A. WATI AOversusTHE STATE OF MANIPUR

A                                  A. WAT! AO
                                         v
                            THE STATE OF MANIPUR

                               OCTOBER 13, 1995

B               IA.M. AHMADI, CJ AND B.L. HANSARIA, J.)

          Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 120-B

          Prevention of Co1111ption Act, 1947: Section S(J)(d).

C           Govemment Office1-Award of contract to a black listed Jinn at ex-
    tre111ely exorbitant rate~Mate1ial supjJ01ting charge of conuption and con-
    spiracy---Conviction-Sentenc~Enhancen1ent by Su11renle Court-Factors
    relevant in sentencing.

          The appellant, a senior IAS Officer, was prosecuted under section
D 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with section S(l)(d) of the
    Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The prosecution case was that he was
    a party to the conspiracy in giving a contract to a black listed firm at
    extremely exorbitant rates. The Trial Court convicted the appellant and
    imposed on him the sentence of fine of Rs. 10,000 as well as imprisonment
E till the rising of the Court. Appellant's appeal was dismissed by the High
    Court. While imposing the sentence the Trial Court took into account
    various factors such as that (i) he was a respectable person; (ii) he has a
    number of dependents but there was certainty of his losing the job; (iii) it
  . was his first offence; and (iv) the spectre of delay was hanging on his head
F   for about live years.

          On ap1ieal this Court issued notice for enhancement of punishment
    to be imposed on the appellant while it was contended for him that the
    conviction was not maintainable because the prosecution has not fully
    discharged its onus to prove the appellant's guilt which was based on
G   circumstantial evidence.

           Dismissing the appeal, this Court

          HELD : I. The involvement of the appellant in the conspiracy is so
    apparent that it cannot be said that there was any straining of the
H   circumstance to connect the appellant with the crime. The appellant had
                                         296
                  A WAT! AO v. STATE [HANSAR!A. J.]                     297

knowledge about the fact of black listing of the firm. As to the rates being   A
exorbitant, there is a clear finding of the Trial Court, which was endorsed
by the High Court. Thus there were clinching materials to hold the
appellant guilty of the offences charged. Accordingly, his conviction is
upheld. [298-F, 299-B]

      2. None of the factors taken into account by the Trial Court while       B
in1posing sentence, except the delay to some extent make out a case for
awarding sentence less than the minimum prescribed by the Act i.e. one
year. Though the fact of delay of about five years could not have been a
ground to award the sentence of imprisonment till rising of the court,
which really makes a mockery of the whole exercise, yet the delay does         C
require some reduction from the minimum prescribed. On the facts of this
case, ends of justice would be met if a sentence of imprisonment for six
months is awarded. [299-E, H, 300-A)

      S.P. Bhalllagar v. State of Maharashtra, [1979] 2 SCR 875, referred
to.                                                                            D

      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
698 of 1995.

      From the Judgment and Order dated 3.5.95 of the Assam High Court
in Cr!. A. No. 12/88/4/88.                                                     E

      R.K. Dhawan, Vinod Kanth, and Navin Prakash, for the Appellant.

      Ms. S. Janani for the Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               F

      HANSARIA, J. The appellant was convicted under S.120-B of the
Penal Code read with S.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
by Special Judge, Manipur. He ~as sentenced to a tine of Rs. 10,000 and
to imprisonment till the rising of the Court. On appeal being preferred, the   G
Imphal Bench of the Gauhati High Court dismissed the same. The learned
Judge deciding the appeal, however, granted, on oral prayer being made,
leave, under Article 134(c) of the Constitution to prefer an appeal to this
Court, albeit without specifying the question of law involved.

      2. While issuing notice in the appeal, the appellant was also asked to H
    298                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 4S.C.R.

A show-cause as to why the punishment should not be enhanced.

           3. Dr. Dhawan, appearing for the appellant, has first contended that
    the conviction of the appellant itself is not tenable inasmuch as the onus
    of proof, which lies in a case where guilt is based on circumstantial
    evidence, as in this case, has not been fully discharged by prosecution. To
B   sustain this submission, we have been referred to S.P. Bhatnagar v. State of
    Maharashtra, 11979) 2 SCR 875. As Dr. Dhawan strenuously contended that
    the test regarding proof laid down in Bhatnagar's case has not been
    satisfied, it would be apposite to find out what was held in that case. A
    reference to the judgment shows that this Court mentioned about the
c   fundamental rule relating to the proof of guilt based on circumstantial
    evidence, which is that there is always danger that conjecture or suspicion
    might take the place of legal proof inasmuch as in cases based on cir-
    cumstantial evidence mind is apt to take a pleasure in adapting circumstan-
    ces to one another and even in straining them a little, if need be to force
D   them to form parts of one connected whole. It was then stated that in cases
    where the evidence is of circumstantial nature, the circumstances from
    which the concl1:1sion of guilt is drawn should, in the first instance, be fully
    established and then all the facts so established should be consistent only
    with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.

E       4. The aforesaid shows that this Court ·had really reiterated the well
    known tests to be satisfied when the evidence in support of the prosecution
    case is circumstantial in nature. It was, of course, added that precaution
    has to be taken to see that conjecture or surmises do not take the place of
    legal proof.
F
           5. In the present case, however, the involvement of the appellant in
    the conspiracy is so apparent that it cannot be said that there was any
    straining of the circumstance to connect the appellant with the crime. We
                                                                            a
    have said so because the prosecution case is that the appellant was party
    to the conspiracy in giving the contract in question to A. Sarat Chandra
G   Sharma, (whose earlier firm had been black listed) and that too at an
    extremely exorbitant rate. Though the appellant sought to deny his
    knowledge about the fact of blacklisting of the earlier firm of Sarat
    Chandra, this plea has no less to stand, because the decision of the
    Government of Manipur regarding the black listing of the firm had been
H   communicated by the appellant himself to the Chief Engineer by his letter
                  A. WATIAO v. STATE [HANSARIA,J.]                        299

of even number dated 23rd June, 1978, whereas the present contract had           A
been given to another firm of Sarai Chandra in January, 1979, after the
processing had begun in November, 1978. As to the rates being exorbitant,
there is a clear finding of the Trial Court, which was endorsed by the High
Court. Though, Dr. Dhawan contended in this regard that the rates were
those at which supplies had been made ·earlier, this plea has been discarded
by the two courts below. This being a question of fact based on material
                                                                                 B
on record we see no reason to doubt its correctness.

      6. The aforesaid shows that there were clinching materials to hold
the appellant guilty under S.5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
read with S.120-B of the Penal Code. We, therefore, uphold the conviction.       C

       7. This takes us to the question of the sentence. A perusal of the
Trial Court's judgment shows that the sentence of imprisonment till rising
of the court was awarded because of : (1) the appellant being a senior IAS
Officer and holding of different high posts, which showed that he is· a very     D
respectable person; (2) the appellant having a number of dependents; (3)
the certainty of appellant's losing his job and requiring him to earn a living
for himself and his family members; (4) the present being first offence
committed by him; and (5) the spectre of the incident hanging on his head
for about half a decade. According to us, none of these factors (except the
last, to some extent) make out a case for awarding sentence less than the        E
minimum prescribed by the aforesaid Act - the same being imprisonment
for one year. The fact that the appellant is a senior !AS Officer really
requires a serious view of the matter to be taken, instead of soft dealing.
The fact that he has a number of dependents and is going to lose his job
arc irrelevant considerations inasmuch as in almost every case a person          F
found guilty would have dependents and if he be a public servan~ he would
lose his job. The present being the first offence is also an irrelevant
consideration. Though the delay has some relevance, but as in cases of the
present nature, investigation itself takes time and then the trial is
prolonged, because of the type of evidence to be adduced and number of
the witnesses to be examined, we do not think that the fact of delay of          G
about five years could have been a ground to award the sentence of
imprisonment till rising of the court, which really makes a mockery of the
whole exercise. We, however, think that the delay does require some
reduction from the minimum prescribed; and on the facts of this case, ends
of justice would be met, according to us, if at this length of time, pursuant    H
    300                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to notice of enhancement issued by this Court, a sentence of imprisonment
    for six months is awarded.

          8. In the result, while dismissing the appeal, the sentence is enhanced
    to imprisonment for six months. The appellant shall surrender to serve out
    the sentence; if he would not do so, appropriate steps would be taken as
B   permitted by law to incarcerate him.

    T.N.A.                                                    Appeal dismissed.