A.K. GHOSH & COMPANY AND OTHERSversusBIMAN BOSE AND OTHERS

                     [2026] 8 S.C.R. 185 : 2026 INSC 684

                     A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others
                                    v.
                           Biman Bose and Others
                      (Civil Appeal No(s). 8814-8815 of 2026)
                                      13 July 2026
              [Sanjay Kumar* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]


                                Issue for Consideration
           Does the mandatory time frame prescribed by the proviso to Or.VIII
           r.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to the filing of a
           written statement by the plaintiff to a counter-claim raised by the
           defendant in a suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

                                       Headnotes†
           Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Code of Civil Procedure,
           1908 – Or.VIII, r.1, r.6E – Mandatory time frame – Written
           statement to counter-claim – By order dated 19.08.2024 in GA
           (COM) No.4 of 2024 in CS (COM) No.440 of 2024, a Judge of
           the Calcutta High Court held that the appellants herein, viz.,
           the plaintiffs in the suit, CS (COM) No.440 of 2024, were not
           entitled to file their written statement to the counter-claim of
           the respondents, viz., defendant Nos.1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 in the
           said suit, after expiry of the period of 120 days and dismissed
           their application for leave to do so – Correctness:
           Held: A plaintiff in a commercial suit, governed by the CC Act,
           is bound by the mandate of the proviso to Or.VIII r.1 CPC, as
           applicable to a commercial suit, and must file a written statement
           to a counter-claim by a defendant therein, ordinarily within 30
           days from the date of service of summons or receipt of the
           counter-claim, and in the event a plaintiff fails to file such a
           written statement within that time but offers sufficient cause for
           the delay, the Court may extend the time to do so, for reasons to
           be recorded in writing and upon payment of appropriate costs, but
           not beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons upon
           the plaintiff/receipt of the counter-claim by the plaintiff. [Para 33]

           Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – s.13 (1A) – Code of Civil
           Procedure, 1908 – Or.XLIII – Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
           1996 – The Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held
* Author
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       that the appellants herein, viz., the plaintiffs in the suit, CS
       (COM) No.440 of 2024, were not entitled to file their written
       statement to the counter-claim of the respondents, after
       expiry of the period of 120 days – Assailing the said order,
       the appellants filed an appeal in AO-COM/35/2024 before a
       Division Bench (Commercial Division) of the Calcutta High
       Court – However, the appeal was dismissed on the ground
       of maintainability as well as on its merits, vide order dated
       26.02.2025 – Whether the appeal filed before the Division
       Bench of the High Court was maintainable:
       Held: In the light of the statutory scheme and the decisions of
       this Court, it is clear that an appeal would lie u/s.13(1A) only if
       the order sought to be appealed against finds mention either
       in Or.XLIII CPC or s.37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
       1996 – As an order passed under Or.VIII CPC is not appealable
       u/Or.XLIII CPC, the question of the plaintiffs maintaining an
       appeal against the order of the Judge denying them leave to file
       a belated written statement to the counter-claim raised by the
       contesting defendants does not arise – Thus, the Division Bench
       committed no error in holding that the appeal, apart from being
       devoid of merit, was not even maintainable. [Para 37]

                               Case Law Cited
       SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar
       Infrastructure Private Limited and others [2019] 3 SCR 1050 :
       (2019) 12 SCC 210; Nasima Naqi v. Todi Tea Company Limited
       and Others [2019] 17 SCR 1048 : (2023) 17 SCC 641; BGS SGS
       SOMA JV v. NHPC Limited [2019] 17 SCR 742 : (2020) 4 SCC
       234; Kandla Export Corporation and Another v. OCI Corporation
       and Another [2018] 1 SCR 915 : (2018) 14 SCC 715 – referred to.
       Nirottam Sharma v. Ramkishore and Another, SB Civil WP
       No.18024 of 2016, decided on 07.02.2018; CSCO LLC and
       Another v. Lakshmi Saraswathi Spintex Limited and Others Appl.
       No.4791 of 2021 in CS No. 697 of 2017 decided 28.01.2022;
       Indcon Boiler Ltd. v. Maeda Corporation India and Others, CM
       (M) 767/2019 & CM Appl. 23274/2019 on 17.09.2019; Nasima
       Naqi v. Todi Tea Company Limited and Athers (2019) 1 Cal LT
       305 : (2019) 2 Cal LJ 232; Dattaram Krishnanath Pednekar
       and Others v. Pandurang K. Pednekar and Others, 2010 (7)
       Mh.L.J.386; Mrs. Shalini Nunes Mascarenhas v. Mr. Trevor
       Nunes, 2009 (2) Goa LR 222 – referred to.
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                          187

     A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


                                List of Acts
      Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Civil Procedure, 1908; Code of Civil
      Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976; Arbitration and Conciliation
      Act, 1996; ‘The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
      Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015.

                             List of Keywords
      Written Statement; Counter-claim; Order VIII Rule 6A to 6G,
      CPC; Condonation of Delay; Speedy Disposal; Order XLIII CPC;
      Maintainability.

                            Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s).
      8814-8815 of 2026
      From the Judgment and Order dated 19.08.2024 and 26.02.2025
      of the High Court of Calcutta in GA-COM No. 4 of 2024 and
      AO-COM No. 35 of 2024 respectively.

                         Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant(s):
      Jaidip Gupta, Sr. Adv., Soumitra Ghose Chaudhuri, Soumya Dutta,
      Suryanu Sengupta, Riddhi Bose, Ms. Racheeta Chawla, Ms. Rishi
      Agarwal, Siddhant Upmanyu, Ms. Sampriti Baksi, Raibat Sinha,
      Sourabh Tandon, Sourav Mukherjee.
      Advs. for the Respondent(s):
      Rauf Rahim, Sr. Adv., Indranil Ghosh, Palzer Moktan, Ms. Aanchal
      Tikmani, Mujadid Gilani, Ali Asghar Rahim, Mohsin Rahim,
      Ms. Tania Tamannah.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

      Sanjay Kumar, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    ‘Does the mandatory time frame prescribed by the proviso to Order VIII
      Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, apply to the filing of
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        a written statement by the plaintiff to a counter-claim raised by the
        defendant in a suit governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 20151?’
3.      This is the question that presently beseeches decision.
4.      By order dated 19.08.2024 in GA (COM) No. 4 of 2024 in CS (COM)
        No. 440 of 2024, a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court held
        that the appellants herein, viz., the plaintiffs in the suit, CS (COM)
        No. 440 of 2024, were not entitled to file their written statement to
        the counter-claim of the respondents, viz., defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3,
        5 and 6 in the said suit, after expiry of the period of 120 days and
        dismissed their application for leave to do so. Assailing the said order,
        the appellants filed an appeal in AO-COM/35/2024 before a Division
        Bench (Commercial Division) of the Calcutta High Court. However,
        the appeal was dismissed on the ground of maintainability as well
        as on its merits, vide order dated 26.02.2025. In consequence, the
        appeals on hand.
5.      On 23.05.2025, this Court stayed further proceedings in the suit on
        the file of the Calcutta High Court.
6.      Parties shall be referred to hereinafter as arrayed in the suit.
7.      The plaintiffs supplied printing paper to the defendants from time to
        time. Disputes having arisen as to payment therefor, the plaintiffs
        got issued legal notice dated 16.06.2021, claiming that a sum
        of ₹74,65,527/- was payable to them with interest thereon. The
        defendants denied the claim by way of letter dated 28.06.2021. The
        plaintiffs, thereupon, filed a recovery suit in CS No. 274 of 2022,
        which was later renumbered as CS (COM) No. 440 of 2024 on the
        file of the Calcutta High Court. Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6,
        viz., the contesting defendants, filed their written statement in the
        said suit and raised a counter-claim. Copies of the written statement
        and counter-claim were served upon the Advocate-on-Record for
        the plaintiffs, under letter dated 18.07.2023.
8.      However, it was only on 15.03.2024, i.e., after the expiry of 238
        days, that the plaintiffs filed an application before the learned Judge
        seeking leave to file their written statement to the said counter-claim.
        The learned Judge dismissed the application, vide order dated


1    For short, ‘the CC Act’
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                           189

     A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


      19.08.2024. Therein, the learned Judge noted that, though Order VIII
      Rule 6A(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), permitted
      a plaintiff to file a written statement to a defendant’s counter-claim
      within such time as may be fixed by the Court, no such time had
      been fixed in the case on hand. However, as Order VIII Rule 6G CPC
      extended all the rules applicable to the filing of a written statement
      by a defendant to the filing of a written statement in answer to a
      counter-claim, the learned Judge held that the plaintiffs could not
      wriggle out of the time frame fixed under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC,
      as applicable to a commercial suit. He also noted that Order VIII
      Rule 10 CPC visited an embargo upon the Court from receiving a
      belated written statement. Reference was also made to Rule 12A of
      the Original Side Rules of the High Court, which requires a plaintiff
      to file a written statement to a defendant’s counter-claim within 10
      days from the date of receipt of the notice of the filing thereof or
      such further time as may be allowed. The learned Judge, accordingly,
      held that the plaintiffs’ written statement to the counter-claim was
      beyond time and dismissed their application.
9.    In appeal, the Division Bench noted that the provisions of the CC Act
      were stringent with regard to filing of pleadings and, more particularly,
      a written statement. It was observed that the plaint along with a writ
      of summons is served upon a defendant in a suit and, upon such
      service, the obligation of that defendant to file a written statement
      arises and, similarly, for a reply to a counter-claim which, in effect,
      partakes the character of a written statement, upon service of an
      authenticated copy of a written statement raising a counter-claim.
      Per the Bench, the period of 120 days is to be calculated from the
      date of service of such authenticated copy of the written statement
      along with the counter-claim. The Bench noted that the existing
      Original Side Rules of the High Court were silent on the issue of
      filing of a written statement to a counter-claim and issued practice
      directions till appropriate rules were framed. In terms thereof, after
      the scrutiny of a counter-claim filed by a defendant in a suit, the
      Registry is required to serve notice of such counter-claim along
      with a copy thereof on the plaintiff in the said suit or his Advocate-
      on-Record within 7 days. Time for filing a written statement by the
      plaintiff to the counter-claim was directed to be reckoned from the
      date on which the notice along with a copy of the counter-claim is
      served by the Registry on the plaintiff or his Advocate, as the case
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        may be. Applying these standards, the Bench found no merit in the
        plaintiffs’ appeal. On the maintainability of the appeal, the Bench
        noted that an appeal is a creature of a statute and the CC Act, being
        a special statute, was a self-contained code dealing with the specified
        kinds of commercial disputes. Opining that the right of appeal, when
        it is provided, is a substantive right, the Bench referred to case law
        and held that the appeal by the plaintiffs was not maintainable. The
        appeal was, accordingly, dismissed on both grounds.
10.     Learned senior counsel, appearing for the plaintiffs, strenuously
        contended before us that the stipulated period of 120 days for filing of
        a written statement by a defendant cannot be applied mutatis mutandis
        to the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff to a counter-claim
        by the defendant in a commercial suit. He pointed out that, in the
        case on hand, no time frame was fixed by the learned Judge for the
        filing of the written statement when the contesting defendants raised
        their counter-claim and, in the absence of such a time frame being
        fixed under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC, he argued that the plaintiffs
        could not be penalised by denying them an opportunity to respond
        to the said counter-claim. He asserted that the legal position is well
        settled that a penal provision must be interpretated strictly against
        the interest of the party seeking to take advantage of it and if an
        alternative interpretation is permissible, a penal provision must be
        construed so as to give benefit rather than take it away.
11.     On the issue of maintainability of the appeal under Section 13(1A) of
        the CC Act, the learned senior counsel contended that the language
        of Section 13(2) thereof, which restricts the scope of the remedy
        of appeal, could not be interpreted in such a way as to hold that
        no other order would be appealable other than those provided for
        in the CC Act itself. Section 13(2), per the learned senior counsel,
        has to be construed to mean that all appeals must be in accordance
        with the provisions of the Act, notwithstanding anything contained
        to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force or in the
        Letters Patent of the High Court. In effect, his submission is that the
        provision only regulates the procedure in relation to appeals and does
        not take away the substantive right of appeal. Reliance was placed
        upon Nasima Naqi vs. Todi Tea Company Limited and others2


2     (2019) 1 Cal LT 305 : (2019) 2 Cal LJ 232
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                            191

      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


       to contend that whatever has not been included in a legislation
       must be treated as having been excluded by implication and it was
       argued that the intention is clear that the statutory prescription of
       120 days for filing a written statement applies only to a defendant
       in a commercial suit while the filing of a written statement by a
       plaintiff in such a suit to a defendant’s counter-claim is covered by
       Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC.
12.    Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting
       defendants asserted that it is not open to the plaintiffs to get over
       the statutory mandate in relation to completion of pleadings in a
       commercial suit. He contended that the amended Order VIII CPC put
       it beyond the pale of doubt that a written statement in response to
       a counter-claim in a suit governed by the CC Act also has to abide
       by the time frame fixed therein. He pointed out that Order VIII Rule
       6G CPC plainly states that the rules relating to a written statement
       by a defendant shall apply to a written statement filed in answer to
       a counter-claim. In effect, per the learned senior counsel, the time
       frame fixed under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC for the filing of a written
       statement by the defendant in such a suit would squarely apply to
       the filing of a written statement by the plaintiff to a counter-claim
       raised by the defendant in that suit.
13.    The issue, therefore, turns squarely upon interpretation of the
       provisions of Order VIII CPC. Notably, the very concept of a counter-
       claim being raised by a defendant in a suit was introduced by the
       Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976),
       with effect from 01.02.1977, by inserting Rule 6A in Order VIII CPC.
       This reduced multiplicity of proceedings by allowing a defendant in the
       suit, if he had an independent claim of his own against the plaintiff,
       to raise the same in the plaintiff’s suit itself, instead of requiring
       such defendant to institute a separate suit against such plaintiff.
       Order VIII Rule 6A(1) CPC states that a defendant in a suit may,
       in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Order VIII Rule 6
       CPC, set up against the plaintiff’s claim, by way of a counter-claim,
       any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to that
       defendant against the plaintiff, either before or after the filing of the
       suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before
       the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether
       such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not.
       The proviso thereto stipulates that such a counter-claim should not
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       exceed the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court trying the
       plaintiff’s suit. Order VIII Rule 6A(2) CPC states that such a counter-
       claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the
       Court to pronounce the final judgment in the same suit, both on the
       original claim and on the counter-claim. Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC
       provides that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement
       in answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period
       as may be fixed by the Court. Order VIII Rule 6A(4) CPC states
       that the counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed by
       the rules applicable to plaints.
14.    Thus, a counter-claim filed by a defendant in a suit is on par with
       a plaint, insofar as such defendant’s claim is concerned, and the
       reply thereto filed by the plaintiff is nothing other than his written
       statement in response thereto. Order VIII Rule 6E CPC is relevant
       in this regard. It deals with default of a plaintiff in replying to a
       counter-claim and states that, if the plaintiff makes a default in
       putting in a reply to the counter-claim made by the defendant, the
       Court may pronounce judgment against the plaintiff in relation to
       the counter-claim made against him or make such order in relation
       to the counter-claim as it thinks fit. Order VIII Rule 6G CPC is also
       of relevance. Titled ‘Rules relating to written statement to apply’, it
       states that the rules relating to a written statement by a defendant
       shall apply to a written statement filed in answer to a counter-claim.
15.    The time for the filing of a written statement by a defendant in a suit
       is prescribed by Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. Though Order VIII Rule 1
       CPC was amended by Act 104 of 1976 to an extent, the essence
       of it remained the same. It stated that the defendant in a suit shall,
       at or before the first hearing or within such time as the Court may
       permit, present a written statement of his defence. It was, thus,
       entirely within the discretion of the Court to fix the time for filing of
       a written statement by a defendant. Thereafter, on amendment of
       the provision by Act 46 of 1999, it was envisaged that the defendant
       shall, at or before the first hearing or within such time as the Court
       may permit, which shall not be beyond 30 days from the service
       of summons, present a written statement of his defence. The time
       frame was, therefore, sought to be severely curtailed by allowing a
       maximum of 30 days from the service of summons to file a written
       statement. However, the provision was not given effect to and was
       substituted by Act 22 of 2002. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                          193

      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


       of Act 22 of 2002 reflects that, after Act 46 of 1999 was brought out,
       a large number of representations were received for and against its
       enforcement. The Bar Council of India and other Bar Associations
       asked for a relook to be taken at certain provisions thereof, which
       caused hardship to litigants.
16.    The lawmakers, thereupon, made amendments to the Code
       of Civil Procedure,1908, by way of Act 22 of 2002 with effect
       from 01.07.2002. One such amendment was in relation to the
       time frame for a defendant to file a written statement. Pursuant
       thereto, Order VIII Rule 1 CPC required a defendant in a suit to
       file a written statement ordinarily within 30 days from the date of
       service of summons but the proviso thereto stated that, where the
       defendant failed to file a written statement within 30 days, he shall
       be allowed to file the same on such other day as may be specified
       by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall
       not be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons. In
       effect, a defendant normally had to file a written statement within
       30 days from the service of summons but the Court’s discretion to
       extend the time to do so, recording reasons therefor, increased to
       90 days from 30 days.
17.    While so, Order VIII Rule 1 CPC was made more stringent in suits
       relating to commercial disputes of specified value governed by the
       CC Act. Section 16 of the CC Act, read with the Schedule thereto,
       substituted the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC in the context of
       such suits. It states that where the defendant fails to file a written
       statement within 30 days from the service of summons, he may be
       allowed, for reasons to be recorded in writing and on payment of
       such costs as the Court deems fit, to file a written statement on
       such other day as may be specified by the Court, but which shall
       not be later than 120 days from the date of service of summons and
       on the expiry of 120 days from the date of service of summons, the
       defendant shall forfeit the right to file a written statement and the
       Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record.
18.    In the light of the aforestated proviso, if a defendant in a commercial
       suit fails to file a written statement within 120 days, it is not open
       to such defendant to put forth a plea, even if genuine, and seek
       to file a written statement beyond the said period. This was made
       clear by this Court in SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited vs.
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        K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and others3,
        wherein it was held that failure to file a written statement within
        the extended period of 120 days from the date of service of the
        summons on the defendant would entail forfeiture of the right to file
        a written statement and the Court cannot allow a written statement
        to be taken on record after the said date, even if the defendant was
        engaged in pursuing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
        for rejection of the plaint.
19.     The question, presently, is whether such a strict time frame would
        apply to the filing of a written statement by a plaintiff to the counter-
        claim of the defendant in a commercial suit. We may also take note
        of Order VIII Rule 9 CPC, which is titled ‘Subsequent pleadings’.
        It states that no pleading subsequent to the written statement of a
        defendant other than by way of defence to a set-off or counter-claim
        shall be presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such
        terms as the Court thinks fit, but the Court may at any time require
        a written statement or additional written statement from any of the
        parties and fix a time for presenting the same. It may be noted that
        the words ‘or counter-claim’ were inserted in the above provision by
        Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 01.02.1977. Thereafter, by way of
        Act 46 of 1999, it was proposed to altogether omit Order VIII Rule
        9 CPC. However, in the light of the representations received, Act 22
        of 2002 was brought in, with effect from 01.07.2002, whereby the
        earlier provision remained but for the addition that the Court’s power
        and discretion to require a written statement or additional written
        statement from any of the parties was restricted, by limiting the fixing
        of time therefor to not more than 30 days. Therefore, even prior to
        the enactment of the CC Act, the endeavour of the lawmakers was
        to cut down on delays to the extent possible.
20.     Significantly, Order VIII Rule 10 CPC categorically states that if a
        party, from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or
        Rule 9 of Order VIII CPC, fails to present the same within the time
        permitted or fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court is
        entitled to pronounce judgment against him or make such order
        in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of
        such judgment, a decree shall be drawn up. The proviso thereto


3     (2019) 12 SCC 210
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      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


        has application to commercial suits governed by the CC Act and
        mandates that no Court shall extend time for filing a written statement,
        beyond the permissible limit under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC.
21.     We find that some of the High Courts have taken a rather liberal view
        on the issue of delayed filing of a written statement to a defendant’s
        counter-claim. In Nirottam Sharma vs. Ramkishore and another4,
        a learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court held that the Trial
        Court was duty bound to fix the time under Order VIII Rule 6A(3)
        CPC for a plaintiff to file a written statement to a counter-claim and
        if, within that time, the plaintiff failed to file his reply, Order VIII Rule
        6E would come into operation. As the Trial Court had not fixed such
        time in that case, the learned Judge directed it to grant further time
        to the plaintiff to file his reply to the counter-claim within such time
        as it may fix.
22.     In CSCO LLC and another vs. Lakshmi Saraswathi Spintex
        Limited and others5, a learned Judge of the Madras High Court
        had occasion to consider delay of 563 days in the filing of a written
        statement to a counter-claim. In that case, the written statement of
        the defendants was itself filed with a delay of 113 days along with
        a counter-claim. The application for condonation of that delay was
        allowed by the Trial Court and stood confirmed in appeal. The matter
        was then carried to this Court and was pending consideration. At
        that stage, the plaintiffs in the suit filed a written statement to the
        counter-claim with a delay of 563 days. The learned Judge referred
        to Nirottam Sharma (supra) and observed that, even in the case
        before him, no time had been fixed for the plaintiffs to file a written
        statement to the counter-claim and, therefore, it could not be said
        that the default lay with them. The learned Judge opined that the
        law laid down in SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited (supra)
        would not apply to a written statement to be filed by a plaintiff to
        the counter-claim made by a defendant and such cases would be
        governed only by the time fixed by the Court under Order VIII Rule
        6A(3) CPC. He, however, hastened to add that, while fixing such a
        time frame, the outer limit of 120 days fixed for a defendant must
        be kept in mind. On facts, the learned Judge observed that as the


4     SB Civil WP No. 18024 of 2016, decided on 07.02.2018
5     Appl. No. 4791 of 2021 in CS No. 697 of 2017, decided on 28.01.2022
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        matter was pending before this Court in relation to condonation of
        the delay in the filing of the written statement along with a counter-
        claim, reasonable cause had been shown by the plaintiffs for filing
        a written statement to the counter-claim with delay. The learned
        Judge, accordingly, condoned the delay.
23.     In Dattaram Krishnanath Pednekar and others vs. Pandurang
        K. Pednekar and others6, a learned Judge of the Bombay High
        Court followed the earlier decision of that Court in Mrs. Shalini
        Nunes Mascarenhas vs. Mr. Trevor Nunes7, wherein it was held
        that filing of a written statement to a counter-claim is not covered
        by Order VIII Rule 1 CPC but is governed by Order VIII Rule 6A(3)
        CPC. The learned Judge held that, in terms of the said provision,
        the Trial Court is expected to fix a time frame for the filing of a
        written statement to the counter-claim. He opined that Order VIII
        Rule 6G CPC had no bearing on Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC as it
        only refers to the contents of a written statement and had nothing
        to do with the time for filing of a written statement in answer to a
        counter-claim under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC.
24.     In Indcon Boiler Ltd. vs. Maeda Corporation India and others8, a
        learned Judge of the Delhi High Court dealt with delay in the filing of
        a written statement to a counter-claim. The learned Juge observed
        that, in the case of a counter-claim, the plaintiff may accept the
        summons in the Court itself when it is presented but the order has
        to specifically record that the counter-claim has been registered
        and the service of summons is affected and it is only then that the
        time for the plaintiff to file a written statement to the counter-claim
        begins to run. However, on facts, the learned Judge found that the
        suit had originally been instituted in the High Court and was then
        transferred to the District Court, but the counter-claim was never
        registered. At that stage, the CC Act was notified and the plaintiff
        failed to file a written statement to the counter-claim owing to the
        prevailing confusion. The learned Judge, accordingly, permitted
        the plaintiff to file a written statement to the counter-claim of the
        defendants, subject to payment of costs. This case, therefore, turned
        on its own individual facts.


6     2010 (7) Mh.L.J.386
7     2009 (2) Goa LR 222
8     CM (M) 767/2019 & CM APPL. 23274/2019, decided on 17.09.2019
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                           197

      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


25.     In Nasima Naqi (supra), a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court
        was dealing with interpretation of the provisions of a rent control
        legislation. In that context, the learned Judge observed that when
        a statute mentions only one out of more than one, it necessarily
        implies that the others are excluded for that purpose. This observation
        was made in the context of a spouse of an original tenant being
        included in the substantive provision but being excluded from the
        second proviso thereto, whereupon, the learned Judge held that
        the interpretation has perforce to be that the spouse has not been
        conferred the right recognised in the second proviso. This decision
        was affirmed by this Court in Nasima Naqi vs. Todi Tea Company
        Limited and others9 and this Court observed that the High Court
        was correct in observing that this was a case of ‘casus omissus’
        on the part of the legislature.
26.     It would be useful, at this stage, to refer to the Statement of Objects
        and Reasons of the CC Act to understand why the proviso to Order VIII
        Rule 1 CPC reads as it does in the context of a commercial suit. The
        Statement records that the proposal to provide for speedy disposal of
        high value commercial disputes had been under consideration of the
        Government for some time and that there was a need to provide for
        an independent mechanism for such early resolution. It was opined
        that early resolution of commercial disputes would create a positive
        image to the investor world about an independent and responsive
        Indian legal system. Upon the Law Commission’s recommendations,
        the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial
        Appellate Division in High Courts Ordinance, 2015, was promulgated
        on 23.10.2015. Replacing the said Ordinance, the CC Act provided for
        constitution of Commercial Courts as well as Commercial Divisions
        and Commercial Appellate Divisions in the High Courts. The CC Act
        also amended the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in its application
        to Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions and the amended
        provisions were to prevail over the existing High Courts’ Rules and
        other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, so as to improve
        efficiency and reduce delays in disposal of commercial cases.
27.     This being the objective of the entire exercise, it would be
        counterproductive to construe the provisions of Order VIII CPC


9     (2023) 17 SCC 641
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       in a manner which would contribute to further delays instead of
       cutting them down. We may note that Order VIII Rule 1 CPC in its
       application to a regular suit ordinarily requires the filing of the written
       statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons and
       it is only by way of exception that a defendant who fails to do so,
       is allowed by the proviso thereto to file a written statement within
       a further period, if sufficient cause is shown for the delay and the
       Court, upon recording reasons in writing, extends the time to do
       so, but within 90 days from the date of service of summons. The
       proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC was amended in its application
       to a commercial suit, so as to provide more time to a defendant
       therein, when compared to a regular suit, but with the caveat that
       in the event such defendant did not file a written statement within
       the extended period of 120 days, on payment of the costs imposed,
       the very right to file a written statement would stand forfeited with
       no possibility of turning the clock back. The proviso to Order VIII
       Rule 10 CPC emphasizes this by affirming that no Court shall make
       an order to extend the time provided under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC
       for filing of the written statement. Logically, similar time constraints
       have to be applied to filing of a written statement by a plaintiff in
       such a suit to a counter-claim raised by a defendant therein so as
       to maintain a strict time schedule to facilitate prompt disposal of
       such suit. Order VIII Rule 6G CPC achieves that purpose.
28.    We, therefore, do not agree with the view taken by the Bombay
       High Court that the ‘rules’ referred to in Order VIII Rule 6G CPC
       only relate to the contents of a written statement to a counter-claim
       and have nothing to do with the time limit for filing of such written
       statement. The phrasing of Order VIII Rule 6G does not allow for
       any such restriction being read into the provision. It unequivocally
       speaks of application of the rules relating to a written statement by
       a defendant to a written statement that is to be filed in answer to a
       counter-claim also. In the context of a commercial suit governed by
       the CC Act, designed for quicker resolution of commercial disputes,
       extending the strict temporal requirement relating to the filing of a
       written statement by a defendant to the filing of a written statement
       to a counter-claim is rational, as it achieves the same purpose,
       viz., speedy and timely completion of the pleadings in the suit so
       as to enable its faster disposal. Therefore, the distinction that was
       drawn between the filing of a written statement by a defendant in
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                            199

      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


       a commercial suit, in terms of the proviso under Order VIII Rule 1
       CPC, and a written statement that is to be filed by a plaintiff to such
       a defendant’s counter-claim, by subjecting it only to Order VIII Rule
       6A(3) CPC would defeat the very aim of amending the proviso to
       Order VIII Rule 1 CPC in its application to commercial suits.
29.    On the same lines, the Madras High Court had held that Order VIII
       Rule 6A(3) CPC mandates that the Court must specifically pass an
       order, while taking a counter-claim on file, for summons to be served
       on the plaintiff or if the plaintiff is represented by counsel, directing
       such counsel to accept summons on behalf of the plaintiff and fix
       the time for filing a written statement to the counter-claim. According
       to the High Court, the clock would start ticking only when the Court
       fixes the time for filing such a written statement. However, this view
       of the High Court would mean that, in the event the Court fails to fix
       such time, the plaintiff is left free to devise his own time schedule to
       file such a written statement. This, obviously, could not have been the
       intendment of the statute. As we have noted earlier, amendments to
       the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, even prior to the enactment of the
       CC Act, were directed at truncating the delays in civil proceedings so
       as to cut short the time taken for resolution of civil disputes. Order
       VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC, no doubt, enables the Court to fix the time for
       the plaintiff to file a written statement to a counter-claim, but in the
       absence of time being fixed thereunder, Rule 6G of Order VIII kicks
       in and applies the proviso to Rule 1 thereof so as to set the temporal
       outer limit, beyond which such a written statement cannot be filed.
       To interpret the provisions otherwise would render one or the other
       unworkable apart from doing violence to the aims of the CC Act.
30.    Further, the Madras High Court had also noted that the proviso to
       Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, in its application to a commercial suit under
       the CC Act, only referred to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC but not Order
       VIII Rule 9 CPC, though both find mention in Order VIII Rule 10.
       The High Court opined that, as the proviso mentioned Rule 1 and
       not Rule 9 of Order VIII CPC, the time frame fixed under Rule 9
       thereof can be extended by a Court for filing a written statement in
       appropriate cases and the total bar imposed under Rule 1 would not
       be applicable to a written statement to a set-off/counter-claim or the
       written statement/additional written statement, called for by the Court.
       This construction of the provision is also incorrect. Be it noted that
       a written statement to a set-off/counter claim does not come within
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       the ambit of the ‘subsequent pleadings’ covered by Order VIII Rule 9
       CPC, as it explicitly excepts the filing of a defence to a set-off or
       counter-claim which, in consequence, would not need the leave of
       the Court, and states to the effect that no ‘other’ pleading shall be
       filed without the leave of the Court. This, obviously, refers to filing
       of a rejoinder and sur-rejoinder by the parties, which requires prior
       leave of the Court.
31.    Rule 9 of Order VIII CPC also empowers the Court to independently
       require a written statement from a defendant, who has not filed one,
       or an additional written statement from a defendant, who has filed
       one, if the Court deems it necessary. However, this power also came
       to be controlled when Order VIII Rule 9 CPC was substituted by Act
       22 of 2002, specifically adding the maximum time frame of not more
       than 30 days when the Court itself calls for a written statement or
       additional written statement. The scheme and structure of the Code
       of Civil Procedure, 1908, as is evident from the many amendments
       that it has undergone, is aimed at simplifying processes by fixing
       time frames for necessary steps to be taken. Such time frames have
       been made tighter in the context of commercial suits governed by
       the CC Act and any interpretation to the contrary would defeat the
       very purpose of that enactment.
32.    Read together, the scheme of the provisions is that the Court may,
       in the first instance, fix a time frame for filing of a written statement
       to a counter-claim, under Order VIII Rule 6A(3) CPC. Such time
       may be extended, by way of an application at the behest of the
       plaintiff under the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC read with Rule
       6G thereof, or by the Court itself under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC.
       However, in the former case, the discretion of the Court to grant
       more time, subject to recording of reasons and payment of costs,
       would extend to a maximum of 120 days from the date of service
       of the summons/receipt of the counter-claim, but in the latter case,
       when the Court itself calls for a written statement without the party
       seeking to do so, the time to be fixed by the Court therefor is shorter,
       i.e., just 30 days, within the permissible outer limit of 120 days from
       the date of service of the summons. Order VIII Rule 10 CPC speaks
       of the consequences that would follow if these time lines are not
       abided by and honoured, in terms of pronouncement of a judgment
       followed by a decree. The proviso thereto merely puts emphasis
       on the point that the Court cannot extend the time under Rule 1 of
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                            201

      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


       Order VIII CPC beyond the permissible limit in a commercial suit
       governed by the CC Act. This, however, does not mean that the
       time frame fixed under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC stands diluted, as
       the adverse consequences that are to follow upon breach thereof
       still remain intact in Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.
33.    Viewed thus, we answer the question posed in the affirmative. A
       plaintiff in a commercial suit, governed by the CC Act, is bound by
       the mandate of the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC, as applicable
       to a commercial suit, and must file a written statement to a counter-
       claim by a defendant therein, ordinarily within 30 days from the
       date of service of summons or receipt of the counter-claim, and in
       the event a plaintiff fails to file such a written statement within that
       time but offers sufficient cause for the delay, the Court may extend
       the time to do so, for reasons to be recorded in writing and upon
       payment of appropriate costs, but not beyond 120 days from the
       date of service of summons upon the plaintiff/receipt of the counter-
       claim by the plaintiff.
34.    As regards the issue of maintainability of the appeal filed before
       the Division Bench of the High Court, we may note that Section 13
       in Chapter IV of the CC Act deals with appeals. Section 13(1)
       states that any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
       Commercial Court below the level of a District Judge may appeal
       to the Commercial Appellate Court within a period of 60 days from
       the date of the judgment or order. Section 13(1A) provides that any
       person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court
       at the level of the District Judge, exercising original civil jurisdiction
       or, as the case may be, a Commercial Division of a High Court,
       may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court
       within a similar time frame. However, the proviso to Section 13(1A)
       stipulates that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a
       Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically
       enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
       as amended by the CC Act, and Section 37 of the Arbitration and
       Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 13(2), starting with a non-obstante
       clause, emphasises this point. It states that, notwithstanding anything
       contained in any other law for the time being in force or the Letters
       Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or decree
       of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in
       accordance with the provisions of the CC Act.
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35.     Dealing with the scheme of Section 13 in BGS SGS SOMA JV vs.
        NHPC Limited10, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that
        Section 13(1) of the CC Act must be construed in accordance with
        the object sought to be achieved by the said Act and construction
        of Section 13 which would lead to further delay, instead of an
        expeditious enforcement of a foreign arbitral award must, therefore,
        be eschewed. It was further observed that there is no independent
        right of appeal created under Section 13(1) of the CC Act, which
        merely provides the forum for filing the appeal and parameters of
        Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, alone had
        to be looked at in order to determine whether the appeal in that
        case was maintainable. The Bench held that an appeal is a creature
        of statute and must be found within the four corners of the statute.
36.     In Kandla Export Corporation and another vs. OCI Corporation
        and another11, this Court considered the question as to whether an
        appeal which is not maintainable under Section 50 of the Arbitration
        and Conciliation Act, 1996, would nonetheless be maintainable under
        Section 13(1) of the CC Act. Answering this question in the negative,
        this Court held that Section 13(1) of the CC Act is in two parts - the
        main provision, which provides for an appeal from a judgment, order
        and decree of the Commercial Division of the High Court and, to this
        main provision, an exception that has been carved out by the proviso.
        We may note that, in this case, the unamended Section 13 of the
        CC Act, which was then titled ‘The Commercial Courts, Commercial
        Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015’,
        was under consideration. Section 13, as it then stood, read as under:-
                “(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the
                Commercial Court or Commercial Division of a High
                Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division
                of that High Court within a period of sixty days from the
                date of judgment or order, as the case may be:
                Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed
                by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are
                specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code
                of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this


10    (2020) 4 SCC 234
11   (2018) 14 SCC 715
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                            203

      A.K. Ghosh & Company and Others v. Biman Bose and Others


                Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
                Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).”
       As the proviso, which remains unchanged, restricted the appellate
       jurisdiction under Section 13 of the CC Act to only those orders that
       are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII CPC and Section 37
       of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Court held that
       orders that were not specifically enumerated thereunder would not
       be amenable to appeal. This Court opined that where a special Act
       sets out a self-contained code, applicability of the general law would
       be impliedly excluded.
37.    In the light of the above statutory scheme and the decisions of this
       Court referred to hereinabove, it is clear that an appeal would lie under
       Section 13(1A) only if the order sought to be appealed against finds
       mention either in Order XLIII CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration
       and Conciliation Act, 1996. As an order passed under Order VIII
       CPC is not appealable under Order XLIII CPC, the question of the
       plaintiffs maintaining an appeal against the order of the learned
       Judge denying them leave to file a belated written statement to the
       counter-claim raised by the contesting defendants does not arise.
       Thus, the Division Bench committed no error in holding that the
       appeal, apart from being devoid of merit, was not even maintainable.
38.    We, therefore, find that the learned Judge and the Division Bench
       of the High Court were fully justified in rejecting the plea of the
       plaintiffs to grant them leave to file their written statement to the
       counter-claim raised by the contesting defendants, notwithstanding
       the long delay on their part.
       The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
       Interim order dated 23.05.2025 shall stand vacated.
       Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand dismissed.
       Parties shall bear their own costs.

       Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan