A.K ROY & ANR.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1986 INSC 205
- Decided
- 29 September 1986
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A P SEN
Holding
The delegation of power to the Food Inspector was ultra vires; s.20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 does not permit sub‑delegation, rendering the Inspector incompetent to prosecute.
Summary
The appellants, A.K. Roy and others, were charged under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 after a Food Inspector from Faridkot filed a complaint alleging adulteration of noodles. The Inspector claimed authority to prosecute based on a delegation of power from the State Government to the Food (Health) Authority under Rule 3 of the Punjab Rules, which in turn authorized the Inspector. The appellants challenged this, arguing that the rule and the subsequent notification sub‑delegated powers in violation of s.20(1) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that s.20(1) imposes a mandatory, negative requirement that prosecutions may be instituted only by the Central or State Government or a person expressly authorised by them, and that the statute does not permit further sub‑delegation. Consequently, the notification authorising the Inspector was ultra vires, rendering the Inspector incompetent to lodge the complaint. The Court set aside the lower courts' orders and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958, framed under s.24(2)(e) of the Act, is ultra vires because it conflicts with the mandatory provisions of s.20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
- Whether the Food (Health) Authority could sub‑delegate its authority under s.20(1) to a Food Inspector.
- Whether the complaint filed by the Food Inspector was validly instituted.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954s. 14, s. 14A, s. 16(1)(a)(ii), s. 20(1), s. 24(2)(e), s. 9
Subjects
Judgment
A
. A.K. ROY & ANR.
v.'
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
B
SEPTEMBER 29, 1986
[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.J.
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: ss. 20(1) and 24(2)
(e)/Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958: r. 3- c
Prosecution for an offence under the Act-Sub-delegation of power-
Validity of
Interpretation of Statutes-Use of negative words-Whether
makes the provision absolute.
D
Administrative Law
Statute-Rules framed thereUnder-Sub-delegation of power-,--
Extent of
Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 E
dealing with cognizance and trial of offences provides that no prosecu-
tion for an offence under that Act shall be instituted except by, or with
the written consent of :he Central Government or the State Government
or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by'tbe
Central or State Government. Section 24(1) empowers the State
Government to frame rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provi- F
sions of the Act, whiles. 24(2) (e) states that such rules may provide for
the delegation of the powers and functions conferred by this Act on the
State Government or the Food (Health) .Authority to subordinate or
local authorities.
Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, G
1958 framed by the State Government empowered the State Govern-
ment to delegate its powers to appoint Food Inspectors, to authorise a
person to institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act and such·
other powers exercisable by it under the Act as may be specified in the
order of the Food (Health) Authority of the State.
H
961
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) 3 S.C.R.
A In pursuance of the provisions of r. 3 of the Rules the State
Government issued a Notification dated October 10, 1968 purporting to
delegate its powers and functions conferred by s. 20(1) of the Act to
institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act, to the Food (Health)
Authority. In terms of that Notification the Food (Health) Authority
issued a Notification dated September 7, 1972 authorising the Food
8
Inspector, Faridkot to launch prosecutions under s. 20(1) for an offence
under the Act.
On February 1, 1985 the Food Inspector, Faridkot filed a comp-
laint against the appellants for having committed an offence punishable
u'nder s. 16(1) (a) (ii) of the Act for alleged violation ofrr. 24, 28, 29 and
c 32 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955.
During the course of the proceedings, the appellants raised an
objection that r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab)
Rules, 1958 framed under s. 24(2) (e) read with s. 20(1) of the Act was
ultra vires the State Government. Alternatively it was urged that by
D virtue of the authilrity derived under r.3 the Food (Health) Authority
alone had the power to institute prosecution for an offence under the
Act and, therefore, he could not sub-delegate his powers to launch the
prosecution to the Food Inspector by the Notification dated September
7, 1972. This preliminary objection was rejected by the Magistrate and
he proceeded to frame charges against the appellants. They thereupon
E moved the High Court under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 for quashing of the aforesaid order taking cognizance of the
offence and consequent fr~ming of the charge, but the High Court
dismissed the petition in limine. ·
On the question whether the Food Inspector, Faridkot was com-
F petent to lodge a complaint against the appellants under s. 20(1) of the
Act by virtue of the delegation of powers by the Food (Health) Author-
ity, Punjab under the Notification dated September 7, 1972 issued by
him under r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules,
1958.
G Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court,
HELD 1. The notification dated September 7, 1972 issued by the
Food (Health) Authority is ultra vires the Food (Health) Authority
insofar as he purported to delegate his powers to institute prosecutions
for an offence under the Act under s. 20(1) to the Food Inspector,
H
A.K. ROY v. STATE OF PUNJAB 963
A
Faridkot. The latter was, therefore, not competent to lodge the com-
plaint against the appellants. [9728-C J
2.1 Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way
the thing most be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of
performance are necessarily forbidden. The intention of the Legislature B
in enacting s. 20( 1) was to confer power on the authority specified
therein, which power had to be exercised in the manner provided and
not otherwise. [970E-F]
2.2 The use of the negative words in s. 20( 1) that 'no prosecution
for an offence under this Act ••. shall be instituted except by, or with
the written consent of' plainly make the requirements of the section
c
imperative. 'Qtey inhibit institution of prosecutions for an offence under
the Act except where it is done by the Central. Government or the State
Government or a person authorised in that behalf by the Central
/
Government or the State Government, or where the prosecution is
instituted with the written consent of any of the four specified categories D
of authorities or persons. If either of these two conditions is satisfied;
there would be sufficient authority for the institution of such a prosecu-
tion for an offence under the Act. [970C; 969G-H; 970A-B[
Craies on Statute Law, 6th edu., p. 263 referred to.
E
3. The use of the expression 'in this behalf' in s. 20(1) shows that
the delegation of such power by the Central Government or the State
Government by general or special order most be for a specific purpose,
to authorise a designated person to institute such prosecutions on their
behalf. The terms of the section do not postulate further delegation of
powers by the person authorised. He can only give his consent in writ- F
ing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a
particular case and records his reasons for the launching of such pro-
secution in public interest. [966E; 97IA-B]
4. L Rules fra!Ded pursuant to a power conferred by a statute
cannot proceed or go against the specific provisions of the statute. The G
maxim de/egatus non potest delegare merely indicates that sub-
delegation of powers is not normally allowable but the Legislature can
always provide for it. The provision contained ins. 24(2) (e) of the Act
enables the State Government to frame a rule for delegation of powers
and functions under the Act but it clearly does not envisage any sub-
delegation. [97ICD] H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) 3 S.C.R.
A 4.2. Rule 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab)
Rules, 1958 must, therefore, he read subject to the provisions contained
in s. 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It cannot
be con~trued to authorise sub-delegation of powers by the Food (Health)
Authority, Punjab to the Food Inspector. So construed, it means that in
the instant case, the Food (Health) Authority was the person authorised
B by the State Government to initiate prosecutions. [971G-H; 972A)
4.3 It was open to the State Government to have issued a notifica-
tion under s. 20(1) conferring authority on the Food Inspector to launch
prosecutions for an offence under the Act, as is the practice in other
States. The Food Inspector having been authorised by the Director of
c Health Service and not the State Government, he was not a person who
had been authorised by any general or special order issued by the
Central Government or the State Governments. [969G-H)
\. State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal, [1961) I SCR 458 &
The Corporation of Calcutta v. Md. Omer Ali & Anr., [1976) 4 SCC
D 527 referred to.
CRIMJNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 400 of 1986
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.1986 of the Punjab )'
E and Haryana High Court in Crl. Misc. Petn. No. 202-M/86.
Dr. Y.S. Chitale, Ra.,,inder Narain, D.N. Misra and P .K. Ram
for the Appellants. ·
H.K. Puri and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN, J. This appeal by special leave directed against the judg-
ment and order of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dated February
12, 1986 raises a question of some importance. The question is whether
G the Food Inspector, Faridkot was competent to lodge a complaint
against the appellants under s. 20( 1) of the Act for commission of an
offence punishable under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) of the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short 'the Act') by virtue of the delegation
of powers by the Food (Health) Authority, Punjab under notification
dated September 7, 1972 purported to have been issued by him under
H r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958.
•
A.K. ROYv. STATE OF PUNJAB (SEN, l.I 965
Put very shortly, the essential facts are these. Appellant No. 2, A
Messrs Food Specialities Limited is a company incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 engaged in the business of manufacturing and
selling various well-known articles of food including New Maggi 2
minute noodles with sweet sour taste-maker while appellant No. 1
A.K. Roy is the Manager, Quality Controllor of the Company. On B
December 14, 1984 at about 3.30 p.m. the Food lnspector, Faridkot
purchased a sample of New Maggi Noodles from the shop of a general
·merchant for purposes of analysis. The Public Analyst by his report
dated January 17, 1985 opined that the said article of food contains
carmosine and sunset yellow acid coal tar dye instead of caramel as
v described on the label and was therefore both adulterated as well as
misbranded. He further opined that the label of the article of food did c
not comply with the requirements of rr. 24 and 32 of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 regarding. the addition of extraneous
colouring matter. On February 1, 1985 the Food Inspector, Faridkot
filed a complaint against the general merchant as well as the appellants
for having committed an offence punishable under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) of D
the Act for alleged violation of rr. 24, 28, 29 and 32 of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 by virtue of the delegation of powers
by the Food (Health) Authority under notification dated October 10,
1968 purported to have been issued by him under r. 3 of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958.
E
During. the course of the proceedings, the appellants raised an
objection inter a/ia that r. 3 of the Rules framed by the State Govern-
ment in purported exercise of powers under s. 24(2) read withs. 20(1)
of the Act, was ultra vires the State Government and alternatively by
virtue of the authority derived under r. 3 of the said Rules, the Food
(Health) Authority alone had the power to initiate pro8ecutions for an F
offence under the Act and therefore he could not legally by the im-
pugned notification sub-delegate his powers to launch the prosecutions
to the Food Inspector. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate
by his order dated December 4, 1985 rejected the preliminary objec-
tion ·raised as to the power of the Food Inspector to launch the pro-
secution unders. 20(1) read withs. 9 of the Act, on the ground that the G
State Government having delegated its powers to the Food (Health)
Authority by framing r.3 under s. 24(2)(e) of the Act, the Food
(Health) Authority was competent to issue the impugned notification
and therefore the complaint was validly lodged. The learned Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate further proceeded to frame charges
against the appellants for having committed an offence punishable H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986) 3 S.C.R.
A under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) of the Act. Thereafter, the appellants moved the
High Court by petition under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 1973 for quashing the impugned order passed by the learned
Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of the' offence
and the consequent framing of the charge by him. High Court did not
go into the question and dismissed the petition in limine.
B
It is argued on behalf of the appellants that as a matter of
construction the first part of s. 20(1) of the Act makes it clear that a
prosecution for offences under the Act not being an offence under s.
14 ors. 14A, can be instituted only by one of the following authorities,
namely : (i) the Central Government or the State Government, or
c (ii) with the written consent of the Central Government or the State
Government, or (iii) a person authorised in this behalf by a general or
special order by the Central Government or the State Government, or
(iv) with the written consent of a person so authorised. It is urged that
the opening words of s. 20(1) 'No prosecution for an offence under this
Act ...... shall be instituted except by' being of a negative character,
D the requirements of the section are imperative and that a discretionary
power must, in general, by exercised by the authority to which it has
been committed. Emphasis is placed on the words 'in this behalf in the
second part of s. 20( 1) of the Act for the submission that the delega-
tion of powers to launch a prosecution by the Central Government or
the State Government, by general or special order, must be for a
E specific purpose in that behalf viz. to authorise the institution of pro-
secutions under the Act. It was accordingly submitted that r. 3 of the
Punjab Rules enables the Food (Health) AuthoritY to sub-delegate his
power 'to authorise the launching of a prosecution for an offence
under the Act' to the Food Inspector, was ultra vires the State Govern-
ment and could not be sustained on the terms of s. 24(2) (e) i.e. the
F general power of the State Government under s. 24(2) (e) of delega-
tion of its powers and functions under the Act.
In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that r.
3 is in the nature of a general order in terms of s. 20(1) of the Act and
therefore the State Government has not only delegated its powers 'to
G launch a prosecution for an offence under the Act' under s. 20(1) to
the Food (Health) Authority i.e. the Director of Health Services,
Punjab but also under the said rule provision has been made for
further sub-delegation of his power to authorise the launching of
prosecutions under s. 20(1) to the Food Inspectors.
H In order to appreciate the contentions it is necessary to refer to
A.K. ROYv. STAIB OF PUNJAB {SEN,J.] 967
'
~- the relevant provisions. Sub-s. (1) of s. 20 of the Act which is material A
for our purposes, provides as follows:
"20(1). Cognizance and trial of offences-No prosecutio.n
for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under
section 14 or section 14A shall be instituted except by, or
with the written consent of the Central Government or the B
;.,.- State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by
, general or special order, by the Central Government or the
'\ State Government."
Y Sub-s. (1) of s. 24 of the Act empowers the State Government to frame
-' rules after consultation with the Committee and subject to the condi- c
tion of previous publication, for the purpose of giving effect to the
provisions of the Act not falling within the purview of s. 23. Sub-s. (2)
·"( thereof provides that in particular and without prejudice to the gene-
rality of the foregoing power, the State Government may make rules
for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of ti)e Act in matters
not falling within the purview of s. 23. S. 24(2) (e) of the Act provides: D
/
"24(2). In particular, and without prejudice to the gene-
rality of the foregoing power, such rules may-
(e) provide for the delegation of the powers and func-
tions conferred by this Act on the State Government or · E
the Food (Health) Authority to subordinate authorities
or to local authorities."
In exercise of the powers under s. 24(2) (e) of the Act, the Punjab ·
Government framed the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab)
Rules, 1958. R. 3 of the Rules reads as under: F
"Rule 3-Power of Food (Health) Authority-The State
Government may, by an. order in writing delegate its
powers to appoint Food Inspectors, to authorise a person
to institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act and
such other powers exercisable by it under th~ Act as may be· G
specified in the order of the Food (Health) Authority of the
State of Punjab"
lo accordance with r. 3, the State Government issued a noti-·
fication dated October 10, 1968 purporting to delegate its powers and
functions conferred bys. 20(1) of the Act viz. to initiate prosecutions
968 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A for an offence under the Act, to the Food (Health) Authority, to the
effect:
"In pursuance of the provisions of rule 3 of the Prevention
of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958, the President
of India is pleased to delegate to the Food (Health)
B
Authority its powers of appointment of Food Inspectors
and to authorise institution of prosecution for an offence
under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954."
In terms of the aforesaid notification, the Food (Health) Authority
issued a notification dated September 7, 1972 authorising the Food ·y
c Inspector, Faridkot to launch prosecution under s. 20(1) for an offence \
under the Act, in these terms: .'
"No. F IV-I-Pb-72/7518- 2(i)
·"''}.
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 9 of
D
the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act No. 37
of 1954) read with Rule 8 of the Prevention of Food Adul-
teration Rules, 1955 and the powers delegated vide Punjab
Government Notification No. 5575-HBIL-68/29659 dated
10th October, 1968, Shri Jagrup Singh is hereby appointed
as Government Food Inspector for all the local areas in the
E
District, in which the official is posted as Government
Food Inspector.
In exercise of powers conferred by Section 20 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act No. 37 of
1954) read with Punjab Government Notification No. 5575-
2HBI 1/68/29659 dated 10th October, 1968 the Director,
F
Health Services, Punjab also authorises the above men-
tioned Food Inspector to institute prosecution against the
persons committing offences under the said Act within the
limits of his local areas."
In this appeal, two main questions arise, namely: (i) Whether r.
G
3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab) Rules, 1958 framed
under s. 24(2) (e) of the Act being contrary to the legislative manf!!lte
contained ins. 20(1) of the Act, was ultra vires the State Government
and therefore the impugned notification issued by the State Govern-
ment dated October 10, 1968 purporting to delegate its powers under
H s. 20(1) to the Food (Health) Authority viz. to authorise the institution
A.K. ROYv. STAIB OF PUNJAB [SEN,J.] 969
A
of prosecu.tions for an offence under the Act, was liable to be struck
down. Consequently, whether the impugned notification dated Sep-
tember 7, 1972 issued by the Food (Health) Authority authorising the
Food Inspector, Faridkot to institute such prosecu.tions was illegal,
bad in law and void ab initio. (ii) Even if r. 3 of the said Rules could be
regarded as a general order issued by the State Government in terms · B
of s. 20(1) of the Act authorising the Food (Health)· Authority to
launch prosecutions for an offence under the Act by the framing of a
rule under s. 24(2) (e) of the Act, whether the Food (Health) Autho-
rity by the impugned notification dated September 7, 1972 could , in
his turn, sub-delegate his powers to the Food Inspector, Faridkot. The
ultimate question is whether the terms of s. 20(1) of the Act do not
postulate further delegation by the person authorised to institute pro- c
secutions for an offence under the Act; he can only give his written
consent to such prosecution.
It is common ground that the prosecution in the instant case has
not been launched either by or with the written consent of the Central D
Government or the State Government. It therefore becomes necessary
to ascertain whether the Food Inspector, Faridkot was duly authorised ·
to launch a prosecution. The Food Inspector had been conferred
powers of the State Government under s. 20(1) of the Act viz. to
initiate prosecutions for an offence under the Act, by the Food
(Health) Authority i.e. the Director of Health Services. A mere E
perusal of the impugned notification dated September 7, 1972 makes it
manifest that it was the Director of Health Services and not the State
Government who had authorised the Food Inspector to launch pro-
secutions for an offence under the Act. It is therefore clear that the
Food Inspector is not a person who has been authorised by any general
or special order issued by the Central Government or the State F
Government. There would be no problem if the State Government
were to issue a notification under s. 20(1) of the Act conferring autho-
rity on the Food Inspector, Faridkot under s. 20(1) to launch prose-
cutions for an offence under the Act as is the practice in the other
States.
G
A careful analysis of the language of s. 20(1J° of the Act clearly
shows that it inhibits institution of prosecu.tions for an offence under
the Act except on fulfilment of one or the other or the two conditions.
Either the prosecutions must be instituted by the Central Government
or the State Government or a person authorised in that behalf by the
Central Government or the State Government, or the prosecutions H
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11986] 3 S.C.R.
A should be instituted with the written consent of any of the four
specified categories of authorities or persons. If either of these two
conditions is satisfied, there would be sufficient authority for the
institution of such a prosecution for an offence under the Act. The
provision contained in s. 20(1) of the Act does not contemplate the
B institution of a prosecution by any person other than those designated.
The terms of s. 20 (1) do not envisage further delegation of powers by
the person authorised, except that such prosecution may be instituted
with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Gov-
ernment or the person authorised. The use of the negative words in s.
20(1) "No prosecution for an offence under this Act ...... shall be
instituted except by or with the written consent of" plainly make the
c requirements of the section imperative. That conclusion of ours must
necessarily follow from the well-known rule of construction of infer-
ence to be drawn from the negative language used in a statute stated by
Craies Qn Statute Law, 6th edn., p. 263 in his own terse language:
o· "If the requirements of a statute which prescribe the man-
ner in which something is to be done are expressed in nega-
tive language, that is "to say, if the statute enacts that it shall
be done in such a manner and in no other manner, it has
been laid down that those requirements are in all cases
absolute, and that neglect to attend to them will invalidate
E the whole proceeding."
Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing
must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance
are necessarily forbidden. The intention of the Legislature in enacting
s. 20(1) was to confer a power on the authorities specified therein
F which power had to be exercised in the manner provided and not
otherwise.
The first part of s. 20(1) of the Act lays down the manner of
launching prosecutions for an offence under the Act, not being an
offence under s. 14 ors. 14A. The second part provides for delegation
G of powers by the Central Government or the State Government. It
enables that prosecutions for an offence under the Act can also be
instituted with the written consent of the Central Government or the
State Government or by a person authorised in that behalf, by a
general or special order issued by the Central Government or the State
Government. The use of the words 'in this behalf' ins. 20(1) of the Act
1-1 shows that the delegation of such power by the Central Government or
A.K. ROYv. STATE OF PUNJAB ISEN,J.] 971
the State Government by general or special order must be for a specific A
purpose, to authorise a designated person to institute such prosecu-
tions 0 n their behalf. The terms of s. 20(1) of the Act do not postulate
further delegation by the person so authorised; he can only give his
consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in
the facts of a particular case and records his reasons for the launching B
of such prosecution in the public interest.
In the case of statutory powers the important question is whether
on a true construction of the Act, it is intended that a power conferred
upon A may be exercised on A's authority by B. The maxim delegati.ts
non potest de/egare merely indicates that this is not normally allowable
but the Legislature can always provide for sub-delegation of powers. c
The provision contained in ss. 24(2) (e) enables the State Government
to frame a rule for delegation of powers and functions under the Act
but it clearly does not envisage.any sub-delegation. That apart, a rule
framed under s. 24(2) (e) can only provide for deiegation of minor
administrative functions e.g. appointment of Food Inspectors, Food D
(Health) Authority etF. In the case of important executive functions
like the one contained ins. 20(1) of the Act to authorise launching of
prosecutions for an offence under the Act which is in the nature of a
safeguard, the Courts may be disposed to construe general powers of
delegation restrictively. Keeping in view the language of s. 20(1) and
24(2) (e) of the Act, r. 3 of the Punjab Rules can be treated to be a E
general order issued by the State Government to authorise the Food
(Health) Authority i.e. the Director of Health Services to institute
prosecutions for an offence under the Act. Unfortunately, the
draftsmen of r. 3 more or less employed the language of s. 20( 1) of the
·Act. If r. 3 were to be literally interpreted, the words "to authorise the
launching of prosecutions" may lead to the consequence that the Food
F
(Health) Authority who had been delegated the power of the St~te
Government under s. 20(1) of the Act could, in his tum, sub-delegate .
his powers to the Food Inspector. Such a consequence is not envisaged
bys. 20(1) of the Act. It is well-settled that rules framed pursuant to a
power conferred by a statute cannot proceed or go against the specific
provisions of the. statute. It must therefore follow as a logical conse-
G
quence· that r. 3 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Punjab)
Rules,. 1958 must be read subject to the provisions contained in s.
20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 anrl cannot be
construed to authorise sub-delegation of powers by the Food (Health)
Authority ;Punjab to the Food Inspector, Faridkot. If so construed, as
it must, it would mean that the Food (Health) Authority was the H
.~
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 3 S.C.R.
A person authorised by the State Government to initiate prosecutions. It
was also permissible for the Food (Health) Authority being the person
authorised under s. 20(1) of the Act to give his written consent for the
. institution of such prosecutions by the Food Inspector, Faridkot as laid
down by this Court in State of Bombay v. Parshottam Kanaiyalal,
[1961] 1SCR458 and The Corporation of Calcutta v. Md. Omer Ali &
B Anr., I 1976] 4 sec 527.
In !He premises, the impugned notification dated September·?,
1972 issued by the Food (Health) Authority must be declared as ultra
vires the Food (Health) Authority insofar as the purported to delegate
his powers to institute prosecutions for an offence under the Act under
C s. 20(1) to the Food Inspector, Faridkot. It must accordingly follow
that °the Food Inspector, Faridkot was not competent to lodge the
complaint against the appellants for having committed an offence
punishable under s. 16(1) (a) (ii) read withs. 9 of the Prevention of ~·
Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
D In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed. The judg-
ment and order passed by the High Court and that of the Sub-
Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Moga are set aside.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.
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