AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS.versusSAYED ISMAIL

                       [2012] 6 S.C.R. 984


A             AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
                                 v.
                          SAYED ISMAIL
            (Civil Appeal Nos. 5316-5318 of 2012 etc.)
                          JULY 19, 2012
B
       [T.S. THAKUR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM
                     KALIFULLA, JJ.]

       Rent Control and Eviction - Suits for recovery of arrears
C - Decreed by trial and first appellate cburt - In second appeal
  High Court non-suited the land-lord on the ground that the
  rent-deed was not registered and _hence not admissible in
  evidence - On appeal, held: Since the relationship of land-
  lord and tenant was .established, and the tenant had admitted
D the default, the /and-lord could not have been non-suited on
  the sole ground that ren- deed was not admissible in evidence
  - Admission of a party is the best evidence and does not need
  any corroboration - In view of second para of s. 107 of TP Act,
  status of parties on the basis of undisputed facts as land-lord
E and tenant can always be accepted and the rights of the
  parties can be worked out on that basis - Decree modified as
  regards the rent and the total amount due - Transfer of
  Property Act, 1882 - s. 107 - Registration Act, 1908 - Evidence
  - Admission.
F      Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control
  Act, 1954 - Eviction petition - On the ground that suit for
  recovery of rent was decreed, and statutory period of six
  months was over - Petition decided ex-parte and allowed
  directing eviction - Order confirmed by first appellate court -
G In Revision, High Court remitted the matter to Rent Controller
  to decide the matter afresh - On appeal, held: Since the
  application has been dismissed by Rent Controller after
  remission, the appeal become infructuous and hence
  dismissed.
H                              984
   AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED               985
                  ISMAIL

Civil Appeal Nos. 5316-53143 of 2012:                          A

    The appellants filed civil suits in the years 1974, 1977
and 1980 against the respondent for recovery of arrears
of rent for the period from October 1971 to November
1980. Trial court d.ecreed the suit, and the same was          B
confirmed by the first appellate Court. In second appeal,
High .Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by
the courts below, on the ground that the rent deed
marked as exhibit 69 cannot be legally accepted in
evidence as the same was not registered.
                                                               c
    in the present appeals, the appellants contended that
even if the rent deed was not registered, it can be relied
upon for the collateral purpose of ascertaining the rent
and as to whether the tenant was liable to pay such rent.
                                                               D
SLP (C) No. 23457/2001:

      fhe petitioners (who were also the appellants in CA
Nos. 5316-5318 of 2012) filed petition u/s. 15 of Hyderabad
Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 for
eviction of the respondent-tenants (the respondent in CA       E
Nos. 5316-5318 of 2012), on the ground that since the
petition for recovery of rent was decreed; and that the
statutory period of 6 months was over, the tenant was
liable to be evicted. The case was decided ex-parte by the
Rent Controller, allowing ttie petition. Appellate court       F
declined to interfere with the order of Rent Controller. In
revision, High directed to give an opportunity of hearing
to the tenant and to allow him to place on record his
Written Statement and also as'ked the land-lords to
comply with the requirements of s. 15(2)(i) of the Act.        G
Thus, setting aside the orders of courts below, remitted
the matter back to Rent Controller. Hence the present
petition.

    In the petition to this Court, it was brought to the
                                                               H
    986      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A notice of the Court that after the remittal, the Rent
  Controller had dismissed the application and appeal
  against the order was pending before appellate court.

      Allowing the appeal Nos. 5316-5318 of 2012 and
B dismissing SLP (C) No. 23457 of 2001 as infructuous, the
  Court

    HELD:

    Civil Appeal Nos. 5316-5318 of 2012:
c        1.1 The High Court ought to have upheld the decree
    for payment of arrears of rent by either directing the trial
    Court to calculate the actual amount payable by
    respondent or by modifying the decree to that extent.
    [Para 12] [994-F]
0
        Anthony v. K. C. lttoop and Sons and Ors. 2000 (6) SCC
    394: 2000 (1)Suppl. SCR 645 - relied on.

       1.2. The appellants could not have been non-suited
E solely on the ground that Exhibit-69 was not admissible
  in evidence. Admission of a party in the proceedings
  either in the pleadings or oral is the best evidence and
  the same does not need any further corroboration . .Vital
  aspect in the case (viz) the admission of the respondent
  in the written statement about the rate of rent and the
F further admission about its non-payment for the entire
  period for which the claim was made in the three suits
  was sufficient to support the suit claim. The High Court
  failed to note the said factor. Even while eschewing
  Exhibit-69 from consideration, the High Court should
G have noted that the relationship of land-lord and tenant
  as between the plaintiffs and the defendants was an
  established factor and the rate of rent was admitted as
  Rs. 800/- per year. [Para 10] [992-D-G]

H         1.3. In the light of the provisions contained in second
   AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED              987
                  !SMAIL
para of Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act, the status   A
of the parties on the basis of undisputed facts pertaining
to the demised premises as land-lord and tenant can
always be accepted and the rights of the parties can be
worked out on that basis. [Para 5] [990-E-F] ·
                                                              B
     1.4. The plea that Exhibit 69, though an unregistered
document, can still be relied upon for collateral purposes,
cannot be accepted. Exhibit 69 was relied upon not for
any collateral purpose but for the support of the main
'claim of arrears of rent. The suit was for arrears of rent
and Exhibit 69 was filed to show the agreement of lease       C
of the demised premises, the other terms of the lease and
the rate of rent between the parties. In that respect, the
conclusion of the High Court as regards Exhibit 69
cannot be faulted. [Para 13] [994-G; 995-A-C]
                                                              D
   S. Kaladevi vs. V.R. Somasundaram and Ors. (2010) 5
SCC 407: 2010 (6 ) SCR 480 - distinguished.

     1.5. Therefore, while upholding the judgment and
decree of the trial court as confirmed by the lower           E
appellate court in holding that the respondent is liable to
pay arrears of rent for the period from October 1971 to
November 1980, The court only modifies the rent payable
with actual rent due in a sum of Rs. 7200/- and the decree
to that extent is granted. [Para 16] [996-C]
                                                              F
SLP (C) No. 23457 of 2011:

    2. Having regard to the subsequent development
relating to the Rent Control proceedings in which the
appeal preferred by the petitioner is stated to be pending    G
before the District Judge, the Court is not inclined to
accede to the submission of the petitioner though C.A.
Nos. 5316-5318/2012 preferred against the common
judgment in Second Appeal Nos.148-150/92 was allowed.
Such a shortcut method cannot be resorted to, based on        H
                                           ..
    988       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A the submission of the petitioner. It is for the petitioners
  to work out their remedies in the Rent Appeal pending
  before the District Judge, in the light of the judgment
  passed in the Civil Appeal Nos. 5316-5318/2012. In the
  light of the decision in C.A.Nos.5316-5318/2012 and in the
B light of the fact that after the order of remittal passed in
  Civil Revision Application, the rent control proceeding
  having been concluded before the Rent Controller, it will
  have to be held that the petition has to be dismissed as
  having become infructuous. [Paras 19 and 20] [997-H;
c 998-A-C, D-E]
                          Case Law Reference:
          2000 (1) Suppl. SCR 645 Relied on.              Para 11
          2010 (6) SCR 480           Distinguished.       Para 13
D
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    5316-5318 of 2012.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 6.5.2011 of the High
E Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Second Appeal
  Nos. 148/1992 and 150/1992.
                                   WITH
          SLP @ No. 23457 of 2001.
          Vivek Solshe, C.G. Solshe for the Appellants.
F
       Shirish K Deshpande, Ashok Kumar Gupta II for the
    Respondent.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
         FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. lhe
    parties in the above special leave petitions are common and
    the issue relates to the shop premises with regard to which
    proceedings were initiated before the Courts below which were
    dealt with by the High Court in the orders impugned in these
H
   AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED     989
!SMAIL [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

petitions and, therefore, the same are being disposed of by this   A
common order.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2012(@ SLP (C) NOS. 26049-51
OF 2011)

    2. Leave granted.                                              B

    Challenge in these appeals is the orders of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad
dated 06.05.2011 passed in Second Appeal Nos. 148-150/
1992.                                                              c
      3. To trace the brief facts, the appellants herein filed
Regular Civil Suit No.167 of 1974, RCS No.211 of 1977 and
RCS No.240of1980 against the respondent herein for recovery
of arrears of rent for the period covering October 1971 to         D
November 1980. The suits were decreed by the trial Court and
the same was also confirmed by the lower appellate Court.
However, the High Court set aside the judgment and decree
of the Courts below on the sole ground that the rent deed
marked as Exhibit-69 cannot be legally accepted in evidence
for the purpose of recovery of rent and consequently the decree    E
granted in favour of the appellants based on such inadmissible
document cannot be sustained. While holding so, the High Court
placed reliance on Anthony v. K. C. lttoop & Sons & Ors. [2000
(6) sec 394].
                                                                   F
      4. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, the counsel
for the appellants contended that even if the rent deed was not
registered, as required under the provisions of the Registration
Act and Transfer of Property Act, it can be relied upon for the
collateral purpose of ascertaining the rent and as to whether      G
the respondent was liable to pay such rent fot the period for
which it was claimed by the appellants. Counsel for the
respondent would, however, contend that there is no question
of relying upon such document by way of collateral means and,
                                                                   H
    990      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court does not
  call for interference.

       5. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties
  and having perused the material papers, we are constrained
  to state that though there can be no two opinion that the rent
8
  deed relied upon by the appellants being an unregistered
  document cannot form the basis to support the claim of the
  appellants for recovery of rent due, if we are able to find that in
  the case on hand there were other uncontroverted evidence
  available on record to support the claim of the appellants that
C would be sufficient to uphold the decree for recovery of rent from
  the respondent. We also wish to point out that such other
  materials which existed should have been accepted by the High
  Court while examining the correctness of the order of the Courts
  below. We also wish to state that that very decision which was
D relied upon by the High Court, while laying down the principle
  that an unregistered document cannot be legally accepted in
  evidence to support the claim of the parties in regard to the
  respective status as lessor and lessee and vice versa as well
  as other recitals therein relating to rent, etc., in the light of the
E provisions contained in second para of Section 107 of Transfer
  of Property Act itself, the status of the parties on the basis of
  undisputed facts pertaining to the demised premises as
  landlord and tenant can always be accepted and the rights of
  the parties can be worked out on that basis.
F
       6. To elaborate our conclusions, we wish to point out that
  when the appellants filed the first suit in RCS No. 167/1974,
  the suit was laid for recovery of the rent amounting to Rs.
  3150.68/- being the rent payable by the respondent for the
G immediately preceding three years of the filing of the suit.
  According to the appellants, it was let out on 19.10.1971 for
  one year on a monthly rent of Rs. 83.32/- based on a rent note
  and that from the very first date the respondent failed to pay
  the rent. It was also averred that while initially it was governed
  by Exhibit 68 in which the rent was fixed at Rs.83.32/- the rent
H
    AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED     . 991
 ISMAIL [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

 was subsequently revised at Rs. 1150/- per year from                 A
 26.10.1973 under Exhibit 69. It was contended that such
 revised rent was payable by the respondent from then onwards
 and that he failed to pay that rent as well. ·

      7. As against the above claim, according to the respondent      8
 the tenancy was entered into by him with the 8th respondent,
 namely, Abdul Rehman in the Second Appeal in the year 1968
 and the rent was fixed at Rs.800/- per year. As far as non-
 payment of rent was concerned the same was not disputed by
 the respondent. The respondent however sought to explain it
 by saying that he carried out repairs by investing a sum of Rs.      C
 5000/- and the appellants agreed to adjust the said sum from
 the rents payable to him. It was based on the above pleas that
 the parties went into trial.

       8. The trial Court after examining the evidence rendered       D
  a categorical finding that the stand of the respondent was not
· supported by any legally admissible evidence, that the said
  Abdul Rehman himself admitted that the plaintiff Smt. lmambee
  wife of SK Mehtab Sahe~ who is none other than his mother
  was the owner of the shop and that the shop was rented out to       E
  the respondent only by his mother lmambee. The other
  respondents were the brothers and sisters of Abdul Rehman
  who also took a clear stand that it was only lmambee who was
  the owner of the demised premises. The Courts below also
  reached a definite finding that right from 1971 the respondent      F
  has not paid any rent to the plaintiff or even to the said Abdul
  Rehman.

      9. As far as the adjustment of rent was concerned, the trial
 Court rendered a finding that though it was claimed in the written
 statement that the accounts registers were maintained to show        G
 the adjustment of rents to cover the expenses of repairs carried
 out in the demised premises, nothing was placed before the
 Court in support of the said stand. Exhibit-85 was relied upon
 by the respondent which was a receipt issued by the said
 Abdul Rehman for Rs. 300/- towards rent for the shop and that        H
    992 ·    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A the said document did not in any way support the stand of the
  respondent. Such findings were recorded by the trial 9ourt in
  all the three suits based on the evidence before it. The lower
  appellate Court also sifted the evidence in detail and concurred
  with the conclusions of the trial Court as regards the non-
8 payment of rent right from day one of the respondent's induction
  into the demised premises.

           10. Keeping the above undisputed facts in mind, when we
    examine the legal issue, at the very outset, it will have to be
    stated that even while holding that Exhibits 68-69 being
C   unregistered documents cannot be accepted in evidence, the
    relationship of the appellants and the respondent as landlord
    and tenant was not in controversy. Even according to the
    respondent himself the rent payable was Rs.800/- per year
    which was admittedly not paid by him right from day one when
D   the tenancy commenced. It was an admitted case of the
    respondent that the rent was due from him from October, 1971
    till the third suit was filed. We are unable to appreciate as to
    how the appellants could have been non-suited solely on the
    ground that Exhibit-69 was not admissible in evidence. It is
E   needless to emphasize that admission of a party in the
    proceedings either in the pleadings or oral is the best evidence
    and the same does not need any further corroboration. In our
    considered opinion, that vital aspect in the case (viz) the
    admission of the respondent in the written statement about the
F   rate of rent and the further admission about its non-payment for
    the entire period for which the claim was made in the three suits
    was sufficient to support the suit claim. The High Court failed
    to note the said factor while deciding the Second Appeal which
    led to the dismissal of the appeals. Even while eschewing
G   Exhibit-69 from consideration, the High Court should have
    noted that the relationship of landlord and tenant as between
    the plaintiffs and the defendants was an established factor and
    the rate of rent was admitted as Rs. 800/- per year.

         11. In this context, when we refer to the decision in Anthony
H
   AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED     993
ISMAIL [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

(supra) relied upon by the High Court, we wish to point out that   A
while the learned Judge placed reliance upon paras 8 and 11
of the said decision, the learned Judge ought to have looked
into other paragraphs of the same decision where this Court
has made a specific reference to the second para of Section
107 of Transfer of Property Act to lay down the principle as       B
under in paras 12 to 14:

          "12. But the above finding does not exhaust the
    scope of the issue whether the appellant is a lessee of the
    building. A lease of immovable property is defined in          C
    Section 105 of the TP Act. A transfer of a right to enjoy a
    property in consideration of a price paid or promised to
    be rendered periodically or on specified occasions is the
    basic fabric for a valid lease. The provision says that
    such a transfer can be made expressly or by implication.
    Once there is such a transfer of right to enjoy the property   D
    a lease stands created. What is mentioned in the three
    paragraphs of the first part of Section 107 of the TP Act
    are only the different modes of how leases are created.
    The first para has been extracted above and it deals with
    the mode of creating the particulaf- kinds of leases           E
    mentioned therein. The third para can be read along with
    the above as it contains a condition to be complied with if
    the parties choose to. create a lease as per a registered
    instrument mentioned therein. All other leases, if created,
    necessarily fall within the ambit of the second para. Thus,    F
    dehors the instrument parties can create a lease as
    envisaged in the second para of section 107 which reads
    thus:

         "All other leases of immovable property may be            G
    made either by a registered instrument or by oral
    agreement accompanied by delivery of possession."

          "13.When lease is a transfer of right to enjoy the
    property and such transfer can be made expressly or by
    implication, the mere fact that an unregistered instrument     H
    994       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         came into existence would not stand in the way of the Court
          to determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise
          than through such deed".

          14. When it is admitted by both sides that the appellant
B         was inducted into the possession of the building by the
          owner thereof and that the appellant was paying monthly
          rent or had agreed to pay rent in respect of the building,
          the legal character of the appellant's possession has to be
          attributed to a jural relationship between the parties. Such
          a jural relationship, on the fact situation of this case, cannot
c         be placed anything different from that of lessor and lessee
          falling within the purview of the second para of Section 107
          of the TP Act extracted above. From the pleadings of the
          parties there is no possibility for holding that the nature
          of possession of the appellant in respect of the building
D         is anything other than as a lessee.".

                                                     (emphasis added)

         12. When we apply the above principles laid down by this
E   Court in juxtaposition with the stand of the respondent that the
    lease was in fact created in respect of the demised premises
    on an annual rent of Rs.800/-, and the trial Court, based on the
    evidence placed before it, reached a categorical finding that
    such lease was between the plaintiff and the respondent based
F   on unimpeachable evidence available on record, having regard
    to the clear cut finding as regards the arrears of rent payable
    by the respondent, the High Court ought to have upheld the
    decree for payment of arrears of rent by either directing the trial
    Court to calculate the actual amount payable by respondent or
    by modifying the decree to that extent.
G
       13. In the written submissions of the appellants, it was
  contended that Exhibit 69, though an unregistered document,
  can still be relied upon for collateral purposes. In support of the
  said contention reliance was placed upon the decision of this
H Court in S. Kaladevi Vs. V.R. Somasundaram and Ors. -
   AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED     995
ISMAIL [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

(2010) 5 SCC 407. The said decision is clearly distinguishable.      A   •
In the case on hand Exhibit 69 was relied upon not for any
collateral purpose but for the support of the main claim of
arrears of rent. The suit was for arrears of rent and Exhibit 69
was filed to show the agreement of lease of the demised
premises, the other terms of the lease and the rate of rent          s
between the parties. Therefore, the contention that the
document was filed merely for establishing some collateral
transaction cannot be accepted. In that respect, the conclusion
of the High Court as regards Exhibit 69 cannot be faulted.
However, for reasons set out in the earlier paragraphs of our        c
judgment we reiterate that the claim of the appellants for
recovery of rent was established by the Defendant's own
categorical admission about the rate as well its non-payment
right from day one.

     14. As far the decision now relied upon (viz) Kaladevi          D
(supra) is concerned, that was a case where the suit was laid
for specific performance and stress was made on the proviso
to Section 49 of the Registration Act which specifically exclude
the mandatory requirement of registration in the substantive part
of Section 49 read along with Section 17 of the Transfer of          E
Property Act. This Court, therefore, held that the reliance placed
upon the unregistered Sale Deed at least for the purpose of
proof of an oral agreement of sale as a collateral transaction
was permissible. This Court also made it clear that in such a
situation the document in question can be received in evidence       F
by making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence
of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to Section 49
of the Registration Act. Therefore, the said decision in the facts
and circumstances of the case is clearly distinguishable.
                                                                     G
     15. We are, therefore, of the view that the dismissal of the
suit on the simple ground that Exhibit 69 was not a registered
document cannot be accepted. Having regard to our above
conclusion, the appeals deserve to be allowed. Since the claim
of the plaintiff has been lingering from the year 1971, we do
                                                                     H
    996     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A not wish to relegate the parties once again to the Court below
  for the simple purpose of ascertaining the arrears. Since the
  respondent admitted the annual rent payable as Rs.800/- per
  year, the claim being from October 1971 to November 1980,
  namely, for 9 years by simple arithmetic, the arrears can be
B worked out to a sum of Rs.2400/- in RCS No.167/1974, Rs.
  2400/- in RCS No.211/1977 and another Rs.2400 in RCS No.
  24011980, in all a sum of Rs.7200/-.

       16. Therefore, while upholding the judgment and decree
  of the trial Court as confirmed by the lower appellate Court in
C holding that the respondent is liable to pay arrears of rent for
  the period from October 1971 to November 1980, we only
  modify the rent payable with actual rent due in a sum of Rs.
  72001- and the decree to that extent is granted. The appeals
  stand allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set
D aside and the judgment and decree of the trial Court and the
  lower appellate Court stand restored with the above
  modification as regards the rent and the total amount due.

    SLP (C) No.23457/2011
E
        17. This Special Leave Petition arise out of the judgment
  and decree passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of
  Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application No.424 of
  1987 dated 06.05.2011. The said revision was preferred by the
  respondent challenging the order of the Rent Controller dated
F 13.01.1986 in file No.1979.R.C.A.3 in Rent No.1/86. The said
  petition was filed before the Rent Controller under Section 15
  of Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act,
  1954 for eviction of the defendant from House No.3-3-32
  situated at Udgir. The plaintiff in RCS No.167/1974 along with
G her son Ahmed Saheb was the petitioner. The plaint for eviction
  was on the ground that RCS No.167174 for recovery of rent was
  decreed, that the default in making the payment of rent was
  willful, that the tenancy was terminated on 6.12.1978, that the
  statutory period of six months was over and, therefore, the
H respondent was liable to be evicted. The respondent in the
   AHMEDSAHEB (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. SAYED     997
ISMAIL [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

eviction petition did not file the written statement for a period   A
of six years. The rent controller found that even on the date of
final hearing the tenant and his Advocate failed to appear and,
therefore, it was decided ex parte. After hearing the arguments
of the plaintiff the application for eviction was allowed and the
respondent was directed to deliver vacant possession. The           B
respondent-tenant preferred file No.1979.R.C.A.3 in Rent No.1 /
86 before the District Judge, Latur. The appellate Court
declined to interfere with the order of the Rent Controller and
the appeal was dismissed.

      18. By the impugned order, the High Court held that the       C
respondent tenant should be directed to place on record the
written statement by giving an opportunity of hearing. While
holding so the learned Judge also noted that since even the
appellant did not lead any evidence, while permitting. the
respondent to file written statement, the .appellant can be         D
directed to comply with the requirements of Section 15 (2)(i)
of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Leases) Control
Act, 1954 in respect of tendering of rent and whether default
was committed by the respondent and accordingly set aside
the orders of the Court below and remit the matter back to the      E
Rent Controller for rendering a decision in accordance with law
by fixing a time schedule.

      19. Before us the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent submitted that after the order of remittal the.Rent      F
Controller dismissed the application. Learned counsel also
contended that as against the order of dismissal by the Rent
Controller, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the
District Judge which is stated to ..be pending. Counsel for the
petitioner in his submissions contended that since the              G
petitioners in Special Leave Petitions are common if the
judgment in Second Appeal No.148-150/1992 is to be set
aside, there should be a direction for eviction as against the
respondent. Having regard to the subsequent development
relating to the Rent Control proceedings in which the appeal
                                                                    H
    998       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2012) 6 S.C.R.


A   preferred by the petitioner is stated to be pending before the
    Learned District Judge, we are not inclined to accede to the
    submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner though we
    have allowed C.A. Nos5316-5318/2012 (@ SLP (C)
    Nos.26049-51/2011 preferred against the common judgment
s   in Second Appeal Nos.148-150/92. Such a shortcut method
    cannot be resorted to based on the submission of the learned
    counsel for the petitioner. It is for the petitioners to work out their
    remedies in the Rent Appeal No. 2/2012 pending before the
    learned Principal District Judge, Latur in the light of the
c   judgment passed in the Civil Appeal Nos5316-5318/2012 (@
    SLP© Nos. 26049-51/2011 ). In the light of our above
    conclusion, we do not find any necessity to traverse from the
    various other submissions made in the written submission of
    the respondent.

D       20. In the light of the decision in C.A.Nos5316-5318/
  2012(@ SLP (C) Nos.26049-51/2011) and in the light of the
  fact that after the order of remittal passed in Civil Revision
  Application No.424 of 1987 dated 06.05.2011, the Rent Control
  Proceeding having been concluded before the Rent Controller,
E it will have to be held that SLP (C) No.23457/2011 has to be
  dismissed as having become infructuous. Accordingly, while
  C.A.Nos ....... ./2012(@ SLP (C) Nos.26049-51 of 2011) stand
  allowed with specific directions as regards the Rent arrears
  payable by the respondent, the Special Leave Petition
F No.23457 of 2011 stands dismissed as having become
  infructuous.
          There will be no orders as to costs.

    K.K.T.                        Appeal allowed & SLP dismissed.