Supreme Court of India
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED AND ORS.versusCAPT. GURDARSHAN KAUR SANDHU
- Citation
- 2019 INSC 946
- Decided
- 22 August 2019
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- UDAY UMESH LALIT
Holding
A resignation cannot be withdrawn once the employer has made substantive arrangements, such as training a replacement, under a statutory notice period that serves public interest, thereby invoking the exception to the general rule on withdrawal of resignation.
Summary
Capt. Gurdeep Kaur Sandhu, a pilot with Air India Express Ltd, tendered her resignation by email on 3 July 2017, invoking the six‑month notice period required under the Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR). The company accepted the resignation on 2 September 2017, engaged and trained a replacement pilot at considerable cost, and later refused her request on 18 December 2017 to withdraw the resignation. The pilot filed a writ petition seeking to continue in service; the Kerala High Court allowed the withdrawal, but the company appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the CAR’s mandatory notice period constitutes a special provision that falls within the exception to the general rule that a resignation can be withdrawn before it becomes effective, as articulated in Gopal Chandra Mishra and Balram Gupta. It held that because the employer had already made substantive arrangements, including training a replacement, the resignation was deemed effective and the pilot could not withdraw it. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the writ petition dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether a pilot can withdraw a resignation tendered before its effective date under the statutory six‑month notice period of the Civil Aviation Requirements.
- Whether the CAR’s notice period is a special provision that falls within the exception to the general rule on withdrawal of resignation as per Gopal Chandra Mishra and Balram Gupta.
- Whether the employer’s steps to find and train a replacement pilot constitute ‘arrangements acting on the resignation’ that bar withdrawal.
- Whether the public‑interest rationale underlying the CAR overrides the employee’s right to withdraw resignation.
Legislation cited
- Air Corporations Act, 1934s. 5, s. 7, s. 8(2)
- Air Corporations Rules, 1937s. Rule 133A
- Indian Telegraph Act, 1885s. 4
Subjects
service lawwithdrawal of resignationcivil aviation requirementspublic interestnotice periodemployment lawairline pilotstatutory exception
Judgment
980 [2019] 12
SUPREME COURT S.C.R. 980
REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED AND ORS.
v.
CAPT. GURDARSHAN KAUR SANDHU
(Civil Appeal No.6567 of 2019)
B AUGUST 22, 2019
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Service Law – Withdrawal of Resignation – Respondent was
working as a pilot in the appellant-Company – On 03.07.2017
respondent communicated through e-mail her resignation to the
C
appellant – In view of her resignation, appellant engaged a
replacement pilot – On 02.09.2017, the resignation sent by the
respondent was accepted by the appellants – Thereafter on
18.12.2017, respondent sent an e-mail and sought withdrawal of
her resignation – Her request for withdrawal of resignation was
D not accepted by the appellants – Writ petition by the respondent –
High Court held that the resignation tendered by the respondent
could be withdrawn by her before she was actually relieved from
the service – On appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellants
contended that they had already taken appropriate steps for finding
and training an alternative and as such the instant case came within
E
the exceptions acknowledged in the decisions of Gopal Chandra
Mishra and Balram Gupta – Held: It is settled that normally, until the
resignation becomes effective, it is open to an employee to withdraw
his resignation – When would the resignation become effective may
depend upon the governing service regulations and/or the terms
F and conditions of the office/post – In the instant case, the provisions
of the Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR), the terms and conditions
of appointment specifically stated that the respondent would give
six months’ notice in case she desired to leave the services of the
appellant – The underlying principle and the basic idea behind
stipulation of the mandatory notice period is public interest – By
G
very nature of the job profile a replacement for a pilot does not
come so easily and therefore, the period of six months – The CAR
acknowledges the fact that it would require considerable expenses
and efforts to train the concerned replacement before he could be
a worthy substitute – In the present case, steps were taken by the
H
980
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 981
KAUR SANDHU
appellant to discharge such obligation and replacement was found A
– Therefore, the instant matter would be within the exception
stipulated in the decisions of Gopal Chandra Mishra and Balram Gupta,
and the respondent could not have withdrawn the resignation – Air
Craft Act, 1934 – ss.5,7 and 8(2) – Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 –
s.4 – Air Craft Rules, 1937 – Part XII.
B
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. It is well settled that normally, until the
resignation becomes effective, it is open to an employee to
withdraw his resignation. When would the resignation become
effective may depend upon the governing service regulations and/ C
or the terms and conditions of the office/post. As stated in Gopal
Chandra Mishra, “in the absence of anything to the contrary in
the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/
post” or “in the absence of a legal contractual or constitutional
bar, a ‘prospective resignation’ can be withdrawn at any time
before it becomes effective”. Further, as laid down in Balram D
Gupta, “If, however, the administration had made arrangements
acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other
employee available for his job, that would be another matter.”
[Para 11] [1001-E-G]
2. In the light of the aforementioned principles the issue E
whether the respondent could have withdrawn her letter of
resignation depends upon answers to the following questions:
A) Whether the stipulation of the notice period in the Civil
Aviation Requirement (CAR) is intended to safeguard the interest
of the employee? ; and F
B) Whether the provisions of the CAR and the governing
principles stipulated therein are in the nature of special provisions
coming within the exception stipulated in Gopal Chandra Mishra
and Balram Gupta cases thereby disabling the respondent from
withdrawing her resignation? [Para 12] [1001-G-H; 1002-A-B] G
3. The CAR acknowledges that it takes considerable period
to train a pilot to operate an aircraft and that as a part of the
training, the new incumbent will be required to pass technical
and performance examinations and will have to undergo simulator
H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A and flying training and to undertake skill test to satisfy the
requirements. Even after imparting of such training, said person
would function only as a co-pilot till he reaches the level of
expertise required of a pilot. The CAR states that the resignation
without minimum notice of six months could result in last minute
cancellation of flights and harassment to passengers. As the pilots
B
are highly skilled personnel, a decision was taken that any act on
part of the pilots including resignation from the airlines without
minimum notice period of six months be treated as an act against
public interest. [Para 13] [1002-C-D]
4. The underlying principle and the basic idea behind
C stipulation of the mandatory notice period is public interest. It is
not the interest of the employee which is intended to be
safeguarded but the public interest which is to be sub-served. It
seeks to ensure that there would not be any last minute
cancellation of flights causing enormous inconvenience to the
D travellers. It is for this reason that the concerned pilot is required
to serve till the expiry of the notice period. The notice period
may stand curtailed if NOC is given to the concerned pilot and
the resignation is accepted even before the expiring of the notice
period. It may, in a given case, be possible that the trained
manpower to replace the pilot, who had tendered resignation,
E could be made available before the expiry of such notice period,
in which case the employer is given a choice under Clause 3.7 of
the CAR. Even in such eventuality, the guiding idea or parameter
is public interest. [Para 14] [1003-A-C]
5. The stipulation of notice period is, therefore, only to
F sub-serve public interest and is designed to enable the air
transport undertaking or employer to find a suitable replacement
or a substitute. By very nature of the job profile a replacement
for a pilot does not come so easily and therefore, the period of
six months. The CAR acknowledges the fact that it would require
G considerable expenses and efforts to train the concerned
replacement before he could be a worthy substitute. The notice
period enables the air transport undertaking or the employer to
gear itself up in that direction and obliges it to find a substitute
or a replacement. The obligation to find a suitable replacement
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 983
KAUR SANDHU
begins immediately on receipt of letter of resignation. In the A
present case, steps were taken by the appellant to discharge such
obligation and replacement was found. The normal principle that
an employee can at any time before the resignation becomes
effective, withdraw his resignation will therefore be subject to
the core principles of the CAR. Therefore, the instant matter
B
would be within the exception stipulated in decisions of the Gopal
Chandra Mishra and Balram Gupta, and the respondent could
not have withdrawn the resignation. [Para 14] [1003-D-G]
Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Mishra (1978) 2 SCC
301 : [1978] 3 SCR 12 – followed.
C
Balram Gupta v. Union of India and Another (1987)
Suppl. SCC 228 : [1987] SCR 1173 ; Jai Ram v. Union
of India AIR 1954 SC 584 ; Raj Kumar v. Union of
India [1968] 3 SCR 857 – relied on.
Srikantah S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd. (2005) 8 D
SCC 314 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 156 ; J.N. Srivastava
v. Union of India and Another (1998) 9 SCC 559;
Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project and Development
India Limited and Another (2002) 3 SCC 437 : [2002]
2 SCR 396; P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of
Technology (1981) 1 SCC 405 : [1981] 2 SCR 490; E
Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal [1989] 2 Suppl.
SCC 175 : [1989] 1 SCR 612 ; Moti Ram v. Param
Dev (1993) 2 SCC 725 : [1993] 2 SCR 250; Power
Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia (1997) 4
SCC 280 : [1997] 2 SCR 1170 ; Nand Keshwar Prasad F
v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd. (1998) 5 SCC
461; Union of India v. Wing Commander T.
Parthasarathy (2001) 1 SCC 158 : [2000] 4 Suppl.
SCR 531; Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar (2003) 2
SCC 721 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 438 ; Reserve Bank
of India v. Cecil Denis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461 : G
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 465; Secy., Technical Education,
U.P. and Ors. v. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay (2007) 4 SCC
492 : [2007] 4 SCR 976; New India Assurance Company
Ltd. v. Raghuvir Singh Narang and Another (2010) 5
H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A SCC 335 : [2010] 4 SCR 299 ; Union of India and
Ors. v. Hitendra Kumar Soni (2014) 13 SCC 204 :
[2014] 6 SCR 563 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 156 referred to Para 6
B
(1998) 9 SCC 559 referred to Para 6
[2002] 2 SCR 396 referred to Para 6
[1978] 3 SCR 12 followed Para 8
[1987] SCR 1173 relied on Para 8
C
AIR 1954 SC 584 relied on Para 10[A]
[1968] 3 SCR 857 relied on Para 10[B]
[1981] 2 SCR 490 referred to Para 10[E]
D [1989] 1 SCR 612 referred to Para 10[E]
[1993] 2 SCR 250 referred to Para 10[E]
[1997] 2 SCR 1170 referred to Para 10[E]
(1998) 5 SCC 461 referred to Para 10[E]
E [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 531 referred to Para 10[E]
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 438 referred to Para 10[E]
[2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 465 referred to Para 10[E]
[2007] 4 SCR 976 referred to Para 10[E]
F [2010] 4 SCR 299 referred to Para 10[E]
[2014] 6 SCR 563 referred to Para 10[E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6567
of 2019
G From the Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2018 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in W.A. No. 796 of 2018
Ms. Madhvi Divan, ASG, Lalit Bhasin, Ms. Nina Gupta, Ms. Palak
Chadha, P. V. Yogeswaran, Dhawal Jain, Ms. Vaishali Verma, Advs.
for the Appellants.
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 985
KAUR SANDHU
Jamshed P. Cama, Sr. Adv., Anil Kumar Mishra-I, Ms. Suruchi A
Kumar, M. Kumar Advs., for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.
1. Leave granted. B
2. This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated
09.04.2018 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam in Writ Appeal No.796 of 2018 preferred by the appellants
herein and thereby affirming the view taken by the Single Judge in Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 1991 of 2018. C
3. The basic issue involved in the instant case is whether the
respondent, a pilot working with the appellant, could withdraw her
resignation that was tendered on 03.07.2017.
4. The statutory provisions and the concerned regulations
concerning the controversy in issue are as under:- D
A] In exercise of powers conferred by Sections 5, 7 and 8(2) of
the Air Craft Act, 1934 and by Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act,
1885, the Air Craft Rules, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’)
were framed by the Central Government. Part XIIA of the Rules deals
with “Regulatory Provisions”, Rule 133A in said Part is as under:- E
“133A. Directions by Director-General.- (1) The Director-
General may, through Notices to Airmen (NOTAMS), Aeronautical
Information Publication, Aeronautical Information Circulars
(AICs), Notice to Aircraft Owners and Maintenance Engineers
and publication entitled Civil Aviation Requirements issue special F
directions not inconsistent with the Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934)
or these rules, relating to the operation, use, possession,
maintenance or navigation of aircraft flying in or over India or of
aircraft registered in India.
(2) The Civil Aviation Requirements under sub-rule(1) shall be G
issued after placing the draft on the website of the Directorate
General of Civil Aviation for a period of thirty days for inviting
objections and suggestions from all persons likely to be affected
thereby:
H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A Provided that the Director General may, in the public interest and
by order in writing dispense with the requirement of inviting such
objections and suggestions.
(3) Every direction issued under sub-rule (1) shall be complied
with by the person or persons to whom such direction is issued.”
B B] On 27.10.2009 the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA)
issued “Civil Aviation Requirement” (‘the CAR’ for short) as under:-
“OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL
AVIATION, TECHNICAL CENTER, OPPOSITE
SAFDARJUNG AIRPORT, NEW DELHI.
C
CIVIL AVIATION REQUIREMENT
SECTION 7 – FLIGHT CREW STANDARDS
TRAINING AND LICENSING
SERIES ‘X’ PART II
D
ISSUE II, 27TH OCTOBER 2009 EFFECTIVE:FORTHWITH
Subject: Requirement of ‘Notice Period’ by the Pilots to the airlines
employing them.
1. INTRODUCTION
E 1.1 It has been observed that pilots are resigning without
providing any notice to the airlines. In some cases, even
groups of pilots resign together without notice and as a result
airlines are forced to cancel their flights at the last minute.
Such resignation by the pilots and the resultant cancellation
F of flights causes inconvenience and harassment to the
passengers. Sometimes such an abrupt action on the part
of the pilots is in the form of a concerted move, which is
tantamount to holding the airlines to ransom and leaving the
travelling public stranded. This is a highly undesirable
practice and goes against the public interest.
G
1.2 Such an action on the part of pilots attracts the provisions
of sub-rule (2) of rule 39A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937, which
reads as follows:
“The Central Government may debar a person permanently
or temporarily from holding any licence or rating mentioned
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 987
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
in rule 38 if in its opinion it is necessary to do so in the A
public interest.”
2. APPLICABILITY
2.1 This Civil Aviation Requirement shall be applicable to the pilots
in regular employment of any air transport undertaking as
defined in clause (9A) of rule 3 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937. B
2.2 This CAR is issued with the approval of the Ministry of Civil
Aviation vide their letters No.A2012/08/2005-A dated
1st September 2005 and No.A.60015/024/2008-VE dated
21st October 2009.
C
3. REQUIREMENTS
3.1 It takes about four months to train a pilot to operate an aircraft
used for airline operations, as he has to pass technical and
performance examinations of the aircraft, undergo simulator
& flying training and has to undertake ‘Skill Test’ to satisfy D
licence requirements. Even after this training, the pilot can
operate only as a co-pilot. To operate an aircraft as Pilot-in-
Command (PIC), he needs to gain experience and undertake
‘Skill Test’ to fly as PIC of an aircraft, which may take another
four months or so. Therefore, it would take more than four
months for an airline to replace a trained Pilot-in-Command. E
3.2 Pilots are highly skilled personnel and shoulder complete
responsibility of the aircraft and the passengers. They are
highly paid for the responsibility they share with the airlines
towards the travelling public and are required to act with
extreme responsibility. F
3.3 In view of the above, it has been decided by the Government
that any act on the part of pilots including resignation from the
airlines without a minimum notice period of six months, which
may result into last minute cancellation of flights and harassment
to passengers, would be treated as an act against the public G
interest.
3.4 It has, therefore, been decided that every pilot working in an
air transport undertaking shall give a ‘Notice Period’ of at least
six months to the employer indicating his intention to leave the
H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A job. During the notice period, neither the pilot shall refuse to
undertake the flight duties assigned to him nor shall the employer
deprive the pilot of his legitimate rights and privileges with
respect to the assignment of his duties. Failure to comply with
the provisions of the CAR may lead to action against the pilot
or the air transport undertaking, as the case may be, under the
B
relevant provisions of Aircraft Rules, 1937.
3.5 In case an air transport undertaking resorts to reduction in the
salary/perks or otherwise alters the terms and conditions of
the employment to the disadvantage of the employee pilot
during the notice period, the pilot shall be free to make a
C request for his release before the expiry of the notice period
and the air transport undertaking shall accept his request.
3.6 It shall be mandatory for the air transport undertaking to issue
NOC to the pilot on expiry of the notice period of six months,
failing which it shall be liable to penal action by DGCA.
D
3.7 The ‘Notice Period’ of six months, however, may be reduced
if the air transport undertaking provides a ‘No Objection
Certificate’ to a pilot and accepts his resignation earlier than
six months.
E (Dr. Nasim Zaidi)
Director General of Civil Aviation”
C] It may be stated here that the revised CAR issued by the
Office of the Director General of Civil Aviation, New Delhi on 16.08.2017
now records,
F “3.1 It takes about eight to nine months to train a pilot to operate
an aircraft used for airline operations, as he has to pass technical
and performance examinations of the aircraft, undergo simulator
& flying training and has to undertake ‘Skill Test’ to satisfy licence
requirements before he is released to fly.”
G 5. The facts leading to the filing of the Writ Petition in the High
Court were as under:-
a) On 15.06.2007 the respondent was offered the post of Co-Pilot by
Air India Charters Limited on successful completion of B737-800
training on a contract for 5 years with effect from 15.06.2007.
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 989
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
b) On 28.07.2011 the respondent was appointed as Captain by Air A
India Charters Limited after successful completion of B737-800
training with effect from 26.03.2011. On 25.01.2017 she was
appointed as Commander. Clauses 33 and 34 of the Terms and
Conditions of the appointment were:-
“33 In the event of your desiring to leave the services of the B
Company at any time, you shall give the Company six months’
notice, in writing, as per CAR Section 7 – Flight Crew Standards
Training & Licensing, Series ‘X’ Part II, Issue II dated October
27, 2009 and as amended from time to time subject to minimum
of six months. You will also be required to serve the Company
during the Notice Period. C
34. In the event of your cessation of service for any reason
whatsoever or your leaving abandoning the Company, you shall
be obliged to account for and return the property of the Company,
such as identify cards, instruments, tools, books, uniforms,
Company accommodation, if any, in your possession, custody D
or charge, failing which your stipend/salary shall be withheld
and/or equivalent amount will be liable to be recovered or any
such other action may be taken as deemed fit. … …”
c) On and with effect from 05.05.2017 the name of the Company
was changed from ‘Air India Charters Limited’ to ‘Air India E
Express Limited’.
d) On 03.07.2017 the respondent sent a communication through e-
mail to Chief of Operations of the first appellant submitting her
resignation. The relevant assertions in the letter were as under:-
F
“I, Capt. G.K. Sandhu, am from the first batch of Air India
Express pilot, flying for more than 12 years now, without even a
single spot on my flying career.
I am tendering my resignation today. Please consider this as
my six months’ notice period. I am listing below the reasons of
G
my resignation.
… … …
If any time I am forced to stay away from home for longer
periods during this time, it will be legal for me to leave the
H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A company without completing the notice period, as these are the
least of the reasons I have mentioned.”
e) According to the appellants, in view of the above resignation, a
replacement pilot viz. Captain Jiban Mahapatra was engaged on
14.08.2017 as Captain and was given appropriate training by the
B appellant which cost the appellant more than Rs.12,00,000/-.
f) On 02.09.2017 the resignation sent by the respondent was accepted
by the appellants as under:-
“Dear Madam,
C Your resignation dated 03.07.2017 from the services of Air India
Express has been accepted by competent authority. Your
expected release after completion of six months notice period
from your date of resignation.
This is for your kind information. You are requested to complete
D all the Admin formalities before release.”
g) More than three months later, on 18.12.2017 an e-mail was sent
by the respondent to the appellants seeking to withdraw her
resignation as under:-
“Respected Sir,
E I would like to inform you that I am withdrawing my resignation
dated 3rd July, 2017 with immediate effect and will continue
serving the company as per my current designation.
Kind Regards,
F Capt. G.K. Sandhu
Staff No. 76002"
h) On 29.12.2017 a letter was received from the Advocates of the
respondent that since she had withdrawn the resignation, the
respondent be rostered for future flights with effect from
G 02.01.2018. A response was, thereafter, sent by the appellants to
the respondent on 04.01.2018 stating as under:-
“… …Please note that your request for withdrawal of your
resignation letter cannot be acceded to as your resignation had
become effective from 03.07.2017 by virtue of its acceptance
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 991
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
vide email dated 02.09.2017 and you stood released from the A
services of the Company w.e.f. 02.01.2018 (i.e. on completion
of six months notice period w.e.f. 03.07.2017). … …”
6. Thereafter, the respondent filed Writ Petition (Civil)No. 1991
of 2018 before the High Court challenging the letters dated 02.09.2017
and 04.01.2018 and for declaration that the respondent was eligible and B
entitled to continue with all service benefits without any break in service
and that the appellant be directed to forthwith disburse to the respondent
the salary and other service conditions. The Writ Petition was allowed
by a Single Judge of the High Court by judgment and order dated
22.02.2018. The objection taken by the appellants as regards territorial
jurisdiction to consider the controversy in question was rejected. The C
provisions of the CAR (Ext.P3) were considered and relying upon the
decisions of this Court in Srikantah S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers
Ltd.1, J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India and another2, Shambhu
Murari Sinha v. Project and Development India Limited and
another3 it was observed that the resignation tendered by the respondent D
could be withdrawn by her before she was actually relieved from service.
The Single Judge concluded:
“In the present case also since the resignation was to take effect
from 02.01.2018, the petitioner could have very well withdrawn
her resignation and the respondents could not have withheld the E
same or rejected the same. In this case there is one more
obligation on the respondents under clause 3.6 of Ext.p3, to issue
an NOC on acceptance of resignation. Such a no objection
certificate is not granted even when they issued Ext.P8 letter and
refused to assign her duty from 02.01.2018 onwards.”
F
7. The appellants being aggrieved filed Writ Appeal No.796 of
2018 against the decision of the Single Judge. The Division Bench of
the High Court rejected the challenge by its judgment and order dated
09.04.2018 which is presently under challenge. The Division Bench
relied upon the decisions noted by the Single Judge and concluded:
G
“There can be little doubt with respect to the position of law settled
on the said subject. In respect of an employee who submitted an
1
(2005) 8 SCC 314
2
(1998) 9 SCC 559
3
(2002) 3 SCC 437 H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A application for resignation, it would be open to him to withdraw
the same prior to the expiry of the period of notice. ….. It is to
be noted that even though the appellants claimed that the Ext.P2
letter of resignation was accepted the tenor of Ext.P5 would reveal
that it was ordered to accept only on the expiry of the notice
period. In that context, it is relevant to refer to Ext.P5 letter.”
B
8. In this appeal we heard Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned Additional
Solicitor General for the appellants and Mr. Jamshed P. Cama, learned
Senior Advocate for the respondent.
Learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that though in
C normal circumstances an employee who had tendered resignation would
be well within his rights to withdraw the resignation before such
resignation had become effective but the decisions of this Court admitted
two exceptions to the rule. She relied upon the decisions of this Court in
Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Mishra4 and Balram Gupta v.
Union of Indiaand another5 and submitted that as acknowledged by
D the CAR the positions of pilots stood on a different footing and finding a
replacement or an alternative for a pilot would require incurring of some
expenditure in training the concerned new talent. In the circumstances,
the CAR had put certain restrictions and made some special provisions
in public interest. The appellants had already taken appropriate steps
E for finding and training an alternative and as such the instant case came
within the exceptions acknowledged in the decisions of this Court.
On the other hand, Mr. Jamshed P. Cama, learned Senior Advocate
submitted that the law on the point is well settled that an employee could
withdraw the resignation before it comes into effect or operation. He
F submitted that the resignation submitted by the respondent was to come
into effect from a prospective date and the respondent was therefore
entitled to withdraw the resignation before it became effective. According
to him, the fact that the appellant had to incur expenditure in training
another pilot would be of no consequence, as for an organisation of the
size of Air India the requirement and consequential training of pilots
G would be a regular feature.
9. Before we deal with the rival submissions an important fact
must be noted. After the respondent was not allowed to join her duties,
4
(1978) 2 SCC 301
5
1987 (Supp) SCC 228
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 993
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
it appears that she was employed as a pilot with Jet Airways for some A
time. However, with the closing of operations of Jet Airways, she is not
presently holding any position as pilot in any airline.
10. The circumstances under which an employee can withdraw
the resignation tendered by him and what are the limitations to the exercise
of such right, have been dealt by this Court in a number of decisions. B
6
A] In Jai Ram vs. Union of India , the concerned Government
servant was to attain age of 55 years on 26.11.1946. He applied on
07.05.1945 for leave preparatory to retirement in terms of Fundamental
Rule 86. The request was finally allowed and he was given 6 months’
leave which was to expire on 25.05.1947. Ten days before such expiry C
i.e. on 16.05.1947, he sent an intimation that he would resume his duties
which request was rejected. The submission that the age of retirement
was 60 years was rejected by this Court. The submission that in terms
of Rule 56(b)(i) of Chapter IX of the Fundamental Rules, if found
efficient, he could have continued till he attained the age of 60 years,
was rejected. It was observed that when a public servant himself D
expresses his inability to continue in service any longer and seeks
permission for retirement, the required exercise in terms of said Rule
56(b)(i) to decide whether to continue him beyond the age of 55 years
was rightly not undertaken and the age of retirement for him would be
55 years. In the context whether he could apply for resuming duties on E
16.05.1947, it was observed by the Constitution Bench of this Court,:-
“It may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has expressed
a desire to retire from service and applied to his superior officer
to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind
subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus F
obtained; but he can be allowed to do so long as he continues in
service and not after it has terminated.
As we have said above, the plaintiff’s service ceased on the 27th
of November 1946; the leave, which was allowed to him
subsequent to that date, was post-retirement leave which was G
granted under the special circumstances mentioned in F. R. 86.
He could not be held to continue in service after the 26th of
November 1946, and consequently it was no longer competent to
6
AIR 1954 SC 584
H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A him to apply for joining his duties on the 16th of May 1947, even
though the post-retirement leave had not yet run out. In our opinion,
the decision of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court is
right and this appeal should stand dismissed.”
B] In Raj Kumar v. Union of India7, an officer belonging to the
B Indian Administrative Service tendered resignation and addressed a letter
to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan on 30.08.1964
that it may be forwarded to the Government of India with remarks of
the State Government. The State Government recommended that the
resignation be accepted and on 31.10.1964 the Government of India
requested the Chief Secretary to the State Government “to intimate the
C date on which the appellant was relieved of his duties so that a formal
notification could be issued in that behalf”. Before the date could be
intimated and formal notification could be issued, the officer withdrew
his resignation by letter dated 27.11.1964. On 29.03.1965 an order
accepting his resignation was issued. The challenge raised by the officer
D was rejected and the High Court held that the resignation became
effective on the date the Government of India had accepted it. While
dismissing the appeal, a Bench of three Judges of this Court observed:-
“The letters written by the appellant on August 21, 1964, and
August 30, 1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to
E become effective until acceptances thereof was intimated to the
appellant. The appellant informed the authorities of the State of
Rajasthan that his resignation may be forwarded for early
acceptance. On the plain terms of the letters, the resignation was
to become effective as soon as it was accepted by the appointing
authority. No rule has been framed under Article 309 of the
F Constitution which enacts that for an order accepting the
resignation to be effective, it must be communicated to the person
submitting his resignation.
Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of
Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika (AIR 1966 SCR 1313)in which it
G was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and
kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned
or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on
which the order was actually written out by the said authority;
7
H (1968) 3 SCR 857
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 995
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
such an order could only be effective after it was communicated A
to the Officer concerned or was otherwise published. The
principle of that case has no application here. Termination of
employment by order passed by the Government does not become
effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where
a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination
B
of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from
the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the
appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule
governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not
be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is
accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is C
accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules
governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus
poenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the
public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of
resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been
D
accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within
a short time after it was received by the Government of India.
Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement
the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant
cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving
him of his duties.” E
C] In Union of India and others v. Gopal Chandra Mishra
and others4 the issue for consideration was whether a High Court
Judge, who had by letter in his own hand writing sent to the President
intimated his intention to resign the office with effect from a future date
would be competent to withdraw the resignation before the date had F
reached? The decisions in Jai Ram6 and Raj Kumar7 were considered
and while dealing with the scope of clause(a) of the proviso to Article
217 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench of this Court stated:-
“20. Here, in this case, we have to focus attention on clause (a)
of the proviso. In order to terminate his tenure under this clause, G
the Judge must do three volitional things: Firstly, he should execute
a “writing under his hand”. Secondly, the writing should be
“addressed to the President”. Thirdly, by that writing he should
“resign his office”. If any of these things is not done, or the
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A performance of any of them is not complete, clause (a) will not
operate to cut short or terminate the tenure of his office.
22. It may be observed that the entire edifice of this reasoning is
founded on the supposition that the “Judge” had completely
performed everything which he was required to do under proviso
B (a) to Article 217(1). We have seen that to enable a Judge to
terminate his term of office by his own unilateral act, he has to
perform three things. In the instant case, there can be no dispute
about the performance of the first two, namely: (i) he wrote a
letter under his hand, (ii) addressed to the President. Thus, the
first two pillars of the ratiocinative edifice raised by the High Court
C rest on sound foundations. But, is the same true about the third,
which indisputably is the chief prop of that edifice? Is it a completed
act of resignation within the contemplation of proviso (a)? This is
the primary question that calls for an answer. If the answer to this
question is found in the affirmative, the appeals must fail. If it be
D in the negative, the foundation for the reasoning of the High Court
will fail and the appeals succeed.”
The tenor and the effect of resignation were then considered in
paragraph 28 and it was held that the letter in question was merely an
intimation or notice to resign the office on a future date and it was open
E to withdraw the resignation before the arrival of the indicated future
date. The observations were:-
“28. The substantive body of this letter (which has been extracted
in full in a foregoing part of this judgment) is comprised of three
sentences only. In the first sentence, it is stated: “I beg to resign
F my office as Judge, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.” Had
this sentence stood alone, or been the only content of this letter, it
would operate as a complete resignation in praesenti, involving
immediate relinquishment of the office and termination of his tenure
as Judge. But this is not so. The first sentence is immediately
followed by two more, which read : “I will be on leave till July 31,
G 1977. My resignation shall be effective on August 1, 1977.” The
first sentence cannot be divorced from the context of the other
two sentences and construed in isolation. It has to be read along
with the succeeding two which qualify it. Construed as a whole
according to its tenor, the letter dated May 7, 1977, is merely an
H intimation or notice of the writer’s intention to resign his office as
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 997
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
Judge, on a future date viz. August 1, 1977. For the sake of A
convenience, we might call this communication as a prospective
or potential resignation, but before the arrival of the indicated future
date it was certainly not a complete and operative resignation
because, by itself, it did not and could not, sever the writer from
the office of the Judge, or terminate his tenure as such.”
B
The Court went on to state the principles as:-
“41. The general principle that emerges from the foregoing
conspectus, is that in the absence of anything to the contrary in
the provisions governing the terms and conditions of the office/
post, an intimation in writing sent to the competent authority by C
the incumbent, of his intention or proposal to resign his office/post
from a future specified date can be withdrawn by him at any time
before it becomes effective, i.e. before it effects termination of
the tenure of the office/post or the employment.
50. It will bear repetition that the general principle is that in the D
absence of a legal, contractual or constitutional bar, a “prospective”
resignation can be withdrawn at any time before it becomes
effective, and it becomes effective when it operates to terminate
the employment or the office-tenure of the resignor. This general
rule is equally applicable to government servants and constitutional
functionaries. In the case of a government servant/or functionary/ E
who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his
own unilateral act of tendering resignation, give up his service/or
office, normally, the tender of resignation becomes effective and
his service/or office-tenure terminated, when it is accepted by
the competent authority. In the case of a Judge of a High Court, F
who is a constitutional functionary and under proviso (a) to Article
217(1) has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office, his
resignation becomes effective and tenure terminated on the date
from which he, of his own volition, chooses to quit office. If in
terms of the writing under his hand addressed to the President, he
resigns in praesenti, the resignation terminates his office-tenure G
forthwith, and cannot therefore, be withdrawn or revoked
thereafter. But, if he by such writing, chooses to resign from a
future date the act of resigning office is not complete because it
does not terminate his tenure before such date and the Judge can
at any time before the arrival of that prospective date on which it H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A was intended to be effective, withdraw it, because the Constitution
does not bar such withdrawal.”
As regards the applicability of the rule in Jai Ram6, it was stated:-
“49. In our opinion, none of the aforesaid reasons given by the
High Court for getting out of the ratio of Jai Ram case is valid.
B Firstly, it was not a “casual” enunciation. It was necessary to
dispose of effectually and completely the second point that had
been canvassed on behalf of Jai Ram. Moreover, the same
principle was reiterated pointedly in 1968 in Raj Kumar case.
Secondly, a proposal to retire from service/office and a tender to
C resign office from a future date for the purpose of the point under
discussion, stand on the same footing. Thirdly, the distinction
between a case where the resignation is required to be accepted
and the one where no acceptance is required, makes no difference
to the applicability of the rule in Jai Ram case.”
D D] In Balram Gupta v. Union of India5the concerned officer
was an accountant in the Photo Division of the Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting. While holding that the matter was covered by the
decisions of this Court in Raj Kumar7 and Gopal Chandra Misra4,this
Court considered the relevant guidelines and observed:
E “12. In this case the guidelines are that ordinarily permission
should not be granted unless the officer concerned is in a position
to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances
in consideration of which the notice was originally given. In the
facts of the instant case such indication has been given. The
appellant has stated that on the persistent and personal requests
F of the staff members he had dropped the idea of seeking voluntary
retirement. We do not see how this could not be a good and valid
reason. It is true that he was resigning and in the notice for
resignation he had not given any reason except to state that he
sought voluntary retirement. We see nothing wrong in this. In the
G modern age we should not put embargo upon people’s choice or
freedom. If, however, the administration had made arrangements
acting on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other
employee available for his job, that would be another matter but
the appellant’s offer to retire and withdrawal of the same happened
in such quick succession that it cannot be said that any
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 999
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
administrative set-up or arrangement was affected. The A
administration has now taken a long time by its own attitude to
communicate the matter. For this the respondent is to blame and
not the appellant.”
E) The principles laid down in Union of India and others v.
Gopal Chandra Misra4have since then been followed by this Court B
inP. Kasilingam vs. P.S.G. College of Technology8, Punjab National
Bank vs. P.K. Mittal9, Moti Ram vs. Param Dev10, Power Finance
Corpn. Ltd. vs. Pramod Kumar Bhatia11 Nand Keshwar Prasad
vs. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Coop. Ltd. 12, J.N. Srivastava vs.
Union of India and another2, Union of India vs. Wing Commander
T. Parthasarathy 13 , Shambhu Murari Sinha vs. Proect & C
Development India Ltd.3, Bank of India vs. O.P. Swarnakar 14,
Reserve Bank of India vs. Cecil Denis Solomon15, Srikantha S.M.
vs. Bharath Earth Movers Ltd.1, Secy., Technical Education, U.P.
and ors. vs. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay16, New India Assurance
Company Ltd. vs. Raghuvir Singh Narang and another17 and Union D
of India and ors. vs. Hitendra Kumar Soni18.
F) In Punjab National Bank vs. P.K. Mittal9 a permanent officer
in the bank sent a letter of resignation on 21.01.1986 in terms of Regulation
20 of PNB (Officers) Service Regulation, 1979, which was to become
effective on 30.06.1986. By communication dated 07.02.1986, he was E
informed that his resignation was accepted with immediate effect. The
resignation was withdrawn by the officer on 15.04.1986. The issue
therefore arose in the context of said Regulation 20, whether the officer
could withdraw the resignation. Regulation 20 was as under:
“20. (1) Subject to sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 16, the bank F
may terminate the services of any officer by giving him three
8
(1981) 1 SCC 405
9
(1989) Supp 2 SCC 175
10
(1993) 2 SCC 725
11
(1997) 4 SCC 280
12
(1998) 5 SCC 461
G
13
(2001) 1 SCC 158
14
(2003) 2 SCC 721
15
(2004) 9 SCC 461
16
(2007) 4 SCC 492
17
(2010) 5 SCC 335
18
(2014) 13 SCC 204 H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A months’ notice in writing or by paying him three months’
emoluments in lieu thereof.
(2) No officer shall resign from the service of the bank otherwise
than on the expiry of three months from the service on the bank
of a notice in writing of such resignation:
B Provided further that the competent authority may reduce the
period of three months, or remit the requirement of notice.”
The submission that Clause 2 of Regulation 20 and its proviso
were intended only to safeguard the bank’s interest and as such the
bank could accept the resignation before the date when it was to come
C into effect was rejected by this Court in following terms:
7. Dr. Anand Prakash emphasises that as clause (2) and its proviso
are intended only to safeguard the bank’s interests they should be
interpreted on the lines suggested by him. We are of the opinion
that clause (2) of the regulation and its proviso are intended not
D only for the protection of the bank but also for the benefit of the
employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to
resign often wavers in this decision and even in a case where he
has taken a firm decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out
immediately. In most cases he would need a period of adjustment
E and hence like to defer the actual date of relief from duties for a
few months for various personal reasons. Equally an employer
may like to have time to make some alternative arrangement before
relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded
keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the employee a
period of adjustment and rethinking. It also enables the bank to
F have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an
appropriate case, to accept the resignation of an employee even
without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The proviso in our
opinion should not be interpreted as enabling a bank to thrust a
resignation on an employee with effect from a date different from
G the one on which he can make his resignation effective under the
terms of the regulation. We, therefore, agree with the High Court
that in the present case the resignation of the employee could
have become effective only on or about 21-4-1986 or on 30-6-
1986 and that the bank could not have “accepted” that resignation
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 1001
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
on any earlier date. The letter dated 7-2-1986 was, therefore, A
without jurisdiction.
8. The result of the above interpretation is that the employee
continued to be in service till 21-4-1986 or 30-6-1986, on which
date his services would have come normally to an end in terms of
his letter dated 21-1-1986. But, by that time, he had exercised his B
right to withdraw the resignation. Since the withdrawal letter was
written before the resignation became effective, the resignation
stands withdrawn, with the result that the respondent continues to
be in the service of the bank. It is true that there is no specific
provision in the regulations permitting the employee to withdraw
the resignation. It is, however, not necessary that there should be C
any such specific rule. Until the resignation becomes effective on
the terms of the letter read with Regulation 20, it is open to the
employee, on general principles, to withdraw his letter of
resignation. That is why, in some cases of public services, this
right of withdrawal is also made subject to the permission of the D
employer. There is no such clause here. It is not necessary to
labour this point further as it is well settled by the earlier decisions
of this Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, Union of India v.
Gopal Chandra Misra and Balram Gupta v. Union of India.
11. It is thus well settled that normally, until the resignation becomes E
effective, it is open to an employee to withdraw his resignation. When
would the resignation become effective may depend upon the governing
service regulations and/or the terms and conditions of the office/post.
As stated in paragraphs 41 and 50 in Gopal Chandra Misra4, “in the
absence of anything to the contrary in the provisions governing the terms
and conditions of the office/post” or “in the absence of a legal contractual F
or constitutional bar, a ‘prospective resignation’ can be withdrawn at
any time before it becomes effective”. Further, as laid down in Balram
Gupta5, “If, however, the administration had made arrangements acting
on his resignation or letter of retirement to make other employee available
for his job, that would be another matter.” G
12. In the light of the aforementioned principles the issue whether
the respondent could have withdrawn her letter of resignation depends
upon answers to the following questions:
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A A) Whether the stipulation of the notice period in the CAR is
intended to safeguard the interest of the employee? ; and
B) Whether the provisions of the CAR and the governing principles
stipulated therein are in the nature of special provisions coming
within the exception stipulated in paragraphs 41 and 50 of the
B decision in Gopal Chandra Mishra4 and paragraph 12 of the
decision in Balram Gupta5 thereby disabling the respondent from
withdrawing her resignation?
13. The CAR acknowledges that it takes considerable period to
train a pilot to operate an aircraft and that as a part of the training, the
C new incumbent will be required to pass technical and performance
examinations and will have to undergo simulator and flying training and
to undertake skill test to satisfy the requirements. Even after imparting
of such training, said person would function only as a co-pilot till he
reaches the level of expertise required of a pilot. The CAR states that
the resignation without minimum notice of six months could result in last
D minute cancellation of flights and harassment to passengers. As the
pilots are highly skilled personnel, a decision was taken that any act on
part of the pilots including resignation from the airlines without minimum
notice period of six months be treated as an act against public interest.
The CAR, therefore, provides:-
E a) During the notice period neither the pilot shall refuse to undertake
flight duties nor shall the employer deprive the pilot of his legitimate
rights and privileges.
b) In case the air transport undertaking resorts to reduction in the
salaries/perks, the pilot will be free to make a request for his
F release before the expiry of the notice period
c) On the expiry of the notice period an appropriate NOC shall be
issued by the air transport undertaking
d) The notice period of six months could however be reduced if
the NOC was provided to the pilot and his resignation was accepted
G
earlier than six months.
In terms of the provisions of the CAR, the terms and conditions
of appointment in the instant case specifically stated that the respondent
would give six months’ notice in case she desired to leave the services
of the appellant.
H
AIR INDIA EXPRESS LIMITED v. CAPT. GURDARSHAN 1003
KAUR SANDHU [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]
14. The underlying principle and the basic idea behind stipulation A
of the mandatory notice period is public interest. It is not the interest of
the employee which is intended to be safeguarded but the public interest
which is to be sub-served. It seeks to ensure that there would not be
any last minute cancellation of flights causing enormous inconvenience
to the travellers. It is for this reason that the concerned pilot is required
B
to serve till the expiry of the notice period. The notice period may stand
curtailed if NOC is given to the concerned pilot and the resignation is
accepted even before the expiring of the notice period. It may, in a
given case, be possible that the trained manpower to replace the pilot,
who had tendered resignation, could be made available before the expiry
of such notice period, in which case the employer is given a choice C
under Clause 3.7 of the CAR. Even in such eventuality, the guiding idea
or parameter is public interest.
The stipulation of notice period is, therefore, only to sub-serve
public interest and is designed to enable the air transport undertaking or
employer to find a suitable replacement or a substitute. By very nature D
of the job profile a replacement for a pilot does not come so easily and
therefore, the period of six months. The CAR acknowledges the fact
that it would require considerable expenses and efforts to train the
concerned replacement before he could be a worthy substitute. The
notice period enables the air transport undertaking or the employer to
gear itself up in that direction and obliges it to find a substitute or a E
replacement. The obligation to find a suitable replacement begins
immediately on receipt of letter of resignation. In the present case,
steps were taken by the appellant to discharge such obligation and
replacement in Captain Jiban Mahapatra was found. The normal principle
that an employee can at any time before the resignation becomes F
effective, withdraw his resignation will therefore be subject to the core
principles of the CAR. In our view, the instant matter would, therefore,
be within the exception stipulated in paragraphs 41 and 50 of the decision
in Gopal Chandra Mishra4and paragraph 12 of the decision in Balram
Gupta5, and the respondent could not have withdrawn the resignation.
G
15. The letter of resignation may now be considered to complete
the discussion. Said resignation letter dated 03.07.2017 had three relevant
statements: -
1. I am tendering my resignation letter.
2. Please consider this as my six months’ notice period H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.
A 3. If any time I am forced to stay away from home for longer
periods during this time, it will be legal for me to leave the
company without completing the notice period, as these
are the least of the reasons I have mentioned.
The first sentence shows that the intimation was unequivocal that
B the respondent was tendering resignation. The following sentence referred
to the notice period of six months, being the requirement under the CAR
and the terms and conditions of the appointment. The third sentence
clearly suggested that in case the respondent was forced to stay away
from home for longer periods during the notice period, it would be open
to her to leave the company without completing the notice period. The
C notice period was thus only in terms of the requirements of the CAR.
16. In the circumstances, we hold that the respondent could not
have withdrawn the letter of resignation dated 03.07.2017. We, therefore,
allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and orders passed by the Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss Writ Petition
D (Civil) No.1991 of 2018. No order as to costs.
Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.
E
F
G
H
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "service law"Sign in to search