
      1.2 The provisions of s. 354 IPC have been enacted
  to safeguard public morality and decent behaviour.
  Therefore, if any person uses criminal force upon any
  woman with the intention or knowledge that the woman's
G modesty will be outraged, he is to be punished. Courts
  cannot take lenient view in awarding sentence on the
  ground of sympathy or delay as the same cannot be any
  ground for reduction of sentence. In the instant case, the
  High Court has opined that appellant has been dealt with
H very leniently and it was a fit case where the High Court
      AJAHAR ALI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL               913

wanted to enhance the sentence but considering the fact A
that the incident occurred long back, the High Court
refrained to do so. [Paras 14, 20 and 21] [920-A-B; 921-F,
G-H; 922-A]
     State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCR 286 = AIR
                                                           8
1967 SC 63; Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2004 (2) SCR
237 =AIR 2004 SC 1497; Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State
of Maharashtra, 2004 (2) SCR 287 = AIR 2004 SC 1677;
Turkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 10
= (2006) 8 SCC 560; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar C
Pal Singh Gill & Anr. 1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 237 =AIR 1996
SC 309; Chinnadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1996 SC
546; State of U.P. v. Shri Kishan, AIR 2005 SC 1250,
Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
2012 SC 3242 - referred to.
                                                              D
     1.3 The appellant has committed a heinous crime and
with the social condition prevailing, the modesty of a
woman has to be strongly guarded and keeping in view
the manner in which the appellant behaved, it is not a fit
case where the benefit of the Act 1958 should be given        E
to him. [Para 12] [919-E]
    Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 178, Om
Prakash & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2001) 10 SCC 477;
                                                  =
Manjappa v. State of Kamataka, 2007 (7) SCR 275 (2007)
6 SCC 231; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dharam Pal,           F
(2004) 9 sec 681 - referred to.
    Mohamed Aziz Mohamed Nasir v. State of Maharashtra,
1976 (3) SCR 663 =AIR 1976 SC 730 - distinguished.
     1.4 As regards the applicability of JJ Act 2000, if the G
matter came before the Juvenile Justice Board, the
maximum sentence that can be awarded in such a case
is of 3 years. In the instant case, the punishment awarded
is only six months, so the cause of the appellant is not
prejudiced. This Court is, therefore, of the considered H
    914      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   opinion that as the appellant had been awarded only six
    months imprisonment, considering the matter under the
    JJ Act, 2000 would not serve any purpose at such a
    belated stage. [Para 13 and 21] [919-F, G-H; 921-G]

         Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1997 (3)
8
    Suppl. SCR 404 = AIR 1997 SC 3011; Apparel Export
    Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, 1999 (1) SCR 117 =AIR
    1999 SC 625; Musa Khan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
    1976 DV 2566; Abuzar Hossain @ Gu/am Hossain v. State
C   of West Bengal 2012 (9) SCR 244 = (2012) 10 SCC 489 -
    referred to.
                        Case Law Reference:
          1976 (3) SCR 663        distinguished        para 8
D         AIR 1976 DV 2566        referred to          para 9
          (2009) 1 sec 118        referred to          para 10
          (2001) 10 sec 477       referred to          para 10
          2007 (7) SCR 275        referred to          para 10
E
          (2004) 9 sec 681        referred to          para 11
          2012 (9) SCR 244        referred to          Para 13
          1966 SCR 286 .          referred to          Para 15
F
          2004 (2) SCR 237        referred to          Para 15
          2004 (2) SCR 287        referred to          Para 15
          2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 10 referred to           Para 15
G         1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 237 referred to          Para 16
          1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 404 referred to          Para 17
          1999 (1) SCR 117        referred to          Para 17

H
      AJAHAR ALI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                       915


     AIR 1996 SC 546               referred to            Para 18      A

     AIR 2005 SC 1250              referred to            Para 18
     AIR 2012 SC 3242              referred to            Para 20

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal                   B
No. 1623 of 2013.                  '

   S.C. Ghosh, Reshmi Rea Sinha, Rameshwar Prasad
Goyal for the Appellant.

    Soumitra G. Chaudhuri, Anip Sachthey for the                       c
Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                       D
     2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned
judgment and order dated 19.9.2012 passed by the High Court
of Calcutta in Criminal Revision No. 3240 of 2012 affirming the
judgment and order of the learned Sessions Judge dated
22.8.2012 dismissing the appeal of the appellant against the           E
judgment and order of the learned Magistrate dated 9.5.2012,
by which and whereunder the learned Magistrate had found the
appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 354
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC'),
He had been sentenced to suffer SI for 6 months and further to         F
pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, further
to undergo SI for two months.

     3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to appeal are that:

     A. On 6.11.1995, Nasima Begum (PW.1), aged about 16 G
years filed a complaint alleging that on that day while she was
going to attend her tuition alongwith her friend Nilufa Khatun,
she met the appellant on the way who suddenly came and
forcibly caught hold of her hair and planted a kiss, resultantly,
she suffered a cut over her lower lip and starteq bleeding.            H
    916      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A        B. A case under Section 354/324 IPC was registered.
    After conducting the trial, the court of 1st Judicial Magistrate, 1st
    Court, Maida vide judgment and order dated 9.5.2012 found
    the appellant guilty for offence under Section 354 IPC and
    sentenced him as referred to hereinabove.
B
        C. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal
    No.2/2012 before the learned Sessions Judge, Maida and the
    said appeal was dismissed vide judgment and order dated
    22.8.2012.

c       D. Appellant challenged both the aforesaid orders by filing
    Criminal Revision before the High Court which has been
    dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated
    19.9.2012.

D         Hence, this appeal.

       4. Shri S.C. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the
  appellant has half-heartedly challenged the findings of fact
  recorded by the courts below. However, we are not inclined to
  re-appreciate the evidence and disturb the findings recorded
E by the three courts, therefore, he argued that since the incident
  occurred more than 18 years ago and at that time the appellant
  as well as the complainant were about 16 years of age, the
  court should not send the appellant to jail at such a belated·
  stage. Considering the fact that the appellant was juvenile in
F view of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 (hereinafter
  referred to as the 'JJ Act 2000'), he ought to have been tried
  before the Juvenile Justice Board and not by the criminal court,
  as was done. Even otherwise, considering the time gap of 18
  years and the fact that the appellant as well as the complainant
G have settled in life and both of them are married and have
  children, their lives should not be disturbed. In all circumstances,
  the court should give the benefit to the appellant under the
  provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter
  referred to as the 'Act 1958'). Therefore, the appeal deserves
H to be allowed.
      AJAHAR ALI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                      917
             [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.]
       5. On the other hand, Shri Anip Sachthey, learned Standing    A
counsel appearing for the State of West Bengal has opposed
the appeal contending that considering the nature of offence
wherein the modesty of a young girl was outraged, the question
of showing any leniency or granting the benefit of the Act 1958
is not. warranted. Even if the case of the appellant is considered   B
under the JJ Act 2000, the maximum punishment that can be
awarded is of 3 years, while in the instant case, the appellant
had been sentenced only for a period of six months. Therefore,
it will be a futile exercise to consider the case of the appellant
on that anvil. Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.           c
     6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

      7. In view of the concurrent findings recorded by the three
courts below; we are not inclined to re-appreciate the evidence.     D
The same is also not warranted in view of the fact that the
complainant, Nasima Begum who had no enmity against the
appellant has been very consistent about the factual matrix not
only in her statement under Sectiort 161 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (~ereinafter referred to as ·cr.P.C.') but also      E
before the court and had supported the prosecution case fully.
Her version was corroborated by several other witnesses and
the courts below have recorded a finding that the appellant was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
                                                                     F
     8. Learned counsel for the appellant pleads for leniency
on the ground that the trial has gone on for a long time;
furthermore, he has no previous criminal history and that he
may lose his job. For the purpose of seeking a benefit under
the Act 1958 he has placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court in Mohamed Aziz Mohamed Nasir v. State of                      G
Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 730, wherein the ben'efit of the Act
1958 was given observing further that even if such plea had not
been raised before the court below, it can be raised for the first
time before this court. That was a case under Section 379 r/w
Section 34 IPC and the charge against the said appellant was         H
    918       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   snatching two sarees from one Govind who was carrying them
    from the shop of his master to that of a washer and dyer.

          9. In Musa Khan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976
    DV 2566, this Court observed that the purpose of the provisions
    of the Act 1958 is to reform the juvenile offenders though that
8
    was a case of Section 149 IPC and the court held that culpable
    liability does not arise from mere presence in the assembly and
    even participation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
    that he joined that unlawful assembly willingly.

C     10. This Court in Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009)
  7 sec 178, to which one of us (Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.) was a
  member of the Bench, after considering various earlier
  judgments and particularly Om Prakash & Ors. v. State of
  Haryana, (2001) 10 SCC 477 and Manjappa v. State of
D Karnataka, (2007) 6 SCC 231; held that a relief under the Act
  1958 should be granted in the offences which were not of a very
  grave nature or where the mens rea is absent.

         11. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dharam Pal, (2004) ·
    9 sec 681, this Court considered the appeal of the State of
E   Himachal Pradesh wherein the benefit of the Act 1958 had
    been given to the accused who was held guilty for offence under
    Section 376/511 IPC for attempt to commit rape. This Court in
    the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case did not
F   interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court, but at
    the same time did not approve of the reasoning given by the
    High Court. The court held as under:

          "According to us, the offence of an attempt to commit rape
          is a serious offence, as ultimately if translated into th.e act
G         leads to an assault on the most valuable possession of a
          woman i.e. character, reputation, dignity and honour. In a
          traditional and conservative country like India, any attempt
          to misbehave or sexually assault a woman is one of the
          most depraved acts. The Act is intended to reform the
H         persons who can be reformed and would cease to be a
      AJAHAR ALI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                      919
             [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    nuisance in the society. But the discretion to exercise the A
    jurisdiction under Section 4 is hedged with a condition
    about the nature of offence and the character of the
    offender. Section 6 of the Act makes the provisions
    applicable in cases where offenders are under 21 years
    of age, as restrictions on imprisonment of offenders have B
    been indicated in the said provision. In a case involving
    similar facts, this Court in State of Haryana v. Prem
    Chand, (1997) 7 SCC 756 upheld the judgment of the
    High Court which extended the benefit of provisions under
    Section 4 of the Act. Considering the peculiar c
    circumstances of the case and taking into account the fact
    that on the date of occurrence the accused was less than
    21 years old, we feel this is a case where no interference
    is called for with the judgment of the High Court, though
    some of the conclusions arrived at by the High Court do 0
    not have our approval."

     12. In the instant case, as the appellant has committed a
heinous crime and with the social condition prevailing in the
society, the modesty of a woman has to be strongly guarded
and as the appellant behaved like a road side Romeo, we do            E
not think it is a fit case where the benefit of the Act 1958 should
be given to the appellant.

      13. This brings us to the next question regarding the
applicability of JJ Act 2000. This issue has been raised for the F
first time in this court and the appellant can do so in view of
the larger Bench judgment of this Court in Abuzar Hossain @
Gu/am Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489,
wherein it was held that the plea of juvenility can be raised at
any stage irrespective of delay in raising the same. But the G
question that would arise is if the matter came before the
Juvenile Justice Board, the maximum sentence that can be
awarded in such a case is of 3 years. In the instant case, the
punishment awarded is only six months so the cause of the
appellant is not prejudiced.
                                                                      H
    920      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A        14. The provisions of Section 354 IPC has been enacted
    to safeguard public morality and decent behaviour. Therefore,
    if any person uses criminal force upon any woman with the
    intention or knowledge that the woman's modesty will be
    outraged, he is to be punished.
B
         15. In State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63,
    this Court observed that modesty is the quality of being modest
    which means as regards women, decent in manner and
    conduct, scrupulously chaste, though the word 'modesty' has not
    been defined in the Code. The ultimate test for determining
C   whether modesty has been outraged is whether the action of
    the offender as such can be perceived as one which is capable
    of lowering the sense of decency of a woman.

    (See also: Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC
D   1497; Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
    2004 SC 1677; and Turkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (2006)
    a sec 560).
         16. In Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh.
    Gill & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 309, slapping a woman on her
E   posterior amounted to outraging of her modesty within the
    meaning of Sections 354 and 509 IPC.

          17. In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR
    1997 SC 3011 and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.
F   Chopra, AIR 1999 SC 625, this court held that the offence
    relating to modesty of woman cannot be treated as trivial and
    a lenient view by giving six months imprisonment on the ground
    of juvenility does not require consideration.

G        18. In Chinnadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1996 SC
    546, this Court rejected the plea for reduction of sentence in
    view of conside-rable delay and other circumstances observing
    that sentence has to be awarded taking into consideration the
    gravity of the injuries.

H         19. In State of U.P. v. Shri Kishan, AIR 2005 SC 1250,      .
     AJAHAR ALI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                    921
            [DR. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.]
this Court has emphasised that just and proper sentence should     A
be imposed. The Court held:

    " ...... Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences
    or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of
    lapse of time in respect of such offences will be              8
    result-wise counter productive in the long run and
    against societal interest which needs to be cared for and
    strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the
    sentencing system.

           The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate    C
    punishmerit is not awarded for a crime which has been
    committed not only against the individual victim but also
    against the society to which the criminal and victim belong.
    The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be
    irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with     D
    the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been
    perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public
    abhorrence and it should 'respond to the society's cry for
    justice against the criminal'."
                                                                   E
                                            (Emphasis added)

     20. In Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 3242, this Court observed that the
courts cannot take lenient view in awarding sentence on the
ground of sympathy or delay as the same cannot be any ground       F
for reduction of sentence.

     21. In view of the above, we are of considered opinion that
as the appellant had been awarded only six months
imprisonment, considering the matter under the JJ Act, 2000        G
would not serve any purpose at such a belated stage. The High
Court had been of the opinion that appellant had been dealt
with very leniently and it was a fit case where the High Court
wanted to enhance the sentence but considering the fact that
                                                                   H
    922      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A   the incident occurred long back, the High Court refrained to do
    so.

         22. Thus, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
    The appellant is directed to surrender within a period of four
    weeks to serve out the sentence, failing which the Chief Judicial
8
    Magistrate, Maida, is directed to take him into custody to serve
    out the sentence. A copy of the order be sent to Chief Judicial
    Magistrate, Maida for information and action.

    R.P.                                        Appeal dismissed.