ABDUL NAWAZversusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL

                       [2012] 4 S.C.R. 560


A                        ABDUL NAWAZ
                                 v.
                    STATE OF WEST BENGAL
                (Criminal Appeal No. 801 of 2012)

                          MAY 10, 2012
B
        [T.S. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]

        PENAL CODE, 1860:

c      s. 300, Exception 4 and s. 304(Part-I) - Scuffle between
  accused and Head Constable of police in order to release the
  dinghy from the police -· Accused causing head injury to
  Head Constable and pushing him into the sea - Dead body
  of victim recovered from the sea - Held: Pushing a person
0 into the sea with ableeding head injury may not have been
  with the intention to kill, but it would certainly show the
  "intention of causing a bodily injury as was likely to cause
  death''. within the meaning of s. 300 and secondly s. 304(Part-
  I) - The act of the accused is more appropriately punishable
E uls 304 (Part-I) instead of s. 302 as invoked by the courts
  below - Conviction u/s 302 set aside - Instead accused
  convicted u/s 304 (Part-I) and sentenced to 8 years RI -
  Evidence - Minor discrepancies in evidence and recording
  FIR - Effect of

F     The appellant and 16 others were prosecuted for
  commission of offences punishable u/ss 3021392/411/201/
  1208/341/109 IPC. The prosecution case was that at
  about 23.50 hrs on 19.3.2008, when the policemen PWs
  1 and 3 were on patrol duty, they noticed that in two
G dinghies tied to a ferry boat stationed at the jetty, diesel
  was being illegally removed from the ferry boat. On
  seeing the policemen, the miscreants escaped in one of
  the dinghies. When some more police personnel reached

H                               560
   ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                   561


the scene, the Engineer, the Master and the Lskar of the        A
ferry boat were caught. Head Constable 'S' and PW1
boarded the dinghy left behind by the miscreants.
Meanwhile, the other dinghy that had earlier fled away,
returned to the spot with four persons on board including
the appellant. They got into a scuffle with Head Constable      B
'S' to secure the release of the dinghy. The appellant
picked up a dao that was lying in the dinghy, inflicted a
blow on the head of 'S' and pushed him into the sea and
escaped in the dinghy. The dead body of 'S' was
recovered from the sea by the Coast Guard Divers on             c
20.3.2008. The trial court convicted the appellant u/s 302
IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. A-1 to A-
3 were convicted and sentenced u/s 332/34. The
remaining accused charged with commission of offences
punishable u/ss 392/409/411 were, however, acquitted.           0
The High Court allowed the appeals of A-1 to A-3 and
dismissed the appeal of the appellant.

     In the instant appeal, it was, inter alia, contended for
the appellant that the prosecution case was primarily
based on the evidence of PWs 1 and 2; that the evidence         E
of PW 1 was not worthy of credit and could not,
therefore, be relied upon; that PW 2 was not an eye-
witness and had not corroborated the version given by
PW 1; that there was no evidence to prove that the injury
stated to have been inflicted by the appellant was in the       F
ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause the death;
that even according to the prosecution case itself, there
was a sudden fight between the deceased and the
appellant and his companions bringing the case under
Exception 4 to s. 300 IPC.                                      G

    Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. The trial court considered the evidence
on record carefully and came to the conclusion that the
                                                                H
    562      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 4 S.C.R.

A return of the appellant to recover the second dinghy, a
  scuffle taking place between the appellant and the
  deceased Head Constable on board the second dinghy,
  and the deceased being hit with a 'dao' by the appellant
  and being pushed into the sea was proved by the
B evidence on record. [para 9] [568-F-H]

       1.2. In appeal, the High Court re-appraised the
  evidence adduced by the prosecution and affirmed the
  findings recorded by the trial court as regards the
  presence and return of the appellant to recover the
C second dinghy left behind by the miscreants, the assault
  on the deceased with a 'dao' and his being pushed into
  the sea. The High Court found that the depositions of
  PWs1 and 2 to the extent they proved the above facts
  were cogent and consistent hence acceptable. There
D does not seem to be any palpable error in the approach
  adopted by the High Court. The discrepancies indicated
  in the recording of the FIR, or the offence under which it
  was registered are not of much significance and do not
  affect the substratum of the prosecution case. [para 10
E and 12] [569-A-B; 570-D-E]

          Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1983
    (3) SCR 280 =(1983) 3 SCC 217 - referred to.

       1.3. This Court accordingly affirms the findings of the
F two courts below to the extent that the appellant was
  indeed one of the four persons who returned to the place
  of occurrence to recover the second dinghy that had
  been left behind by them and finding the deceased-Head
  Constable inside the dinghy assaulted him in the course
G of a scuffle, pushed him into the sea and eventually took
  away the dinghy with the help of his companions. [para
  12] [570-E-F]

          2.1. The prosecution case clearly is that the appellant
H
    ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                 563


and his companions had returned to the place of                A
occurrence only to recover the second dinghy which
they had left behind while they had escaped from the spot
in the other dinghy. It is not the case of the prosecution
that there was any pre-mediation to commit the murder
of the deceased. It is also common ground that the             B
appellant was not armed with any weapon. The weapon
allegedly used by him to assault the deceased was even
according to the prosecution case lying in the said
dinghy. The nature of the injury inflicted upon the victim
has not been proved to be sufficient in the ordinary           c
course of nature to cause death. The blow given by the
appellant to the deceased had not caused any fracture
on the skull. [para 15] [571-F-H; 572-A]

     2.2. It cannot be ignored that the deceased had
sustained a head injury and was bleeding. Pushing a            D
person into the sea, with a bleeding head injury may not
have been with the intention to kill, but it would certainly
show the "intention of causing a bodily injury as was
likely to cause death", within the meaning of s. 300 and
secondly 304 (Part I) of the IPC. [para 16] [572-E-F]          E

      2.3. The appellant having assaulted the deceased
with a 'dao' and having thereby disabled him sufficiently
ought to have known that pushing him into the sea was
likely to cause his death. Pushing the deceased into the       F
sea was in the circumstances itself tantamount to
inflicting an injury which was likely to cause the death of
the deceased. In the case at hand he was assaulted with
a sharp edged weapon on the head and was bleeding.
The injury on the head and the push into the sea have,         G
therefore, to be construed as one single act which the
appellant ought to have known was likely to cause death
of the deceased. Even so, Exception 4 to s. 300 of the IPC
would come to the rescue of appellant inasmuch as the
act of the appellant even when tantamount to commission
                                                               H
    564      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A of culpable homicide will not amount to murder as the
  same was committed without any pre-meditation and in
  a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, in the course of a
  sudden quarrel without the offender taking undue
  advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. T h e
B act of the appellant is more appropriately punishable u/s
  304 (Part I) instead of s. 302 IPC invoked by the courts
  below. [para 16] [572-G-H; 573-A-F]

      2.4. The conviction of the appellant for the offence of
C murder u/s 302 IPC, is set aside. He is convicted of
  culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
  u/s 304(1) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo
  imprisonment for a period of eight years. [para 17] [573-
  F-G].

D      Chinnathaman v. State 2007 (14) SCC 690; Muthu v.
  State 2007 (11) SCR 911 = 2009 (17) SCC 433, Arumugam
                                 =
  v. State 2008 (14) SCR 309 2008 (15) SCC 590; Ajit Singh
  v. State of Punjab 2011 (12) SCR 375 = 2011 (9) SCC 462;
  and Elavarasan v. State 2011 (10) SCR 1147 = 2011 (7)
E sec 110 - cited.

                         Case Law Reference:
          1983 (3) SCR 280        referred to         para 12
          2001 (14) sec 690       cited               para 14
F
          2007 (11) SCR 911       cited               para 14
          2008 (14) SCR309        cited               para 14
          2011 (12) SCR375        cited               para 14
G
          2011 (10) SCR 1147      cited               para 14

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 801 of 2012.

H         From the Judgment & Order dated 30.08.2010 of the High
    ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                       565


Court at Calcutta (Circuit Bench at Port Blair) in C. R. A. No. 5     A
of 2010.

     Jaspal Singh, Rauf Rahim, Y. Bansal for the Appellant.

    Ashok Bhan, Asha G. Nair, Sadhna Sandhu, CK Sharma,
D.S. Mahra for the Respondent.                                        B

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.

    2. This appeal by special leave arises out of a judgment          C
and order dated 30th August, 2010 passed by the High Court
of Calcutta whereby Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2010 filed by the
appellant assailing his conviction under Section 302 of the IPC
and sentence of life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.50,000/- and
a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years has         D
been dismissed.

      3. Two policemen deployed on patrol duty examined at the
trial as PWs 1 & 3 reached Chatham Jetty at about 23.50 hrs.
on the 19th of March, 2008. While at the Jetty they started           E
smelling diesel odour and suspecting that something fishy was
going on, parked their motor cycle to take a walk in the
surrounding area. Soon they noticed that two dinghies were tied
to M.V. Pillokunji, a vehicle ferry boat stationed at the jetty. In
one of these dinghies there were 20 drums besides a man
present on the dinghy while in the other there were three to four     F
men and 14 drums, which were being filled with diesel using a
plastic pipeline drawn from the vessel mentioned above. The
suspects jumped in to one of the two dinghies and escaped,
when they saw the approaching policemen that included Head
Constable Sunil Kumar (PW-2) and Constable K.Vijay Rao                G
(PW-5). The police party, it appears, tried to contact police
station Chatham and the Control Room. While they were doing
so the Engineer, Master and the Laskar of the said vessel
attempted to snatch the VHF set from them. The police party,
therefore, caught hold of these persons as they appeared to           H
    566     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A   be in league with the miscreants, who had escaped. Soon
    thereafter arrived Constable Amit Talukdar (PW-4) and the
    deceased Head Constable Shri Shaji from Police Station,
    Chatham. After hearing the version from the patrolling
    constables and the PCR van personnel who too had arrived on
B   the spot the deceased informed the SHO, Chatham police
    station and requested him to reach the spot. In the meantime,
    the deceased and PW-1 boarded the dinghy that had been left
    behind by the miscreants leaving the three crew members of
    the vessel under the vigil of the remaining members of the police
C   party. PW-1 who accompanied the deceased on to the dinghy
    firmly tied the rope of the dinghy but while both of them were
    still in the dinghy, the other dinghy that had earlier fled away
    returned to the spot with four persons on board. The prosecution
    case is that the appellant and one Abdul Gaffar were among
    those who entered the dinghy and got into a scuffle with the
0
    deceased to secure the release of the dinghy. In the course of
    the scuffle the appellant is alleged to have picked up a dao
    (sharp edged weapon lying in the dinghy) and inflicted an injury
    on the head of the deceased. The appellant is then alleged to
    have pushed the deceased into the sea. The rope of the dinghy
E   was cut by the miscreants to escape in the dinghy towards
    Bambooflat.

       4. A search for the deceased was launched by the SHO
  after he arrived on the spot which proved futile. His dead body
F was eventually recovered from the sea by the Coast Guard
  Divers on 20th March, 2008 at about 6.15 hours. The inquest
  was followed by the post-mortem examination of the dead body
  conducted by Dr. Subrata Saha. Statements of witnesses were
  recorded in the course of investigation and the dao recovered
G culminating in the filing of a charge-sheet against as many as
  seventeen persons for offences punishable under Sections
  302/392/411/201/1208/341/109 IPC. The case was, in due
  course, committed for trial to the court of Sessions Judge,
  Andaman & Nicobar Islands at Port Blair before whom the
H accused pleaded not guilty and claimed a trial.
    ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                       567
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

     5. At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 66         A
witnesses apart from placing reliance upon an equal number
of documents marked at the trial apart from material exhibits.
The accused did not examine any witnesses but produced a
few documents in support of their defence.
                                                                     B
     6. The Trial Court eventually convicted the appellant for an
offence of murder punishable under Section 302, IPC and
sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. A-1 to A-3
were also similarly convicted but only for offences punishable
under Sections 332/34 of the IPC. The remaining accused              C
persons charged with commission of offences punishable under
Sections 392/409/411 of the IPC were, however, acquitted.

     7. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded to
them, A-1 to A-3 and the appellant herein preferred appeals
before the High Court of Calcutta, Circuit Bench at Port Blair.      D
By the impugned judgment under appeal before us, the High
Court has while allowing three of the appeals filed by the other
convicts, dismissed that filed by the appellant herein thereby
upholding his conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment
awarded to him.                                                      E

     8. We have heard Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Mr. Ashok Bhan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent-State who have taken us
through the judgments under appeal and the relevant portions
                                                                     F
of the evidence adduced at the trial. It was contended by Mr.
Jaspal Singh that the prosecution case rests primarily on the
depositions of PWs 1 & 2 as the remaining police witnesses
were admittedly at some distance from the place of occurrence.
Out of these witnesses PW-1, according to Mr. Jaspal Singh,
was not worthy of credit and could not, therefore, be relied upon.   G
A draft FIR was, according to the learned counsel, prepared
by PW65-the investigating officer which PW1 is said to have
signed without even reading the same. This implied that the
version given in the FIR was not that of the witness, but of the
person who had drafted the same. It was further contended that       H
    568      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A although the FIR was recorded at 1:30 a.m., the body of the
  deceased was recovered only at about 5:40 a.m. In the
  intervening period it was not known whether the deceased was
  alive or dead. The FIR purportedly registered at about 1:30 a.m.
  all the same alleged the commission of an offence under
B Section 302 IPC. This, according to Mr. Singh, indicated that
  the FIR was actually registered much after the recovery of the
  body. Mr. Jaspal Singh, further, contended that PW-2 was not
  an eye-witness and had not corroborated the version given by
  PW-1. He had instead improved his own version given in the
c statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He further contended that
  the name of the appellant had been introduced subsequently
  as the contemporaneous documents showed that the name of
  the assailant was not known.

         9. The Trial Court has viewed the occurrence in two distinct
D   sequences. The first sequence comprises the police party's
    arrival on the spot and discovering the process of removal of
    diesel from the bigger vessel into the dinghies carrying drums
    with the help of a pipe and a pump and the escape of the four
    persons from the place after the police went near the spot. The
E   second sequence comprises three crew members of the vessel
    being detained by the police party, the arrival of the deceased
    head Constable Shaji from police station-Chatham, the
    deceased entering the second dinghy left behind by the
    miscreants, the return of the four persons including the
F   appellant to the place of occurrence, a scuffle ensuing in which
    the deceased was hit on the head and pushed into the sea.
    The Trial Court considered the evidence on record carefully in
    the context of the above two sequences and came to the
    conclusion that the return of the appellant to recover the second
G   dinghy, a scuffle taking place between the appellant and the
    deceased Head Constable-Shaji on board the second dinghy,
    and the deceased being hit with a dao by the appellant and
    being pushed into the sea was proved by the evidence on
    record.
H
   ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                     569
             [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
     10. In appeal, the High Court re-appraised the evidence      A
adduced by the prosecution and affirmed the findings recorded
by the Trial Court as regards the presence and return of Nawaz
to recover the second dinghy left behind by the miscreants, the
assault on the deceased with a dao and his being pushed into
the sea. The High Court found that the depositions of PWs1        B
and 2 to the extent they proved the above facts was cogent and
consistent hence acceptable. The High Court observed:

    "From the above versions of the prosecution witnesses, it
    seems to be clear that the victim had been assaulted by       C
    a dao and then pushed into the sea water and it was
    thereafter that PW-2, for sending message, left for the
    PCR van. It is in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that they
    noticed Nawaz to be the assailant of the victim. While PW-
    1 was categorical that Nawaz pushed the victim into the
    sea water, PW-2 did not specifically say who pushed the       D
    victim into the sea water but having regard to the sequence
    of events sighted by him which support the version of PW-
    1, it would not be unreasonable to conclude based on the
    version of PW-1 that it was Nawaz who had also pushed
    the victim into the sea water.                                E

    Number of similarities appear from a reading of the
    respective versions of PWs 1 and 2, viz. that PW-2 and
    other staff who were on the vehicle approaching the jetty
    were stopped by PW-1; that there were 20 drums on one         F
    dinghy and 14 drums on the other; that through green
    coloured pipe, diesel was being supplied to the drums from
    the said vessel; that the victim picked up the mobile phone
    lying in the detained dinghy; that PW-1 had come over to
    the said vessel for tying the dinghy; that both recognized    G
    Nawaz as the person who picked up the dao from the
    dinghy and hit the victim. These are some evidence
    tendered by PWs 1 and 2 which are absolutely mutually
    consistent. That apart, the other witnesses present at the
    spot (though had not recognized Nawaz or been informed
                                                                  H
    5'70      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012] 4 S.C.R.


A          about the identity of the assailant), had heard that the
           victim was assaulted with a dao."

        11. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Bharwada
    Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217,
8 the High Court held that minor discrepancies in the depositions
  of witnesses which did not go to the root of the matter cannot
  result in the entire prosecution case being thrown out.

          12. We do not see any palpable error in the approach
    adopted by the High Court in appreciating the evidence
C   adduced by the prosecution. The deposition of PWs 1 & 2
    regarding the presence of the appellant at the place of
    occurrence, his getting into a scuffle with the deceased in an
    attempt to recover the dinghy and the assault on the deceased,
    who was then pushed into the sea is, in our opinion,
D   satisfactorily proved. The discrepancies indicated by Mr. Jaspal
    Singh in the recording of the FIR, or the offence under which it
    was registered are not of much significance and do not, in our
    view, affect the substratum of the prosecution case. We
    accordingly affirm the findings of the two Courts below to the
E   extent that the appellant was indeed one of the four persons
    who returned to the place of occurrence to recover the second
    dinghy that had been left behind by them and finding the
    deceased-Head Constable Shaji inside the dinghy assaulted
    him in the course of a scuffle and eventually took away the
F   dinghy with the help of his companions, after the deceased was
    assaulted and pushed into the sea.
        13. That brings us to the second limb of Mr. Jaspal Singh's
  contention in support of the appeal. It was contended by him
  that the evidence on record established that the appellant had
G not come armed to the place of occurrence. The dao allegedly
  used by him for assaulting the deceased was even according
  to the prosecution lying within the dinghy. That the appellant had
  not repeated the act and the intensity of the dao blow was not
  severe enough inasmuch as it had not caused any fracture on
H the skull of the deceased.
     ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                        571
               [TS. THAKUR, J.]

      14. It was further argued that there was no evidence              A
medical or otherwise to prove that the injury inflicted by the
appellant was in the ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause
death. As a matter of fact, the injury had not itself caused the
death, as according to the trial Court, the victim had died of
drowning. It was urged that while according to PW-1 the                 B
deceased was pushed into the sea that version had not been
supported by PW2. To top it all the prosecution case itself
suggested that there was a sudden fight between the deceased
and the appellant and his companions and it was in the course
of the said fight that an injury was sustained causing the death        c
of the deceased thereby bringing the case under exception 4
to Section 300 of the IPC. Relying upon the decisions of this
Court in Chinnathaman v. State [2007 (14) SCC 690), Muthu
v. State [2009 (17) SCC 433), Arumugam v. State [2008 (15)
SCC 590) and Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab [2011 (9) SCC                D
462] and judgment of this Court in Elavarasan v. State [2011
(7) SCC 11 OJ it was contended that the conviction of the
appellant under Section 302 of the IPC was erroneous in the
facts and circumstances of the case and that the evidence at
best made out a case punishable under Section 304 Part II of            E
the IPC, and in the worst case scenario, one punishable under
Secti.on 304 Part I.

       15. The contention urged by Mr. Jaspal Singh is not wholly
without merit to be lightly brushed aside. The prosecution case
clearly is that the appellant and his companions had returned           F
to the place of occurrence only to recover the second dinghy
which they had left behind while they had escaped from the spot
in the other dinghy. It is not the case of the prosecution that there
was any pre-mediation to commit the murder of the deceased.
It is also common ground that the appellant was not armed with          G
any weapon. The weapon allegedly used by him to assault the
deceased was even according to the prosecution case lying in
the said dinghy. The nature of the injury inflicted upon the victim
has not been proved to be sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. The blow given by the appellant to the           H
    572     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 4 S.C.R.


A deceased had not caused any fracture on the skull. The two
  courts below have, all the same, accepted the prosecution story
  that after the deceased was given a dao blow, the appellant
  pushed him into the sea. That finding has been affirmed by us
  in the earlier part of this judgment. The question, however, is
B whether this act of pushing the deceased into the sea after he
  was given a blow on the head, no matter the blow was not
  proved to be severe enough to cause death by itself, would be
  suggestive of an intention to kill. According to Mr. Jaspal Singh
  the answer is in the negative. That is so because, the main
c purpose of the appellant returning to the place of occurrence
  was not to kill any one, but only to have the dinghy back. The
  obstruction caused in the accomplishment of that object could
  be removed by pushing the deceased who was resisting the
  attempt made by the appellant into the sea. The fact that the
0 deceased was pushed into the sea, should not, therefore, be
  seen as indication of an intention to kill the deceased.

        16. The appellant was interested only in having the dinghy
  back. That could be done only by removing the obstruction
  caused by the deceased who was resisting the attempt.
E Pushing the deceased into the sea could be one way of
  removing the obstruction not necessarily by killing the
  deceased. Having said that we cannot ignore the fact that'the
  deceased had sustained a head injury and was bleeding.
  Pushing a person into the sea, with a bleeding head injury may
F not have been with the intention to kill, but it would certainly show
  the "intention of causing a bodily injury as was likely to cause
  death", within the meaning of Sections 300 & secondly 304 Part
  I of the IPC.

G       The appellant having assaulted the deceased with a dao
  and having thereby disabled him sufficiently ought to have known
  that pushing him into the sea was likely to cause his death.
  Pushing the deceased into the sea was in the circumstances
  itself tantamount to inflicting an injury which was likely to cause
H the death of the deceased. The High Court has gone into the
       ABDUL NAWAZ v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                   573
                 [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

question whether the deceased knew or did not know                  A
swimming. But that issue may have assumed importance if the
deceased was not disabled by the assault on a vital part of his
body. In the case at hand he was assaulted with a sharp edged
weapon on the head and was bleeding. His ability to swim,
assuming he knew how to swim, was not, therefore, of any use        B
to him. The injury on the head and the push into the sea have,
therefore, to be construed as one single act which the appellant
ought to have known was likely to cause death of the deceased.
Even so exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC would come to
the rescue of appellant inasmuch as the act of the appellant        c
even when tantamount to commission of culpable homicide will
not amount to murder as the same was committed without any
pre-meditation and in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion, in
the course of a sudtlen quarrel without the offender taking undue
advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. The               0
prosecution evidence sufficiently suggests that a scuffle had
indeed taken place~n the dinghy where the appellant and his
companions were trying to recover the dinghy while the
deceased was preventing them from doing so. In the course
of this sudden fight and in the heat of passion the appellant       E
assaulted the deceased and pushed him into the sea eventually
resulting in his death. The act of the appellant is more
appropriately punishable under Section 304 (I) of the IPC
instead of Section 302 of the Code invoked by the Courts
below. The appeal must to that extent succeed.
                                                                    F
     17. In the result, we allow this appeal in part and to the
extent that while setting aside the conviction of the appellant
for the offence of murder under Section 302 of the IPC, we
convict him for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under Section 304 (I) of the IPC and sentence him        G
to undergo imprisonment for a period of eight years. Sentence
of fine and imprisonment in default of payment of fine is,
however, affirmed.

R.P.                                     Appeal partly allowed.
                                                                    H