ADOR SAMIA PRIVATE LIMITEDversusPEEKA Y HOLDING LIMITED AND ORS.

                                                                                       '-
A                     ADOR SAMIA PRIVATE LIMITED
                                   v.                                                  i-
                    PEEKA Y HOLDING LIMITED AND ORS.

                                 AUGUST 20, 1999

B              [S.B. MAJMUDAR AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]                                     r




          Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:

         S. 11(6)-Appointment of arbitrator-Order by Chief Justice or his
c   designate-Nature of-Held, Order u/s 11 (6)-being ofan administrative nature
    cannot be subjected to any challenge directly under Article 136 of the
    Constitution of India-Article 136.

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C)                          \
    No. 10792 of I999.
D
         From the judgment and Order dated 2.7.99 of the Bombay High
    Court in A.P. No. 288 of 1998.

          Rajiv Dutta for the Petitioner.

E         The following Order of the Court was delivered :

          This Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of Constitution of India
    is moved by the petitioner challenging an order of the learned Chief Justice
    of the High Court of Bombay in Arbitration Petition No. 288 of 1998 moved
    before him under Section I I sub-section (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
F   Act, 1996 ('the Act' for short).

           It has been held by a Bench of this Court in the case of Sundaram
    Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., [ 1999] 2 SCC 479 that orders under Section
    I I of the Act are not judicial orders. The relevant observations are found in
    paragraph I2 of the Report as under:
G
           "Under the 1996 Act, appointment of arbitrator/s is made as per the
           provision of Section 11 which does not require the court to pass a
           judicial order appointing arbitrator/s. The High Court was, therefore,      ,.
           wrong in referring to these provisions of the I940 Act while interpreting
                                                                                       ·-~
           Section 4 of the new Act."
H                                        658
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                                                                                       I
          ADOR SAMIA PRIVATE LTD. v. PEEKA Y HOLDING LTD.                       659
      It is now well settled that petition under Article 136 can lie for challenging   A
a judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause of matter
passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. As the
learned Chief Justice or his designate under Section I I (6) of the Act acts in
administrative capacity as held by this Court in the aforesaid decision it is
obvious that this order is not passed by any court exercising any judicial
function nor it is a tribunal having trappings of a judicial authority. Question       B
of maintainability of such a petition under Article 136 is decided since long
by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indo-China Steam
Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs and
Ors., [1964] 6 SCR 594.

      In the said decision at page 60 I the Constitution Bench of this Court
                                                                                       c
speaking through Gajendragadkar, CJ., has made the following pertinent
observations:

        "It is settled by decisions of this Court that the Customs Officer who
        initially acts under Section 167 (12A) is not a Court or Tribunal,             D
        though it is also settled that in adjudicating upon the question as to
        whether Section 52A has been contravened by any ship and by such
        contmvention the said ship has made itself liable to confiscation
        under Section 167(12A), the Customs Officer has to act in a quasi-
        judicial manner."
                                                                                       E
      At page 603 it has been further observed as under:

        "The result, therefore, is that it is no longer open to doubt that the
        Customs Officer is not a Court or Tribunal, though in adjudicating
        upon matter under Section 167 of the Act, he has to act in a judicial          F
        manner. It may be conceded that neither the Central Board of Revenue,
        nor the Central Government is a Court within the meaning of Article
        136."

      At page 603 it has been further observed as under:
                                                                                       G
        "It is clear that before an appeal can be entertained in this Court under
        Article 136, two conditions have to be satisfied; the order impugned
        must be an order of a judicial or quasi-judicial character and should
        not be purely an administrative or executive order; and the said order
        should have been passed either by a Court or a Tribunal in the
        territory of India."                                                           H
    660                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A          In view of this settled legal position therefore, there is no escape from
    the conclusion that orders passed by the learned Chief Justice under Section
    11 (6) of the Act being of an administrative nature cannot be subjected to any
    challenge directly under Article 136 of the Constitution oflndia. Only on this
    short ground and without expressing any opinion on the merits of the
B   controversy between the parties this Special Leave Petition is disopsed of as
    not maintainable.

          Whatever other remedy is available to the petitioner for challenging this
    order will obviously remain untouched by the present order.

    RP.                                                      Petition disposed of.