A.K. SINGHANIAversusGUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO. LTD. & ANR.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 701
- Decided
- 17 October 2013
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- C K PRASAD
Holding
A director cannot be prosecuted under Section 138/141 unless the complaint expressly aver that he was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of the offence.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined complaints filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. and its directors, including A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash, for dishonour of cheques. The key issue was whether the complaints specifically alleged that the directors were "in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company" as required by Section 141 of the Act to attract vicarious liability. The Court found that the complaints did not contain such averments for the two directors and therefore they could not be prosecuted under the Act. As a result, the High Court’s order quashing the prosecution of Vikram Prakash was upheld, while the order rejecting the quash of Singhania was set aside, leading to the dismissal of the complainant’s appeal and the quashing of the prosecutions. The judgment reiterates that explicit pleading of a director’s responsibility is essential for liability under Sections 138 and 141.
Issues considered
- Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act must specifically aver that a director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of the offence as required by Section 141.
- Whether the High Court was correct in quashing the prosecution of Vikram Prakash and in rejecting the petition to quash the prosecution of A.K. Singhania.
- Whether vicarious liability of directors can be inferred without explicit averments in the complaint.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 9 S.C.R. 1069
A.K. SINGHANIA A
v.
GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER CO. LTD. & ANR.
{Criminal Appeal Nos. 1692-1718 of 2013 etc.)
OCTOBER 17, 2013
B
[CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.]
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881:
c
s. 141 rlw s. 138 - Complaint against a company, its
Chairman, Managing Directors and Directors - Petitions· by
two directors seeking to quash the proceedings against them
- Held: In case of offence by company for dishonour of
cheque, culpability of Directors has to be decided with 0
reference to s. 141 -- To bring the Directors within the mischief
of s. 138, it shall be necessary to allege that at the relevant
time they were in charge of and responsible to the conduct of
business of the Company -- It is necessary ingredient to
proceed against such Directors -- In the instant case, the E
averments in the complaints nowhere suggest that the two
Directors concerned were incharge and responsible for
conduct of business of the company at the time when the
offence was committed - Thus, the necessary averment in the
complaints is Jacking - Therefore, prosecution of two Directors F
concerned cannot be allowed to continue and their
prosecution in all the cases, is quashed.
Respondent no. 1 in Crl. A. No. 1726-1732 of 2013
and the appellant in Crl. A. No. 1692-1718 of 2013 were
arraigned as accused Nos. 7 and 9, respectively in G
Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996 filed against accused
Nos. 1 to 13 alleging commission of offence u/s 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Several other
similar complaints were also filed by Gujarat State
1069 H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A Fertilizer Company against Esslon Synthetics Ltd., its
Chairman, Managing Directors and other Directors
including the said accused Nos. 7 and 9. The Magistrate
took cognizance of the offence and issued process to the
accused persons. Accused Nos. 7 and 9 in Complaint
B Case No. 331 of 1996 filed petitions u/s 482 Cr.P.C. before
the High Court seeking to quash the proceedings against
them. The High Court allowed the petitions of accused
No. 7, but rejected those of accused No. 9.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1 In the case of offence by company for
dishonour of cheque, culpability of the Directors has to
be decided with reference to s. 141 of the Act. To bring
the Directors within the mischief of s. 138 of the Act, it shall
D be necessary to allege that at the time the offence was
committed, they were in charge of and responsible to the
conduct of the business of the Company. It is necessary
ingredient which would be sufficient to proceed against
such Directors. If reading of the complaint shows and
E substance of accusation discloses necessary averments,
that would be sufficient to proceed against such of the
Directors and no particular form is necessary. However,
it may not be necessary to allege and prove that, in fact,
such of the Directors have any specific role in respect of
F the transaction leading to issuance of cheque. Section
141 of the Act makes the Directors in charge and
responsible to Company "for the conduct of the
business of the Company" within the mischief of s. 138
of the Act and not particular business for which the
G cheque was issued. [para 17-18] [1078-F; 1080-A-D]
S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, 2005 (3)
Suppl. SCR 371 = (2005) 8 SCC 89; National Small
Industries Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal 2010 (2) SCR
805 = (2010) 3 SCC 330; Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata
H
A.K. SINGHANIA v. GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER 1071
CO. LTD.
Koley, 2011 (2) SCR 670 = (2011) 3 sec 351; N. A
Rangachari v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., 2007 (5) SCR 329
=(2007) 5 SCC 108; and K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10
sec 48 - relied on.
1.2 On facts, according to the complainant itself, it B
was accused Nos. 1 to 5 who were taking decisions; and
the allegation was that in taking the decisions they used
to consult accused nos. 7 and 9 also. From the
allegations made in the complaint, it cannot be inferred
that there is any averment that these two accused were C
in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company at the time the offence was
committed. Therefore, there is no essential averment in
the complaints. In this view of the matter, prosecution of
accused nos. 7 and 9 cannot be allowed to continue.
Accordingly, the order of the High Court quashing the D
prosecution of the accused No. 7 is not fit to be interfered
with. For the same reason the order passed by the High
Court declining the prayer of accused no.9 for quashing
of the prosecution cannot be sustained, and, as such, is
set aside. [para 15, 16 and 22] [1077-E-H; 1078-A; 1082- E
E-F]
Case Law Reference:
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 371 relied on para 19
F
2010 (2) SCR 805 relied on para 20
2011 (2) SCR 670 relied on para 21
2007 (5) SCR 329 relied on para 21
2009 (1 O) sec 48 relied on para 21 G
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1692-1718 of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.02.2012 of the H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Crl. Misc. Nos. 1566,
1567, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1571 and 1572 of 2012.
WITH
Crl. A. Nos. 1719-1725, 1726-1732 & 1733-1759 of 2013.
B
Ranjit Kumar, Kavita Wadia, Shashank Tripathi, Khaitan
& Co. for the Appellant.
Jayant Bhushan, Ashok Kr. Shrivastava, Nitish Massey,
C Sanjeev K. Kapoor (for Khaitan & Co.), Shubhada Deshpande
(for Hemantika Wahi), Kunal Verma, Vijeta Ohri, Arpita Seth
for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. 'In all these
special leave petitions common question of law and facts arise
and, therefore, they have been heard together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Leave granted.
E
3. In all these cases we are concerned with accused A.K.
Singhania and Vikram Prakash. Several complaints were filed
by Gujarat State Fertilizer Company against Esslon Synthetics
Ltd., its Chairman, Managing Director and other Directors
F including aforesaid A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash
alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.
4. In Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996 the allegations
G which are relevant for the decision of these appeals read as
follows:
"3. The accused No. 14 is a Limited Company
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and are doing
business of chemicals, synthetics etc. The accused No. 1
H is Managing Director of accused company No. 14 and
A.K. SINGHANIA v. GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER 1073
CO. LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
accused No. 2 is Deputy Managing Director, accused No. A
3 is Chairman, accused No. 4 is Whole Time Director,
accused No. 5 is Finance Director, accused No. 6 to 12
are the Directors and the accused No. 13 was Senior
Manager (Finance) of the accused company No. 14
Esslon Synthetics Ltd. B
4. All the business and financial affairs of the
accused company No. 14 are decided, organized,
administered by accused No. 1 being Managing Director
and accused No. 2 being Deputy Managing Director, C
accused No. 3 Chairman, accused No. 4 Whole Time
Director, accused No. 5 Finance Director with consultation
of other Directors from accused Nos. 6 to 12 and accused
No. 13 was Sr. Manager (Finance) of accused company
No. 14. So accused Nos. 1 to 12 and accused No. 13 are
also responsible for all the transactions and business D
affairs done on behalf of accused Company No. 14 and
are responsible for all the financial affairs and
administration of accused Company No. 14."
5. A.K. Singhania is the accused No. 7 and Vikram E
Prakash is accused No. 9 in this complaint.
6. In Complaint Case No. 1293 of 1996, the allegations
~ with which we are concerned in these appeals read as follows:
"4. All the business and financial affairs of the accused F
company No. 1 are decided, organized, administered by
the accused No. 2 being Managing Director and accused
No. 3 being Managing Director, accused No. 4 Chairman,
accused No. 5 Whole Time Director, accused No. 6
Finance Director with consultation of other Directors from G
accused Nos. 7 to 13 and accused No. 14 was Sr.
Manager (Finance) of accused No. 1. At the time the
offence was committed, they were incharge of and were
responsible to the company for the conduct of the business
of the accused company. Therefore, they are responsible H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A for day to day affairs and all the transactions and business
done on behalf of the accused Company No. 1 and they
are also responsible for all the financial affairs and
administration of accused company No. 1."
7. A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash have been arrayed
8
as accused Nos. 8 and 10 in this complaint and in all other
complaints, the allegations against A.K. Singhania are identical
to what have been alleged in the Complaint Case No. 331 of
1996.
C 8. Taking into account the allegations made in the
respective complaints, the learned Magistrate took cognizance
of the offence, issued process to the accused aforesaid
besides other accused to face trial for commission of the
offence under Section 138 of the Act.
D
9. Vikram Prakash, aggrieved by the order issuing
summons to face trial under Section 138 of the Act in different
complaints, filed applications under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order taking cognizance
E and issuing process. The applications filed by said Vikram
Prakash were registered as Criminal Miscellaneous
Application Nos. 13393-13399 of 2007. The High Court by its
common order dated January 20, 2012 allowed all the
applications and quashed his prosecution. While doing so, the
F High Court held as follows:
"7 ............. It is to be noted that as such there are
general allegations and averments against the applicant
in the complaints, however there are no specific allegations
and averments in the complaint against the applicant with
G respect to transaction for which the cheques were issued
by the accused no. 14 company. Under the circumstance,
on the ground that applicant was non Executive Director
of the Company on the board of the company, which is not
disputed by the complainant, the applicant cannot be
H prosecuted for the offence under Sections 138 r/w 141 of
AK. SINGHANIA v. GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER 1075
CO. LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
the Negotiable Instruments Act and cannot be held A
vicariously liable for the offence alleged to have been
committed by the accused no. 14 company. Under the
circumstance, this Court is of opinion that this is a fit case
to exercise the powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and to quash and set aside the 8
impugned complaint/criminal case qua applicant-original
accused no. 9 ...... "
10. It is this common order which has been assailed by
the Gujarat State Fertilizer Company Ltd. in the special leave
petitions filed by it. C
11. AK. Singhania also, aggrieved by the order issuing
process under Section 138 of the Act, filed separate
applications for quashing the entire prosecution including the
aforesaid order under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal D
Procedure. All the applications filed by A.K. Singhania were
taken together by the High Court for consideration and by the
impugned order the applications filed by him have been
dismissed. While doing so, the High Court observed as follows:
"9. As the paragraphs of the complaint reproduced E
in earlier part of decision specifically para 4 and
subsequent paragraphs would reveal that the applicant in
the capacity of Director was responsible for business
affairs and he was in-charge of the Company. Not only that
but nowhere· it can be said that the applicant was non- F
Executive Director and even if it is so the said argument
is in realm of defence to be decided by Court trying the
case under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Since sufficient
averments attracting of Section 138 of Negotiable
Instrument Act are the foundation of the complaint and it G
is further averred that cheques were issued with
mischievous, dishonest intention, knowingly and willingly to
cheat the complainant company. Arguments canvassed by
learned advocate for the applicant do not require any
further deliberation in exercise of powers under Section H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A 482 of the Code since quashing the complaint would not
secure end of justice but would result into miscarriage of
justice ........... "
12. AK. Singhania, aggrieved by the aforesaid common
order, has preferred these special leave petitions.
B
13. Leave granted.
14. We have heard Mr.Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior
Counsel on behalf of the accused A.K. Singhania and
C Mr.Ashok Kr. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of
Vikram Prakash whereas the complainant, Gujarat State
Fertilizer Company Ltd. is represented by Mr. Jayant Bhushan,
learned Senior Counsel. Mr. Ranjit Kumar appearing on behalf
of the accused submits that necessary averments that at the
D time the offence was committed, the accused were in-charge
of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company have not been averred, which is sine qua non for
proceeding against the Directors of the company. He has
drawn our attention to the averments made in the complaints,
which we have reproduced in the preceding paragraphs of this
E judgment and submits that mere assertion that these accused
persons were the Directors of the company is not sufficient to
make them liable under Section 141 of the Act. Mr. Jayant
Bhushan however, submits that there is clear averment in the
complaint that these accused persons were the Directors of the
F company and, in fact, in-charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company and, hence, they were
rightly summoned to face the trial. He points out that the
judgment and order of the High Court quashing the prosecution
of accused Vikram Prakash is under challenge in this batch of
G appeals and accused AK. Singhania cannot take benefit of the
said order and the fate of both the accused shall depend upon
the decision in all these appeals. Mr. Ranjit Kumar submits that
on same set of facts when the prosecution of the accused
Vikram Prakash has been quashed, there does not seem any
H justification to decline the prayer of the accused AK. Singhania.
A.K. SINGHANIA v. GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER 1077
CO. LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
15. In view of rival submissions, we proc~ed to consider A
the exact allegations made against the accused A.K. Singhania
and accused Vikram Prakash. It is not in dispute that allegations
against both the accused in different complaints are one and
the same. In Complaint Case No. 331 of 1996, the allegation
is that "all business and financial affairs of the accused B
company are decided, organized, administered by Accused
Nos. 1 to 5". It has further been alleged that Accused Nos. 1 to
5 do so with consultation of other Directors namely, Accused
Nos. 6 to 12. In view of aforesaid, according to the complainant,
accused Nos. 1 to 13 are also responsible for all the c
transactions and business affairs, financial affairs and
administration done on behalf of the accused company. It is
relevant here to state that A.K. Singhania and Vikram Prakash
are accused Nos. 7 and 9 in this complaint. The averments
made in the complaint nowhere suggest that these two D
accused, at the time the offence was committed, were in-
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of
the company. According to the complainant itself, it was
accused Nos. 1 to 5 who were taking decisions and the
allegation that in taking the decisions they used to consult these E
accused also will not mean that these two accused were at the
time the offence was committed, were in~charge of and
responsible for the conduct of business of the company. In
complaint Case No. 1293 of 1996 and all other complaints with
which we are concerned in the present appeals the allegation
is that "all business and financial affairs of the accused F
company No.1, are decided, organized, administered by
accused Nos. 2 to 6 and in consultation of other directors i.e.
from accused Nos. 7 to 13". It has further been averred that at
the time the offence was committed "they were in-charge and
responsible to the company for the conduct of the business" G
and, therefore, "they are responsible for day to day affairs and
transaction, business and all financial affairs of the accused
company." Mr. Ranjit Kumar submits that the aforesaid
averments are not sufficient and from that it cannot be inferred
that accused A.K. Singhania and accused Vikram Prakash H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 9 S.C.R.
A have been alleged to be in-charge and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company at the time the offence
was committed. He points out that A.K. Singhania is accused
No. 8 whereas accused Vikram Prakash is accused No. 10 in
these complaints. Mr. Jayant Bhushan, however, joins issue and
B submits that the substance of the accusation clearly indicates
that the two accused were in-charge and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company at the time of the
offence.
16. We have perused the complaints and, in fact, the
C relevant portions of the allegations have been reproduced in
the foregoing paragraphs of the judgment. From that it is difficult
to infer that there is any averment that these two accused were
in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business
of the company at the time the offence was committed. The
D allegations in the complaints in sum and substance mean that
business and financial affairs of the company used to be
decided, organized and administered by accused Nos. 2 to 6
and while doing so, other Directors including the two accused
herein were consulted. The inference drawn by the complainant
E on that basis that these two accused, therefore, are in-charge
and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business,
is absolutely misconceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that essential averment in the complaints is lacking.
F 17. In case of offence by company for dishonour of cheque,
the culpability of the Directors has to be decided with reference
to Section 141 of the Act, same reads as follows:
"141. Offences by companies.-(1} If the person
committing an offence under section 138 is a company,
G every person who, at the time the offence was committed,
was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for
the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the
company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
H accordingly:
AK. SINGHANIA v. GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER 1079
CO. LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
18. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall A
render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence:
B
Provided further that where a person is nominated
as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any
office or employment in the Central Government or State
Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled
by the Central Government or the State Government, as
the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution C
under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
where any offence under this Act has been committed by
a company and it is proved that the offence has been D
committed with the consent or connivance of, or is
attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director,
manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such
director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be
deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to E
be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,-
(a) "company" means any body corporate and
includes a firm or other association of individuals; F
and
(b) "director'', in relation to a firm, means a partner
in the firm."
19. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision it is G
evident that every person who at the time the offence was
committed is in charge of and responsible to the Company shall
be deemed to be guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the
Act. In the face of it, will it be necessary to specifically state in
the complaint that the person accused was in charge of and H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company?
In our opinion, in the case of offence by Company, to bring its
Directors within the mischief of Section 138 of the Act, it shall
be necessary to allege that they were in charge of and
responsible to the conduct of the business of the Company. It
B is necessary ingredient which would be sufficient to proceed
against such Directors. However, we may add that as no
particular form is prescribed, it may not be necessary to
reproduce the words of the section. If reading of the complaint
shows and substance of accusation discloses necessary
c averments, that would be sufficient to proceed against such of
the Directors and no particular form is necessary. However, it
may not be necessary to allege and prove that, in fact, such of
the Directors have any specific role in respect of the transaction
leading to issuance of cheque. Section 141 of the Act makes
the Directors in charge and responsible to Company "for the
0
conduct of the business of the Company" within the mischief
of Section 138 of the Act and not particular business for which
the cheque was issued. We cannot read more than what has
been mandated in Section 141 of the Act.
E 20. A large number of authorities of this Court have been
cited by the counsel representing the party to bring home their
point. We deem it inexpedient to refer to all of them. Suffice it
to say that this question has been answered eloquently by a
three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of S.M.S.
F Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, in
the following words:
"19. In view of the above discussion, our answers to the
questions posed in the reference are as under:
G (a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under
Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed,
the person accused was in-charge of, and responsible for
the conduct of business of the company. This averment is
an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be
H made in a complaint. Without this averment being made
A.K. SINGHANIA v. GUJARAT STATE FERTILIZER 1081
CO. LTD. [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be A
said to be satisfied."
21. This Court in the case of National Small Industries
Corpn. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330, after
reviewing all its earlier judgments summarized the legal position
as follows: B
"39. From the above discussion, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The primary responsibility is on the complainant
to make specific averments as are required under the law C
in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously
liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no
presumption that every Director knows about the
transaction.
(ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable D
for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened only
on those who, at the time of the commission of the offence,
were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of
the business of the company.
E
(iii) Vicarious liability can be inferred against a
company registered or incorporated under the Companies
Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements, which are
required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made
so as to make the accused therein vicariously liable for
F
offence committed by the company along with averments
in the petition containing that the accused were in charge
of and responsible for the business of the company and
by virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded
with.
G
(iv) Vicarious liability on the part of a person must
be pleaded and proved and not inferred.
(v) If the accused is a Managing Director or a Joint
Managing Director then it is not necessary to make
specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of their H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 9 S.C.R.
A position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(vi) If the accused is a Director or an officer of a
company who signed the cheques on behalf of the
company then also it is not necessary to make specific
averment in the complaint.
B
(vii) The person sought to be made liable should be
in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company at the relevant time. This has to
be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a
Director in such cases."
c
In Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley, (2011) 3
sec 351, after referring to its earlier decisions in S.M.S.
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), National Small Industries
Corpn. Ltd. (supra), N. Rangachari v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam
D Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 108 and K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009)
10 sec 48, this Court reiterated the same view.
22. We have found on fact that there is no averment that
the two accused herein were in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the time the
E offence was committed. Hence, there is no essential averment
in the complaints. In view of what we have observed above, the
prosecution of accused A.K. Singhania and accused Vikram
Prakash cannot be allowed to continue. Accordingly, the order
of the High Court quashing the prosecution of the accused
F Vikram Prakash is not fit to be interfered with. For the same
reason the order passed by the High Court declining the prayer
of A.K. Singhania for quashing of the prosecution cannot be
sustained and the appeals preferred by him deserve to be
allowed.
G 23. In the result, we dismiss the appeals preferred by the
complainant Gujarat State Fertilizers Company Ltd. and allow
the appeals preferred by A.K. Singhania and quash his
prosecution in all these cases.
H R.P. Appeals disposed of.
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