Supreme Court of India
ABDUL RAZAK NANNEKHAN PATHANversusPOLICE COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD & ANR.
- Citation
- 1989 INSC 213
- Decided
- 27 July 1989
- Disposal
- Case Allowed
- Bench
- B C RAY
Holding
The detention order under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 was illegal and was quashed.
Summary
Abdul Razak challenged a detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985, claiming the grounds were vague, irrelevant and violated Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The petitioner's grounds listed seven criminal cases and alleged use of deadly weapons, but the Court found no specific details of incidents, victims, or locations, rendering the grounds insufficient for a valid representation. The Court held that the cited offences pertained to private law‑and‑order matters and did not affect public order as required by the Act. The non‑disclosure of witness names under Section 9(2) was not examined because the detention itself was illegal. Consequently, the Court declared the detention order illegal, quashed it and ordered the detenu’s release.
Issues considered
- Whether the grounds of detention under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat PASA Act were specific, germane and complied with Article 22(5).
- Whether the criminal cases cited constitute a threat to public order within the meaning of the Act.
- Whether the detaining authority applied its mind in satisfying the criteria for detention.
- Whether the non‑disclosure of witness identities under Section 9(2) affects the validity of the detention.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959s. Chapter V
- Bombay Police Acts. 135
- Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985s. 2(c), s. 3(1), s. 4, s. 9(2)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 1208, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 307, s. 324, s. 336, s. 337, s. 427, s. 436, s. 440
Subjects
preventive detentionvagueness of groundsArticle 22(5)public order vs law and orderwitness protectionGujarat PASA Actdetention order quashed
Judgment
-1},
7i>,j!
-~~
~·
~ ABDUL RAZAK NANNEKHAN PATHAN
~ v.
A
'
,
~
'
POLICE COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD & ANR.
JULY 27, 1989
(
[B.C. RAY AND S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN, JJ.] B
4 Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985-Section
;k 3( 1)-Detenu-Detention Order-Mention of Criminal cases registered
·,i~·
under 1. P. C.-Detenu had become dangerous person of the area-Held
- i
that reach and effect not so deep as ro affect public at large--Detention
__,..Order quashed.
c
• By the present petition the Petitioner challenged the legality and
validity of the detention order passed by the Respondent against him
under ·Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities
Act, 1985. The detenu was arrested and kept in Sabarmati Central Jail
on S.10.1988. The detenu iiomediately thereafter, made representation D
to the detaining authority as well as to tbe State Government as also to
the Advisory Board against the detention order but he having not
received any reply, he flied this Writ Petition.
The grounds of detention which were supplied to tbe detenu inter
~
alia mentioned that by . reason of various criminal acts committed by E
him with the help of his companions which included looting of persons,
causing injuries by lethal weapons, be had become a terror in the area
and as such a dangerous person within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the said
Act. Grounds also enumerated seven criminal cases which had been
registered against the detenu. The detenu was stated to have committed
offences affecting human body by holding deadly weapons such as
·~· razor, knife, Tamancba, Sword, Hockey stick etc. It was specifically
F
mentioned tbat if the passers by refused to pay to the detenu the money
as demanded by him, be used to threaten them of murder by showing
weapons. It was also stated in the grounds that particulars of detenu 's
anti-social activities were given by four persons of the area, who did not
desire that their names be disclosed which were accordingly not dis·
G
closed claiming.privilege in that behalf.
~ Taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts the detaining
authority felt satisf"ied that the detenu has been committing offences
punishable under I.P.C. and that due to those activities of the detenu,
public order was disturbed, be having become a hurdle in the main·
H
569
-. - '
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
A tenance of public order. This is how the detention order referred to ~
above came to be passed.
The Petitioner ,challenged the detention-order principally on two
grounds, viz., (i) that the grounds of detention are not germane and
relevant as they are vague lacking in material particulars and (ii) that
B there has been complete non-application of mind by the detaining +1
authority in making the order of detention.
The Court immediately after conclusion of the hearing of the Writ
Petition pronounced an order on May 5, 1988 allowing the Writ Petition
and stating that the written judgment shall follow later. These are the
reasons given by the Court in support of the said order whereby the
+ •
c ~rt, ~
HELD: The averments made in the grounds of detention are
absolutely vague inasmuch as no ;>articulars as to which persons have
been robbed or what offences have been ~ommitted by showing deadly
D weapons and at what place have not been mentioned. [5778]
There is also no mention when and where the detenu in a drunken
condition demanded money from whom nor it has been stated when the
detenu threatened, whom to murder by showing razor or Rampuri 1__
knife. There is no particular instance also as to which peace loving
E citizens and in which area the Petitioner has beaten in pul>lic believing,
that they are giving information of his criminal activities to the police.
It is also a vague statement that the detenu is coming in the way of
maintenance of public order. [575G, 576D-G]
The grounds and averments made in the grounds which were Jl
F served on the detenu are vague and as surh they are violative of Article
22(5) of the Constitution oflndia. [576H-577 A]
Pushkar Mukharjee & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, [1969] 2
SCR 635 at page 641; and Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of
Police, Ahmedabad City & Anr., JT 1988 4 SC 703 at page 710.
G
An act may create a 'law and order' problem but such an act
does not necessarily cause an obstruction to the maintenance of public 'f
order. [579A]
Dr. Ram Manoh.ar Lohia v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1966] I SCR
H 709 at page 746.
ABDUL RAZAK v. POLICE COMMR. [RAY, J.] 571
The criminal cases in the Jnstant case are confined to certain A
private individuals ancl it is merely a 'law and order' problem and it
has nothing to do with "maintenance of public order". Its reach and
effect is not so deep as 'to affect the public at large. It does not create
or tend to create any panic in the minds of the people of a particular
locality or public in general nor it affects adversely the maintenance
·~. of public order. There is nothing to show that the activities or the B
Petitioner have affected or tended to affect the even tempo of life of the
community. [571G-572Al
. · It has been stated by the detaifilng authority that on relevant
ftt' inquiry, it found the statements to be true and as such the names and
addresses of those witnesses have not been given to the detenu as pro- C
'r" vided in Seetion 9(2) of the PASA Act, 1985. The Court did not enter
into that controversy as in its opinion the detaining authority was
satisfied not to disclose then names of those witnesses. [581G-582A]
Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, [1982J 2 SCC 403; not
applicable-distinguished. D
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 15 of
1989.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
E
T. U. Mehta and S.C. Patel for the Petitioner .
..
G.A. Shah, M.N. Shroff and K.M.M. Khan for the Respon-
dents.
··~
' The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F
•) B.C. RAY, J. We have already pronounced in Court on May 5,
1986 the order allowing the writ petition and stating therein that the
written judgment will follow later on.
Pursuant to this, ,. ' are passing the judgment embodying G
reasons. This writ petition is directed against the order of detention
made under s. 3(1) of Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities
Act, 1985, mainly on the grounds that the grounds are not germane
and relevant and there has been non-application of mind by the detain-
ing authority in making the said order.
I H
,· The detenu was arrested and kept in Sabarmati Central Jail on
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
October 5, 1988 under the impugned detention order made on
A
October 5, 1988 by the respondent No. 1, Shri S.N. Sinha, Police
Commissioner, Ahmedabad City and the grounds had been served on
him.
The detenu immediately thereafter made representations to the
B detaining authority as well as to the State Government and also to the
Advisory Board against the impugned order of detention questioning
the legality and validity of the detention order. But uptil now he has
not received any intimation in respect of his aforesaid representation.
The detenu thereafter challenged the impugned order of detention ~
before this Court by the instant Writ Petition No. 15 of 1989 for quash- ~
C ing the same.
Before proceeding to consider on merit it is necessary to quote
excerpts of the grounds of detention.
"That in the Shahalam Chandola Tank area you, with the help of
D your companions, are committing acts affecting human body as shown
in Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code with the help of Rampuri
knife, Razor etc. You are creating atmosphere of terror and danger by
causing injuries and by showing lethal weapons to innocent citizens.
You are known as dangerous and terrible person in the said area. .l
Therefore you are a 'dangerous person' as defined under s. 2(c) of the
E said Act and you are, by creating atmosphere of danger and terror,
becoming hunlle in the way of maintenance of law and order in the
said area. For such acts of yours the following criminal offences under •
the Indian Penal Code have been registered in the police record
against you. The details thereof are as under:
tl
F S. No. Police Stn. Crime R. No. Section Result
1. Kagdapith 96/85 324, 504, 114 Compounded
r
IPC, 135(1) B.P
2. Maninagar 120/86 Secs. 336, 337, Compounded
427, 114 !PC
G
3. Kagdapith 225/87 Sec. 135(1) B.P. Conviction )'
4. Maninagar 122/86 Secs. 307/451,
147, 148, 149,436,
440, 1208 !PC, 25C
Arms Act, 3, 4,
H
Explosive. Not proved.
ABDUL RAZAK v. POLICE COMMR. [RAY, J.] 573
-1
5. Maninagar 33/88 Sec. 324, 504, Under in-
A
114 IPC, 135(1) vestigation.
-i
B.P. Act.
6. Kagdapith 51/88 307, 232, 114 IPC Under in-
135(1) B.P. Act. vestigation.
~ 7, Kagadapith 81/88 326, 114 IPC, Under in-
B
135(1) B.P. Act vestigation.
't-· . Thus, on scrutiny of the complaints, proposals and other papers
· therewith, it appears th;:;t you are committing offences affecting
human body in the said.area by holding deadly weapons such as knife,
It- razor, tamancha, sword, hockey stick, iron pipes etc. Therefore, you c
are a dangerous person as defined ins. 2(c) of the said Act. Further,
you are robbing persons who pass from there for business or service by
showing deadly weapons. In the said area in drunken condition you are
demanding money from those passing from there. If they do not give
money you are threatening them of murder by showing razor of
Rampuri knife. You are beating peace lovi'1g citizens in the said area D
in public believing that they are giving information of your activities to
the police. By this you are coming in the way of maintenance of public
....l order. ·
Particulars in support of your aforesaid anti-social a~tivities have
been given by four persons residing in the said area or doing trade or E
business in the said area in their statements. Copies thereof are given
herewith.
Being afraid of you, the aforesaid witnesses have asked not to
disclose their names and addresses, because they are afraid of damage
to their person and property and their safety and 011 reliable inquiry it F
is found to be true. Therefore, you are not given names and addresses
of those witnesses as provided ins. 9(2) of PASA ACT, 1985 however
contents of the facts states by them are given to you."
" ..................................................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." G
"Taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts, I am fully
satisfied that you are committing offences punishable under the Indian
Penal Code and affecting to human body. You are a notorious, terrible
and dangerous person. Due to such activities of yours public order is
. disturbed very often in the said· area. By such activities you have H
I
'
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1989] 3 S.C.R.
A become hurdle in maintenance of public order."
The respondent No. 1 has thus referred to se~en crilDinal cases ~
filed against the petitioner and also the statements of four persons
residing in the area recotded by the police. The respondc.it No. 1 has
also made averrnents in the grounds alleging various anti-social
B activities of the petitionor and after considering the same made the
impugned order of detenuon forming an opinion that the petitioner is
a dangerous person within the mei:cing of s. 2(c) ::if the said Act. The
names and addresses of the four witnesses have not been disclosed
claiming privilege under s. 9(2) of 'PASA' Act. .'(_
c As regardS the seven criminal cases, the detenu has been acquit·
ted of the charges in the tint two cases that is, Kagdapith case No.
96/85 and Maninager case No. 120/86 which have been compounded.
In the third. case under s. 135 of"the Bombay Police Act, that is,
Kagdapith case No. 225/87, the detenu has been convicted. But it has
no relevan~ for the purpose of forming an opinion that the petitioner
D is a dangerous person under s. 2(c) of PASA Act. As regards the case
No. 4, that is criminal case No. 122/86, ihe petitioner has been acquit·
led. The other three criminal cases that is Maninagar case No. 33/88,
Kagdapith case No. 51/88, & Kagdapith case No. 81/88 arc all under
investigation and in these cases the petitioner has been enlarged on
bail. It has also been stated that the grounds of detention supplied to
E the petitioner are vague and indefinite and as such the dctenu could
_not make an effective and proper representation under Art. 22(5) of
the Constitution. It has further been stated that out of the aforesaid
seven criminal cases, the first two criminal cases arc not proximate to
the date of making the impugned order of detention. There is absolute
non-application of mind by the detaining authority in coming to his
, . F subjective satisfaction that the impugned order was necessary to be
. made to prevent the detenu from acting in any mannl:r prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order. ·
The respondent No. 1, filed an affidavit-in-reply stating inter alia
that the petitioner-detenu is indulging in criminal activities prejudicial
G to the maintenance of the public order 'and as such the order of dcten·
tion was made against the detenu after considering that recourse to
actions .under the provisions of ordinary law will not be adequate. It
has been further denied in paragraph (d) of the said affidavit the
statement that no effective representation could be made due to non·
supply of the names and addresses of the so called witnesses and other
H relevant materials as made in the petition. It has also been stated that
on the basis of the apprehension exp.ressed by those four witnesses
ABDUL RAZAK v. POLICE COMMR. (RAY, J.] 575
·.-1
whose statements have been recorded by the Police Inspector and · A , .
verified by the Superintendent of Police that their names and addres-
ses have not been disclosed by the detaining authority claiming the
privilege available under s. 9(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
Social Activities Act, 1985. It has also been stated that the detaining
authority has been subjectively satisfied that the petitioner is indulging
in nefarious activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order B
and as such the impugned order of detention was made by him against
the detenu. It has also been stated that in Criminal Case No. 225/87,
the detenu was found with razor and be was convicted in that par-
ticular case. It has also been· stated that from the cases registered ·
agains~ the detenu from 1985 to 1988 that the detenu is involved in
prejudicial activities from 1985 to 1988 and as such it was inferred that
the passing of detention order was the only remedy to restrain the C
petitioner from indulging in similar prejudicial activities.
It is evident from the grounds of detention that the impugned
order of detention was made on the ground that the petitioner is a
dangerous and terrible person in the area as defined ins. 2(c) of the D
PASA Act. The said section states:
"dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself
or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of three
successive years habitually commit, or attempts to commit
or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable E
under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal
Code (XLV of 1860) or any of the offences punishable
under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959)."
In the grounds, it has been stated that the detenu by creating
atmosphere of danger and terror has become hurdle in the way of f
maintenance of law and order in the said area. It has also been stated
that for such acts as well as due to the following criminal offences
under the Indian Penal Code registered against him, the detenu has
become a dangerous person of the area. It has also been stated that the
detenu has been robbing persons who pass from there for business or
service by showing deadly weapons. It has also been stated, "In the G
y said area in drunken condition you are demanding money from those
passing from there. If they do not give money you are threatening
them of murder by showing razor or Rampuri knife. You are beating
peace-loving citizens in the said area in public believing that they are
giving information of your criminal activities to the police. By this you
are coming· in the way of maintenance of public order." H
,,
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
,....
It has already been stated hereinbefore that offences under
A
Chapter XVI of Indian Penal Code have been compounded and the
detenu has been acquitted. As regards the third case that is, Kagdapith
case No. 225/87 under s. 135 of Bombay Police Act, the petitioner was
convicted. This offence is not one of the offences falling within the
offences mentioned ins. 2(c) of the PASA Act and as such this case
B cannot be taken into consideration to hold the detenu a dangerous >--
person. As regards the fourth case-Maninagar case no. 122/86, being
not proved against the petitioner he has been acquitted of the
offences charged in the said case. The other three remaining cases that
is, Maninagar case no. 33/88, Kagdapith case no. 15/88 and 81/88 are
~·
all under investigation. Therefore, the fourth case in which the '
petitioner had already obtained acquittal could not be taken into con-
c sideration. For the purpose of determining the petitioner as a dangerous ·..,i
person, it is also very relevant to notice thats. 2(c) defines dangerous
person as a person who habitually commits or attempts to commit
offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of Indian
Penal Code or any of the offences under Chapter V of the Arms Act.
D From the aforesaid seven criminal cases, two cases are of 1985 and
1986 which are not proximate to the date of the order of detention and
so stale. Moreover, the petitioner being acquitted the said cases could
not be taken into consideration. Similarly case No. 3 also falls outside
the purview of the s. 2(c) of the said Act. Fourth case No. 122/86 can .L.
also not be considered as petitioner earned acquittal. Merely on con-
;;
E sideration of the other three criminal cases which are under investiga-
~" tion ·and are yet to be decided the detaining authority cannot come to
his subjective satisfaction that the detenu was a dangerous person who
habitually indulges in committing offences referred in s. 2(c) of the
PASA Act. The other averments made in the said grounds and refer-
red to hereinbefore are absolutely vague in as much as no particulars
as to which persons have been robbed or what offences have been
~
F
committed by showing deadly weapons at what place have not been
mentioned. There is also no mention when and where the detenu in a
drunken condition demanded money from whom nor it has been stated
when the detenu threatened whom to murder by showing razor or
Rampuri knife. There is no particular instance also as to which peace-
loving citizens and in which area the petitioner has beaten in public
G
believing, that they are giving information of his criminal activities to y
the police. It is also a vague statement that the detenu is cvming in the
way of maintenance of public order. Similarly the statement of the said
four witnesses mentioned in the grounds of detention are also very
., vague and without any particulars of the names of the four witnesses
,}
H and their addresses were not disclosed. These statements are also
ABDUL RAZAK v. POLICE COMMR. (RAY, J.) 577
~. vague. In such circumstances, it is not at all possible for the detenu to A
make a proper and effective representation except merely denying the
alleged grounds of detention as mandatorily required under Art. 22(5)
of the Constitution of India. This Article confers on a detenu two
fundamental rights namely, ( 1) that the detaining authority has to com-
municate to the detenu the grounds as early as possible on which the
order of detention has been made and secondly the right to make an B
effective representation against the said order. This obviously requires
that the grounds must not be vague but must be specific, relevant in
order to enable the detenu to make an appropriate and effecting rep-
ri:sentation against the same before the Advi.sory Board as well as
~ before other authorities including detaining authority. The grounds
and the averments made in the grounds which were served on the
detenu are vague and as such they are violative of the Art. 22(5) of the
c
.... Constitution of India. It is pertinent to refer in this connection the
decision reported in Pushkar Mukharjee & Ors. v. The State of West
Bengal, [ 1969) 2 SCR 635 at page 641. "Similarly, if some of the
grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually
deprive the detenu of the statutory right of making a representation, D
that again may make the order of detention invalid."
That has been referred to have been relied upon in the subse-
quent decision in the matter of Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner
j
of Police, Ahmedabad City & Anr., JT 1988(4) SC 703 at page 710.
E
"It was held by this Court that the ground was extremely vague
and gave no particulars to enable the petitioners to make an adequate
• representation against the order of detention and it infringed the con-
stitutional safeguard provided under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of
India."
/~ F
In the case of Pushkar Mukharjee, the ground no. 2 states:
"You have become a menace to the society and th~re have
been disturbances and confusion in the lives of peaceful
citizens of Baraset and K.hardah P.S. areas under 24-
Parganas District .and the inhabitants thereof are constant G
threat of disturbances of public order." It was held in this
case that, "It is manifest that this ground is extremely
vague and gives no particulars to enable the petitioner to
make an adequate representation against the order of
detention and thus infringes the constitutional safeguard
provided under Art. 22(5)." H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1989] 3 S.C.R.
A The second crucial question that falls for consideration in this
case is whether the grounds of detention particularly referring to the
seven criminal cases are relevant and germane grounds for passing of
an order of detention under s. 3(1) of the PASA Act. All the seven
criminal cases mentioned relate to problem of law and order and not
public order in as much as they disclose cases relating to particular
B persons which has nothing to do with the maintenance of public order.
As has already been said hereinbefore that out of the seven criminal
c;,ases, two have been compounded and in the fourth case the criminal
charges have not been proved against the petitioner as such he was
acquitted. The third case being under s. 135 of the Bombay Police Act
does not fall within the purview of the s. 2(c) of the Act and it is
c confined to a private individual. The other three cases which are under
investigation also relate to assault to private individuals and they have
nothing to do with the disturbance of even tempo of the life of the
community or of men of a particular locality nor does it affect the even
flow of life of the public as a whole. Section 3(1) clearly mandates that
the order of dete.ntion can be made only when the State Government
D or its authorised officer has come to a subjective satisfaction that a
person is required to be detained in order to prevent him from acting
in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.
Sub-section 4 embodies a deeming clause to the effect that a person
should be deemed to act in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance
of public order when such person is engaged in any activities as a
E dangerous person which affect adversely or are likely to affect
adversely the maintenance of public order. Explanation 2 clause 4
further provides that for the purpose of this sub-section public order
shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely or shall be deemed •
likely to be affected adversely inter a/ia if any of the activiJies of any
person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly, is causing
F or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity
among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or wide-
spread danger of life, property or public health. Coming to this
particular case, the criminal cases mentioned in th~ grounds do not
refer to any dangerous, harmful or adverse act or alarm which gives
rise to a feeling of insecurity for the general public amongst the
G persons of a locality. The criminal cases are confined to certain private
individuals and it is merely a law and order problem and it has nothing
to do with maintenance of public order. Its reach and effect is not so
deep as to affect the public at large. It does not create or tend or create
any panic in the mind of people of particular locality or public in
general nor it affects adversely the maintenance of public order. There
H is nothing to show that the above activities of the petitioner have
ABDUL RAZAK v. POLICE COMMR. [RAY, J.J 579,
1 affected or tended to affect the even tempo of life of the community. A
An act may create a law and order problem but such an act does not
necessarily cause an obstruction to the maintenance of public order.
The difference between ·the law and order and public order has been
very succinctly stated by this Court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State
of Bihar & Ors., [966] 1 SCR 709 at page 746 wherein it has been
stated that: B
"It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rul-
ings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend
disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of
State" "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less
gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to C
imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents
the largest circle within which is the next circle representing
public order and the smallest circle represents security of
State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and
order but not public order just as an act may affect public
order but not security of the State. But using the expression D
"maintenance of law and order" the District Magistrate
was widening his own field of action and was adding a
clause to the Defence of Indian Rules."
In Pushkar Mukharjee v. State of West Bengal, ('tiupra), it has
been stated that: .E
"It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific
persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people
quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in
a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public
disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested F
in the executive authorities under the provisions of or-
dinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on
the grounds that they were disturbing public order. The con-
travention of any law always affects order but before it can
be said to affect public order, it must affect the community
or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a G
line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms
of disorder which directly affect the community or injure
the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of
peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure
specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public
interest. A ·mere disturbance of law and order leading to H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1989] 3 S.C.R.
A disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under )--
the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will ""
affect public order comes within the scope of the Act. A
District Magistrate is therefore entitled to take action
under s. 3( 1) of the Act to prevent subversion of public
order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under
B ordinary circumstances."
It has also been observed in a recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. The Commissioner of Police,
Ahmedabad City, (supra) that: ~·
.,
"The allegations made against the petitioner may give rise
c to a question of law and order but, surely, they have no- '<I
thing to do with the question of public order. A person may
be very fierce by nature, but so long as the public generally
are not affected by his activities or conduct, the question of
maintenance of public order will not arise. In order that an
D activity may be said to affect adversely the maintenance of
public order, there must be materials to show that there has
been a feeliog of insecurity among the general public. If
any act of a person creates panic or fear in the minds of the
members of the public upsetting the even tempo of life of .l
the community, such act must be said to have a direct bear-
E ing on the question of maintenance of public order. The
commission of an offence will not necessarily come within
the purview of 'public order'." •
Our attention has been drawn to the decision in the case of
Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982] 2 SCC 403. In that case ;:.<.
F in the grounds of detention thirty six criminal cases have been referred
to showing the prejudicial activities of the detenu leading to public
disorder. This Court in considering these series of criminal cases com-
mitted by the detenu held that the detenu appears to have taken a life
of crime and become a notorious character. The fact that the
petitioner and his associates are facing trial or the matters are still
G under investigation only shows that they are such dangerous characters
that people are afraid of giving evidence against him. The armed hold- )'
up gangsters in an exclusive residential areas of the city where persons
are deprived of their belongings at the point of knife or revolver reveal
organised crime. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of
detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu, cover a wide
H field and fall within the contours of the concept of public order. The
'
ABDUL RAZAK v. POLICE COMMR. (RAY, I.I 581
,1 grounds furnished were also neither vague nor irrelevant or lacking in A
particulars or were not inadequate or insufficient for the objective
satisfaction of the detaining authority. Considering these, this Court
held in the particular facts and circumstances of that case that the
order of detention made by the detaining authority after being subjec-
tively satisfied that the acts of the detenu hinder the maintenance of
public order. B
The facts and circumstances of that case are distinguishable from
the facts of the present case and as such· it has got no application.
-t·There is nothing in this case to show that the petitio~er was a member
of a gang which are engaged in criminal activities systematically in a
particular locality and those create a panic and a sense of insecurity C
)" amongst the residents of that particular area in consideration of which
the impugned order was made. Considering the above decisions, we
are unable to hold that the criminal cases mentioned in the grounds
and the statements of the witnesses referred to in the vague and
irrelevant grounds of detention do not in any way pose a threat to the
maintenance of public order nor it disturbs the even tempo of public D
life as envisaged ins. 3(1) of PASA Act. So there has been complete
non-application of mind by the detaining authority before reaching a
J subjective satisfaction to make the impugned order of detention.
It has been urged on behalf of the detenu that there has been no
consideration by the detaining authority of the relevant facts and E
circumstances before making an order under s. 9(2) of the PASA Act
• in not disclosing the names and addresses of the witnesses on whose
statements the subjective satisfaction has been arrived at. It has also
•
been stated in this connection that in the grounds of detention it has
merely been stated, "Being afraid of you the aforesaid witnesses have
asked not to disclose their names and addresses because they are F
afraid of persons. It has been urged with force that this ground does
not refer that the detaining authority has himself considered and
satisfied that the disclosure of their names and addresses are likely to
cause damages to their person and property. It has been stated by the
detaining authority that on relevant enquiry, it found those statements
to be true and as such the names and addresses of those witnesses have G
not been given to the detenu Is provided in s. 9(2) of the PASA Act,
1985. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that there is
nothing to show that the detaining authority has himself considered
that _in public interest the names and addresses of these persons should
not be disclosed and so such non-disclosure is vague .. We do not want
to enter into this controversy and decide the same as in our opinion the H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I19891 3 S.C.R.
A detaining authority has been satisfied not to disclose the names of
those witnesses under s. 9(2) of the said Act. No other grounds have
been urged before us on behalf of the petitioner.
For the reasons aforesaid, we hold the order of detention is
illegal and bad and as such we allow the writ petition. The order of
B detention is quashed and set aside and the detenu is set free forthwith.
Y.Lal Petition allowed.
·-j,L
;
•
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