Holding

The appeal is dismissed as the case is not fit for exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and the multiplier applied by the High Court stands.

Summary

The respondent, a 38‑year‑old carpenter with six dependents, was permanently disabled after being hit by a bus owned by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation on 26 January 1995. He claimed damages under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act; the tribunal awarded Rs 85,000 and the High Court enhanced the award by Rs 162,800, applying a multiplier of 15 from the Second Schedule. The corporation appealed, contending that a multiplier of 12 was appropriate and that the Supreme Court should not entertain the appeal under Article 136. The Court examined the effect of Section 163A, the relevance of the multiplier, and the scope of discretionary jurisdiction, concluding that the case was not fit for exercise of Article 136 and that no general rule altering the multiplier could be laid down. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, leaving the High Court's award in place.

Issues considered

The appropriate multiplier to be applied under Section 166 and the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act in a permanent disability case.
Whether the Supreme Court can entertain the appeal under its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The effect of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act on the computation of compensation.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 163A, s. 166, s. 63A
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923s. 2(1)

Subjects

Motor Vehicles ActCompensationMultiplierPermanent disabilitySection 166Article 136Discretionary jurisdictionSecond ScheduleWorkmen's Compensation Act

Judgment

(
f.-

A.P.S.R.T.C. REP. BY ITS CHIEF LAW OFFICER A
v.
M. PENTAIAH CHARY

AUGUST 30, 2007

(S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.) B
;--

Motor Vehicles Act:

ss./63A and 166; Second Schedule-Motor accident-Permanent
disability-Assessment of compensation-PersOIJ aged 38 years met wi(h C
accident-Became permanently disabled and lost earning capacity-
Compensation awarded by High Court-Plea for interference by Supreme
Court-Held: Minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should
be consideredfrom sufferings ofdisability undergone by the victim-Case not
fit and proper for Supreme Court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under D
Art. 136 of the Constitution-Workmen Compensation Act, 1923-s.2(1)-
Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 136.

s. I 66-Compensation-Determining factors-Laid down.

Respondent, aged 38 years, working as carpenter in a company on a _E _
monthly salary of Rs.4,500/-, met with an accident with the bus belonging to
appellant-Corporation while he was riding on a two-wheeler. He suffered
serious multiple injuries on various parts of his body and consequently
became permanently disabled and lost his earning capacity. Respondent had
six dependants viz. his parents, wife and three children. He filed application
under s.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming damages. Tribunal awarded F
a sum of Rs.85000/- with interest at the rate of 12% p.a.. On appeal, High
Court enhanced the compensation by RS.1,62,800/- after applying a multiplier
of 15.

In appeal to this Court, it was contended by the appellant-corporation
that the correct multiplier applicable in this case is 12 and not 15 as appli~ G
by the High Court.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

607 H
'
~.

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R

A HELD: 1.1. The accident took place on 26.01.1995. A few months prior
thereto, the Parliament inserted Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act by
Act 54of1994 with effect from 14.li.1994. The said provision contains a
non-obstante clause in terms whereof inter a/ia the owner of the motor vehicle
is made liable to pay, in the case of death or permanent disablement,
B compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule appended to the Act.
(Para 911612-D, E)

1.2. "Total Disablement" has been defined in Section 2(1) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to mean "such disablement, whether
of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work
C which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in
such disablement". {Para 10) (612-E, F)

1.3. Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act evidently stands on a different
footing. The extent of compensation payable thereunder may vary from case
to case. Various other factors including contributory negligence, earning
D capacity, extent of negligence on the part of one vehicle or the other, are
relevant factors for computation of damages. Loss of property can also be
subject matter of the claim petition. [Para ll) (612-F, G)

General Manager, Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation,
Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas (Mrs) and Ors., (1994) 2 SCC 176; Dr. K.G.
E Poovaiah v. General Manager/ Managing Director Karnataka State Road
Transpprt Corporation, [2001) 9 SCC 167'and U.P. State Road Transport
Corpn. v. Krishna Bala and Ors., [2006) 6 SCC 249, referred to.

2.1. One fails to visualise that in a case of this nature a claimant can be
deprived of a reasonable amount of compensation despite the fact that he has
F permanently lost his capacity to earn and remains dependant on others besides
physical sufferance of such magnitude. (Para 13) {613-E)
. .
2.2. This Court does not, however, intend to lay down a general law. The
minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should be considered
G from the sufferings of disability undergone by the victim. This Court is not
suggesting that in certain situations, the multiplier specified in the Second
Schedule to the Act cannot and should not be altered but therefor there must·
exist strong circumstances. [Para 14) (613-F)

Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,
H Baroda, (2004] 5 sec 385, relied on.
f--
A.P.S.RT.C. v. MPENTAIAHCHARY [S.B.SINHA,J.] 609
3. The present case is not a fit and proper case where discretionary A
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution should be exercised.
(Para 16) [614-B)

CIVIL APPE~LATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3988 of2007.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 29.08.2006 of the High Court B
of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal Against Order No.

·- 528 of2000 and C.M.A. No. 3350of1999.

A. Vinayagam and S.Udaya Kumar Sagar for the Appellant.

Naveen R. Nath for the Respondent. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. l. Leave granted.

2. Whether jn the facts and circumstances of this case multiplier of' 15' D
ought to have been applied by the High Court in its impugned judgment falls
for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a common judgment and
~rder dated 29.08.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra
Pradesh in Appeal against Order No. 528 of2000 and C.M.A. No. 3350of1999,

3. Before embarking upon the said question, we may notice the basic E
fact of the matter which is not in dispute. Claimant was aged about 38 years
on the date of accident which took place on 26.01.1995. He was a carpenter
working in a company. His monthly salary was said to be Rs. 4500/-. He had
15 years of experience in woodcrafts. His parents, wife, two daughters and
one son were dependant on him. On the night of 25.0l.1995, he was coming
back to his house. When he was riding on a two-wheeler, he met with the F
accident having been hit by a bus belonging to the appellant -corporation.
He was thrown on the road and dragged to a distance of IO to 15 yards. He
suffered serious multiple injuries, viz., fracture of left hand (humour); fracture
of left eight ribs; rupture of spleen; loss of skin and rupture of left hand;
injury to haemolhorex; injury to spinal cord, injury to nerve of contracting to G
spleen; blunt injury to left forehead; injury to thoracic lumber; blunt injury
~ -1- to thigh; rupture of left calf muscle, bruises all over the body; closed brain
injury with blackouts. He underwent an operation. A steel rod was inserted
in his fractured hand. lie became permanently disabled and lost his earning
capacity. -
H
--\

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 9 S.C.R.

A He filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for
short "the Act") claiming, a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- as damages. The,Tribunal
awarded a sum of Rs. 85,000/- with interest at 12% p.a.

4. Respondent preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court by
reason of the impugned judgment granted further compensation to him for a
B sum of Rs. l ,62,800/- in addition to the awarded compensation of
Rs. 85,000/-.

5. Applicatien of the multiplier in a structural form was provided in the
Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act. Benefit of applying
such structural formula was considered by this Court in General Manager,
C Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas
(Mrs) and Ors., [1994) 2 SCC 176] wherein this Court opined:

"14. The considerations generally relevant in the selection of
multiplicand and multiplier were adverted to by Lord Diplock in his
speech in Mallett's case where the deceased was aged 25 and left
D
behind his widow of about the same age and three minor children. On
the question of selection of multiplicand Lord Diplock observed:

"The starting point in any estimate of the amount of the "dependency"
is the annual value of the material benefits provided for the dependants
out of the earnings of the deceased at the date of his dea~h. But...there
E
are many factors which might have led to variations up or down in
the future. His earnings might have increased and with them the
amount provided by him for his dependants. They might have
diminished with a recession in trade or he might have had spells of
unemployment. As his children grew up and became independent the
F proportion of his earnings spent on his dependants would have been
likely to fall. But in considering the effect to be given in the award
of damages to possible variations in the dependency there are two
factors to be borne in mind. The first is that the more remote in the
future is the anticipated change the less confidence there can be in
the chance of its occurring and the smaller the allowance to be made
G for it in the assessment. The second is that as a matter of the arithmetic
of the calculation of present value, the later the change takes place
the less will be its effect upon the total award of damages. Thus at
{titerest rates of 4 1/2 per.cent the present value of an annuity for 20
years of which the first ten years are at Pounds 100 per annum and
H the second ten years at Pounds 200 per annum, is about 12 years'
A.P.S.R.T.C. v. MPENTAIAHCHARY [S.B.SINHA,J.] 611

purchase of the arithmetical average annuity of Pounds 150 per annum, .A
whereas if the first ten years are at Pounds 200 per annum and the
second ten years at Pounds 100 per annum the present issue is about
14 years' purchase of the arithmetical mean of Pounds 150 per annum.
If therefore the chances of variations in the "dependency" are to be
reflected in the multiplicand of which the years' purchase is the
multiplier, variations in the dependency which are not expected to take B
place until after ten years should have only a relatively small effect
in increasing or diminishing the "dependency" used for the purpose
of assessing the damages."

6. Placing strong reliance upon the observations made therein, the C
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant - corporation would
submit that the correct multiplier which should have been applied in this case
was '12'.

Reliance was also placed on Dr. K.G. Poovaiah v. General Manager/
Managing Director Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, [200 I) 9 D
SCC 167 wherein this Court opined:

"5 ... However, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss
of earning capacity is very much on the lower side. The injury to the
right hand, which has left a permanent disability and which has
affected the functioning of the limb and in particular the fingers, is a E
serious handicap to a medical practitioner. Patients would be reluctant
to go to him for treatment and, therefore, the loss of earning capacity
would be substantial. Even if we were to assume that it would reduce
his earning capacity by 50% and even if we go by his earnings at the
date of the accident, the monthly loss would come to Rs. 1500 i.e. Rs.
18,000 per annum. If this monthly loss of earning is multiplied by IO F
years purchase factor the compensation would work out to Rs. 1,80,000.
To that must be added the compensation allowed under certain other
heads, namely, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, medical expenses,
etc. The total amount comes to Rs. 2,38,000."

7. Reliance has also been placed on U.P. State Road Transport Corpn.
G
v. Krishna Bala and Ors., [2006] 6 SCC 249 wherein it was held:

"13. In Susamma Thomas case it was noted that the normal rate of
interest was about 10% and accordingly the multiplier was worked
out. As. the interest ratP. is on the decline, the multiplier has to H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 9 S.C.R.

A consequentially be raised. Therefore, instead of 16 the multiplier of 18
as was adopted in Trilok Chandra appears to be appropriate. In fact
in Trilok Chandra case, after reference to Second Schedtiie'to the Act,
it was noticed that the same suffers from many defects. It was pointed
out that the same is to serve as a guide, but cannot be said to be
invariable ready reckoner. However, the appropriate highest multiplier
B was held to be 18. The highest multiplier has to be for the age group
of 21 years to 25 years when an ordinary fodian citiZen starts
independently earning and the lowest would be in respect of a person
in the age group of 60 to 70, which is the nonnal retirement age. (See:
New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Charlie)"
c 8. As against this,. the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent would submit that this is not a fit case where this Court should
exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and in particular having regard to a
recent decision of this Court in Deepal Girishbhai So,;i and Ors. v. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda, (2004] 5 ,sec 385: AIR (2004) SC 2107.
D
9. We have noticed hereinbefore that the accident took place on
26.0l.1995. A few months prior thereto, the Parliament inserted Section
163-A of the Act by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994. The said
provision contains a non-obstante clause in tenns whereof inter a/ia the
owner of the motor vehicle is made liable to pay, in the case of death or
E pennanent disablement, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule
appended to the Act.

I 0. "Total Disablement" has been defined in Section 2(1) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to mean "such disablement," whether of
F a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work
which he was capable of perfmming at the time of the accident resulting in
such disablement".

11. Section 166 of the Act evidently stands on a different footing. The
extent of compensation payable thereunder may vary from case to case.
G Various other factors including contributory negligence, earning capacity,
extent of negligence on the part of one ve~icle or the other, are relevant
factors for computation of damages. Loss of property can also be subject
matter of the claim petition.

12. In D(!epal Girishbhai Soni (supra), this Court observed:
H
A.P.S.RT.C.v.M.PENTAIAHCHARY[S.B.SINHA,J.] 613

"Section I63A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a A
section of the people whose annual income is not more thaP Rs.
40,000/- having regard to the fact that in terms of Section l63A of the
Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto; compensation
is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the
age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant B
therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final
settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns
contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is
not interim in nature. The note appended to column l which deals with
fatal acddents makes the position furthermore clear stating that from
the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to reduced in C
consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred
towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the
other heads of compensation as contained in columns 2 to 6 thereof
leaves no manner of doubt that the Parliament intended to lay a
comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate
compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount D
of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for l'roving
that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the
driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a
motor vehicle."

13. We, therefore, fail to visualise that in a case of this nature a claimant
E
can be deprived of a reasonable amount of compensation despite the fact that
he has permanently lost his capacity to earn and remain dependant on other
besides physical sufferance of such magnitude as to why the multiplier
suggested by the Parliament should not be accepted.
F
14. We do not, however, intend to lay down a general law. We wish to
point out that minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should
be considered from the sufferings of disability undergone by the victim. We
are not suggesting that in certain situations, the multiplier specified in the
Second Schedule cannot and should not be altered but therefor there must
exist strong circumstances. In the year 1995, the rate of interest was lower G
than the rate of interest taken into consideration in Susamma Thomas (supra).
Application of multiplicative factor should also be considered from that angle.

Susamma Thomas (supra) or the other decisions relied upon by the
learned counsel, do not lay down any law in absolute terms.
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 9 S.C.R.

A 15. In Krishna Bala (supra), the Division Bench considered that the
amount of compensation will have to be determined having regard to the fact
as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable
economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. Rate of
interest, therefore, was a relevant.factor.

B 16. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, we are of the opinion that it
is not a fit and proper case where we should exercise our discretionary
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal
C which is dismissed accordingly. Appellant shall bear the costs of the
respondents. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.

B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.