A.S.V. NARAYANAN RAOversusRATNAMALA & ANOTHER
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 614
- Decided
- 13 September 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- H L GOKHALE
Holding
The alleged negligence did not amount to gross negligence under Section 304A IPC, so the criminal proceedings must be quashed.
Summary
The appellant, a cardiologist, was charged under Section 304A IPC for the death of a patient after an unsuccessful angioplasty and subsequent bypass surgery. The police investigation concluded there was no evidence, but the magistrate proceeded with the case, and the High Court refused to quash the proceedings, citing alleged lapses such as performing angioplasty without a standby surgical unit and without consulting a cardio‑anesthesiologist. The appellant challenged the prosecution, arguing that the negligence, if any, was not gross and that medical opinions indicated the doctors had acted to the best of their ability. The Supreme Court, relying on the guidelines from Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, held that criminal liability requires gross negligence, which was absent here, and that the High Court had ignored a crucial medical statement that the time gap was not a factor in the death. Consequently, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings and set aside the High Court’s order. No costs were awarded.
Issues considered
- Whether the doctor's conduct constitutes gross negligence sufficient to attract criminal liability under Section 304A IPC.
- Whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in view of the lack of prima facie evidence and the guidelines laid down in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab.
- Whether the High Court erred in disregarding the medical opinion that the time gap between angioplasty failure and surgery was not a causal factor in the death.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 10 S.C.R. 117
A.S.V. NARAYANAN RAO A
v.
RATNAMALA & ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 1433 of 2013)
SEPTEMBER 13, 2013
8
[H.L. GOKHALE AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s . .482 - Criminal
proceedings u/s. 304A /PC for medical negligence -
Quashing of - Denied by courts below - Held: The C
proceedings are liable to be quashed - Though doctors are
not immune from criminal proceedings for their professional
negligence, but in the interest of the society they are required
to be protected from frivolous and unjust prosecution - In the
facts of the case, case u/s. 304A not made out against the D
accused doctor - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304A.
Criminal proceedings were initiated against the
appellant (a medical practitioner) uls. 304A IPC at the
behest of respondent No.1, who was the wife of E
appellant's patient who lost his life during treatment.
Though the police· after its investigation of the case,
submitted its report stating that it was a case of no
evidence, but the Magistrate took cognizance of the
offence. The appellant approached the High Court
seeking quashing of the proceedings, but the High Court F
declined to quash the proceedings. Hence the present
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1. Though doctors are not immune from legal
proceedings in the event of their negligence in
discharging their professional duties, in the interest of the
117 H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A society, it is necessary to protect doctors from frivolous
and unjust prosecution. [Para 11) [122-A-B]
2. From the final report submitted by the police in the
instant case, it can be gathered that the records
8 pertaining to the treatment given to the deceased were
forwarded to the State Medical Council and also the
Medical Council of India which opined that the "doctors
seem to have made an attempt to do their best as per
records". However, the High Court thought it fit to
C continue the prosecution of the appellant for two reasons
(1) that the appellant chose to conduct the angioplasty
without having a surgical standby unit and such failure
resulted in delay of 5 hours in conducting by-pass after
the angioplasty failed; and (2) that the appellant did not
consult a Cardio Anesthesian before conducting an
D angioplasty. According to the High Court, both the
above-mentioned 'lapses' on the part of the appellant
"clearly show the negligence" of the appellant. The High
Court reached such conclusion on the basis of evidence
of a doctor, given before the State Consumer Redressal
E Commission in the consumer dispute initiated by the
respondent-wife of the deceased against the appellant
and others. But the High Court failed to take into account
another part of the same statemenYwhereby the doctor
stated that the time gap between (he angioplasty failure
F and the surgery was not the factor for the death of the
patient and that the time gap may or may not be a factor
for the enhancement of the risk. This is most crucial in
the context of criminal prosecution of the appellant.
Therefore, the prosecution of the appellant is uncalled for.
G [Paras 12 to 16] [123-A-E; 124-8-D]
Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab and Anr. (2005) 6
sec 1: 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 307 - relied on.
H
A.S.V. NARAYANAN RAO v. RATNAMALA 119
Case Law Reference: A
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 307 relied on Para 16
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1433 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 28.10.2010 of the High B
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No.
6506 of 2007.
P.S. Narasimha, M. Srinivas R. Rao, Sudha Gupta for the
Appellant.
c
Mahabir Singh, Nikhil Jain, C.S.N. Mohan Rao, G.N.
Reddy, Debojit, M. Bala Shivudu, D. Mahesh Babu for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
CHELAMESWAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of an order dated 28th October
2010 in Criminal Petition No.6506 of 2007 of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh.
3. The aforementioned criminal petition was filed praying E
that the proceedings initiated against the appellant herein in
C.C. No.600 of 2006 on the file of the XIV Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad for the offence punishable
under section 304A IPC be quashed. The said petition along
with another similar petition by one of the co-accused was F
heard and disposed of by a common order (order in appeal).
4. While the petition filed by the appellant herein was
dismissed by the High Court, the other petition of the co-
accused was allowed.
G
5. The appellant is a cardiologist. The husband of the first
respondent (one Divakar) approached the appellant herein,
complaining of a pain in the chest on 22.04.2002. Divakar was
admitted in the hospital where the appellant was working and
H
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A kept in the Intensive Care \.)nit (ICU). Thereafter, the appellant
informed the first respondent that Divakar had suffered a mild
heart attack. On 23.04.2002, an angiogram was conducted
which showed three blocks in the vessels carrying blood to the
heart. On 25.04.2002 at 9.30 a.m., the appellant unsuccessfully
B attempted to perform an angioplasty on Divakar. Around 1.30
in the afternoon, the appellant informed the first respondent that
the angioplasty failed as the blocks were calcified. Same day
at around 3.30 p.m., by-pass surgery was conducted on Divakar
in the same hospital. Subsequently, various complications
c developed and eventually Divakar died on 09.05.2002.
6. On 14.05.2002, the first respondent lodged a complaint
against the appellant and others under section 304A IPC which
came to be registered as FIR No.416 of 2002.
7. The police on investigation submitted a final report on
D 02.02.2005 treating the case to be one of lack of evidence. The
respondent filed objections before the Metropolitan Magistrate
to the final report and prayed the Magistrate to take cognizance
of the offence. The learned Magistrate by his order dated
11.12.2006 came to the prima facie conclusion that there exists
E material to try the accused for the offence punishable under
section 304A IPC. Challenging the said order the appellant
approached the High Court by way of Criminal Petition No.6506
of 2007.
F 8. By judgment under appeal, the High Court opined that
the material on record "clearly shows negligence on the part of
A 1"1 and declined to quash the proceedings.
1. The sworn statement of Dr. P.V.N. Rao also discloses that A1 without
consulting the. Anestheist and without a surgical stand conducted
G Angioplasty, which should be done by the Surgeon, as the surgeon was
out of station which fact he came to know through the Anesthetist. The
operation was delayed by 5 hours due to want of surgeon who has to come
from New Delhi, which clearly shows the negligence on the part of A1.
Further as the patient was a chronic smoker he should be prepared before
undertaking Angioplasty and the Cardiac Anesthesian should be consulted
for fitness of the patient before conducting the same.
A.S.V. NARAYANAN RAO v. RATNAMALA 121
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
9. Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel appearing A
for the appellant submitted that the High Court clearly erred in
dismissing the petition of the appellant herein. Learned senior
counsel argued that the law laid down by this Court in Jacob
Mathew Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1 has
completely been ignored by both the learned Magistrate and B
·the High Court in deciding to proceed with the case against
the appellant herein. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
first respondent submitted that the conduct of the appellant in
undertaking the angioplasty without having a standby surgical
unit is clearly in violation of the established practice of the c
medical profession and therefore a clear case of negligence
warranting punishment of the appellant.
10. This Court in the case of Jacob Mathew (supra)
considered exhaustively the various aspects of negligence on
the part of a doctor and laid down inter alia; D
"48 ..... (5) The jurisprudential concept of negligence
differs in civil and criminal law. What may be negligence
in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal
law. For negligence to amount to an offence, the element E
of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount
to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should
be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high degree.
Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree
may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot F
form the basis for prosecution.
(6) The word "gross" has not been used in Section 304-
A /PC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or
recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high
degree as to be "gross". The expression "rash or G
negligent act'' as occurring in Section 304-A /PC has to
The entire record adduced does not indicate as to whether A1 assessd
the condition of the patient on consulation of the cardio Anasthesian and
obtained the fitness certificate for going Angioplasty on the patient. H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A be read as qualified by the word "grossly"."
11. This Court further opined that though doctors are not
immune from legal proceedings in the event of their negligence
in discharging their professional duties, in the interest of the
8 society, it is necessary to protect doctors from frivolous and
unjust prosecution. It was further pointed out the need to frame
either statutory rules or administrative instructions incorporating
guidelines for prosecuting doctors on charges of criminal
negligence. This Court therefore, ordered that until such
C guidelines are laid down, the following procedure is required
to be followed:-
"52. . .. we propose to lay down certain guidelines for the
future which should govern the prosecution of doctors for
offences of which criminal rashness or criminal
D negligence is an ingredient. A private complaint may not
be entertained unless the complainant has produced
prima facie evidence before the court in the form of a
credible opinion given by another competent doctor to
support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part
E of the accused doctor. The investigating officer should,
before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or
negligent act or omission, obtain an independent and
competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in
government service, qualified in that branch of medical
F practice who can normally be expected to give an
impartial and unbiased opinion applying the Bo/am test
to the facts collected in the investigation. A doctor
accused of rashness or negligence, may not be arrested
in a routine manner (simply because a charge has been
levelled against him). Unless his arrest is necessary for
G
furthering the investigation or for collecting evidence or
unless the investigating officer feels satisfied that the
doctor proceeded against would not make himself
available to face the prosecution unless arrested, the
arrest may be withheld."
H
A.S.V. NARAYANAN RAO v. RATNAMALA 123
[J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
12. From the final report submitted by the police in the A
instant case, it can be gatherc)d that the records pertaining to
the treatment given to the deceased were forwarded to the
Andhra Pradesh Medical Council and also the Medical Council
of India which opined that the "doctors seem to have made an
attempt to do their best as per records". B
13. However, the High Court tflought it fit to continue the
prosecution of ~he appellant for two reasons (1) that the ·
appellant chose to conduct the angioplasty without having a
surgical standby unit and such failure resulted in delay of 5 hours C
in conducting by-pass after the angioplasty failed; and (2) that
the appellant did not consult a Cardio Anesthesian before
conducting an angioplasty. According to the High Court, both
the above-mentioned 'lapses' on the part of the appellant
"clearly show the negligence" of the appellant.
D-
14. The basis for such conclusion though not apparent from
the judgment, we are told by the l1earned counsel for the first
respondent, .is to be found in the evidence of Dr. Surajit Dan
given before the A.P. State Consumer Redressal Commission
in C.D. No. 38 of 2004. It may also be mentioned here that apart E
from initiating criminal proceedings against the appellant and
others, the first respondent also raist~d a consumer dispute
against the appellant and others. It is in the said proceedings,
the above-mentioned Dr. Dan's evidence was recorded
wherein. Dr. Dan in his cross-examination stated as follows:- F
" ... Whenever Cardiologist performs an angioplasty, he
requests for the surgical team to b1e ready as standby. I
was not put on standby in the instant case .... "
He further stated; G
• ... The failure of angioplasty put the heart in a
compromised position of poor coronary perfusion that
increases the risk of the emergency surgery after that. In
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 10 S.C.R.
A a planned coronary surgery, the risk is less than in an
emergency surgery .... "
However, the same doctor also stated;
" .... The time gap between 'tbe angioplasty failure and the
B surgery is not THE FACTOR for the death of the patient.
The time gap may· or may not be a factor for the
enhancement of the,· risk."
15. Unfortunately, the last of the above extracted
c statements of Dr. Surajit Dan is not taken into account by the
High Court which statement according to us is most crucial in
the context of criminal prosecution of the appellant.
16. The High Court unfortunately overlooked this factor.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that the prosecution of the
D appellant is uncalled for as pointed out by this Court in Jacob
Mathew case (supra) that the negligence, if any, on the part of
the appellant cannot be said to be "gross". We, therefore, set
aside the judgment under appeal and also the proceedings of
the trial court dated 11.12.2006.
E
17. The appeal is allowed, however, there shall be no order
as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.
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